KHOMEINISM: THE IMPACT OF THEOLOGY ON IRANIAN POLITICS

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05169097
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00457
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983

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Khomeinism: The Impact of
Theology on Iranian Politics (u)
A Research Paper
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NESA 83-10270
November 1983
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Directorate of
Intelligence
�Secret�
Khomeinism: The Impact of
Theology on Iranian Politics (u)
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. (u)
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
on (u)
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Summary
Information available
as of 1 October 1983
was used in this report.
Khomeinism: The Impact of
Theology on Iranian Politics (u)
Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of an Islamic state and his style of governing
have deep roots in the traditions of Shia Islam. Efforts by Shia clerics to
implement an Islamic state in Iran, however, have been encumbered by
divisions within the clerical community over government policy, levels of
clerical involvement in government, and the course Iran should follow after
Khomeini dies. The consensus of the US Intelligence Community is that
the Iranian religious leaders will remain in power over the next several
years despite these divisions. Consequently, even if Khomeini dies soon, the
domestic and foreign policies of the Iranian regime, the structure of the
government, and the focus of factional disputes will be defined by Shia
dogma and tradition. Similarly, we believe that the opportunities and
constraints facing the United States and the USSR in Iran will be
determined by the strengths of the various clerical factions and the
different political systems they propound.
Khomeini draws much of his political philosophy�in particular, his central
concept that religion and politics are inextricably united�from a long
tradition of "activist" Shia clerics. The activists have argued for deep
clerical involvement in politics to establish a "just" theocratic state. During
several brief periods in Iranian history, activist Shia clerics have estab-
lished theocracies or dominated secular Iranian rulers. The clerics who now
control Iran's Islamic Republic draw inspiration from their precursors.
Activists, however, have not been the leading force in Shia Islam for most
of the 14 centuries of its existence. Instead, Iran's religious life has been
dominated by quietist clerics who advocate indirect clerical involvement in
politics or no involvement at all. The quietists focus on their religious role
and argue for accommodation with secular authorities. They believe that
clerics should supervise the government, but they do not insist that the
actual governing power belongs to the clerics. "Grand" Ayatollahs Khoi,
Marashi-Najafi, and Shariat-Madari and many of Khomeini's other
leading clerical opponents tend toward the quietist tradition.
Khomeini's public statements emphasize his aim to revitalize the will of
Iranians and all Muslims to form just states based on religious law and led
by clerical jurisprudents like himself. We believe that, as a result, any
Iranian regime led by clerics in the activist, Khomeini tradition will have a
reformist, even revolutionary, view of other, "un-Islamic" states in the
region. Such a regime will also want to spread its views worldwide to all
peoples "oppressed by imperialism."
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(b)(3)
Although Khomeini denigrates the quietists as "court mullahs," his
political philosophy also embodies important aspects of the quietist tradi-
tion. Shia histories show that his arguments for clerical guardianship over
all aspects of Iranian daily life spring from the religious authority
established by quietist clerics nearly 400 years ago. Moreover, Khomeini's
establishment of clerical councils to review legislation and select his
successor implements quietist proposals put forward earlier in this century.
Khomeini's charisma and ability to combine the activist and quietist
traditions into a comprehensive political philosophy made the Iranian
revolution possible. Khomeini's followers have used his background and
personality to create an image that plays on strong Shia religious emotions
and links him to the idealized early Muslim period. Khomeini alone among
senior Iranian clerics also was able to relate his interest in relations
between the state, the clergy, and the people to contemporary events in a
comprehensive manner. Official biographies show that his academic
studies on topics rarely covered in Shia seminaries enabled him to broaden
his political thinking, and his relations with older activist clerics gave him a
firm background in activist politics.
The Iranian clerical establishment is now engaged in an intense internal
struggle over the future of Shiism in Iran. The activists, led by Khomeini,
are trying to ensure that their influence survives him. They emphasize the
revolutionary aspects of Shia Islam and the Iranian revolution. They view
Western influences as mortal threats to Islam. To strike out at the West,
the activists support good relations with Moscow and "anti-imperialist"
forces worldwide, but they are not pro-Communist. Comparisons of the
programs of various Iranian political groups show that the activists also
have co-opted much of the left's domestic proposals.
Khomeini's quietist opponents regard the activists' interpretations of many
of his ideas as heretical. The quietists' public statements focus on the
religious elements of the Iranian revolution. They reject close ties with
Communist states and want to use Western technology to rebuild the
economy, but�like the activists�they are wary of allowing Western
influences in Iran. We believe the quietists played a major role in the
regime's recent crackdown on the Tudeh Communist Party and in Iran's
cooling of relations with the USSR
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The course of the Islamic Republic depends to a large extent on how the
Iranian clerics manage the succession to Khomeini. We believe that none
of the activist clerics�including Ayatollah Montazeri, who may be
Khomeini's choice as successor�has the necessary seniority, political
commitment, and broad acceptance to succeed him as "guardian" cleric.
The weight of Shia tradition and, probably, of numbers within the clerical
community favors the quietists. This suggests that "Khomeinism" will be
diluted after the Ayatollah's death in favor of collective clerical leadership
at the top and, possibly, a greater role for laymen.
We believe the grand ayatollahs may well enter the succession process in
an effort to modify the regime's ideology in favor of less clerical
involvement in running the government. Just as the death of the predomin-
ent Shia cleric�a quietist�in 1961 freed Khomeini and other anti-Shah
activists, Khomeini's death would allow the grand ayatollahs, who are all
generally quietists, to exert their own still-considerable influence over the
Iranian people.
The quietists have stayed in the background for the most part since 1979,
but recently, grand Ayatollah Shirazi, ayatollahs in Mashhad and Esfa-
han, and possibly even grand Ayatollah Khoi have sponsored demonstra-
tions against the government in Iranian cities, according to the Iranian
media. We believe such activities, if continued, would present a serious
challenge to the activist clerics and would be especially threatening after
Khomeini's death. If Khomeini, who is 83, can outlive his widely respected
peers�all in their 80s or 90s�activists who back the doctrine of a
((guardian" cleric will face less authoritative quietist challenges.
Regardless of the balance of power that emerges, we expect a post-
Khomeini regime to remain highly ideological and especially wary of
relationships with any superpower. But the ground rules for Iranian
ideology defined by Khomeini dictate particular enmity toward the United
States. Consequently, for the near term after Khomeini's death, the ruling
clerics are most likely to focus on marshaling their strength at home and
abroad against perceived threats from Washington. Although the Soviets
probably would have little influence on Iranian policies, Moscow would
continue to benefit indirectly from the clerics' aversion to the United
States.
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Contents
Page
Summary iii
The Roots of Clerical Activism 1
Origins of the Activist and Quietist Traditions 1
Rise of Shia Jurisprudents 3
Institutionalized Shiism in Iran 3
Toward the Revolution 5
Clerics on the Defensive 6
Khomeini: The Charismatic Leader 6
Into the Political Spotlight 12
Evolution of Khomeini's Thought 14
Foreign Policy 16
Economic Theory 16
Conflict Over the Form of an Islamic Regime 17
The Current Clerical Debate 19
Prospects 22
Implications for the United States 25
vii
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Shia Religious Sites
Tabriz: Large Shia religious center. Base of
support for grand Ayatollah Shariat-Madari.
Site of serious anti-Khomeini demonstrations
by Shariat-Madari's followers in late 1979 and
early 1980.
Baghdad: Base of the four "deputies to the
Imam" who ended the succession of Shia
charismatic political-religious leaders in the
9th century.
An Najaf: Site of 1,000-year-old predominant
Shia religious center. All serious clerics study
and/or teach there. Khomeini there in exile
1965-78. Grand Ayatollah Khol opposes
Khomeini.
Karbala: Site of Third Imam's
"martyrdom" in the 7th century. A
major Shia religious center.
700458 (A02843) 11-83
Amol: Approximate site of 14th-century theocracy
and 20th-century leftist "Sarbedaran" dissidents
crushed by the Khomeini regime.
Iraq
BAGHDAD
� Karbala'
An Najaf
Soviet Union
Caspian
Sea
Amol Mashhad.
�
Salmi/
*TEHRAN Sal
� Dom
Khomeyn.
KUWAIT
.Esfahan
ITCTII
Saudi Persian
Bahrain Gulf
Arabia MANAMA* i.fatar
DOHA
ABU
DHABI
*RIYADH
290 Kilometers
200 Miles
U. A. E.
Oman
Afghanistan
Gulf of Oman
MUSCAT
Pakistan
Khomeyn: Birthplace of Ayatollah
Khomeini.
Mashhad: Second only to Qom as an Iranian
Shia religious site. Location of Eighth Imam's
tomb. Senior clerics there, including grand
Ayatollah Shirazi, oppose the Khomeini
regime.
Qom: Foremost Iranian Shia religious center.
Major clerics live permanently or spend many
years there. Expanded and revitalized in
1920s with financial aid from bazaar
merchants. Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani,
Marashi-Najafi, and Shariat-Madari oppose
Khomeini.
Esfahan: Large religious center. Site of
quietist-inspired demonstrations against the
Khomeini regime 1982-83.
Shiraz: Large Shia religious center.
Sabzevar: Approximate location of
14th-century Sarbedaran theocracy.
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See
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Khomeinism: The Impact of
Theology on Iranian Politics (u)
Iranian clerics, whether they support or oppose the
Khomeini regime, are preoccupied with Shia history
and religious law. This ensures that the regime's
domestic and foreign policies, the structure of the
government, and disputes within the clerical establish-
ment are defined by interpretations of centuries-old
doctrinal guidelines.
The Roots of Clerical Activism
Ayatollah Khomeini's books and speeches show that
the essence of "Khomeinism" is his view that Shia
clerics have for centuries sold out to temporal author-
ity in order to advance themselves materially. In so
doing, the clerics have abandoned a Muslim's princi-
pal religious duty�establishing a just state. In Kho-
meini's view, such a state must be based on religious
law and can only be led by a religious jurisprudent
like himself. All other forms of government are
illegitimate and must be opposed by faithful Muslims
as religious duty.
Our problem is people who wear turbans, have
read a book somewhere, and have joined the state
to fill their bellies or increase their authority . . .
These false saints prevent Islam from exerting its
proper influence.' (u)
According to Khomeini, the source of the basic error
in Shia theological development lies in rivalries be-
tween political "activists" and "quietists" that can be
traced back to the origins of Shia Islam. Statements
published in the Iranian media show that disagree-
ments between contemporary activist and quietist
clerics are profoundly affecting the political develop-
ment of the Islamic Republic. In the eyes of tradition-
al-minded quietist clerics, the essence of Khomeinism
is a heretical "innovation" in Shia doctrine.
' Ayatollah Khomeini, Islamic Government, c. 1970. (u)
1
Origins of the Activist and Quietist Traditions
Histories of Islam show that Shiism sprang from a
split in the early Muslim community following the
death of the Prophet Muhammad. A minority�
known as Shiiat Ali (the party of Ali)�revolted
against Muhammad's immediate successors, who
were backed by the Muslim mainstream, the Sunnis.
The rebels believed that Muhammad had designated
Ali, his son-in-law and the first male convert to Islam,
as his heir. These rebels represent the "activism" that
Khomeini admires.
Activists focused on the duty of successive generations
of Shias to create a "just" government headed by Ali
or one of his male descendants. Shias recognize a
series of 12 such infallible, charismatic leaders�the
Imams. Khomeini's supporters exploit Iranian nostal-
gia for the early Muslim period by referring to him as
"deputy to the Imam" or simply as "Imam".
The activists saw the Imams as combined religious
and political authorities but emphasized the right of
the current imam to seize political power. Activists
probably considered that any man selected to be an
imam had a religious duty to lead a rebellion; howev-
er, all but the First and Third Imams kept relatively
low profiles, according to experts on Islam. The later
Imams were imprisoned or otherwise isolated from
their followers by Sunni rulers even if they did not
publicly assert their claim to rule the Muslim commu-
nity.
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Histories of Islam also indicate that a quietist strain
has opposed activism from the beginning of Shiism.
Quietist beliefs relieved Shias of the risks of challeng-
ing a secular ruler. They taught that Shias should
instead await the return of the Twelfth Imam as the
Mandi�a messiah-like figure�who would create a
perfect government on Earth. Quietists also rejected a (b)(3)
direct clerical role in political affairs. (10)(3)
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Figure 2
The Shia Imams
Prophet Muhammad � �
(d. 632 AD) �
I. Ali � �
(ruled as Muhammad's fourth
heir, 656 to his death in 661 AD)
2. Hasan
(ruled for less than a year i
and died in 669 AD)
� Important in developing
traditional Shiism.
� Important in developing
Khomeini's ideology.
Unclassified
3. Hosein � �
(died at Karbala in 680 AD)
4. Ali Zayn at Abedin
(d. ca. 712 AD)
5. Muhammad at Baqr �
(d. 731 AD)
6. Jafar at Sadeq �
(d. 765 AD)
7. Musa at Qasem
(d. ca. 799 AD)
8. All at Resa
(d. ca. 818 AD)
9. Muhammad al Javad
(d. 835 AD)
10. Ali at Hadi
(d. ca. 868 AD)
11. Hasan at Askari
(d. ca. 874 AD)
12. Muhammad at Montar �
(the Hidden Imam and Mandi,
who "disappeared"ca. 878 AD)
301038 11-83
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Their doctrine focused on a depoliticized conception
of the Imams that minimized the activism of the
Prophet and the First and Third Imams. Quietists
invested the "martyrdom" of the Third Imam,
Hosein�by the forces of the Sunni ruler at Karbala,
Iraq, in 680 A.D.�with strong and appealing symbol-
ism designed to foster popular accommodation to all
temporal authority. Imam Hosein became an interme-
diary who enables powerless believers who mourn him
properly to receive favors from God, according to
quietist Shia scholars.
When Khomeini's followers began to preach activism
to lower class Iranians in the 1960s and 1970s, they
wanted to submerge the quietist view of the Shia
Imams. Clerical propaganda from that period illus-
trates how they adapted concepts and terms used by
popular Islamic leftists to redefine the Third Imam.
In the activist interpretation, the Third Imam was a
charismatic political-religious leader who selflessly
struggled against overwhelming odds to set an eternal
example of how Shias should react to oppression. Pro-
Khomeini clerics compared Khomeini with the mar-
tyred Imam and said the Shah was like the Sunni
ruler who deceived and killed him. Ironically, the
lower classes were receptive to the activists' propagan-
da partly because job opportunities created by the
economic boom under the Shah had for the first time
given poor Iranians some financial and psychological
independence.
Many influential Iranian clerics�including all of
Khomeini's peers among the Shia "grand" ayatol-
lahs�are quietists who believe clerics should influ-
ence the government but not become involved in day-
to-day politics. Quietists have publicly accused
pro-Khomeini activists of perverting Shiism.
But Shia quietism also contributed to Khomeinism,
despite the quietist rejection of a direct clerical role in
politics. Its legacy was the creation of a clerical
hierarchy with broad authority over believers and a
far-reaching system of religious organizations. These
were crucial to Khomeini's arguments for clerical rule
and, we believe, to his followers' ability to establish
control throughout Iran.
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Rise of of the Shia Jurisprudents
When the Eleventh Imam died without an obvious
successor around 874 A.D., four prominent Shia
scholar-merchants in Baghdad claimed to speak for
the Twelfth Imam�allegedly a young son of the dead
Eleventh Imam�who was voluntarily in hiding. Ac-
cording to histories of Islam, they assumed the title of
"deputies to the Imam" previously applied to men
responsible for communicating with imprisoned
Imams. Khomeini has appropriated the same title.
The four deputies hoped to make peace with the
ruling Sunni regime and suppress permanently all
activist claims to charismatic Shia leadership. They
asserted that the Hidden Twelfth Imam told them he
wanted Shias to tolerate temporal authority until he
returned as the Mandi.
Research by a variety of scholars shows that Shia
scholars, who began to write down the sect's oral
traditions in the 10th century, firmly established
quietist dominance by omitting texts defining the
Imams' right to exercise temporal political power.
They focused instead on the Imams' role as religious
guides, on their acquiescence in Shia accommodation
with temporal authority, and on their exceptional
knowledge of religious law. Khomeinism depends on
the recognition of modern-day jurisprudents as heirs
of the Imams' legal knowledge.
As quietist scholars wrote the Imams and Shia activ-
ists out of Shia daily life, they created a greater
collective role for clerics as the guardians of Islamic
law. By the time the last "deputy" died, religious
jurisprudents had become an elite, unwilling to allow
any one man to monopolize religious authority and
privileges. Histories of Islam note that quietist doc-
trine firmly excluded any legal expert from claiming
charismatic authority by insisting that clerics remain
fallible no matter how learned they become. In fact, a
hallmark of Shiism had been its refusal, until Kho-
meini came to power, to insist on a single correct
interpretation of doctrine. Khomeini's calls for "uni-
ty" among the clerics become�in the mouths of his
most radical followers�implications that he is infalli-
ble. Quietist clerics, therefore, consider these calls
heresy.
3
Quietist scholars and jurisprudents further repressed
activist tendencies by restricting the clerics' right to
use inferential reasoning to interpret Shia doctrine to
meet contemporary problems. But, by the 12th centu-
ry, day-to-day needs of the Shia community and an
emerging clerical hierarchy led the most senior juris-
prudents to reassert their right to make such infer-
ences. Major developments in Shia doctrine followed,
according to academic experts on Islam, such as the
rationalization of the Twelfth Imam's disappearance
and of Shia relations with other Muslims. Khomeini's
justifications of clerical rule in his book, Islamic
Republic, could not be made without such inferential
reasoning.
Institutionalized Shiism in Iran
The tensions between the Shia clergy and the state
that have characterized modern Iranian history began
with the establishment of a strong Shia government in
Persia under the Safavid dynasty in 1501. The new
rulers made Shiism the state religion to foster political
and cultural unity in their domain, according to
academic researchers. A wealthy, influential religious
class quickly emerged that played a broad role in
daily affairs. Clerics were integrated into national and
local government as judges, educators, and adminis-
trators of religious foundations that controlled large
revenues. Many became landowners, and some inter- (b)(3)
married with the royal family, according to academic
experts on Shiism. Some used gangs of thugs�the
predecessors of the Khomeini regime's hezbollahis
and Revolutionary Guards�to enforce their decrees.
In return, members of these private armies were
allowed to plunder the possessions of their victims.
Critics of the Khomeini regime argue that such
activities have become routine under the current
Iranian Government.
As the Safavids stabilized their control, however, they
needed fewer of these clerics whom Khomeini dispar-
ages as "court mullahs." Experts on Islam have
written that those who had no attachment to the
Safavids gradually became a separate scholarly, qui-
etist elite that rejected any accommodation with a
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Early Shia Theocracies
Several small and short-lived Shia theocracies ap-
peared during the mid-14th century. The most im-
portant is the Sarbedar state (1338-81) in what is now
northeast Iran. The Sarbedaran�literally "those
who put their heads in a noose" (and expect execution
if their fight against oppression fails)�were inspired
by a Shia cleric who, like Khomeini, taught mysti-
cism. His successor, an activist cleric, led a peasant
uprising that created the Sarbedar ministate. The
link established between activist mystic religious
leaders and activist lay brotherhoods created the type
of coalition that brought to power the first Shia
rulers in Iran and later gave Khomeini political
influence.
Sarbedar rhetoric contained phrases�such as "cor-
rupt on Earth" and "waging war against God"�that
became Shia watchwords and are now among the
ruling clerics '-labels for domestic opponents. The
government-controlled Iranian television system has
announced that it is producing a miniseries on the
Sarbedar rising, which it labels "one of the most
popular Iranian revolts springing from a spiritual
leader."
A leftist opposition group crushed by the Khomeini
regime in 1982 tried to exploit the Sarbedar name. It
operated on the Caspian coast near where another
short-lived 14th century theocracy was set up by a
direct ancestor of Khomeini's peer, grand Ayatollah
Marashi-Najafi, a quietist.
regime they defined as illegitimate despite its profes-
sion of Shiism. The members of this elite took little
direct part in worldly affairs but were recognized by
the Safavids as the true guardians of Shia values.
They also were popular with the people, who expected
them to use moral force against official injustices.
Eventually, some of these scholars called for a council
of senior clerics to supervise the government.' The
1 This concept emerged repeatedly in Shia clerics' later political
programs. It was included in the 1906 constitution but never
implemented. Clerical councils finally took shape in the Islamic
Republic's Council of Guardians�which reviews all legislation to
ensure it conforms with religious law�and the two Assemblies of
Experts�to draft the constitution and to choose Khomeini's succes-
sor, respectively
scholars and court mullahs debated many of the issues
that divide the Iranian clerics today�legitimacy of a
regime before the Mandi returns and the proper
extent of governmental powers, for example.
A group of strict quietist clerics, called Akbaris,
emerged in the late 1500s, in reaction, we believe, to
the increasing authority of the court mullahs, whom
they perceived as too involved in worldly affairs.
Akbari quietists dominated Shia thinking until almost
the end of the 18th century. Their influence over the
Persian populace was strengthened by lucid and au-
thoritative interpretations of sacred texts, according
to academic experts on Islam. These were written in
the late 1600s by a leading theologian, Ayatollah
Majlesi, who�like Khomeini�appealed to the com-
mon man in simple Farsi rather than clerical Arabic.
His books incorporated all acceptable popular reli-
gious practices, thereby ensuring for the first time
clerical authority over all aspects of religion. The
broad clerical authority that Majlesi established gives
legitimacy to Khomeini's assertion of the religious
"guardian's" right to control all facets of Iranian life.
In the late 1700s a rival group with activist tenden-
cies, called Usulis, emerged among Shia scholars in
Iraq and deposed the Akbari clerics, in part by
intimidating them with thugs. Usuli doctrine led to a
resurgence of clerical involvement in temporal activity
and to occasional calls for a theocracy.
The Usulis expanded clerical authority by requiring
all believers who were not expert in religious law to
follow the guidance of a clerical "source of imitation."
Shia tradition has, generally speaking, allowed indi-
vidual believers to choose the senior cleric to whom
they will be loyal. But the Iranian media show that
activist Khomeinism has increasingly focused on loy-
alty to Khomeini alone
Clerical finances were strengthened by the Usulis'
authorization to collect special taxes previously con-
sidered to be in abeyance until the return of the
Hidden Twelfth Imam. Academic experts agree that
the financial independence from the Iranian state that
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this tax tax revenue gave to 20th century Shia clerics was
one of the factors that allowed them to challenge the
Shah.'
Toward the Revolution
After the Shia Qajar dynasty took power in 1795, the
penetration of Iran by Western influences triggered a
struggle for power and influence between the clerics
and the state that climaxed almost 200 years later in
the fall of the Shah. Histories of modern Iran show
that many of the themes in Khomeini's political
philosophy originated in clerical confrontations with
the government under the Qajars.
At first the struggle to preserve Islamic values from
Western corruption seemed to go in the clerics' favor.
Senior clerics forced one Qajar ruler to resist Russian
border incursions and toppled several provincial gov-
ernors at about the same time. Clerical influence
increased later in the 19th century, when the power of
the Qajar government did not extend far beyond the
capital. Some of the most senior clerics even gained
veto power over appointments to high-level state
positions, according to Iranian historians. Shia schol-
ars in Iraq, meanwhile, were arguing that all laymen
and lesser clerics should be loyal to one supreme Shia
cleric. We believe this doctrine strengthened the
theoretical basis for the centralized clerical leadership
that is crucial to Khomeini's ideology.
Clerical championship of the interests of landowners
and merchants increased during this period. Ties with
the lower classes remained tenuous. The clerics inter-
ceded with the government on behalf of bazaar
merchants hurt by Western competition and property
owners offended by the behavior of Western infidels
in Iran. The strong support for the "oppressed" lower
classes characteristic of Khomeinism was alien to
clerics of this period. According to Iranian historians,
the conditions of workers on property owned or man-
aged by the clergy were usually worse than that of
workers under lay masters
With increased power came greater clerical involve-
ment in political activity. The broad range of activist
and quietist clerical support for the first Iranian mass
movements against foreign encroachment is well do-
cumented by historians. These protests led to ratifica-
tion of the first Iranian constitution in 1906 and the
election of the first legislature the following year.
Initially, most clerics supported a constitutional mon-
archy and expected to influence the legislative pro-
cess. Like the quietist Shia scholars some 300 years
earlier, they advocated formation of a council of
senior "guardian" jurisprudents with veto power over
legislation to ensure its conformity with religious law.'
Westernized lay reformers agreed to write a council
into the draft constitution in return for clerical back-
ing of basic civil rights. Successive governments re-
fused to implement the provision, and such a council
was not formed until 1980 under the Khomeini
regime.
The minority of clerics who opposed constitutional
government saw all modernization as a threat to
Islamic values and clerical interests. One, Ayatollah
Nun, had activist tendencies. He was eventually able
to turn almost all the clerical community against the
constitution�partly by the now traditional tactic of
using thugs against his opponents.
Historical records show that Nun i presaged many of
Khomeini's charges against the state. Nun i attacked
uncontrolled adoption of foreign values and customs,
which he said led to the state's denigration of Islam,
the clergy, and traditional Shia values. He called for
clerical supervision of the press to prevent it from
fostering the corruption of youth and women. Nuni
also vehemently opposed granting equal rights to
Iran's ethnic and religious minorities. He supported
the monarchy, not because he believed it had any
inherent legitimacy, but because the clerics were
familiar with ways to manipulate it. Official clerical
biographies indicate that one of Nun's closest asso-
ciates later became Khomeini's first theological in-
structor.
' Many ambitious clerics were elected to Iranian legislatures before
the Islamic Consultative Assembly was formed in 1980, but they
participated primarily as individual politicians rather than as
guardians of clerical interests, according to Iranian historians.n
' Shia taxes include general alms, one-fifth of annual income, and
an optional amount�originally to be paid to the current imam. (u)
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Clerics on the Defensive
Lay reformers:
. . . want your efforts and blood, but do
not want Islam or yourselves.' (u)
The struggle between the state and the clerics intensi-
fied significantly after Reza Pahlavi assumed the
throne in 1925, according to histories of modern Iran.
The new Shah saw the religious establishment as an
obstacle to his plans to modernize Iran and to replace
popular loyalty to Islam with allegiance to a territori-
al state and the royal family. He tried to break the
clerics' power by stripping them of judicial and
educational authority and taking control of the reli-
gious endowments and their immense revenues. Pro-
tests led by clerics were put down harshly. The clerics'
strong links with bazaar merchants, however, prevent-
ed the Shah from moving against the newly estab-
lished clerical center in Qom
For 20 years after Reza Shah was deposed in 1941,
his heir was unsure of his powers, and the clerical
establishment regained some of its lost influence. In
the 1950s most clerics supported the new Pahlavi
Shah against Prime Minister Mossadeq, who advocat-
ed major social reforms damaging to clerical interests.
Ayatollah Borujerdi, then the dominant Shia cleric
and a quietist, was privately critical of many official
policies but flatly opposed involvement by activist
clerics in political affairs, according to Iranian histori-
ans.
In 1960, when the Shah felt confident, he, too, moved
against the clerical establishment. The government
reduced clerical control over the religious foundations
and closed religious publishing houses. Security forces
infiltrated gatherings at mosques, and intelligence or
military officers took charge of major religious
shrines. Clerics who protested were arrested, interro-
gated, imprisoned, tortured, or executed. Clerical
biographies published in the Iranian media show that
many of those who were harassed and imprisoned
later assumed leading positions in the Khomeini re-
gime.
Borujerdi's death in the early 1960s removed a major
quietist restraint on activist politicking. No cleric was
powerful enough to succeed him, and Khomeini
emerged as the clerics' most outspoken advocate.
Khomeini to fellow clerics in the 1970s. (u)
-Seetet�
Khomeini: The Charismatic Leader
We believe without Ayatollah Khomeini the Iranian
revolution would not have occurred and the Islamic
Republic would not have been founded in 1979. His
personality, background, and style of expression were
as important as his ideas in bringing him to the
forefront of contemporary Iranian politics. No other
contemporary Iranian has equaled his ability to cap-
ture popular emotion or to win the support of dispa-
rate factions. No other cleric provided a programmat-
ic analysis of threats to clerical interests and an
alternative to accommodation with temporal author-
ity.
The first evidence of Khomeini's activism came in the
early 1940s when he published a book on Islam and
government that was critical of Pahlavi rule. Official
biographies indicate that his views had been influ-
enced by his father's death at the hands of a Qajar
official and by his own contacts with Shia clerics who
had fled British rule in Iraq in the 1920s. Khomeini
had also witnessed the dramatic reduction in clerical
prestige and revenue caused by the Pahlavi secular-
ization of the Iranian judiciary in the 1930s. His
interest in relations among the clergy, people, and
state was fed by his study of ethics, philosophy, and
mysticism. These studies exposed him to Muslim,
Greek, and Christian philosophical concepts rarely
covered in Shia seminaries.
But we believe it was the young Khomeini's close
contacts with two older clerics who had activist
tendencies that focused his thoughts. Khomeini first
studied under a close colleague of Ayatollah Nun, the
impassioned opponent of constitutionalism and mod-
ernization. Somewhat later, Khomeini became very
close to Ayatollah Kashani, a political sophisticate
and activist, who we believe may have served as his
role model. Both Nun i and Kashani have been extolled
in the media of the Islamic Republic.
Kaihani's biography indicates that he cut short a
brilliant academic career before achieving full senior
clerical rank. Instead, he became involved in protests
on behalf of clerical interests against the secular
government and foreign influences first in Iraq and
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-Secret�
Figure 3
Selected Shia Activist and Quietist Elements'
Activist
Third Imam, Hosein
(d. 680)
First Imam, All
d. 661)
Prophet Mohammad
d. 632)
Idealized charismatic leaders who created
"just" governments that Khomeini wants
to re-create.
Small, short-lived theocracies formed in
northern Iran.
HiIli
(d. ca. 1300) The first Shia cleric called.
"ayatollah" and first to sanction clerics' use
of individual reason to derive judgments
on issues not in primary sacred texts.
Shirazi
(d. 1894) Third supreme jurisprudent,
who forced the ruler to retract concessions i
granted to British entrepreneurs.
Najafi
(d. 1850) First supreme Shia jurisprudent.
Senior clerics make ruler defend against
Russian incursions. Local clerics oust
provincial governors.
Usuli school reestablished clerics'
individual reasoning power and compelled.
all Shias to follow a living cleric. Some
early Usulis called for theocracy.
Majlesi
(d. 1699) First Shia cleric to broadly
influence Iranian development.
Popularized Shi ism and co-opted all
religious practices. The source of
Khomeinism's all-embracing clerical
authority.
Nun
(executed (executed 1909) Opposed secularization
,and Western influences in Iran. One of
his close associates was Khomeini's first
teacher.
,Borujerdi
i(d. 1961) Fifth supreme jurisprudent.
'Expanded clerical networks and allowed
Khomeini and Shariat-Madari to reform
the Qom curriculum.
Kashani
(d. 1962) Opposed secularization and
Westernization. He was Khomeini's
mentor.
r.Baqr-Sadr
(d. 1980) Wrote a comprehensive Islamic
economic theory that gives extensive
power to the head of an Islamic state.
Khomeini
Began political activity in 1940. Assumed power in 1979.
4
4 4
4
400 AD
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
ft
f
t
?
?
I
?
1
fP
�
Second Imam, Hasan
(d. 669)
Third Imam, Hosein
(d. 680) Used by quietists to enforce
accommodation with temporal rulers.
Fifth and Sixth Imams
(d. 731 and 765) Used by quietists to
enforce their views.
Quietist
a Some Shia clerics contributed to both the
activist and quietist traditions.
Unclassified
Hilli
(d. ca. 1300) Wrote an influential text on
accomodation and defined the Imam as a
nonpolitical figure.
Tusi
(d. ca. 1050) Wrote an influential book on
accommodation. Said the "just" ruler
"orders the proper and forbids the
improper"; i.e. implements religious law.
Kulini
(d. 939) Wrote a detailed legal code that
restricted clerics' latitude in interpreting
religious law.
Four "deputies" for the Hidden Imam
ended the succession of charismatic Shia
leaders and advised accomodation with
temporal rulers. (ca. 878-940)
Hidden" 12th Imam -Mandi
(d. ca. 878)
!Akbari school rejects individual
!reasoning by clerics.
Shariat-Madari
Has opposed Khomeini's activism for
over 20 years because he prefers a lay
government supervised by clerics. Now
under house arrest.
Borujerdi
(d. 1961) Fifth supreme jurisprudent,
who refused to become involved in
political affairs.
Ansari
(d. 1861) Second supreme jurisprudent.
Wrote an influential legal code and
denied the political potential of his
position.
301004 11-83
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Khomeini Charisma
Charisma
Khomeini's supporters have drawn on his personality
and background to link him to the idealized period at
the beginning of Shia history and to create emotional
bonds between him and the Iranian people, according
to Western scholars. Khomeini's radical supporters
compare him with the Prophet Muhammad and the
First and Third Imams to suggest that he has special
qualities like theirs that command believers' obedi-
ence. Since 1970 they have reinforced these compari-
sons by addressing Khomeini as "deputy to the
Imam" and "Imam "�a technically correct term for
a Shia leader. These titles border on heresy when
used by the most extreme Khomeinists, who imply
that Khomeini has the special charismatic powers of
the 12 Imams
Khomeini's image capitalizes, in particular, on the
implication that�like the 12 Imams�he has access
to wisdom beyond that of ordinary men. Khomeini's
own writings suggest that he may want to be seen as
the "renovator" who comes in each new age to purify
Islam, according to Shia tradition. This image is
reinforced by the coincidence that he came to power
in 1979, the beginning of a new century and millenni-
um in the Islamic calendar. Khomeini's association
with mysticism strengthens his followers' suggestions
that he receives guidance from God, the Prophet, or
the Imams at night while meditating. Khomeini's
ascetic lifestyle�another characteristic of the
Imams�is used to deflect allegations that he has
sought power for personal gain, but articles in the
Iranian media show that it does not prevent oppo-
nents from attacking the much-improved lifestyle of
his now-powerful former students.
Shias believe a mystic must have great self-control to
avoid seduction by evil, according to Islamic schol-
ars. A cleric who studied with Khomeini for many
years says that the Ayatollah has tried to eliminate
all emotion in his thoughts and actions. Medical
personnel who witnessed his reaction to a heart
ailment in 1980 were dumbfounded at his apparent
lack of interest in whether he lived or died. Airline
employees who returned from France with him in
1979 remarked on his lack of emotion over his
triumph over the Shah. Some foreign visitors who
have met with Khomeini have mistaken his low
monotone, terseness, and lack of interest in his
surroundings for senility. Others, of no apparent bias,
have reported a deeply moving sense of "presence,"
according to a Western diplomat in Tehran.
Khomeini's self-confidence and determination have
been demonstrated over the past 20 years. In the
1960s and 1970s his confrontational style was often
denigrated by his opponents and rivals as self-indul-
gent and careless of the safety of his followers, who
suffered imprisonment and torture. By 1978, howev-
er, Khomeini's intransigence had become a virtue as
he faced down the Shah. Quietists like Shariat-
Madari�who remained in Iran to mediate on behalf
of their flocks�on the other hand, were tainted with
"treason."
Khomeini apparently is a man at peace with himself.
One of a group of senior clerics younger than Kho-
meini who met with him in 1982 said Khomeini told
them he would outlive them all because he under-
stood himself. Khomeini comes from a long-lived
family.
In mid-August 1983, according to the Iranian media,
he stood while delivering a 42-minute speech.
Analysis of Khomeini's books and speeches shows
that he has used two styles of expression to advance
his ideas. Until Islamic Government was issued in the
early 1970s, he appeared to favor well-organized oral
and written statements in scholarly, but clear, lan-
guage. Since then, however, Khomeini has relied on
less structured oral appeals in colloquial Farsi tar-
geted on the lower classes and the emotions of
Iranians as a whole. The texts show that he uses
repetition, rhythm, exaggerated images, and cutting
political jokes to drive his message home and alters
his vocabulary�but not his delivery�to show in-
creased emotion. His monotone exerts a hypnotic
effect that is heightened by supporters placed among
the audience to lead chanted slogans.
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Table 1
Key Dates in Ayatollah Khomeini's Career
c. 1900 Born in Khomeyn, near Qom, into poor
clerical family ... father killed by officials
of the Qajar Shah soon afterward.
1921 To Qom for advanced theological studies
under leading quietist ayatollah ... met
senior clerics there who had fled British
"oppression" in Iraq.
1938-48 Taught in Qom seminary ... made classes
relevant to contemporary events.
Early 1940s
First book, Discovery of Secrets, critical of
Pahlavi rule, but did not advocate over-
throw of the regime.
Mid-1950s
Became an aide to dominant jurisprudent,
Borujerdi, who was a quietist ... with
Shariat-Madari revised Qom curriculum.
1961 One of several contenders to become domi-
nant Shia jurisprudent.
1963 Prominent in opposition to Shah's pro-
grams ... arrested and imprisoned.
October 1964
Exiled to Turkey.
October 1965
c. 1970
Moved to seminary at An Najaf, Iraq.
Second book, Islamic Government, advo-
cated theocracy, but not rule by a single
"guardian cleric" ... style of expression
shifted almost exclusively to appeals to
Iranian emotions, rather than reason.
1977 Eldest son, Mostafa, died in An Najaf...
allegedly killed by Shah's security service.
January 1978
Iranian Government press campaign tried
to discredit him as a "foreign agent" ...
protest marches began the Islamic
Revolution.
October 1978
Expelled from Iraq to Paris.
February 1979
Assumed power in Iran.
December 1979
Enshrined in the constitution as the sole
guardian jurisprudent at the head of the
Islamic Re ublic.
then in Iran from the 1920s to the mid-1950s. Ka-
shani was especially prominent in Iranian political
affairs during the Mossadeq era, first as a supporter,
then as an opponent of Mossadeq.
According to a Western scholar, Khomeini apparently
concluded that one of the reasons Kashani did not
achieve greater political success was that he lacked
Khomeini still has the last word on major govern-
ment decisions, such as on continuing the war with
Iraq, according to a Western diplomat in Tehran.
Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani's emphatic denial of
recent rumors that Khomeini is being manipulated
ring true. The Ayatollah maintains firm superior-
subordinate relations with his now-powerful former
students. Khomeini's son has told the Iranian media
that his father is a voracious reader
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Figure 4. 4. Ayatollah Kashani (c. 1882-1962). (v)
the clerical credentials needed to rally the people and
to limit opposition from quietist clerics, whom Kho-
meini calls "false saints." Kashani, on the other hand,
believed Khomeini too intransigent for a career as a
political activist, according to members of the Ka-
shani family.
The ideology and programs of the Khomeini regime
echo Kashani's calls for Iranian control of natural
resources, opposition to foreign influences, "export of
the revolution," and worldwide Muslim self-help or-
ganizations to combat imperialism. Tehran has also
adopted Kashani's desire to "free" all peoples colo-
nized or dominated by the great powers so they could
use their national resources to improve their own lives.
Records of Kashani's statements show that�like pro-
Khomeini clerics�he evoked the martyred Third
Imam as a model Muslim who "preferred death with
honor (as an activist fighting oppression) to life with
shame (quietism)." Kashani's calls for clerical involve-
ment in political affairs have been echoed by
Khomeini
11
Clerical Credentials of
Ayatollah Khomeini and His Mentor
Shia clerics are traditionally judged by their lineage,
education (where, with whom, how long), and publica-
tions, according to an American researcher on mod-
ern Iran. The establishment of religious institutions
is also important but requires a substantial income.
Political savvy in the broadest sense and popular
appeal play roles in determining how much money
clerics receive from followers. Senior clerics under
the Pahlavis often managed millions of dollars a year
without accountability.
Clerical biographic registers show that Khomeini has
produced an acceptable, but not outstanding, number
of publications on a variety of theological subjects,
and that Kashani wrote no texts and never taught at
a seminary. Kashani founded a school at An Najaf at
which Islamic studies, science, and paramilitary tech-
niques were taught. Khomeini founded no religious
institutions before he came to power. Both Kashani
and Khomeini studied with some of the best instruc-
tors, and Khomeini taught at Qom and at An Najaf,
Iraq, the leading Shia seminaries. The clerical regis-
ters trace the ancestry of both men back no further
than a generation or two. Khomeini's elevation to the
rank of ayatollah was delayed, according to a cleric
at Qom, because of his interest in mysticism�which
is looked on askance by senior clerics but fascinates
lay Iranians.
In the 1950s and early 1960s Khomeini, alone among
senior instructors in Qom, consistently related his
lectures to current affairs, according to histories of
modern Iran. He held regular meetings with other
middle-level clerics there to discuss politics. Several
clerics and laymen who now hold or have held high
office in the Khomeini regime also participated in
public seminars. in Tehran on the nature of clerical
leadership and responses to modern challenges
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Published accounts of the talks in Tehran contain
conclusions that later became key goals of Khomeini's
Islamic Republic:
� Creation of a Shia society requires popular accept-
ance that the clergy have inherited much of the
Imams' God-given legal knowledge.
� A permanent clerical council must be formed to
issue collective, definitive interpretations of religious
law.
� The collective will of the community that "good
should be enforced and evil be forbidden" must be
reestablished, that is, religious law should define the
society.
� Muslim youth must be indoctrinated with a renewed
sense of Islamic responsibility.
� The clerical establishment must remain financially
independent of the state
In the 1950s Khomeini became an aide to grand
Ayatollah Borujerdi, the dominant cleric and a quiet-
ist. We believe this allowed Khomeini to develop wide
contacts within the religious and bazaar networks�
expanded and rationalized by Borujerdi�that later
supported Khomeini during the revolution and under
the Islamic Republic. Khomeini was allowed by Boru-
jerdi to deemphasize Shia penal codes and rituals in
the Qom curriculum and to add courses designed to
develop an interest in political and social responsibil-
ity among the seminarians. He shared this responsibil-
ity with another middle-level cleric named Shariat-
Madari, a quietist who had probably already emerged
as Khomeini's philosophical rival. When Borujerdi
died in 1961, he left Khomeini in charge of his assets,
which we believe Khomeini almost certainly used to
advance students and teachers sympathetic to his own
ideas.6
Into the Political Spotlight
Within three years after the death of Borujerdi,
Khomeini had become leader of the activist clerics
opposed to the Pahlavi regime. Khomeini first gained
Ayatollah Shariat-Madari is, like Khomeini, a "grand" ayatollah.
Throughout the revolution, Shariat-Madari hoped to arrange for a
constitutional monarchy. Later, he was an outspoken critic of the
Khomeini regime and was a major force in diluting some of the
more radical proposals of the pro-Khomeini clerics. Shariat-Madari
became a focus of many Islamic-oriented opposition groups and was
"defrocked" by activist clerics in 1982 after he allegedly failed to
inform security forces of a coup plot.
prominence beyond Qom when he was one of several
candidates to succeed Borujerdi. Histories of modern
Iran indicate that he won significant support from
bazaar merchants because he was perceived as more
strongly opposed than other contenders to the Shah's
economic policies, which were causing a recession.
This alliance with the bazaar resulted in the sizable
contributions�possibly millions of dollars a month�
that Khomeini used to support his followers during
the anti-Shah movement in the 1960s and 1970s
Look at the seminaries. You see negligent, lazy,
idle, and apathetic people who do nothing but
discuss law and offer prayers . . . Do not picture
clerics in some corner in Qom or An Najaf study-
ing questions on childbirth and menstruation in-
stead of concerning themselves with politics and
draw the conclusion that religion must be separate
from politics.' (u)
Islam is based on politics! (u)
The clerics could not agree on a new leader to succeed
Borujerdi; hence, no superior emerged to prevent
Khomeini's entry into the political arena. He did so
with relish, and by 1962 he had begun to expound the
first comprehensive "Islamic" alternative to the
Shah's program.
Largely because of Khomeini's activism, 1963 was a
watershed year in clerical-state relations in Iran. The
Shah confronted senior clerics in Qom and made clear
that he would tolerate no rivals for authority. The
mainly quietist clergy first called on their followers to
demonstrate but later tried to negotiate a compro-
mise. They hoped to convince the Shah to form a
council of jurisprudents to review legislation and
grant other forms of official recognition that Islam
and the clergy would have a meaningful role in Iran
as it was modernized under the Pahlavis. Many feared
that full-scale opposition to the Shah would be ex-
ploited by the left.
' Khomeini, Islamic Government. (u)
'Ayatollah Khomeini, 1983. (u)
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Figure 5. 5. Poster commemorat-
ing the 20th anniversary of
Khomeini's emergence into the
national political arena (1963-
8.3). Its design is one that is
offensive to quietist clerics who
reject activist elevation of Kho-
meini to a special position
among clerics.
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eLl
The small faction of activists, led by Khomeini, was
bolder. Contemporary accounts show that the activists
argued for major changes in the Shah's regime and,
ultimately, for his replacement by an Islamic govern-
ment. Their well-publicized views and activities pre-
vented the quietist religious establishment from
reaching an accommodation with the Shah.
When Khomeini was arrested in 1963, protest demon-
strations erupted throughout Iran and were forcefully
put down. Khomeini had become a national hero. His
popularity grew even though he was exiled the next
year. His followers kept him in the forefront of the
anti-Shah protests by smuggling tapes of his speeches
into Iran where they were reproduced and widely
circulated
Evolution of Khomeini's Thought
Khomeini's books and speeches show that over the
past 30 years he has moved from a toleration of
imperfect secular Iranian institutions to a preoccupa-
tion with uncompromising opposition to any threat he
perceives to Islam. To defend Islam, he has reinter-
preted Shia dogma to support extreme activism�the
total involvement of clerics in politics as a religious
duty. In the process, he and his supporters have
created a doctrine so radical that, as one Western
scholar has written, if Khomeini lives long enough to
preside over its institutionalization, Shiism as it has
been known in Iran will come to an end.
A decayed government is better than no govern-
ment at all. The practical power of the jurispru-
dents excludes the government. Even when rulers
are oppressive and against the people, the clergy
will not try to destroy them.9 (u)
In his first book�Discovery of Secrets, published in
the 1940s�Khomeini argued that a new social and
political structure alien to Islam was being created in
Iran. Instead of responding to individual issues as his
predecessors had done, Khomeini tried to deal com-
prehensively with how the clerics, as guardians of
Islamic values, should respond. The book did not
advocate the Shah's ouster but called instead for a
constitutional monarchy that would respect religious
law by allowing clerical review of all legislation.
'Khomeini, Discovery of Secrets. (u)
Under such a system, Khomeini wrote, the ruler
would be chosen by an "assembly" of religious juris-
prudents, and the legislature would be composed of
clerics or "at least supervised by them." Peacetime
armed forces would be made up of pious volunteers,
and, if Iran were attacked, all able-bodied males
would respond to a call for holy war from an Islamic
propaganda ministry. This idea presaged Iran's
reliance on the Revolutionary Guard and militia
troops for much of its manpower in the war with Iraq
as well as the regime's creation of an Islamic Guid-
ance Ministry to direct internal and external propa-
ganda.
Khomeini's more famous work�Islamic Govern-
ment�was compiled around 1970. In it, Khomeini
repeated themes from his first book and anti-Pahlavi
speeches, but he also called for theocracy and abroga-
tion of parts of the 1906 constitution. The book
asserted the right of senior clerics to rule as "guardian
jurisprudents," but it did not allude to a single cleric
in a supreme position such as Khomeini now occupies
in the Islamic Republic. The text also did not mention
the word "republic." The term was included in the
official name of the new Iranian regime at the
insistence of Shariat-Madari and other quietist clerics
opposed to the more radical aspects of Khomeinism,
according to Western scholars with good contacts
among the quietist clerics
Islamic government is neither tyrannical nor abso-
lute, but constitutional. It is not constitutional in
the current sense of the word�based on approval
of laws in accordance with majority opinion. It is
constitutional in the sense that rulers are subject
to a certain set of conditions in governing that are
set forth in the Koran and the traditions of the
Prophet and of the Imams.' (u)
Islamic Government is not a clear blueprint of a
theocratic structure or its policies in the Western
sense." In Khomeini's view, religious law has defined
' Ayatollah Khomeini, 1978. (u)
1' The best translation is Hamid Algar's in Islam and Revolution:
Writings of Imam Khomeini, Mizan Press, Berkeley, 1981. (u)
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all but the minor details of government, "like traffic
laws, which are beneath the dignity of Islam to
consider." Religious law covers, for example, national
policy, commercial codes, and personal hygiene, as
well as prayer. Islam, as Khomeini sees it, has an
answer for any problem, in any age. Because they are
derived from the word of God, the religious laws of
Shiism must be perfect. The question, therefore, is not
to bring Islam into line with the modern world, but
rather the reverse.
Let them erect a wall around Iran and confine us
inside. We prefer this to the doors being open and
plunderers pouring in. Why should we want a
civilization which is worse than savagery? Is this
civilization? 12 (u)
Khomeini's books and speeches show that he believes
all Muslims now confront a fundamental identity
crisis that threatens the existence of Islam. He says
this alienation is primarily caused by "westoxica-
tion"�a fascination with Western culture that
creates a sense of inferiority and helplessness among
Muslims. Khomeini borrowed the term from a popu-
lar lay thinker and the concept from Ayatollah
Kashani. He writes that the only effective response is
to enforce a social order in Iran that defines both
public and private attitudes in accordance with Islam-
ic law. This, he believes, will produce a unity of
thought and action focused on Islam that will give
Muslims the "faith" needed to defeat their oppressors.
To achieve this in Iran, Khomeini proposes to return
Shiism to the ideal revolutionary system that he
believes was abandoned after the Prophet Muham-
mad and the First Imam. Strong clerical leadership is
the keystone of his program. "Know that it is your
duty to establish an Islamic government," he told his
students in Islamic Government.
Since the rule of Islam is the rule of law, only the
jurisprudents, and no one else, should be in charge
of government. They are the ones who can govern
as God ordained." (u)
'2 Ayatollah Khomeini, June 1980. (u)
"Khomeini, Islamic Government. (u)
15
Khomeini asserts that supreme political and religious
leadership by a "guardian cleric"�or velayat-e
faqih�is inherited from the Prophet and the First
Imam, who had complete political and religious au-
thority. The jurisprudents are their heirs and must be
obeyed completely. Khomeini emphasizes in his book
that the "faith" of the early Shia leaders allowed
them to actively struggle for the state of well-being
God intended for man. He wants contemporary Irani-
ans to show the way to other Muslims by taking up
the same struggle.
Implementing all-inclusive religious law involves, ac-
cording to Khomeini, narrowing the bounds of accept-
able behavior to force Iranians to embody a pure
revolutionary Islamic faith. Khomeini is adamant
about the rigorous application of religious law under
the Islamic Republic to accomplish this goal.
The "unity" for which Khomeini has been calling
with increasing insistence in his speeches over the past
four and a half years denotes, we believe, rigid
ideological conformity intended to reproduce his con-
ception of the ideal milieu of early Islam. Accounts in
the Iranian media show that some of Khomeini's
strongest opponents among the Iranian clergy�main-
ly quietists�firmly believe that the Twelfth Imam
will return to create the only just government possible
on Earth during a time of extraordinary chaos. They
see Khomeini's efforts as preventing those events.
These accounts also show that extreme Khomeinists,
on the other hand, are beginning to suggest that if
everyone would just cooperate with the regime, the
return of the Twelfth Imam�the Mandi�might not
be necessary.
Khomeini writes that Iranians must individually wage
an internal battle with their instincts in order to
become good Muslims. As the guardian jurisprudent,
Khomeini shows them through his words and actions
the way they must think and behave. When they have
conquered themselves, he says, citizens of the Islamic
state are ready to take on all external enemies of
Islam. Khomeini apparently dismisses the possibility
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1.11V
that strict application of religious law under clerical
guidance will not produce the nationwide community
of purpose that he wants.
Khomeini's statements focus on the "oppressed" lower
classes as those best qualified to become citizens and
officials of an Islamic regime and to reap the greatest
benefits from its programs. In Khomeini's view, the
lower classes remain relatively untainted by Western
influence. They are, therefore, open to developing the
"faith" needed to create an ideal theocratic state.
Although he has publicly acknowledged that Iran
needs persons with expertise in many fields, Khomei-
ni's statements make clear that those who do not
receive their training at an Islamic institution cannot
really be trusted. We believe he has virtually written
off the upper classes.
The Islamic state�like Islam itself�is a gift from
God, according to Khomeini. His books and speeches
make clear that dissent is unacceptable and incompre-
hensible in Khomeinism, except as a manifestation of
foreign influence or evil conspiracies designed to
perpetuate "oppression" in Iran. When Khomeini
refers to the United States as the "great satan," he
means that US opposition to the Islamic Republic is a
part of the work of the devil that the United States
does in Iran and around the world. To Khomeini,
those Iranians who oppose the guardian cleric's re-
gime are failures as individuals and�using terms that
originated in 14th-century Shia theocracies�are
"waging war on God" and "corrupt on Earth." This
view contrasts with the traditional Shia refusal to
consider any judgment final, according to academic
experts on Shia Islam.
Foreign Policy. The Islamic state's relationships with
other nations are a major element of Khomeini's
ideology. His book of guidelines for daily living which
all ayatollahs issue to their followers contains an essay
on foreign contacts in place of the standard discussion
of "holy" war, according to an American researcher
on Iran. In it Khomeini demands that Shias defend
their political and economic integrity at any cost
against all real and potential foreign infringements.
He orders religious leaders and believers to force a
ruler to cut off all ties with a state that represents
such a threat.
All our problems stem from these foreigners from
the West, and from America at the moment:4 (u)
Khomeini has consistently advocated a policy inde-
pendent of the East and West. But when he specifical-
ly addresses "ending foreign domination of Iran," he
makes clear that some nations, or "satans"�such as
the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR,
which have "enslaved" Iran in the past�will have
difficulty maintaining relations with an Islamic gov-
ernment under his guidance. His speeches also show
suspicion of Iran's neighbors and strong antipathy
toward Israel.
We believe one of the reasons for Khomeini's intransi-
gence over continuation of the war with Iraq is that he
has stated publicly that the "faith" of the "martyrs"
at the front is all that is needed for victory. Another is
his elevation of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn as a
symbol of the oppressive forces that face the Islamic
Republic. His recent remarks show that the struggle
with Iraq has become, in his mind, one between good
and evil. He is, therefore, likely to insist on fighting on
lest he undermine his concept of the mystical power of
Islamic "faith."
Khomeini and his supporters also have stated publicly
that they have a religious duty to "export" their
ideology to all peoples�especially Muslims�who are
"oppressed by Eastern or Western imperialism."
Islam, as God's word, is applicable universally, not
just in Iran. Logically then, any activist-led regime in
Tehran must have a reformist, even revolutionary,
attitude toward "un-Islamic" governments in the re-
gion it sees as corrupt tools of the West. It would also
feel dutybound to spread its concepts worldwide. We
believe Khomeini and other activists see no clear
distinction between "export of the revolution" and
normal diplomatic practice.
Economic Theory. Khomeini's definition of clerical
guardianship in Islamic Republic gives the leader of
an Islamic state the same powers over national wealth
"Ayatollah Khomeini, October 1979. (u)
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as a guardian has over a ward's assets. But he has
never provided clear guidelines on Islamic economics,
and only one cleric close to him, Ayatollah Baqr Sadr,
has published an economic analysis claiming to be
comprehensive. Neither suggests ways of translating a
doctrine designed for a preindustrial society into
guidelines for a modern economy tied to an interna-
tional economic system. The economic policies of the
Khomeini regime are, in fact, unsystematic and arbi-
trary, according to Western economists who have
studied Tehran's policies. Very little can be described
as exclusively Islamic.'
I do not believe that any prudent individual Can
believe that the purpose of all these sacrifices was
to have less expensive melons. No one would give
his life for better agriculture:6 (u)
Ayatollah Baqr Sadr's book, like Khomeini's, ascribes
broad economic powers to the Islamic state, which
Baqr Sadr wrote is "chosen by God to take charge of
the people's affairs." His book asserts that the state
owns, organizes, and spends state and public proper-
ties and revenues, taxes the private sector, lends assets
to the "oppressed," and can nationalize private prop-
erty. In matters not explicitly raised in the Shia
sacred texts, Baqr Sadr writes that the government
can even take action contrary to established traditions
of the Prophet and Imams."
Such moves�called expediencies in Shia terminol-
ogy�have often been made or suggested by members
of the Khomeini regime. They are a primary source of
continued opposition by senior quietist clerics who
have put distance between themselves and the Islamic
Republic. Public statements by such clerics show that
Khomeini's opponents see these "expediencies" as
heresy. We believe the major point of conflict is the
radical Khomeinists' rejection of the traditional Is-
lamic recognition of private property.
See NESA 83-10159 (Secre July 1983, Iran:
Economic Prospects for the Islamic Republic. (u)
'Ayatollah Khomeini, late 1979. (u)
Ayatollah Baqr Sadr, an influential activist cleric in An Najaf,
was executed by the Iraqi Government in 1980. His book, Our
Economics, published in 1961, was considered incomprehensible by
most clerics in Qom, according to a Western researcher there. One
of Baqr Sadr's sons now leads an Iraqi government-in-exile spon-
sored by the Khomeini regime.
17
Conflict Over the Form of an Islamic Regime
The Iranian clerical establishment is now engaged in
an internal struggle over the nature of Shiism in Iran,
we believe. The continued�and perhaps intensified�
divisions between activist and quietist clerics have
been reflected in the institutions and programs of the
Islamic Republic. Clerics who control the regime have
excluded their leftist and Westernized lay rivals while
co-opting their most popular ideas. But these maneu-
vers have made the regime exclusively "Islamic."
Hence, guidelines in all matters must be defined in
terms of religious law. Yet the activists and quietists
cannot reach agreement, both because Shia texts are
open to many interpretations and because of long-
standing personal, geographic, class, and generational
rivalries within the clerical community.
We see the constitution of the Islamic Republic and
official or quasi-official institutions created under the
clerics as a mix of the activists' and quietists' often
contradictory ideological principles:is
� The official name of the Islamic Republic was a
compromise, according to Western scholars. Kho-
meini agreed to add "republic" but refused to allow
forms of government other than his Islamic regime
to be offered for public acceptance in a referendum.
He also insisted on a new "Islamic" constitution,
based on religious law, drafted by an Assembly of
Experts.
� Religious law was enshrined in the constitution as
the basis of the government and of all national and
individual activity, but there was no firm agreement
over who would have the final word on its interpre-
tation. A "Council of Guardians" composed of
clerical and lay experts was empowered to review all
legislation for compatibility with Shia doctrine.
II Good translations include those in The Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Pars Associates, Tehran, 1980; and the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-MEA-79-236 supp.
034, 6 December 1979. (u)
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Because senior ayatollahs are free to interpret Shia
laws independently, clerics on the Council who have
quietist tendencies have been able to sidetrack
legislation pushed by activist clerics. Accounts in
the Iranian press indicate, moreover, that the re-
gime is still attempting to draft a national legal code
based on religious law that is acceptable to all
factions.
� The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
the government were made subject to direct clerical
supervision and control. But under the quasi-official
komiteh system and mosque networks, which per-
meate all levels of activity, quietist clerics who want
decentralization and oppose direct involvement in
political affairs can act as a brake on others who are
more activist and want a centralized government
under direct clerical control.
"The best article of the constitution is on leader-
ship of the guardian cleric. People gathered and
shouted and demanded that the clergy have a role
in government. The role of the clergy is to control
affairs. Islam does not allow the guardian cleric to
utter one lie or take one step in the wrong direc-
tion." 19
� Leadership by a single supreme guardian cleric or a
small leadership council�velayat-e faqih�was also
enshrined in the constitution. Khomeini alone em-
bodies the principle as the activists prefer. Quietist
clerics who favor collective authority, however, in-
cluded a provision for a small council to serve when
a single outstanding cleric is not available.
� The "leader" was given sweeping powers over the
three branches of government and named com-
mander in chief of the armed forces. The next
article of the constitution, however, asserts the
quietist principle that national affairs must be man-
aged by reliance on public opinion through elections
and referendums. The preamble, moreover, calls for
the involvement of every citizen in "all stages of
political and fateful decisionmaking."
'Ayatollah Khomeini, December 1979. (u)
� Both the regular Army and the paramilitary Revo-
lutionary Guard were included in the constitution as
defenders, respectively, of "independence, territorial
integrity, and the Islamic Republic" and of the
"revolution." Statements by influential clerics show
that quietists who favor lay government tend to
support the interests of the regular forces�properly
"Islamicized." Activists, on the other hand, want
the pious volunteers of the Guard to be the only
armed force. Khomeini vacillates. In early 1983 he
announced that the regular forces "would be with us
until the end of time," but he had earlier supported
activists who wanted to eliminate the regular forces.
In domestic policy the regime has often been ham-
strung by conflict between the activists and quietists
over how to apply religious law to modern problems,
we believe. Statements by leading clerics indicate that
they agree on using Iranian resources on behalf of the
Iranian people, developing domestic capabilities to
exploit those resources, and bettering the lives of the
"oppressed" lower classes while creating a society
impervious to outside influences. But activists and
quietists are at odds over how best to accomplish these
goals. Land and urban housing reform as well as trade
nationalization are the most obvious examples of
activist legislation that has been stymied by quietist
strict-constructionist clerics.
In foreign policy, the activists have been more suc-
cessful, perhaps because their agenda does not strike
so directly at the personal interests of the quietist
clerics and their constituents. Accounts in the Iranian
press show that quietist pressures have, however,
overcome activist reluctance to crack down on the
Tudeh Communist Party and put distance between
Iran and the USSR. Iran now has cut or severely
limited ties with both Eastern and Western "sa-
tans"�the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the USSR�that it perceives as actual or potential
threats to its interests.
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Statements by by leading clerics in the Iranian media
indicate general agreement on seeking alliances with
states�primarily in the Third World�that are op-
posed to "imperialism," and on proposing Muslim and
Third World cooperation and mutual assistance
against "Eastern and Western imperialism." But the
clerics sharply disagree over methods and targets for
"exporting the revolution," in part because activists
. and quietists cannot agree on what the basic message
should be. Quietists tend to support nonviolent activi-
ties compatible with traditional Muslim practice,
while many activists believe that the fusion of religion
and politics in Khomeinism justifies any means of
spreading their ideology. These clerics have taken the
lead in Iran's cooperation with a wide range of
dissident groups throughout the world
The Current Clerical Debate
We believe the longstanding debate between the Shia
activists and quietists is now centered on the succes-
sion to Khomeini and the types of Islamic government
each group envisages for Iran. Two leading rival
systems can be symbolized by two phrases, derived
from Shia doctrine, that the clerics have often used
interchangeably to describe the Islamic regime they
want, according to an American researcher on Iran.
One term, velayat-e fagih (leadership by a religious
jurisprudent), is emphasized by the activists around
Khomeini. It is particularly evocative of their view of
the Shia Imams. Velayat means rule or guardianship
but has an added connotation of sanctity. It symbol-
izes the emotional commitment of inferiors to superi-
ors, such as a child to its father or the believer to God.
This concept taps some of the strongest social and
emotional bonds in Iranian society. Relations between
equals are perceived by Iranians as unstable and
demanding, according to an American scholar who
has focused on Iranian psychology, and are difficult
for them to sustain rationally.
The other term is hokumat-e eslami (Islamic govern-
ment), which has been associated with quietist tenden-
cies. Nevertheless, it is also the term Khomeini used
as the title of his second book. Hokumat-e eslami is
associated with the Shia tradition of jurisprudence.
19
Table 2
Two Forms of Islamic Government
Advocated by Iranian Clerics
Velayat-e Faqih (Rule by a
Religious Jurisprudent)
Hokumat-e Eslami (Islamic
Government)
Now associated with Line-of-
the-Imam faction; its major
organ is the Islamic Republic
Party
Now associated with the Hoja-
tieh faction; its major organ is
the Combatant Clerics'
Association
Strong theocracy; centralized
power; no significant dissent al-
lowed; autocratic
Lay government, clerical super-
vision; decentralized; disagree-
ment and clerical specialization
allowed; consensual
Single supreme leader linked to
infallible Imams and symboli-
cally to God; officials and popu-
lace inferior to leader; succes-
sion by mandate from
predecessor
Supervision by clerics tied to
fallible jurisprudents and legal
tradition; status of clerics, peo-
ple, and officials balanced; suc-
cession by consensus
Limited popular participation
and scope for legislature; popu-
lar allegiance based on emotion
Inflexible, likely to make de-
mands; unanimity stressed
Popular participation and
broader scope for legislature;
allegiance based on reason
Flexible; inclined to negotiate;
follows majority opinion
God is the ruler of the world; temporal government must be based
on His revealed laws and be supervised by religious jurisprudents;
clerics are allowed to use their own reasoning capacities, based on
their accumulated expertise, to interpret doctrines in Shia texts and
apply them to contemporary issues.
Hokumat means control and order derived from legal
powers based on human rationality.
The clerical establishment can now be described as
split into two amorphous groups based in part on these
two views of government. These factions are about
equal in influence, but there are far more quietists
than activists. The factions are called Khat-e Imam
(Line-of-the-Imam [Khomeini] ) and Hojatieh (a refer-
ence to the Hidden Imam�Mandi).2� The Line-of-
the-Imam tends to be activist and the Hojatieh quiet-
" The Line-of-the-Imam faction is sometimes referred to as
Maktabi (a reference to the Islamic equivalent of elementary school
that implies correctness of political views).
�Sesrat�
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Figure 6
Factional Distribution of Selected Clerics
in the Khomeini Regimea
Line-of-the-Imam
Ayatollah Montazeri
Khomeini's heir apparent.
Hojjat ol-Eslam Sanei
Revolutionary Prosecutor General.
Hojjat ol-Eslam Janati
Prayer leader of Ahvaz and occasionally
in Qom, Council of Guardians member.
Hojjat ol-Eslam Khoeniha
Deputy Consultative Assembly Speaker
and adviser of hostage takers at the US
Embassy.
Ayatollah Movahedi-Kermani
Consultative Assembly member, head of
pro-Khomeini paramilitary group, on
leadership rosters of IRP and CCA.
Hojjat ol-Eslam Qafari
Consultative Assembly member and
leader of pro-Khomeini street gangs
(hezbollahi).
-it-- Tendency toward
Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani
Speaker of the Assembly, deputy head of
Islamic Republic Party (IRP).
Hojjat ol-Eslam Dr. Khamenei
President, head of Islamic Republic
Party.
Notes: These characterizations should not be considered definitive. It is
easier to outline broad divisions among the Iranian clerics than to link
individuals to them with confidence. Clerical ties overlap and are often
opportunistic. Alliances have formed and reformed over the past four years,
depending on the issue and Khomeini's position. Iranians tend not to be
troubled by shifting alliances and simultaneous participation in groups with
opposing ideologies and goals, according to Western researchers.
Clerical views, moreover, are obscured by another factor. The unique Shia
doctrine of taqiyeh or "dissimulation" sanctions lying about beliefs when it
benefits the Shia community. Recent Hojati statements in favor of leadership
by a single guardian cleric and mutual praise by Assembly Speaker
Rafsanjani and President Khamenei�who are rivals�are probably
examples of such dissimulation.
301034 11-83
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20
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Ulf
ist, but these distinctions are not rigid." Khomeini has
helped perpetuate divisions within the clergy, even
while calling on all clerics to support his regime and
stop bickering in public
We believe he does this partly to
preserve his own preeminence. But he apparently also
realizes that none of the clerical leaders would imple-
ment fully his ideal of the Islamic Republic.
The Line-of-the-Imam has tended to emphasize the
more revolutionary aspects of Iran's Islamic Revolu-
tion, It has
co-opted leftist programs, including land reform and
central control of industry and trade. The faction
favors good relations with Moscow and anti-imperial-
ist forces worldwide as a means of striking out against
the West. We think radical members of the faction
were responsible for the hostage taking at the US
Embassy in 1979. Members of this faction should not,
however, be regarded as simply pro-Soviet or even
sympathetic toward Communism. Khomeini and most
of its leaders view the USSR as an imperialist "satan'
and a threat to the Islamic Republic
Public statements by members of the Line-of-the-
Imam faction show that they want a single cleric to
succeed Khomeini to continue undiluted the central-
ization of power in one religious leader whose extraor-
dinary qualifications legitimize the regime. Some
clerics, such as Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani, who
are too junior to succeed Khomeini alone or to win
easily a place on a leadership council, have supported
the faction on Khomeini's succession
They and faction mem-
bers hope to preserve their power after Khomeini dies
by installing a successor they can influence.
2' The term Hojatieh is used generically in this paper to indicate
clerics who wish to moderate some of the more wide-ranging
changes proposed by other pro-Khomeini clerics. The name may be
derived from a theologically conservative, anti-Bahai group formed
in the 1950s�called the Hojatieh Society�or from a title of the
Hidden Imam (Oka or "proof') used to symbolize opposition to
enshrining Khomeini as a charismatic leader. Some individuals
associated with the Hojatieh Society may be associated with the
current Hojatieh faction, but the most influential factional mem-
bers may have had no ties to the Society. The Hojatieh Society's
political activities in 1983 were criticized obliquely by Khomeini for
causing divisions within the clergy. The Society announced in July
that it would no longer sponsor public activities.
21
They are currently backing Ayatollah Montazeri,
regarded by many Iranians as Khomeini's own choice
as successor. Montazeri has spoken out in favor of
continued war with Iraq and export of the revolution.
But his statements show that he is also strongly anti-
Soviet. Montazeri has suggested publicly that ties
with the United States are theoretically possible. We
believe, however, that no Iranian cleric will advocate
actually opening contacts with the United States until
the regime is certain of its ability to retain control in
Iran. Montazeri is a far less austere and intransigent
personality than Khomeini, according to Western
journalists and scholars who have met with him.
The other faction, the Hojatis, has tended to focus on
the religious aspects of the revolution
It has the sympathy of all
of the grand ayatollahs and of influential clerics at the
,Qom seminary. President Khamenei�a rival of
Speaker Rafsanjani�has publicly supported its views
on the succession." The Hojatis emphasize the need to
legitimize the government by implementing religious
law as the penal code and guide for everyday activity.
But they believe that
direct clerical intervention in secular affairs should be
limited�a major quietist tenet. We believe they were
largely responsible for Khomeini's decree late last
year that called for more humane social policies and
played an important role in the crackdown on the
Tudeh Communist Party and Soviet activities in Iran.
Some emphasize their religious duty to "export the
revolution."
Iranian press accounts show that Hojatis oppose
major economic reforms sponsored by the Imamis
that are similar to the proposals of leftist Iranian
" In addition to Khomeini, the grand ayatollahs in Iran are
Golpayegani, Marashi-Najafi, and Shariat-Madari in Qom and
Shirazi in Mashhad. Khomeini's supporters claim that his superior-
ity to all other ayatollahs warrants him the title of Imam. Backers
of Ayatollah Montazeri as Khomeini's successor refer to him as a
grand ayatollah, but none of the other grand ayatollahs�including
Khomeini�has ever recognized his claim to the title. Grand
Ayatollah Khoi, in An Najaf, Iraq, is reported
to be close to the Hojatieh. A remark he made in 1970, disparaging
Khomeini's theories on clerical involvement in politics, inspired the
series of lectures that became Khomeini's book, Islamic Republic.
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groups. They also reject close ties to Communist or
radical regimes, whether Muslim or not. They want to
use Western technology in rebuilding the Iranian
economy, but, like the Imamis, they are wary of the
impact of Western influences in Iran.
Hojatis want Khomeini to be succeeded by a council
of three to five senior jurisprudents, which would
presumably include some of their sympathizers. They
emphasize a Shia quietist tradition that vests author-
ity in the clerical community rather than in an
individual cleric. They accept Khomeini as the politi-
cal and religious leader of the moment but refuse to
accept any mystical link between him and early
Muslim leaders. We believe Ayatollah Meshkini may
be the Hojati candidate for the succession. He takes a
hard line on the war with Iraq and is antileftist.
Prospects
The course of the Islamic Republic depends to a large
extent on how the clerics manage the succession to
Khomeini, we believe. This is bound up in the long
activist and quietist philosophical feud over the nature
of Shiism and the clerics' intense personal rivalries.
Both factions have begun to lay the groundwork for
establishing that Shia dogma gives legitimacy to their
views and for institutionalizing their programs after
Khomeini's death, according to accounts in the Irani-
an media.
As a practical matter, after Khomeini, the activist
clerics will have to rely more heavily on coercion of
the population to maintain their control. Khomeini,
like other charismatic leaders, is irreplaceable. More
than any other cleric, he symbolizes the aspirations of
the revolution and an Islamic regime. We believe
whether the clerics choose a single successor�and
Montazeri is the most likely�or a leadership council,
the post-Khomeini clerical leadership will not be able
to evoke the same loyalties that Khomeini has com-
manded from the lower classes who are the mainstay
of the regime.
We see Montazeri as a transitional leader. His cleri-
cal credentials are insufficient to sustain a claim to be
supreme political-religious leader, and his managerial
�Seeret�
skills are disparaged by Iranians. A leadership coun-
cil, on the other hand, whether serving as adviser to
Montazeri or as successor to Khomeini would dilute
the doctrine of guardianship as it has been applied to
Khomeini. It would also undermine his calls for unity
of thought among clerics. A council, however, would
embody the collective leadership desired by the quiet-
ist Hojatis.
We expect each clerical faction to try to impose its
view as the authoritative interpretation of Khomeini's
legacy. Iranian propaganda shows that activists are
trying to popularize radical doctrinal interpretations
that will ensure their dominance. They have also tried
unsuccessfully to stage-manage the succession in ad-
vance They have ma-
neuvered Montazeri into positions of responsibility
delegated by Khomeini that are designed to make him
seem the obvious heir. But Khomeini has also delegat-
ed similar responsibilities to Meshkini.
We think the grand ayatollahs may well enter the
succession process in an effort to modify the regime's
ideology in favor of less clerical involvement in run-
ning the government. Just as Borujerdi's death in
1961 freed Khomeini and other anti-Shah activists,
Khomeini's death would allow the grand ayatollahs,
who are all generally quietist, to exert their own still-
considerable influence over the Iranian people.
They have stayed in the background for the most part
since 1979, but recently grand Ayatollah Shirazi,
ayatollahs in Mashhad and Esfahan, and possibly
even grand Ayatollah Khoi have sponsored demon-
strations against the government in Iranian cities,
according to the Iranian media. We believe such
activities, if sustained, would present a serious chal-
lenge to the activist clerics and would be especially
threatening after Khomeini's death. In this regard,
the succession process is a waiting game. If Khomeini,
who is 83, can outlive his widely respected peers�all
in their eighties or nineties�activists who back the
doctrine of leadership of a guardian cleric will face
less authoritative quietist challenges.
22
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Figure 7
Possible Successors to Khomeini
Hojjat ol-Eslam Ali Khamenei
In his 40s ... president ... a founder and
head of Islamic Republic Party ...
chairman of Supreme Defense Council ..
ties to Revolutionary Guard and regular
forces ... Tehran Friday prayer leader,
but has rarely spoken since serious injury
in bombing in June 1981 ... rival of
Rafsanjani ... favors succession to
Khomeini by a "leadership council" and
opposes Montazeri.
30,005 ',-83
Ayatollah Hosein Montazeri
In his 60s ... leading candidate to succeed
Khomeini ... backed by Line-of-the-
Imam faction ... delegated some of
Khomeini's powers, including authority to
select Supreme Judicial Council
candidates and name Revolutionary Court
judges ... supervises Revolutionary Guard
ideological training and counter-
intelligence organization ... close ties to
Libya ... favors export of the
revolution ... advocates leadership by
"guardian cleric" ... ill health due to
torture while imprisoned by the Shah.
Ayatollah All Meshkini
In his 40s or 50s ... often mentioned as
most likely to succeed Khomeini if
Montazeri does not ... backed by
"hojatieh" faction ... shares with
Montazeri powers over judiciary delegated
by Khomeini ... Qom Friday prayer
leader and head of Qom Combatant
Cleric's Association ... head of Assembly
of Experts chosen to name Khomeini's heir
... supervises selection of weekly sermon
topics for nationwide use ... advocates
clerical supervision, but not direct
participation at all levels of government.
Hojjat ol-Eslam Ali Akbar Hashemi-
Rafsanjani
In his 40s ... considered the most
powerful cleric after Khomeini and a
formidable politician ... speaker of
Consultative Assembly ... a founder and
deputy head of Islamic Republic Party ...
Khomeini's representative and spokesman
of Supreme Defense Council ... ties to
Revolutionary Guard ... hurt somewhat
by crackdown on Tudeh, which he was
willing to tolerate ... rival of Khamenei
... advocates leadership of "guardian
cleric" and supports Montazeri.
23
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We believe, however, that the advantage probably lies
with the reassertion of quietist tendencies. Quietism
has been strong in Shiism from its beginnings. Some
scholars say it has been dominant since at least the
10th century even though quietists failed to stifle
completely the politicized activist clerics. Activist
Khomeinism only began to challenge the quietist
tradition in the 1960s and has overshadowed it only
since 1979. Khomeinism has not yet been institution-
alized in Iran. Some popular clerics who were in the
forefront of activist politicking against the Shah have
joined quietists in opposing the Khomeini regime.
Hence, the weight of time, tradition, and probably
numbers still favors those who do not want an activist
regime.
Political opportunism and the theological and histori-
cal precedents that define clerical ideology encourage
compromise among the clerics. But Shiism also has a
tradition of violent clashes between rival clerical
groups while one dominant faction is being replaced
by another. We think such clashes could trigger wider
violence that would threaten the stability of the
Islamic Republic. The Iranian press has acknowl-
edged a clash in Tehran in mid-June between follow-
ers of the Line-of-the-Imam and the Hojatieh Society,
and recent demonstra-
tions and clashes in other cities. Moreover, Khomei-
ni's repeated calls for the Revolutionary Guard and
Army to eschew political loyalties
influential activist and quietist
clerics have been courting ties with elements of the
armed forces. The Iranian exile media has also sug-
gested that some of the deaths of leading clerics over
the past four years resulted not from attacks by
opposition groups, but from rivalries within the theo-
logical community.
Implications for the United States
The likelihood of continued clerical control in Iran
after Khomeini has important implications for US
interests. We believe the ground rules for Iranian
ideology defined by Khomeinism dictate opposition to
the United States. Ayatollah Montazeri, a strong
activist, has suggested publicly that relations with the
United States are theoretically possible, but none of
the leading clerics is likely to feel secure enough in the
near term after Khomeini's death to initiate contacts
with Washington. Quietists who might try to reverse
25
Khomeini's anti-US course would be especially vul-
nerable to activist charges of treason on religious and
nationalist grounds.
(b)(3)
While the debate among the clerical factions is being
played out, the regime will remain highly ideological
whatever the balance of power among the activists
and quietists, according to a Western diplomat in
Tehran. The clerical community is dominated by Shia
historical precedents and religious laws that circum-
scribe the clerics' world view and regulate their
policies. (b)(3)
We do not expect any of the leaders of clerical
factions to allow Iran to develop close ties with a (b)(3)
superpower or to abandon Tehran's efforts to expand
Iranian influence worldwide as a leader of the Third
World:
� But the stronger the activists become, the more
likely Iran is to seek contacts with the USSR, its
allies, radical Third World regimes, and dissident
groups worldwide. An activist regime will target, in
particular, the Persian Gulf regimes, whose govern-
ments it sees as corrupt tools of the West. The
activists will also focus on offsetting the perceived
ability of the United States to manipulate interna-
tional political and economic relationships and im-
pose Western values on developing nations.
� Conversely, quietist strength is likely to create more
openings for relationships�particularly economic
ties�with the United States and other Western
nations because of quietist appreciation of Western
technology. But quietists are also wary of the impact
on Iran of worldwide US influences.
Thus, for the near term after Khomeini's death, we
believe a clerical regime or an Islamic lay government
backed by clerics is most likely to focus on marshaling
its strength at home and abroad in opposition to the
United States. In the process, its differences with the
USSR are likely to receive less attention. While the
Soviets probably would have little influence on Irani-
an policies after Khomeini, Moscow would continue to
benefit indirectly from the clerics' aversion to Wash-
ington.
-St, iv
(b)(3)
(b)(31
(b)(3)
(h1C31
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