INSURGENT SUCCESS AND FAILURE: SELECTED CASE STUDIES - 1983/05/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05165812
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: May 1, 1983

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Insurgent Success and Failure:
Selected Case Studies 3.5(c)
A Research Paper
,Seeret"
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May 1983
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Directorate of
Intelligence
.Seererr�
Insurgent Success and Failure:
Selected Case Studies
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by the Insurgency Branch
of the Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Instability and Insurgency Center, OGI, on
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3.5(c)
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 8 April 1983
was used in this repor
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Insurgent Success and Failure:
Selected Case Studies (u)
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Although insurgencies differ greatly among themselves and may succeed or
ail for individual or fortuitous reasons, an examination of past insurrec-
ions reveals a fairly close association of certain factors with insurgent
success or failure. For this study, we looked at 14 dissimilar insurgencies,
both successful and unsuccessful, and isolated a number of these factors.
(c)
The characteristics that we believe were responsible for the outcome of the
eight successful rural insurgencies analyzed in this paper include:
� Failure by the government to detect or to counter the initial stages of in-
surgent organization.
� Failure by the government to understand or act on the grievances that
fed the insurgency.
� Emergence of nationalism as a key insurgent theme often exploited by
the Communist elements.
� Lack of an effective government-sponsored political coalition as an
alternative to insurgent coalitions.
� Indiscriminate government repression of opposition groups, leaving the
insurgents as the only group able to represent popular grievances
effectively.
� Existence of a charismatic and effective insurgent leader who maintained
insurgent cadre morale despite setbacks.
� Government use of military tactics emphasizing static defense and
conventional large-unit operations rather than offensive and small-unit
unconventional operations.
� Existence of sanctuaries in adjacent countries or remote domestic areas
where insurgent cadre could organize. (c)
In the three unsuccessful rural insurgencies studied, the victorious govern-
ments were generally able to avoid those pitfalls while the insurgents were
unable to develop safe sanctuaries or exploit nationalism. Moreover, in all
three cases no charismatic leader�of the caliber of Mao or Castro�ever
emerged. (c)
There is no clear-cut case of successful urban insurgency in the post�World
War II era. In the three unsuccessful urban insurgencies studied�
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Argentina�the insurgents attempted but were
unable to maintain rural insurgency. In Argentina and Uruguay, the
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civilian governments were initially paralyzed and eventually replaced by
military governments able to penetrate insurgent organizations and neu-
tralize their leadership. The draconian measures used to destroy these
insurgencies were generally not actively opposed by the urban populations,
which either supported or were intimidated by the military governments in
power. 3.5(c)
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Contents
3.5(c)
Page
Key Judgments iii
Appendix
Case Studies of Insurgencies 7
Argentina (1973-78) 47
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Argentina (1973-78)
Environment of the Insurgency
Guerrilla activity in Argentina during the 1973-78
period grew out of the chaotic political situation that
had existed since the overthrow of Juan Peron in
1955. The various military and civilian governments
that ruled Argentina between 1955 and 1973 were
unable to co-opt, assimilate, or repress large sectors of
society that had embraced various aspects of Peron-
ism. As a result, Argentina's political scene was
marked by widespread labor unrest and terrorist
violence. Additionally, the Argentine economy was in
a steady downward spiral resulting from mismanage-
ment, labor unrest, and weak commodity prices on the
world market. A number of armed groups were
formed during this period with the objective of bring-
ing down the various militarily backed governments.
The majority of these groups were at least nominally
Peronist, although some Marxist groups were also
formed. While disaffection with the existing regimes
promoted a certain unity of action among all opposi-
tion groups, they often disagreed about the type of
political system that would replace the government
once it was defeated. Increasing terrorism and eco-
nomic chaos eventually persuaded the military to cede
power to a civilian government dominated by the
Peronists. In April 1973 Hector Campora, the Peron-
ist candidate, was elected President. After the election
Juan Peron returned to Argentina from exile in Spain
and was elected overwhelmingly to the presidency in
September 1973.
3.5(c)
Early History
Peron's return to power did not end the insurgent
violence. His adoption of relatively conservative poli-
cies exacerbated a split between the left and right
wings of the Peronist movement. The Montoneros, a
well-organized militant Peronist group with a nation-
alistic socialist ideology, became increasingly radical-
ized. According to their own statements, the
Montoneros believed that Peron was betraying the
movement by aligning himself with industrialists and
foreign interests. While not openly breaking with
Peron, the Montoneros continued to organize among
the Peronist youth, labor, and other sections of the
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movement, accumulating resources and material for a
future struggle. By the time Peron died in July 1974,
the Montoneros had developed an extensive network
of hardcore cadre and support personnel. Huge sums
of money were obtained through kidnapings, bank
robberies, and extortion (over US $100 million was
invested abroad). Weapons were purchased on the
black market, stolen from government forces, and
manufactured in underground factories. A political
arm was also formed to organize mass support.
Soon after the Peron regime took power, most of the
radical Marxist groups responded to Peron's drift to
the right by increasing opposition to the government.
Smaller groups eventually coalesced around the mili-
tant Trotskyite organization, the People's Revolution-
ary Army (ERP). Although the ERP adopted primari-
ly an urban warfare approach to pressure the regime,
it also established a base area in the mountainous
region of Tucuman Province. Many people in this
area were sugar mill workers, one of the poorest
groups in Argentina. In addition to the sugar mill
workers, the ERP recruited among students, profes-
sionals, and, to a lesser extent, labor. 3.5(c)
3.5(c)
During the early 1970s, the ERP attempted to estab-
lish a "Robin Hood" image by stealing food, money,
and consumer goods from the rich and distributing
many of these items to poor urban dwellers. The
primary targets of ERP attacks were foreign and
domestic business interests, government officials, and
the military. The attacks were generally kidnapings
for ransom, assassinations, or bombings. Large mili-
tary-type operations, including attacks against mili-
tary installations involving up to 100 men, were also
perpetrated, but these were relatively infrequent. ERP
attacks were aimed at discrediting the government's
ability to maintain order and at obtaining support
from the poor and from organized labor. Various
classified and unclassified reports indicate that the
ERP believed that eventually the continuing chaos
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would either cause the Peronist government to col-
lapse, leaving the ERP as the only organized group
capable of establishing order, or force the government
to give the ERP a leading position in a new coalition
of leftist Peronists and Marxists
3.5(c)
Government Response
Peron moved against the ERP as soon as he took
power, primarily through the creation of rightwing
Peronist paramilitary units to intimidate and assassi-
nate leftwing opponents. Although most of these units
were run through special departments of various
police agencies, they were organized and directed by
Peron's Minister for Social Welfare, Jose Lopez
Rega, and his subordinates. The Federal Police were
also tasked with combating the insurgents through the
more traditional methods of penetration, investiga-
tion, and arrest. 3.5(c)
Initially the Army was reluctant to get involved in the
antisubversive campaign. After nearly 17 years of
military rule, the Army command wanted to rebuild
an image of the Army as defender of the people.
Although the military did penetrate and collect intel-
ligence on both the ERP and the Montoneros, it
avoided sharing information with the police.
lat least one Army corps
organized its own paramilitary unit to act against
leftist targets. Nevertheless, the bulk of the counterin-
surgency effort was directed by civilian agencies.
3.5(c) 3.3(b)(1)
The inability of the civilian agencies to combat the
insurgent violence because of politicalization, bureau-
cratic inertia, and lack of cooperation eventually
persuaded the military to press for a more active role
in the effort. After Peron's death in July of 1974, the
military played an increasingly larger counterinsur-
gent role. In 1975 the military took over the counter-
insurgent campaign against the ERP in Tucuman
Province. Despite grumblings by some rightwing offi-
cers, the Army adopted an extremely enlightened
counterinsurgency approach, particularly in the rural
areas of the province, emphasizing civic action to
improve the living conditions of the sugar mill workers
and psychological operations to explain to the people
what the military was trying to do. Military opera-
tions started with a massive sweep of the area,
followed by the establishment of semipermanent base
camps from which small-unit patrols were continually
launched. The insurgents were thus kept on the run,
while the population was won over by civil affairs
programs 3.5(c)
Efforts by the police to dismantle the ERP and
Montonero urban network continued to fail. The
Argentine legal system, because of its complexity and
inefficiency, made it almost impossible to indict and
sentence arrested insurgents and thereby discouraged
arrests. Paramilitary violence did not affect the hard-
core insurgent infrastructure. Such violence, which
escalated during this period, was haphazard and often
aimed at revenge. 3.5(c)
The continuing economic chaos and terrorist violence
led the military to assume power in a March 1976
coup. The new government effectively coordinated the
counterinsurgency effort through the National Intelli-
gence Center (NIC) and replaced key police officials
with military officers. The NIC collected information
from the various intelligence agencies, processed it,
and disseminated it to appropriate units for exploita-
tion. Paramilitary organizations were placed under
the direct control of their parent organizations and
given specific missions against the insurgent support
networks. While numerous innocent people were tor-
tured and killed by paramilitary units, most of the
victims were at least supporters of the ERP or the
Montoneros. Intelligence units successfully penetrated
both groups and extracted much information from
captured insurgents through the extensive use of
torture. Many of the detained insurgents were later
killed to prevent their future release by a civilian
government. Press censorship was adopted to prevent
the insurgents from obtaining media coverage
Argentina also obtained the cooperation of neighbor-
ing countries when a joint intelligence committee was
established to serve as a focus for the exchange of
information on insurgent activities in these countries.
This cooperative arrangement prevented insurgents
from obtaining refuge and assistance from sympathet-
ic groups in countries bordering Argentina.
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Influence of External Factors
External aid had little influence on the development
and maintenance of the Montoneros and the ERP.
Both groups acquired large sums of money through
kidnapings and bank robberies and used these funds
to purchase arms and equipment. Additional weapons
were obtained through raids on government installa-
tions or by manufacture in sophisticated underground
factories. 3.5(c)
Numerous members of the Montoneros and the ERP,
however, did receive political organization and mili-
tary trainin in Cuba. Furthermore,
Cuban officials provided operation-
a gui ance in propaganda operations and
international logistic supoort t9 both groups.
Cuba provided the
ERP with funds. Some observers argue that without
Cuban training and logistic support neither group
could have become so potent.
3.5(c)
The Argentine military received limited military as-
sistance from the United States until 1977, when the
Carter administration curtailed all military aid to
Argentina because of human rights violations. This
assistance had little bearing on the outcome of the
insurgency. Argentina manufactured numerous weap-
ons domestically and purchased others from a variety
of suppliers. 3.5(c)
Explaining Government Success
Several factors contributed to the government's coun-
terinsurgent success:
� The military government organized an efficient
intelligence apparatus that was able to acquire and
exploit information on the insurgent infrastructure.
A variety of means were employed including pene-
tration, torture, bribes, and limited amnesty.
� Paramilitary terror was effective in decimating the
insurgent support network and intimidating the
population to dissociate themselves from the in-
surgents. This type of terror was effective in Argen-
tina because a large portion of the population, while
having grievances, had a standard of living high
enough to prevent them from risking their lives and
well-being for the dubious goals of the insurgents.
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� As the violence of the confrontation between the
insurgents and the government increased, mass or-
ganizations, such as labor, cut their ties to the
insurgency. Furthermore, insurgent violence began
to lose its political impact as the insurgents concen-
trated on military targets. The insurgency eventual-
ly took on the ethos of a vendetta against the Army
rather than of a "people's" war against the
government.
� Insurgent large-scale attacks began to threaten ci-
vilians not involved in the conflict. As a result the
population became disillusioned with the violence in
general and began providing information on the
insurgents in the hope that peace could be
established.
� In those rural areas infested by insurgents, the
military combined effective counterinsurgent mili-
tary operations with civic action programs that won
the people over to the military.
� Argentina was able to obtain the cooperation of its
neighbors to prevent the insurgents from using
neighboring countries as sanctuaries.
3.5(c)
Despite the victory of the Argentine military over the
insurgent groups, some observers believe that the
brutal methods employed by the military government
will seriously impede the Argentine Government from
achieving the political consensus necessary to rule
effectively. Grievances arising from the brutal sup-
pression of the ERP and Montoneros may contribute
to form the basis for future insurgencies.
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