CUBA: PROMOTING ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AMERICA - 1981/09/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05136430
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981

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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Cuba:
Promoting Armed Struggle
in South Americ 3.5(c)
An Intelligence Assessment
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3.5(c)
PA 81-10372
81-10372
September 1981
Copy 295
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3.5(c)
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National
Foreign
`I Assessment
Center
Cuba:
Promoting Armed Struggle
in South America 3.5(c)
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 1 September 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared by
Office of Political Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Latin
America Division, OPA,
3.5(c)
The assessment was coordinated with the Office of
Strategic Research, the Office of Economic
Research, the Directorate of Operations, and the
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America.
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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PA 81-10372
81-10372
September 1981
3.5(c)
Key Judgments
NR
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Cuba:
Promoting Armed
in South America
gle
3.5(c)
SectFr-
Since the overthrow of President Somoza in Nicaragua in 1979, armed
struggle has played an increasing role in Cuba's policy toward Latin
America. A trend�which shows no sign of abating�has been established
toward greater risk-taking and growing dependence on violent revolution as
a mainstay of foreign policy.
Cuba's hard line has Soviet blessing. The Soviets have come to acknowl-
edge that under certain circumstances rebel groups can serve as the
revolutionary vanguard more effectively than can the local Communist
party.
3.5(c)
In countries where prospects for revolutionary change are dim, Castro
probably believes that a rise in terrorism will provoke enough government
repression to lead to mass alienation, one of the factors necessary for
revolutionary success. Havana is willing to train guerrillas even from
Argentina and Uruguay, where there is little chance of overthrowing the
government, in part because the trained insurgents constitute reserves that
can fight elsewhere in fulfillment of their "international duty"�as they
did in Nicaragua in 1979.
iii
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"ectli
PA 81-10372
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S.d
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3.5(c)
The Castro regime may revise its tactics as a result of setbacks, but its
commitment to violent revolution will not change. Any falloff in its support
for Latin American revolutionaries would require events similar to those of
the late 1960s�a series of major guerrilla defeats, Cuba's virtual isolation
in the hemisphere, and strong pressure from the USSR.
,eere(
3.5(c)
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seret 3.5(c)
Cuba:
Promoting Arme:r_SII ell le 3.5(c)
in South Americ
NR
y,Se
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NR
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SKI-et
The Cubans and the Soviets constantly tout the
Sandinista example as evidence of the critical role
played by leftist unity and international support in
achieving and retaining power. They view these as
requisites for legitimizing the revolution and safe-
guarding it against counterrevolution and outside
interference. Although leftist forces also must
strengthen their paramilitary capabilities and try to
exploit legitimate paths to power until those paths
prove fruitless, unity is seen as the linchpin. (c)
If the unified left succeeds through elections, as
Salvador Allende did in Chile in 1970, the possession
of a strong paramilitary capability protects the leftist
leadership and provides insurance against the armed
forces which, in Cuba's view, are irreversibly opposed
to revolutionary change. The Cubans faulted Allende
for not developing a paramilitary force strong enough
to prevent the coup that unseated him in 1973, and
they are determined to make sure that other revolu-
tionaries who achieve power through elections do not
make the same mistake. (c)
On the other hand, if the left does not succeed by
legitimate means, it can claim that the only way to
right social ills is violent revolution, thus providing
theoretical justification for armed struggle. A strong
paramilitary capability is therefore required regard-
less of the success or failure of the electoral effort, and
the earlier it is created, the sooner the left will be
prepared to take advantage of opportunities as they
arise. (c)
Supporting South American Revolutionaries
Havana's enthusiasm about developments in Central
America quickly grew to include South America.
South American revolutionaries and other leftists
visiting Havana in early 1979 received much the same
advice as their Central American counterparts.
5x-�t 2
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NR
3.5(c)
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f4
Fidel Castro surrounded by leaders of the Nicaraguan Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSL,N) at 26 July 1979 celebrations in
Cuba 3.5(c)
Reflecting the level of Havana's interest, Fidel Castro
became personally involved in some of these efforts.
In December 1980 the Cuban leader reported2y met
with the secretary general of the Chilean Communist
Party and pledged to support the party's efforts to
unite the left against Pinochet. Castro also urged the
Communist Party to adopt armed struggle and to
coordinate its activities more closely with the Move-
ment of the Revolutionary Left.
3.5(c)
Havana's tactical advice was accompanied by a sharp
increase in direct support to South American insur-
gents, particularly those from Chile, Colombia, and to
a lesser extent Argentina. In the last case, Havana
focused its efforts primarily on activities outside
Argentina. For example, Cuba employed a number of
Montoneros in the so-called "Internationalist Bri-
gade" that fought alongside the Sandinistas in Nica-
ragua in 1979. The Cuban media, meantime, provided
favorable coverage of all such exploits
3
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In sum, Castro will continue to promote, and perhaps
escalate, revolutionary activity throughout Latin
America�albeit less recklessly than in the 1960s.
Havana sees prospects for a successful revolution as
brightest in Central America and therefore will con-
centrate its efforts in that region. Nevertheless, the
Cubans also will continue to support insurgent groups ,.
in South America. The Cuban leader sees promising
opportunities through promotion of insurgency to
advance Cuban objectives in the region and to restore r
a sense of revolutionary momentum at home in a
period when little else seems to be working to his
regime's advantage.
3.5(c)
.59s.set� 6
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Appendix
Cuban Support of Revolutionaries
in Selected South American Countries
7
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�Zet
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Cuban Diplomatic Relations in Latin America August 1981
United States
Mexico
Belize
�
The Bahamas !DIGb
' Cuba
Dominicanit,bulic
Haiti
Jamaica
1972
GualernelyHondur�ras^�
El Salvcdais.r.'
Nicaragua 1979
Costa
Rica
Nanabia,
74
Ecuador
-;
Peru
' 1:rcsan
Chile
I I
Diplomatic relations
[E73 Suspended relations
No diplomatic relations
1S74 Relations established or reestablished
I I
aSuspended in March 1981
bNonresident ambassador
c c
Dominica 19 0 bb
51.0 Luc. 1 972
1979 b
St. Vincent and .bados
the Grenadines
w""a1979
. t - 'Trinidad and Tobago 1972 b
Venezuela 1172
Guyana i
French
Guiana
'
S riname i(France)
1
Argentina
truguay
Brazil
South
Atlantic Ocean
3.5(c)
8
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3.5(c)
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>Seal(
Known and Suspect Guerrilla Infiltration Routes into Argentina, Chile and Colombia
United States
hiorth Atlantic Ocean
With intermediate stops in
South and Central America
Guidern
El
Icaragua
Costa
Rica c .
Pan4rna,
I
�is- *BOGOTA
Colombia
)4.
Republic
Hat
With intermediate stops in
Mexico and Central America Dom.'"
SI v,nceni ond sI
Lca
the Grenadines Grena,,,
a Os
Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela
With intermediate
stops in Europe
French
Guiana
' (France)
Ecuado
Peru
Brazil
South Pacific Ocean
Bolivia
Paraguay
Guerrilla Infiltration Routes
Air Land/Sea
Argentine ---
Chilean
Colombian
SANTIAGO*
Chile
Valdivia.
South
Atlantic Ocean
3.5(c)
9
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3.5(c)
�e�t
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Argentina
Until the military coup in March 1976, Havana used
its diplomats in Buenos Aires to maintain contact with
Argentine revolutionaries and the Chilean MIR.
in the mid-1970s the
Cubans met regularly with the Montoneros and the 3.3(b)(1)
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), providing them
with funding and instructions on psychological oper-
ations, propaganda, and recruitment, as well as advice
on military, labor, and student operations. 3.5(c)
NR
3.3(b)(1)
Following the coup in 1976, the Argentine Govern-
ment launched a highly successful campaign to root
out subversives.
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
In August 1976 two Cuban Embassy employees were
kidnaped and never found; Havana strongly suspected
they had been killed by rightist elements in the
Argentine Government. As a result, the Castro re- �
gime sharply curtailed its subversive activities in
Argentina. 3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
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Set
By 1978 the ERP's once-formidable treasury was
seriously depleted, its arsenal had shrunk to a few
small arms and explosives, most of its leaders were
dead or in exile, and fewer than 150 inactive members
remained in the country. The Montonero organiza-
tion, similarly devastated, was reduced to probably no
more than 250 members in Argentina, and only a few
hundred were in exile�including most of the leaders.
3.5(c)
Havana's economic ties with Buenos Aires also have
been a constraint against blatant support of subversive
groups. The Argentines, who saw the Cuban market
as a means of expanding their exports, extended a
$1.2 billion line of credit in 1973, much of which was
used through the mid-1970s to finance purchases of
industrial and transportation equipment. In recent
years, however, the level of trade has begun to decline
(see table). Continuation of this trend will lessen
Havana's incentive to avoid antagonizing the Argen-
tine Government. 3.5(c)
The first sign of a shift in policy toward Argentina
came in 1978 when Cuba invited the Montoneros to
the World Youth Festival in Havana in direct contra-
vention of the wishes of the Argentine Communist
Party. In early 1979 Cuba organized, armed, and
transported an "internationalist brigade" of Latin
American revolutionaries�including Cuban-trained
Montoneros�to participate in the struggle against
the Somoza regime. Havana report-
edly offered the Montoneros financial assistance, not-
ing that the Argentine Communist Party did not
merit such support because it was too conservative
and was not working actively enough against the
military regime. At the time the Cubans indicated
that if the Montoneros were successful, Havana could
provide financial assistance to other revolutionary
vanguard movements, such as those in Colombia and
Uruguay. 3.5(c)
By late 1979 Cuban efforts to promote a more
aggressive guerrilla strategy in Argentina briefly bore
fruit. the Montoneros
were actively infiltrating more members into Argen-
tina and that terrorist activity inside the country had
been revived. The Argentine security service launched
a major crackdown, however, and most infiltration
,t