NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 2 MARCH 1981

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05103282
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-01012
• Publication Date: March 2, 1981

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
2 March 1981
Co NIDC 81-049C
2 March 1981
Copy 456
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Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
NOFORN (NF) Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT (NC)
PROPIN (PP)
NFIBONLY (NO)
ORCON (OC)
Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
Caution�Proprietary Information Involved
NFIB Departments Only
Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL...
A microfiche copy of this docu-
ment is available from OCR/
This Information Has Been Authorized for Release to...
The National Intelligence Daily (Cable) is prepared in the
Central Intelligence Agency in cooperation with the other
US foreign intelligence organizations for the purpose of
informing senior US officials.
This Daze is
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Contents
Situation Report
El Salvador
-Trrr-Srm4r..e.t-
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SITUATION REPORT
EL SALVADOR
The lull in sustained guerrilla military operations continues,
but the insurgents are inflicting heavy damage to the economy and
capable of launching an offensive in the coming months.
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//The diminished level of guerrilla operations is
attributable to several factors. Some units reportedly
are suffering spot shortages of arms and ammunition, sug-
gesting problems in supply distribution and a possible
temporary slowdown in arms deliveries from abroad. The
guerrillas also lack medicines, clothing, food, and other
supplies and apparently are having difficulty recruiting (b)(3)
new personnel.//
Despite these problems, guerrilla hit-and-run attacks
on the electrical power system in recent weeks have caused
a virtual total blackout of the eastern half of the coun-
try. Some 65 electrical towers have been destroyed or
damaged since the first of the year.
//The guerrillas remain strong in Chalatenango de-
partment, where they hold several small villages as well
as some larger, abandoned towns. The Salvadoran military
has only 250 permanently garrisoned, combat-ready troops
to counter heavily fortified insurgent strongholds in
the area. Low troop morale worsened by almost constant
contact with the guerrillas is affecting the military's
ability to conduct offensive actions.//
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--continued
Top Secre
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the
level
January
killed
gent
Military's
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/I rt.
guerrillas have enough weapons to sustain
of activity. Guerrilla casualties
offensive--perhaps 400 to 500 full-time
--have not crippled the estimated
a higher
during the
cadre
4,000-man insur-
force.
Views on Negotiations
officers
opposition
strident
by
with
most
oppose negotiations between the junta and
leaders. Junior officers are particularly
about what they perceive as ill-conceived
Christian Democrats to seek political accommodation
spokesmen of the Revolutionary Democratic Front.
leftist
efforts
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//Hardline rightists in the military are attempting
to turn the recent arrest of former junta member Colonel
Majano into a test of the military's willingness to deal
harshly with those few officers still disposed to compro-
mise with the opposition.
that they
are opposed to General Torrijos' efforts to foster nego-
tiations. The officers said the Salvadoran military
generally views Torrijos as an ally of Cuba and the
insurgents.//
Top Sccrct
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