NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 26 AUGUST 1982

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05066197
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-01785
• Publication Date: August 26, 1982

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
AC,
C-5>
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
26 August 1982
" ilepproved for Release: 2017/11/21 C05066197
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CPAS Ninr R2-2nar
26 August 1982
Copy 402
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Contents
Israel-Lebanon: Evacuation Continues
USSR-US: Concern About Military Capabilities
Iran-USSR: Further Strains in Relations
El Salvador: Insurgents Suffer Reverses
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China-US: Exploitation of Aircraft Engines
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China-Kampuchea: Reassuring ASEAN
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Argentina: Controversial Economic Policies
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Vietnam-China: Proposal To Halt Border Clashes
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Special Analysis
Lebanon: New President's Problems
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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Evacuation Continues
(Information as of 2300 EDT)
//Two more groups of Palestinians left Beirut yesterday. The
Israelis continue to express some concern over aspects of the evac-
uation process. The security situation remained generally calm
throughout Lebanon. Israel has reduced its forces in Lebanon.//
Approximately 1,000 Palestinian fighters left Beirut
by sea yesterday, bringing the total number evacuated to
an estimated 3,450. Syria will receive about 550 of those
who left yesterday, and 448 are en route to Sudan.
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The Syrian Government has begun preparing its public
for the arrival of regular Army troops and Syrian-
controlled Palestine Liberation Army brigades from Beirut.
A government-sponsored "leak" to a radio correspondent
indicates all of these units will travel directly to
Syria, without stopping in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.
Syria had originally indicated it might keep the regulars
and the Palestine Liberation Army in the Bekaa Valley a
move the Israelis were reluctant to accept.
MNF Deployment
//Israeli commanders in Beirut have expressed concern
over the deployment of French troops to the area of the
Museum Crossing. The Israelis apparently still harbor
doubts about the French willingness to keep Palestinian
activity under control.//
//They have refused to allow the Multinational Force
to deploy to more positions along the Green Line, except
for three junctions between the port and the Hippodrome.
PLA units may refuse to withdraw, however, unless their
positions are tar over by contingents of the Multina-
tional Force.//
//The Italian units are due to
up positions at the Galerie Semaan Crossing.//
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arrive today
and take
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//The Israelis are also disturbed because they have
not received any verification lists of the departing
Palestinians and see little evidence that the PLO is
ing over heavy weapons to the Lebanese Army.//
Israeli Military Moves
turn-
//The departure this week of some Israeli units from
the Beirut-Juniyah area have resulted in a net reduction
of Israeli forces in Lebanon during August. The Israelis
two weeks ago seemed to be preparing to expand their
forces in Lebanon.//
//The US defense attache saw major elements of at
least two and perhaps three reserve armored divisions
moving toward Lebanon on 9 August. One or two of these
units arrived in the Beirut area but have now been with-
drawn. The arrival of any of these units in the Bekaa
Valley was never confirmed
There are now
major Israeli units in northern Lebanon.//
no
Comment: //The successful negotiation of a PLO
departure apparently led the Israeli's to reverse their
earlier decision for a buildup.//
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USSR-US: Concern About Military Capabilities
Two articles in Pravda last week reflect Moscow's judgment
that US ballistic missile developments will affect the survivabilit
of Soviet ICBMs and the world "correlation of military forces."
The articles acknowledge US strategic capabilities
are growing, but they also assert that this does not help
the US achieve its political aims and that the US effort
to achieve military superiority has created international
tension. One article maintains that the accuracy and
other capabilities of the MX, Trident II, and Pershing II
missiles prove the US strategy is based upon a surprise
first strike and a limited nuclear war. It warns, how-
ever, that a first strike would draw a counterattack
because the USSR has more than one type of strategic
weapon.
Comment: The articles are part of a recent press
campaign alleging that US strategy has changed to allow
for protracted nuclear war. They demonstrate Soviet
concern that planned new US missiles will threaten Soviet
land-based ICBMs, altering the strategic balance.
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The allegation that US policy is intensifying world
tensions is intended to improve the prospects of the "peace"
movement in the West. The assertion that the US will be
unable to achieve its political aims may be designed to
reassure Soviet allies or domestic critics arguing for a (b)(3)
stronger Soviet response to the US policy.
eftireirtr "Sec..r.tt
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IRAN-USSR: Further Strains in Relations
Leaders of Iran's ruling Islamic Republican Party are reacting
angrily to what they regard as Soviet pressure to end the war and
to cease aiding the insurgents in Afghanistan.
On Monday the party newspaper published a rare
article by the party's political bureau that criticizes
Soviet policy toward Iran. The text was repeated on the
regime's radio newscast. It cited recent Iranian Commu-
nist Party statements as supporting evidence for charges
that the USSR believes an Iranian victory threatens
Moscow's regional interests and its control over Muslims
in the USSR.
Anti-Soviet slogans have become more common at
Iranian rallies this year
The article, however, reflects tensions that have
been growing for several months. Leading Iranians did
not moderate their public criticism of the USSR even after
the arrival of the new Soviet Ambassador in late July.
Tehran has had an ambassador in Moscow only intermittently
since last November, and the post has been vacant since
June.
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EL SALVADOR: Insurgents Suffer Reverses
//A recently completed government sweep operation inflicted heavy
losses and took 13 prisoners, while an important guerrilla leader
has been captured in Honduras.// (b)(3)
//The Army overran several guerrilla base camps in
northern San Vicente, and it claims to have killed over
200 insurgents with few losses of its own. A followup
operation designed to catch the guerrillas off guard began
immediately afterward.//
During the first operation
one unit was surrounded and
situation. Movement of guerrilla supplies reportedly was
disrupted by the offensive.
another was in a difficult
//In Honduras, security forces seized a clandestine
Salvadoran insurgent radio station in Tegucigalpa and
captured an important guerrilla leader.//
Comment: //The capture of the insurgent leader and
other prisoners probably will force the guerrillas to
cancel some planned attacks and to restructure some of
their support networks.//
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CHINA-US: Exploitation of Aircraft Engines
//Beijing's real motive for obtaining two US-built CFM-56-2
aircraft engines apparently is to exploit their modern design and
manufacturing technology for use in China's program to develop jet
engines.//
//The US is awaiting COCOM approval to ship the
engines, which contain the most advanced US engine tech-
nology available for civilian use. The power section of
the CFM-56-2 engine also is used in military applications.
For example, it is used as the core of the B-1 bomber
engine.//
//The Chinese appear to lack many of the project man-
agement skills and the research and development capabil-
ities to conduct a successful reverse-engineering program.
Access to the US engines, which represent technology
at least a full generation ahead of China's current
aircraft engine technology, could allow the Chinese
eventually to remedy some of the problems they have en-
countered in their efforts to produce their own engines.//
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CHINA-KAMPUCHEA: Reassuring ASEAN
China is voicing more active support for the Kampuchean coali-
tion government to reassure ASEAN and to counter Vietnamese-inspired
doubts about Beijing's long-term intentions in Southeast Asia.
//Premier Zhao Ziyang, in talks with Australian
Prime Minister Fraser earlier this month, said he supports
a greater Western effort to strengthen the military capa-
bilities of the non-Communist elements in the coalition.
Zhao affirmed that China's support for Pol Pot and his
Democratic Kampuchea faction did not mean Beijing wants
to restore it to power. Instead, he and other Chinese
officials have stressed that China supports a nonaligned
government led by Prince Sihanouk.//
Comment: //Beijing's concern that the ASEAN states
will try to curb Chinese influence by reducing their sup-
port for the Democratic Kampuchean faction probably led
the Chinese to reiterate their support for the coalition.
Recent Vietnamese efforts to open a dialogue with ASEAN
almost certainly also prompted China to suggest some new
flexibility in its position, including a willingness to
accept the participation of the People's Republic of
Kampuchea leader, Heng Samrin, in elections if he cuts
his ties to Vietnam.//
//China does not want to be the sole supplier of arms
to the coalition, believing that the provision of aid by
a broad variety of donors would increase the coalition's
international legitimacy. Beijing also believes that,
even with non-Chinese aid, neither Sihanouk's forces nor
those .of former Prime Minister Sonn Sann will be able to
achieve military or organizational parity with the
Democratic Kampuchean group.//
//This show of moderation may be achieving results.
The Malaysian Government has revised its estimate of
China's aims and now sees signs of greater Chinese
acceptance of non-Communist Kampuchea.
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ARGENTINA: Controversial Economic Policies
The resignations on Tuesday of Economy Minister
Pastore and Central Bank President Cavallo apparently
were prompted by newly decreed wage increases, but their
departure also reflects their general dissatisfaction
with current economic policies. Labor leaders are al-
ready criticizing the increases as inadequate. The new
Economy Minister, Jorge Wehbe, is a banker and academi-
cian. He has held the same post briefly in previous
civilian and military governments.
Comment: The resignations could portend a shift
toward more populist economic policies designed to appease
restive labor unions. The wage increases are inflationary,
however, and they may not head off further labor agitation.
Any political gains are likely to be short lived and
could be offset by military hardliners opposed to union
activism. Moreover, if the frequent turnover of key per-
sonnel in the Economic Ministry continues, it will under-
cut any long-term efforts to formulate and carry out
rational economic policies.
-7675"-Sterat.�
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VIETNAM-CHINA: Proposal To Halt Border Clashes
Vietnam has offered China a six-week cease-fire along
the Sino-Vietnamese border, where small-scale clashes
frequently occur. The cease-fire would be in effect
during the national days of both countries. The Chinese
have not responded to the proposal, which was submitted
on 14 August.
Comment: The Vietnamese routinely request a cease-
fire during the Tet lunar new year, but this is the first
proposal encompassing their national day on 2 September
and China's national day on 1 October. The timing sug-
gests the offer is being made for propaganda purposes
before the UN General Assembly opens next month. The
Chinese, however, are unlikely to accept the proposal.
They broke off border talks with the Vietnamese in 1980
and continue to reject Hanoi's standing offer to resume
them.
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
LEBANON: New President's Problems
President-elect Bashir Jumayyil faces many obstacles that will
severely test his political skills. If he is to govern effectively,
he will have to overcome widespread bitterness and fear on the part
of his Muslim opponents. His actions over the next several weeks
will be key indicators of his willingness to pay more than Zipser-
vice to national reconciliation.
Jumayyil's first important test will be choosing a
prime minister, the ranking Muslim position in the govern-
ment traditionally reserved for a Sunni. He will respect
that tradition, but it will be important for his nominee
to be broadly acceptable among Sunnis.
Disarming the country's myriad armed factions will
pose a major challenge. Jumayyil probably will ask them
to surrender their weapons voluntarily, but he almost
certainly expects to have to use force to bring them to
heel. Widespread and prolonged fighting among the
Lebanese would complicate efforts to get the Syrians and
Israelis to withdraw.
Even after the PLO leaves Beirut, the new government
still will have to deal with an estimated 350,000 Pales-
tinian civilians, many of whom were uprooted in the recent
fighting. Jumayyil shares Israeli opposition to the
refugee camps but appears to recognize that there are
no realistic alternatives. At a minimum, he will move to
bring the Palestinians under firm control and to limit
their political activity.
Dealing With Syria
Jumayyil has called for a new era of "positive" re-
lations with Syria. He will expect Damascus to recognize
his government officially and to agree not to interfere
in Lebanese politics. In return, he probably will offer
to prevent Lebanon from becoming a base for subversive
activity against Damascus.
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The complete withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon,
a longstanding Phalange demand, will be a precondition
for any bilateral accommodation. Jumayyil will look to
US diplomacy and the threat of Israeli military action
to help him accomplish this.
Seeking Out Arab Friends
To forge good relations with other Arab states and
open the door for Arab aid, Jumayyil will have to estab-
lish his ability to act independently of Israel. In this
context, Prime Minister Begin's public message of congrat-
ulations after the election did not imurove Jumavyil's
chances of allaying Arab concerns.
Coming to Grips With Israel
While Jumayyil needs the Israeli military threat to
Syria in the short term, he has to get the Israelis out
of Lebanon before too long if he is to strengthen the
central government. Once again. Jumayyil will turn to
the US for help.
The President-elect's goals may not be compatible
with Israel's own concerns, particularly its determination
to ensure the security of its northern border. The
Israelis also may believe they need the leverage afforded
by their troop presence to obtain a formal peace treaty
with the Lebanese Government.
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