NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 14 MAY 1982 - 1982/05/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05065872
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: May 14, 1982

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
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CPAS NIDC 82-113C
14 May 1982 3.5(c)
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Contents
Special Analyses
Argentina: President Galtieri's Prospects 11
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Top�S�erreT
SPECIAL ANALYSES
ARGENTINA: President Galtieri's Prospects
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//President GaZtieri's personal standing with the military has
eroded since the onset of the crisis, but the hostilities have tem-
porarily united the embattled armed services.
/The President's survival hinges on the
progress he makes toward international recognition of Argentine
sovereignty over the Falklands. Discernible gains would strengthen
his hold on power but an impasse would make the turnover of greater
authority to civilians increasingly likely. Any successor regime
would feel compelled to make the US the scapegoat for Argentina's
defeat. 3.5(c)
The Army, as the most powerful
determine any military succession.
Possible Successors
service,
will
//If Galtieri falters before the crisis is resolved,
he could be replaced by one of several key corps command-
ers who would have to back any coup attempt.
He disapproves of the President's con-
cessions to civilians and distrusts his goals. Trimarco
could be tempted to try to seize power before he reaches
mandatory retirement age at the end of next year.//
11
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//General Nicolaides, who commands a major corps
centered in Buenos Aires, is interested in assuming
Galtieri's military post. General Guanabens Perello,
who commands the III Corps in the important industrial
center of Cordoba, has criticized Galtieri's handling
of the crisis. 3.5(c)
//Any plotter would have to be concerned, however,
that a coup at this juncture would demoralize Argentine
troops, and possibly split the military. In addition,
if political and military defeat seem likely, a would-be
successor probably would choose to saddle Galtieri with
the onus before moving against him.
The Next Regime
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//A coup in the wake of major military setbacks prob-
ably would not lead to immediate policy changes. Most
potential successors are--like Galtieri--dedicated
nationalists and ideological hardliners. Moreover, any
effort to build support against Galtieri would have to
avoid the appearance of treason by being labeled as
corrections of tactical blunders rather than a backing
off from the British challenge. 3.5(c)
//A successor regime headed by armed forces officers--
even if it took over after hostilities end--probably would
be unable to rule with the authority of previous govern-
ments. Civilians would demand policy changes or partici-
pation in government in exchange for their backing of the
military. 3.5(c)
//A purely civilian administration or, alternatively,
a highly authoritarian military regime also could emerge.
The probable disarray in the ranks of both political and
military institutions, however, makes a transitional
arrangement moving toward elections a more likely alter-
native. 3.5(c)
//If a civilian framework emerges, the Peronists--
because of their numerical and political importance--
probably would carve out a large share of power.
A Difficult Balancing Act
//Clear military or diplomatic gains would end imme-
diate threats to Galtieri's regime. Senior officers,
despite their distrust of Galtieri's judgment and ambi-
--continued
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tions, would back his bid to remain as commander in chief
beyond his scheduled retirement at the end of the year.//
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//Labor and political leaders, faced with appeals to
national solidarity, would be forced to continue their
support--at least in the short run. This would be
especially true if a cease-fire was followed by lengthy
negotiations. 3.5(c)
//Such "support" for Galtieri, however, would continue
to rest on divergent objectives. Labor and political
leaders would argue for a shift away from liberal eco-
nomic policies, increased access to decisionmaking, and
an accelerated schedule for elections. Hardline military
officers, on the other hand, probably would remain sus-
picious of civilian leaders and call for an economic
stabilization program. 3.5(c)
//In the medium term, Galtieri would be able to use
his personal appeal and any "victory" he can claim in
the conflict to keep both sides in check. Over the
longer term, however, his ability to manage the economic
problems created by the crisis will largely determine
his fate. 3.5(c)
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