DAILY INTELLIGENCE CABLE 23 APRIL 1982[SANITIZED] - 1982/04/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05065802
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: April 23, 1982

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DAILY INTELLIGENCE CABLE
23 April 1982
CPAS Nm09c 1 V
IiAprj/J982 3.5(c)
EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
526
EO 13
3.5(c)
NR
Faitrfir
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SrbeRgrT I
23 April 1982
ARGENTINA: Galtieri's Prospects
President Galtieri's widespread domestic political
support in the Falklands dispute masks underlying difficul-
ties he will have holding together a political coalition,
maintaining military cohesion, and strengthening inter-
national support. He will increasingly have to resort to
nationalistic posturing to keep his backers together. This
will in turn further constrict his room for diplomatic
maneuver. 3.5(c)
Reliance on extreme nationalism will allow Galtieri
to weather a stalemate--even if there are military
casualties--for a brief period. After a month or so,
however, the strains on the economy--and on his
presidency--will be severe.
The politically ambitious Galtieri has taken enor-
mous risks in his dealings with the military.
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
Some officers believe that Galtieri's excessive reli-
ance on advice from the hardline Navy led him to misjudge
the British and US response. Such perceptions are especially
dangerous to Galtieri because the Army is the dominant
service and Galtieri has had to work assiduously to line up
support in it for a bid to remain Commander in Chief beyond
his mandatory retirement in December.
If Galtieri wins his gamble on the Falklands, he
could dictate his role. In a case of less than clearcut
gains, however, many important armed forces leaders could
disassociate themselves from the President and dump him.
3.5(c)
Civilian Support
All Argentine political parties, even those with
antimilitary leftist factions, have rallied to Galtieri.
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
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So far, the President appears to have made few commitments
to these erstwhile opponents, who currently have little
choice but to drape themselves with the flag. Any diplo-
matic setbacks will force Galtieri to keep appealing to
the spirit of nationalism, which the hardline press is
raising to new heights. 3.5(c)
Over time, the continuing need for civilian backing
will enhance the power of ultranationalistic Peronist
factions and labor. This will reduce Galtieri's room
for political maneuver and increase pressure to abandon
economic reforms in favor of a return to a Peronist
state-controlled economy.
3.5(c)
Outlook
Galtieri cannot control the political climate that
he has created. He will be in serious trouble if his
efforts at diplomatic compromise bring into question
either his resolve to confront the British or ultimate
Argentine sovereignty over the islands. The President's
military and civilian supporters would begin to back away
from him.
3.5(c)
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�StPeRES\ ,1.0(C)
Only a clear Argentine victory will preserve
Galtieri's position. At a minimum, he will have to pre-
sent the appearance of something more than a status quo
ante bellum. If not, the combined costs of his Falklands
adventure will prompt a military coup.
3.5(b)
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3.5(c)