SOUTH AFRICA: THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS IN THE 1980

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05041552
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982

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Directorate of
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South Africa: The
African National Congress
in the 1980s (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
MASTER FILE COPY
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ALA 82-10056
82-10056
April 1982 .
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Directorate of
Intelligence
South Africa: The
African National Congress
in the 1980s (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 26 February 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared by
of the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Southern Africa
Division, ALA, on (u) (b)(3) CIAAct
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and with the National Intelligence
Council. (u)
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Key Judgments
South Africa: The
African National Congress
in the 1980s (u)
The African National Congress (ANC), the principal South African
insurgent group, will probably continue to increase its terrorist activities
over the next few years, although the resulting racial violence in South
Africa probably will not immediately or directly threaten the survival of
the white government. Racial violence, however, will contribute to the
growing 13,9,Jarization of the white community, marked most recently by the
split in the ruling Afrikaner National Party.-(e)-
Pretoria will respond by attacking ANC installations in neighboring
countries and by exerting increased economic, political, and even military
pressure against black governments that permit the ANC to operate from
their territories. The heightened tensions in the region will offer the Soviet
Union opportunities for expanding its influence in southern Africa and will
make it more difficult than it has been for the United States and the West
to maintain good relations with both Pretoria and the black African states.
The Soviet Union and its allies are the main backers of the ANC and pro-
vide almost all of its military equipment and training. Most members get
their military training in Angola from Soviet and Cuban instructors.
Particularly promising recruits are sent to the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, and Cuba for academic, political, and military training. Moscow
also has significant influence within the ANC through the South African
Communist Party. Communist party members, many of whom are not
black, hold a large number of the important positions in the ANC.4)--
The repressive security an political measures employed by Pretoria in
response to the increase in terrorist activities have discredited moderate
black leaders who oppose the ANC. There is today no effective spokesman
inside South Africa who can realistically claim to have the allegiance of the
black community, and the ANC is having increasing success in filling this
leadership vacuum. Although the ANC apparently does not yet have an
extensive underground political network inside South Africa, it is rapidly
gaining influence among blacks, particularly in labor unions and student
movements.
Ill
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Militants are gaining more control over the group's policies and tactics and
are pushing for a more aggressive terrorist campaign. The new military
commander, Thabo Mbeki, believes that the ANC should no longer
attempt to avoid casualties when carrying out terrorist operations. Mbeki
also believes that the group should stage more operations out of Botswana
and seek more support in the black homelands. {s Nr NC C)
iv
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South Africa: The
African National Congress
in the 1980s (u)
Origins and Development of the ANC
The ANC, the oldest Western-style black African
movement and one of the oldest of all South African
political organizations, was founded in 1912 by a
small group of educated black professionals and tribal
chiefs. The ANC's stated mission was to unite blacks
in defense of their rights and privileges, but during its
early history the group did little to organize opposition
to the government's racial policies. It was not until the
late 1940s that the group, under the leadership of
dynamic young black nationalists such as Nelson
Mandela, took charge of the fight for black political
rights in South Africa. Mandela's attempts to force
government attention to black demands by engaging
in civil disobedience were unsuccessful; and, after
being outlawed by Pretoria in 1960, the ANC
launched an underground military campaign to
overthrow the government. (u)
The ANC's decision to pursue a military solution in
South Africa was premature given its lack of public
support and trained personnel. By 1963 Pretoria's
security forces had succeeded in rounding up most of
the underground leaders, including Mandela. In 1964
Mandela and seven other ANC leaders were sen-
tenced to life imprisonment while other ANC officials
fled into exile. (u)
It took the group almost 20 years to recover from the
imprisonment of its leadership and the destruction of
its organizational structure inside South Africa. The
ANC did not begin to revive until after the suppres-
sion of the Soweto riots of 1976, when several thou-
sand black youths emigrated from South Africa to
neighboring black states and many of them joined the
ANC. This was the first significant influx of new
recruits into the organization since the early 1960s. In
addition, the newly independent black states of Mo-
zambique and Angola provided the ANC with access
to staging and training areas and facilitated the
provision of Soviet aid to the organization.-(e--
1
Figure 1. Nelson Mandela, de-
tained leader of the African
National Congress (u)
By the beginning of 1980, the ANC was conducting
modest terrorist operations in South Africa. The
hostage-taking incident at a suburban Pretoria bank
that January and the sabotage in June of the South
African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (Sasol) syn-
thetic fuel plants, however, shocked the white commu-
nity. Whites steeled themselves against a predicted
terrorist offensive, security measures were tightened,
and Pretoria stepped up its cross-border operations
against ANC targets.-(e)----
The remainder of 1980 was relatively quiet, but 1981
saw the expected increase in ANC activity. Although
no individual terrorist incident matched the magni-
tude of the Sasol sabotage attempt, the ANC was
consistently able to strike at economic and govern-
ment targets. During 1981 the ANC was responsible
for over 40 major incidents, compared to less than 10
during 1980. On several occasions, bombs exploded
simultaneously in different parts of the country, indi-
cating improved efficiency and coordination of the
group's operations. Targets included power stations,
rail lines, military and police facilities, and govern-
ment offices. Most bombs were set to explode either
early in the morning or late at night, when urban
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Figure 2
African National Congress (ANC) in Southern Africa
Gabon
Congo
BRAZZAVILLE
Cabinda
*KINSHASA
*LUANDA
Angola
Namibia
S. AfrIce
Atlantic
Ocean
�Eacrot
WINDHOEK
Cape Town.
Botswa
GABORON
auth
Africa
Rwa aawKIGALI
Buruydi
BULMBURA
G
Tanzania
MflaWl
Zambia LILONGWE
LUSAKA*
SALISBURY*1
Zimbabwe
PRETORIA
o. MB
S z
sot
*Durban
�
East London
Port Elizabeth
Mozambique
UTO
*NAIROBI
Kenya
Ocean
it*.AAAR ES
M.
-IllielliKMajor infiltration route
411010C. Major exfiltration route
gi ANC headquarters
t Major ANC office/facility
5?0
Kilometers
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targets were not crowded. Given the level of its
terrorist activity inside the country last year, it is clear
that the ANC could have inflicted a large number of
white casualties if it had chosen to do so. {G)---
Methods of Operation
Mozambique has been the primary staging area for
ANC operations into South Africa.
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The nature and pattern of
terrorist attacks strongly suggest that many ANC
teams complete their missions as planned and without
incident. They have often eluded South African secu-
rity dragnets and escaped into Swaziland, Lesotho, or
other neighboring states. These terrorists now form a
core group of experienced and disciplined ANC mem
bers. -(e)--
Encouraged by its relative success last year, the ANC
is now attempting to establish a permanent presence
in South Africa. Much of this effort appears concen-
trated in the black homelands, which, because of their
overcrowding and poverty and their less efficient
security police, may eventually become staging areas
for a rurally based insurgency.{e)--
In recent months, South African officials have be-
come increasingly concerned about the growing ANC
presence in areas such as Transkei, KwaZulu,
Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Gazankulu. Unusually
3
The ANC in Africa
The ANC today probably has 1,000 to 2,000 active
members, defined as those individuals living outside
South Africa who have received military training. In
addition, there may be as many as 2,000 to 3,000
other ANC members, including young students, wom-
en, older people, and blacks, inside South Africa who
secretly belong to the organization.
Most new ANC recruits are blacks leaving South
Africa for neighboring states. The organization may
attract 100 to 300 new members a year.
The ANC's principal training base is in Angola,
where members receive military and terrorist train-
ing from Cuban and Soviet instructors, and probably
East German personnel as well. The Soviets provide
the group with almost all of its military equipment.
This consists for the most part of small arms and
explosives, although the ANC has employed 122-mm
rockets in South Africa and may also possess SAM-7
hand-held, surface-to-air missiles.
ANC headquarters are in Lusaka, Zambia. Tanzania
is the site of the main nonmilitary ANC camp.
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Most ANC operations into South Africa are staged
from Mozambique.
The group has camps in northern Mozam-
bique and several transit facilities and safehouses in
the south.
The ANC has a representative in Zimbabwe. Al-
though Salisbury does not condone the use of its
territory for staging terrorist operations, ANC mem-
bers are beginning to infiltrate from Zimbabwe into
South Africa.
The ANC also has representatives in Botswana, Swa-
ziland, and Lesotho. None of these governments
officially allow the group to use their territory for
terrorist purposes, but the ANC often succeeds in
circumventing such restrictions.
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Figure 3
Terrorist Incidents
*WINDHOEK
Namibia
At/antic
-2
Ocean
55
Cape Town. (2)
Zimbabwe
)
Makgathkgatil \
(Salt Pans)
Botswana
GABORONE*
South Afri
Cape
MASERU
Lesotho
),..Nt� ;
,(,,,..._,._,�,
,P�,-"\�e-,b,N- ,
t.... ,ck
1
CiSiOre,t)
`� (---01.9
L- -- East Lo don
,(2)iport Elizabeth
r _
Boundary representation is
not necessarhy authoritative.
MAPUTO
MBABANE
ichard's
Bay
Durban
Terrorist incident (approximate location)
Note: (7) represents number of incidents
Province boundary
Independent homeland boundary
(not recognized by the US)
Non-independent homeland boundary
0 300
Kilometers
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large groups of ANC members, at times numbering ast
many as 20, have been reported in these homelands,
and terrorists have taken refuge there after complet-
ing operations in white areas.lt-rtrl
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Of the more than 40 major terrorist incidents last
year, over half took place either in or within 100
kilometers of a black homeland. Although this figure
in part reflects the proximity of these territories to
white urban centers, it also probably indicates that
the ANC is increasingly selecting targets that are
easily accessible from a homeland area. ANC terror-
ist teams that find temporary haven in the homelands
are now beginning to remain in the country for longer
periods of time, sometimes carrying out several as-
signments before finally leaving South Africa.-(s),,
Militants Gaining Control
The growing power of militants in the ANC leader-
ship may lead to even more important changes in the
group's strategy. Since going into exile in the early
1960s, the ANC has been led by veteran black
activists such as President Oliver Tambo, 64, and
Secretary General Alfred Nzo, 56. Many of the
young militant blacks who joined the ANC after the
Soweto riots were dismayed by the fact that their
leaders were for the most part aging men who spent
their time traveling from one world capital to another.
The militants also deplored what they believed to be
their leaders' excessively careful approach to military
activities inside South Africa.-(1)------
Many of these members have been seeking a way to
gain control of the organization for some time. During
the first half of 1981, rumors began to circulate in
African capitals of an impending major shakeup in
the ANC leadership. Several of the group's top
executives, including Alfred Nzo and military com-
mander Joe Modise, were accused by younger mem-
bers of inefficiency, corruption, cowardice, and even
of working for the South African security services.
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Alfred Nzo apparently escaped any signifi-
cant retribution, but the military commander, Joe
Modise, was replaced by Thabo Mbeki, a militant
black nationalist who had until then been President
Tambo's personal secretary.lt-rtf-
Mbeki, who is probably in his late thirties, is the son
of one of the ANC "heroes" imprisoned with Man-
dela on Robben Island, South Africa's maximum
security prison. In the late 1970s, Mbeki was a
member of the young militant group that wanted to
replace Tambo as ANC president. Since then Mbeki
apparently has made his peace with Tambo, but his
views on ANC strategy and tactics are much closer to
the aggressive positions preferred by the militants
than to those of Tambo's generation. 4s�
Mbeki does not believe that the ANC should strive to
minimize civilian casualties while carrying out its
terrorist operations inside South Africa. The new
military commander believes that the ANC's meticu-
lous preparation for missions is counterproductive
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Although Mbeki holds the title of military command-
er, he does not have full control over ANC operations.
Main responsibility for terrorist activities has been for
years in the hands of Joe Slovo, a white Communist
and the ANC's chief military planner, who designed
most of the tactics Mbeki now criticizes. Unlike his
predecessor, however, Mbeki not only does not intend
to defer to Slovo, but also wants to assume most of
Slovo's responsibilities. -
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The ANC's Communists and the Soviets
The one faction within the ANC that may be the most
affected by the increasing influence of black militants
in the leadership is the South African Communist
Party (SACP). The SACP has been associated with
the ANC for several decades. In 1969 the ANC
opened its membership to all races, and since then
many SACP leaders, who include whites, Coloreds,
and Asians, have also held important executive posi-
tions in the ANC.-H--
Joe Slovo is only one of several influential Commu-
nists in the ANC. Many SACP members belong to
the National Executive Committee, the ANC's gov-
erning structure, and Communists dominate the Rev-
olutionary Council, the administrative body that su-
pervises the ANC's military operations. Influential
SACP members who belong to one or both of these
leadership groups include Yusuf Dadoo, the SACP
chairman; Slovo; Moses Mabhida, chief of the Revo-
lutionary Council and Secretary General of the
SACP; and Reg September, a Colored activist (S NF
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Figure 4. Dr. Yusuf Dadoo,
chairman of the South African
Communist Party (u)
Neues Deutschland �
Communists also wield influence in the ANC through
the South African Congress of Trade Unions
(SACTU), a Communist front organization. SACTU
is formally affiliated with the ANC, and, along with
the SACP, helps funnel Soviet funds to the insurgent
group. Steven Dlamini, a top SACTU executive, is
also an SACP member. {5)-
This Communist connection has been important for
the ANC and was one of the major reasons for the
group's survival during the difficult years of the 1960s
and 1970s. Soon after the ANC went into exile, the
Soviet Union, which has close relations with both the
SACP and SACTU, began providing assistance to the
ANC. Moscow believes that for the time being the
SACP's goal�a Communist South African state�
must be secondary to the ANC's objective of black
majority rule. The Soviets and their allies now supply
the ANC with most of its military equipment, and
promising recruits are sent to the Soviet Union, East
European countries, and Cuba for advanced aca-
demic, political, and military training--
Despite the benefits the African National Congress
has drawn from its relations with the SACP and the
Soviet Union, many black militants have resented the
control that whites and Communists have had over
the ANC. In the late 1950s, in fact, a large number of
blacks split from the group�and later founded the
rival Pan-Africanist Congress�because they disa-
greed with the ANC's multiracial philosophy and its
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emerging Marxist slant. They believed that the strug-
gle in South Africa was between blacks and whites,
and not between economic classes. Many ANC mili-
tants still define the South African problem exclusive-
ly in racial terms. Some, for example, believe that
Slovo's reluctance to authorize ANC operations that
endanger civilians is due to his desire to spare fellow
whites. Ts-#4.z, (b)(3) NatSecAct
The appointment of Mbeki to replace the former
military commander Modise�who is an SACP mem-
ber�was probably initially resisted by Communists
in the ANC executive. The SACP, however, probably
realizes that eventually it will have to accommodate
and preferably win over the militants if it is to
maintain effective influence in the ANC leadership.
To that end, the party in recent years has increased its
recruitment of blacks. Slovo's recent statements are
another indication of the SACP's intention to adapt to
racial reform. A new group of black leaders emerged,
such as Zulu Chief Buthelezi and Dr. Nthato Mot-
lana of the Soweto Committee of Ten, who began to
voice the notion of cooperating with a "progressive"
government. The ANC in exile could not compete
with this mood of cautious optimism. By 1978 Buthe-
lezi and his organization Inkatha, according to one
West European survey, were able to outpoll the ANC
as the most popular black political movement.
Pretoria's failure to implement any significant politi-
cal reforms, however, soon began to erode the popu-
larity of these leaders. Buthelezi and other blacks who
gambled on the South African Government's good
intentions were discredited in the eyes of their politi-
cized black constituency. Few blacks are now willing
to accept leadership roles involving cooperation with
the government, and no one inside South Africa can
claim to have the allegiance of the black community.
the growing militancy of the ANC membership. -r The ANC, with increasing success, is filling this
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Mbeki and other militants are aware that the ANC
cannot remain effective for long without Moscow's
backing. They also realize that young South African
blacks�potential ANC recruits�are becoming more
politically sophisticated, and increasingly are discuss-
ing the relevance of Marxism to their situation. New
ANC recruits, therefore, may be more favorably
disposed to the SACP's role in the organization-s--
Reaching for the Black Mandate
ANC activities will pose a serious threat to white
control only if the group develops an effective under-
ground political organization inside South Africa. For
most of the past two decades, there have been few
indications that the ANC had even the beginnings of
such a network. During the late 1960s and early
1970s, politicized blacks supported Steve Biko's Black
Consciousness Movement�which called on them to
unite and become self-reliant�instead of the ANC.
4c4-
Pretoria subsequently cracked down on Biko's move-
ment and its leaders, but by 1978 the government
seemed to have opened a new chapter in black-white
politics by talking publicly of the need for significant
7
leadership vacuum-$.
The ANC has been aided in its efforts to acquire
political influence inside South Africa by some of the
economic reforms instituted by Pretoria. Blacks, for
example, can now join legally recognized labor un-
ions. The government had hoped to limit the unions to
strictly economic activities, but, because they are the
only effective organization afforded blacks, these
unions have begun to delve into political and commu-
nity affairs as well. Blacks who support the ANC or
are perhaps secret members of the organization are
the leaders of some of the more radical unions,
particularly those operating in the eastern Cape Prov-
ince. Company managers complain that ANC activ-
ists are inciting their workers to strike. In 1981 the
South African Government and homeland authorities
arrested over 300 union activists and may be planning
to charge many of them with supporting ANC terror-
ist activities. ("S"-N�F (b)(3) NatSecAct
Another indicator of the ANC's growing political
influence inside South Africa is the group's recent
ability to overcome tribal animosities and to operate
in Natal Province, where the Zulu homeland is
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located. The ANC traditionally has had a large
number of Xhosa members, and it has significant
support in the eastern Cape Province where most
Xhosas live. The Zulus�historically at odds with the
Xhosas�had not supported ANC activities in the
past, but last year over a dozen terrorist incidents
occurred in Natal. Radical Zulu youths are abandon-
ing Buthelezi in favor of the ANC, and the group
reportedly is increasing its influence in the rural areas
of the homeland.-(e)----
The growing signs of ANC political activity in South
Africa mark the reversal of an almost 20-year trend.
Nonetheless, the ANC has a long way to go before it
can claim an effective political network inside the
country. The current lull in terrorist activity in Natal
following the arrest of a small group of ANC mem-
bers responsible for many of the recent bombings
indicates that the group does not yet have a wide-
spread organizational base. Recent polls show that the
ANC is now the most popular black movement among
South African blacks, but most of that support repre-
sents blacks who applaud the ANC's activities but
who do not personally want to get involved.-(e)--
Outlook
Short-Term Prospects.
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If Mbeki
succeeds in consolidating his authority, more whites
are likely to be victims of ANC operations. The
group's increasing use of the black homelands, its
improving and more sophisticated capabilities, the
emergence of a new generation of aggressive leaders,
and growing political influence inside South Africa
will make it more difficult and costly for Pretoria to
control ANC activities. (s-NcF(b)(3) NatSecAct
The ANC continues to face several problems that
significantly hinder its effectiveness. Black South
African agents continue to penetrate the ANC. In
addition, neighboring states that allow the ANC to
operate from their territories are under constant
economic, political, and even military pressure from
Seerct
Pretoria. ANC facilities in these states are highly
vulnerable to South African military operations, ----i-
(b)(1)
as the raid in January 1981
,
in Mozambique. South African pressure (b)(3) NatSecAct
results�even if only temporarily�in black govern-
ments placing restrictions on the group's activities in
their countries. These difficulties, along with the
continuous problem of evading police forces inside
South Africa, tax the morale of ANC members.-(-.4F
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Long-Term Strategy. The ANC's leaders realize that
the organization cannot hope to defeat the white
government in Pretoria by force of arms alone. They
also believe, however, that it is foolhardy for blacks to
hope that South African whites will voluntarily dis-
card a system of social, economic, and political con-
trol that provides them with one of the world's highest
standards of living. ANC leaders believe that whites
will not face up to the need for change until their
lives, property, and security are threatened.
The leaders of the ANC hope that terrorism�by
unnerving the whites�will eventually compel Pretor-
ia to negotiate directly with the ANC on sharing
political power. The strength and determination of
white South African society, however, make this
unlikely for the forseeable future. The growing num-
ber of terrorist incidents, coupled with increasing
ANC influence in labor unions and other black
movements, is more likely to lead to more persistent
and widespread racial unrest. Pretoria probably will
respond with more repressive measures at home and
more frequent military operations against ANC facili-
ties in neighboring states. At the same time, increas-
ing violence in South Africa will further polarize the
white community into those who believe racial reform
spells suicide and those who believe it is essential.-(e)....
The ANC leaders, particularly the Communists
among them, probably believe that the organization's
interests are best served by continued repressive gov-
ernment policies, which will tend to radicalize the
black community. Meanwhile, moderate blacks who
oppose the ANC's ideology and methods will continue
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Other Black Insurgent Groups
Although the ANC is by far the most influential and
active black insurgent organization, there are several
other black groups in exile, albeit small and ineffec-
tive, that are committed to a campaign of violence
against the South African white minority regime. The
two of any importance are the Pan-Africanist Con-
gress (PAC) and the South African Youth Revolu-
tionary Council (SAYRCO).
The PAC, which broke away from the ANC in the
late 1950s, has long been plagued with organizational
problems and leadership disputes. The group prob-
ably has less than 1,000 members. It has not conduct-
ed any significant activity inside South Africa for
several years; since 1978 its various leaders have
been solely and�for the most part�unsuccessfully
preoccupied with consolidating their authority. Its
current leader, John Pokela�who escaped from
South Africa in 1981 after being released from
Robben Island�does appear, however, to be turning
more of his attention to the development of an
effective insurgent capability.
The PA C'S plans to conduct a rural insurgency
inside South Africa are hampered by insufficient
manpower, inadequate external support, and lack of
access to staging areas in neighboring black states.
The PAC attracted very few of the young blacks who
left South Africa after the Soweto riots, and thus did
not benefit from an infusion of new recruits.
China stopped providing the PAC with military assis-
tance in the late 1970s when leadership disputes
threatened to destroy the organization. Although the
PAC claims that China recently agreed to provide
some military training, Beijing probably is still wait-
ing for Pokela to prove himself before committing any
Sacr.at�AZigarx
significant support.
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Most black nations have refused to give the PAC the
same access to their territories that the ANC enjoys.
Most PAC members live in Tanzania. The PAC has
offices in Botswana, but has little access to Mozam-
bique and Swaziland. The Zimbabwean Government
gives PAC somewhat more support, perhaps because
Prime Minister Mugabe and Pokela are said to be
longtime friends, but even this backing has so far
been largely rhetorical.
The Organization of African Unity for several years
has been urging the PAC to reunite with the ANC,
and some PAC members privately argue in favor of
such a merger. Most of the PAC leadership, however,
would prefer to develop an effective terrorist capabili-
ty inside South Africa before considering such a step.
If the PAC rejoined the ANC in the near future, it
would probably be swallowed by the larger organiza-
tion and PAC leaders would have little influence over
ANC tactics or ideology.
The South African Youth Revolutionary Council was
formed by radical blacks who fled South Africa after
the Soweto riots, but found the ANC to be too
moderate. Little was heard from SAYRCO until last
year when several of its members, including its
leader, infiltrated into South Africa with the inten-
tion of starting a terrorist offensive against "anyone
who supports Pretoria," including US businessmen
and diplomats inside South Africa. Security forces,
however, quickly rounded up the inexperienced
group, and the organization�which probably has
less than 100 members�is unlikely to recover soon
from this setback.
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to be be discredited. Pretoria's persistence in declaring
impoverished and overpopulated homelands indepen-
dent will further antagonize blacks and will provide
the ANC with more bases from which to operate.
Economic reforms, in the absence of any significant
movement on the question of political rights, will
heighten black demands for change. Indeed, "middle
class" blacks, along with better-off Coloreds and
Asians, are the most politicized and critical strata of
South African society.
Regional Impact. Impact. The South African Government
will respond to a significant increase in terrorist
activity by directly punishing neighboring states that
support the ANC. These states, however, will be
unwilling or unable to wholly control ANC activities
on their territories. Even if black governments were
determined to control the ANC, many sympathetic
lower level officials would, as they do now, turn a
blind eye to the group's activities.-(e)�
Actions of South Africa against its neighbors risk
pushing countries such as Zambia, Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, and Botswana closer to the Soviet Union.
The Soviets have already had considerable success in
increasing their influence in Botswana by playing on
Gaborone's fears of South African aggression. Mos-
cow will respond to the ANC's growing effectiveness
by increasing its material assistance to the group. In
addition, as Moscow increases its influence with black
governments, the Soviets will be in a better position to
aid ANC activities directly. The large Soviet Embas-
sy staff in Botswana, for example, probably is already
covertly assisting efforts of the ANC to expand its
presence in Botswana.-(*�
Implications for the United States
The rise in violence in South Africa will probably be
gradual, with increasingly serious implications for US
interests both in the region and internationally. Spe-
cifically, racial violence in South Africa will increase
the risks and costs of constructive engagement with
Pretoria. The United States and other Western na-
tions that have close ties with South Africa will be
frequently attacked in international forums such as
the UN.-4--
US and Western interests inside South Africa will
also be directly threatened by heightened racial ten-
sions. High-visibility multinational corporations oper-
ating in South Africa will become targets for labor
strikes and even terrorist operations. If the ANC
embarks on a more violent terrorist campaign, US
businessmen and diplomats could be personally
threatened, particularly if blacks believe�as many
already do�that the United States tacitly supports
the policies of the South African Government. Radi-
cal blacks will be critical of any US dealings with
Pretoria, making it increasingly difficult for the
United States to maintain contacts with the black
community. fe)�
Regional US interests will also be threatened by
increasing violence both inside South Africa and in
neighboring countries. Moscow and its allies will seek
to portray US relations with Pretoria as proof that the
United States supports South African military ag-
gression against neighboring states. In an increasingly
polarized racial situation, the United States will find
it more difficult to maintain good relations with both
black African states and the white South African
Government.-(-e)--
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-Setre.t--
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--Seeret�
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