PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05012353
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-01120
• Publication Date: October 27, 1971

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Nov 71
C/FE
C/VNO
GACarver, Jr.
1. Attached Ls a r on
nung Hoenig written for ZIA Horgan, who
es the I Corps ROIC when several components of
hat is now the Pining Hoang package first came
lt0 'Aug. I think you will find it interesting and
rovocativs. We have just received via the
.efenee Department a fuller text from the Saigon
:ission on the Latter's currant thinking and
tanning, copies of which I will get to you as soon
possible. Once that has been looked at. I think
e need to firm up some form of policy line to
',cuss with Ted and to present as the Agency
**Mon when the future of this endeavor comes
3) for SRO level decision. Such a decision will
roba))1y be weighed and made around the middle
f this month_
2. BItelillern of his interest and extensive
�ackground, I am also sending a copy of the
Atachfnent to Bill Colby.
George A. Carver. Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
kttachrnent
Mr. Colby
file
1- GAG Chnono\i
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4.
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sor' or111::!:: Nerf
27 October 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Phung Hoang Program
1. The present role, and the future, of Phung Hoang are being
debated in Saigon. Part of the debate concerns the role of CIA vis-
a-vis the arrangement that will arise from this debate. The purpose
of this memorandum is to discuss the issues and the CIA interest
and to lay down policy guidelines for the future.
Z. In the first place it is possibly now axiomatic that in the
context of a People's War pacification means the development of the
friendly side's administration of the population and the neutralization
of the enemy's. Control of territory, or population per se, is not the
point at stake. This simple definition encompasses all the efforts by
the United States in Vietnam and places the military aspect in context
since the military effort is to protect the administrative effort.
3. If the first statement is axiomatic, then there follows a
corollary. Temporary programs outside the normal, permanent,
administrative structure of the country are not ultimately effective
and can be justified only on an expediency basis, i. e. , to get programs
started, to develop concepts temporarily or to allow the U.S. to take
up the slack until the Vietnamese can get up to speed.
4. To illustrate the axiom and its corollary there is the 1
February 1968 COSVN assessment of the Tet offensive, a sort of Phung
Hoang in reverse:
"We have launched simultaneous and timely attacks
on almost all towns and cities, dittrict seats, sectors and
military bases as planned. Generally speaking, achieve-
ments were scored at the first step . . within a short
period of time we succeeded in paralyzing the puppet
government administration from central to local echelons,
and confusing the U.S. command channels."
SECRET
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OLIA �41
5. To turn to the corollary, there are the words of Sir Robert
Thompson on temporary administrative structures:
"The existence of a sound administrative structure,
although complicated by a federal system of government,
was perhaps the greatest advantage which Malaya had
over South Vietnam. The deficiency in South Vietnam was
further compounded by temporary ad hoc measures designed
to bolster particular weaknesses. The worst of these was
the formation of thousands of crash trained 'cadres' to
work in the villages to carry the government's message
to the people. The real answer should have been the
longer training of lower rank officials from government
departments in the practical and technical aspects of
departmental work, such as teachers, nurses, veterinary
assistants, agricultural assistants and public works
foremen, who could have produced practical benefits and
results. "
6. The application to the problem at hand:
a. Insofar as Phung Hoang is part of the effort to build
up the GVN administrative structure and tear down the
Communists', it should be encouraged and continued.
b. Insofar as Phung Hoang is a temporary mechanism
outside the normal government administrative structure,
it should be terminated.
c. In more concrete terms the Phung Hoang participants
must return to a founding original principle. No new structures
are to be created or maintained, and no one who participates
in Phung Hoang is to change his basic charter.
d. In the attack on the infrastructure the police have
a role, as do the MSS, the province chiefs and district
chiefs as well as the national government. Each of these
roles must be perfected and coordinated.
- 2 -
SET
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' Nor
e. Phoi Hop - PH - Phung Hoang - a coordination
mechanism is necessary at all levels and this was the
original idea. PH was an umbrella under which coordi-
nation and education could take place. Phung Hoang has
apparently now become a fossilized and extraneous
mechanism which may even be Impeding the attack on
the infrastructure. Apparently the need for coordination,
however, is still recognized in the debate in Saigon.
f. Although CIA took on a secondary role as Phung
Hoang project manager, the Agency's basic role throughout
has been as advisor to the Special Branch, one of whose
missions is to attack the infrastructure. If Phung Hoang
Itreverts" to the police it will go to the special police and
the Agency will still be advisors to the special police.
g. With the other up country programs of the 65-68
era either eliminated or restructured (except as they
relate to Phung Hoang)-- RD cadre, Census Grievance,
PIC, hamlet informants and PRU -- the only cover rationale
with the Vietnamese for the remaining CIA up country
structure will be our role as Special Branch advisors.
h. I recommend that this memo be turned into a cable
for the new COS for comment.
1.. The name used to refer to the coordination process,
if one is needed, is not material.
JOHN P. HORG.AN
Deputy Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
-3
;
PT
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