CAPTURED 31 JANUARY 1968 COSVN SITUATION ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05009917
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 2, 1968

3.3(h)(2)
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� Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05009917
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IMIENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
2 March 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William Bundy
A.ssistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Department of State
SUBJECT : Captured 31 January 1968 COSVN Situation Assessment
Per Mr. Smyser's request, relayed on your behalf, I queried our Station.
with respect to the alleged. COSVN document captured by the (US) 9th Infantry
Division. (A. clean text of this document, much more readable than the original
M.A.CV version, has been. transmitted by the Embassy as Saigon
Station's reply to my query reads as follows:
) The
3.3(h)(2)
"1. Station translation section states CDEC translation is excellent
job and they cannot improve on it. Experienced translator states that language,
tone, and format of original. document strongly suggests it is genuine. Following
comments prepared by Mr.. George Allen after dis cum Sian with Station analysts
who concur.
"2. Despite minor inconsistencies and ambiguities, we believe the
document is genuine. It represents a sober but positive assessment of the initial
results of the general offensive/general uprising, a realistic appraiE3a1 of weak-
nesses in its execution, and guidelines for action to exploit the limited success of
the first blow. The document probably was hastily composed, as evidenced by
internal inconsistencies and duplications, and appears to reflect collective
parochial views of several specialists rather than. normal, well-organized and
thoroughly staffed directive. The assessment accords generally with that
reflected in the MRN document acquired in Danang, is consonant with more
recently dated documents which appear designed to implement guidelines of this
document, and is in general agreement with interrogations of
and with agent reports from the area which outline -.future enemy plans.
Moreover, its provisions are reflected in general pattern of activity conducted
by the enemy since date of document. We feel that the assessment could have
been made by evening of 31 January, considering fact that pattern of only limited
success would already have been evident, especially in II Corps where action
began .on 29 January.
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'3. In essence, document indicates that the Viet Gong, as of
31 ,Tanuary, recognized that they had failed to achieve all their objectives, but
nevertheles;; considered the campaign partially successful since it created
conditions favorable for further exploitation. The authors reason that plans and
concept were sound, but there were weaknesses in execution. Most serious of
these were failure of political cadre to motivate masses for uprising, ineffective
troop proselyting and propaganda efforts, .sluggish command and liaison functionA.,,.
and general failure to coordinate effectively the military, political and subversive
arms of the attack. They note that failure to pursue their basic strategy, 'to
develop the uprising, and to attack continuously would return initiative to the
allies and enable them to recover and counterattack, 'creating new difficulties'
for the Communists.
.A.ssessment goes on. to reemphasize the sustained character
of the general offensive-general uprising phase_ Initial results proved that the
campaign could succeed, but only after sustained effort over three to four month
period, which apparently was anticipated by an earlier COSVN directive. Initial
guidelines for plan remain valid if implemented vigorously, if basic principles
are followed, and if various facets are closely coordinated with each other.
General guidelines of in exhortatory fashion are: to heighten the will to fight
continuously and over a sustained period and develop revolutionary spirit of the
masses; concentrate on specific vulnerable targets, especially ARVN (emphasizing
subversion), attacking 'United States troops only after careful preparation to
avoid disproportionate losses; focus on disrupting allied rear installations and
lines of communications; effectively combine military offensive with uprising;
arm the populace and bring rural people to cities to assist in combining urban.
uprising with seizure of :rural areas; develop political and military strength
rapidly, i.e., expand political apparatus, and solve troop replacement problem;
expand logistic support elements; step up propaganda, intimidation, and
su.bversion; consolidate newly liberated areas politically and militarily by
organizing administrative elements and creating self defense forces; and
strengthen effectiveness of party and military leadership at all levels.
S. Most significant points would seem to be: A. The reflection
that the Communists had anticipated that first blow might not be climactic and
that a sustained effort would be necessary to achieve their objectives; and 13. the
all encompassing broad nature of the campaign, extending to rural areas as well
as urban areas and requiring optimum performance by all military and infra-
structure elements to insure victory. This latter point may, indeed, be the fatal
flaw in the plan, since it would appear that less thaii optimum performance by
any key component of the Communist organization -- urban cadre, supply elements,
rural guerrillas, combat units, troop proselyting specialists, etc. could lead
to failure of the entire effort. Although the document refers to 'protracted war'
the context suggests that this relates to the resolutions of the Central Committee
in Hanoi which called for 'preparation for protracted war while seeking victory
in the shortest possible time. ' Despite some ambiguity, this document can be
r
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3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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SECiHi
Nair
vfor
interpreted as consistent with that concept. It warns against hope for immediate
success, but implies that concerted effort can achieve victory by end of this
winter-spring campaign. "
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3.5(c)
George A. arver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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