STATION COMMENTS ON GVN ACTIONS AND PERFORMANCE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05009914
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 4, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05009914
4 March 1968
MEMORANDUM THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Station Comments on GYN Actions and Performance
1. The Station's reply to our questions (copies of both attached hereto)
VW be summarised as follows:
Measures and tasks needed to meet immediate crisis
must be carefully discriminated from those related to solving
long-standing ( but not immediately critical) problems.
b. On balance, GVN perforrnance in immediately
critical areas is generally adequate, though far from outstanding.
Station is cautiouely optimistic that CVN performance in these
areas will continue to improve.
US must not dilute MIN energies among diverse tasks
teed, must help the GVN focus on the reaUy critical.
d also avoid pushing solutions requiring drastic GVN
reorganisation or major reorientation of resources.
Z. Station's ranking of specific critical tasks and summary of Station
comments on current GliN performance therein are as follows:
a. Protect seats of GVN authority and key military
liations.
Salim Comment: Thio being accomplished,
at least marginally. No key locale lost to the enemy
but many are subject to repeated harassment or
threatened with imminent ground attack. ARYN's
performance has varied widely but has improved in
recent days.
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b. Insure
by MTV military
act from optimumperformance
is in meeting currant crisis.
Comment: At national (Saigon) level, there are
ens GYri is recovering from initial shock and
beginning to move adequately. President Thieu has
begun to exert some leadership (in response to much
urging). Thanes assignment gives some hope for
IV Corps. Other corps commands seem marginal or
adequate. Performance varies at province level,
with WI advisory effort in some places compensating
for unsatisfactory GVN local performance. Little
information from district.
c. Relieve suffering created by enemy attacks.
Comment: GVN is coping more or less adequately.
OIN1141.114,
d. Rally populace against the enemy and restore confidence
in GVN and loyalty to the state.
Comment; Vietnamese probably incapable of
moving much faster than they are now moving, which
is not very fast.
e. Counter the enemy's siLo
dominate rural areas.
CS
Comment: GVN performance marginal in terms
of pu�ang assets back out into field. GVN feels, with
reason, first priority must be given to protecting
towns and cities. All Mission components are pushing
the line that a good offensive is the best defensive,
with some response in same areas. General Ky's
assignment to survey this problem and make
recommendations is an encouraging step forward.
WO'
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cable is, as advertised, a preliminary
response that does not answer our questions in sufficient
detail. The over-all picture it conveys is a GVN hanging
on, but barely. We also get the impression, perhaps
unfairly, that our colleagues (like the rest of the US Mission)
are tired and a trifle defensive in their response to Washington's
needles. We believe that though the GVN's capacities are
obviously limited, the real root problem is more one of atmos-
phere and attitude than sheer ability. The key person here is
Thieu. Unless he can be persuaded to galvanise the situation
or allow others (e.g. , KT) to do so ostensibly in his name,
prospects for improved GVN performance are bleak. If Thieu
will start acting like a war president in time of crisis, bow-
ever, there could be significant improvement in a number of
fields in a short span of time. The difficulty lies partly in
Thiele, make-up and primarily in the fact that he does not
yet appear to appreciate the urgency and seriousness of the
crisis with which the government ha heads is faced, or the
fact that this is a crisis out of which the US Government
could be unable to bail him (even if it were willing to mount
an all out try) unless he and his Vietnamese colleagues really
do their full share.
George A. Carver, Sr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
0/DCl/SAVA:GACarver/m ee
Distribution
Orig - DCI w/atts
1 - VC Tet Offensive w/7
1 - GAC Chrono w/atts
- VAS/RAC w/atts
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05009914