LOGISTICS IMPACT OF INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN SOUTH LAOS

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05000043
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• Document Creation Date: October 29, 2024
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2024
• Case Number: F-2019-00324
• Publication Date: January 1, 1970

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Logistics Impact of Interdiction Operations
in South Laos
13 Oct 70
No Date
Wells. (DDO/FE) to DDP memo re Dr. Kissinger's Request
for an Evaluation of the South Laos Interdiction
Program (requesting CIA's best estimate of the amounts
of supplies which have been interdicted)
Cable re South Laos interdiction program (clash/casualty
statistics, Sekong River interdiction program, booty
captured or destroyed, qualitative results)
15 Oct 70 Karamessines to Kissinger memo re Logistics Impact of
Interdiction Operations in South Laos
.Attachment: Typescript IM (S-3388) IM re Logistics
Impact of Interdiction Operations in
South Laos During the 1970 Wet Season
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13 OCT 1910
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans
SUBJECT I Dr. Kissinger's Request for an Evalua-
tion of the South Laos interdiction Program
I. John Hoidridge informed me this morning that Dr.
Kissinger had been reviewing our South Laos interdiction
Reports. He then asked Holdridge to get an evaluation from
CIA of the effectiveness of the interdiction program in haras-
sing the communist supply lines in the Panhandle. Specifically
Kissinger wants to have our best estimate of the amounts of
supplies which have been interdicted.
Z. Paul Walsh, Chief, OER, has agreed to help us
prepare a reply to Dr. Kissinger. We will ask the Station
for its assessment and provide this to Walsh tomorrow morn-
ing. Holdridge asked for the paper by tomorrow, and,
hopefully, we will be able to get it to him before the close of
business Wednesday.
signed/William W. Wells
William W. Wells
Acting Chief, Far East Division
Distributiont
0 & I - DDP
I - ADDP
1 - CFE
1 - C/OER
1 CFE/TBL
1 - C/LOC
1 - ACFE Chrono
IVE
GROUP 1
Excluda from automatic
dowurging and
dadasollioation
13 OCT 1970
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FORM 61 0 USEDIMEMUS I:I SECRET 7 CONFIDENTIAL El INTERNAL
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�OLUI1L1 ULUIU.
1 5 OCT 1970
SUBJECT
DUM FOR
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Logistics Impact of Interdiction
Operations in South Laos
1. The attached memorandum is in response to
John Holdridge's request that you wish to be informed
of the amount of supplies destroyed or captured as a
result of the interdiction operations in South Laos
during the 1970 wet season.
2. In view of your interest in what was going
on with the enemy's logistics system during the
period of these operations, I am also attaching a
recent publication by this Agency which discusses
logistical developments in South Laos and Cambodia
during the 1970 wet season.
/s/
THOMAS H. KARAMESSINES
Deputy Director for Plans
Attachments; (2)
1. Intelligence Memorandum, "Logistics
mpact of Interdiction Operations
in South Laos During the 1970 Wet
Season," 15 Oct 70 (SC 15057/70/a)
ER IM 70-147, "Communist Logistical
Developments it Southern Laos and
Camboaa During the 1970 Wet Season,
Oct 70 (SC 12195/70)(Copy No. 170)
SC 15057/70
Copy No. Ap
(ifit3CP I
Ealudg frm ntonstle,
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
15 October 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Logistics Impact of Interdiction
Operations in South Laos
During the 1970 Wet Season
Background
1. Allied interdiction operations against the NVA
logistics system in South Laos during the 1970 wet season
consisted principally of the 7AF Commando Hunt IV program
and limited ground interdiction efforts by friendly
guerrilla forces in Operation Gauntlet and MACSOG units
carrying out Prairie Fire operations.
2. The impact of the 1970 wet season interdiction
operations, in terms of supplies destroyed, was small.
This result was to be expected both because of the reduced
level of logistical activity during the wet season and
the environmental restraints imposed on our inter-
diction operations. The effect of the wet season inter-
diction programs is, in fact, more properly measured by
assessing the extent to which they complicated the enemy's
attempts to keep the system in a state of readiness for
the resumption of dry season operations; increased the
cost and difficulties of moving even small amounts of
supplies; forced the diversion of large numbers of personnel
to maintain and defend the system in South Laos; and
obstructed plans for the westward expansion of the system.
3. A primary reason for not anticipating a large
pay-off in terms of the destruction of supplies is the
meager nature of the target system, particularly during
the wet season. During the 1969 wet season, for example,
the 559th Transportation Group pulled out of South Laos
and the actual movement of supplies was restricted to the
movement of small amounts in the area around the DMZ and
shuttling activities in the central Panhandle. During the
1
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1970 wet season the 559th remained in South Laos. But the
amounts of supplies moved through the system were small,
apparently adequate to maintain the forces in the Panhandle
but not enough to provide a significant volume for through-
put to Cambodia or South Vietnam. Reports from some of
the more important Binh Trams in the system give a good
insight into the small volume of traffic -- 22 tons a day
in June, 7 tons a day in July and about the same volume
in August. By September concern about moving supplies
became minimal and the operations of the 559th concentrated
almost exclusively on the completion of final preparations
for the opening of the 1970-71 dry season.
4. Other factors that limited the pay-off from
interdiction operations were the sharp reductions in Air
Force sorties, the influence of weather on both ground and
air operations, the launching of ground operations during
the period when traffic flows were at their lowest point
of the year, and, finally, the hostile environment which
caused many ground operations to be short-lived.
Air Interdiction
5, 7AF interdiction operations -- Commando Hunt IV --
were reduced significantly during- the 1970 wet season.
Only 14,400 tactical attack sorties were flown in southern
Laos this summer (June-September) compared with 29,500
sorties for the same four months last year. The decrease
�in tactical attack sorties was partly offset, however, by
the greater number of B-52 strikes which more than doubled,
increasing from 1,100 last year to 2,400 this year.
6. The results of these air operations are difficult
to assess in a quantitative sense. This is because the
data on bombing results, principally pilot reports, and
the condition under which they must be reported make them
almost inevitably subject to wide margins of error. In
addition, the methodologies currently used to convert
BDA results to supply losses involve _a number of ques-
tionable, though necessarily arbitrary, assumptions
yielding results which are at odds with other intelligence-.
Despite these limitations which preclude any precise
weighing of supplies lost because of air interdiction,
a number of related factors support a judgment that the
amounts lost during this wet season were undoubtedly small.
Kiarrr
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7. The data reported by 7AF, for example, indicate
that truck destruction during this wet season increased
by about 25 percent compared to the 1969 wet season when
truck traffic was inordinately low. At the same time,
the data show that secondary explosions and fires, the
category which traditionally accounts for the bulk of
estimated losses, decreased by 25 percent.
8. A better appreciation of the magnitude of supply
losses due to air interdiction can be had by comparing BDA
data for this wet season with similar data for the previous
dry season. Thus, effective truck losses averaged 4 a day
during this wet season, compared with losses of 24 trucks
a day during the previous dry season. Similarly, the
average of 47 secondary fires and explosions for this wet
season compares with an average of 200 a day reported
during the past dry season.
Ground Interdiction
9. During the past wet season, two programs --
Operation Gauntlet and Prairie Fire -- involved the use
of friendly ground forces in interdiction operations in
South Laos. Neither of these programs resulted in the
destruction of large amounts of supplies.
Prairie Fire
10. The commitment of Prairie Fire resources to
ground interdiction operations during the 1970 wet
season was minimal. During the period June-September,
an average of 30-35 Prairie Fire operations were con-
ducted monthly in South Laos. About 90% of these
operations were oriented primarily toward reconnaissance
activities. A number of operational handicaps, par-
ticularly the vigorous reactions of enemy forces, meant
that these FGU missions were usually short-lived. Only
a handful of these operations yielded any significant
information on enemy logistics or gained access to
enemy installations that were not long abandoned. In
the few cases where the probes were relatively lucrative,
the amounts of enemy supplies captured or destroyed
were quite small. A typical example is represented by an
operation in late September south of the western corner
of the DMZ. This operation unearthed an ammunition cache
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ve.v410,611 v&m>
in a bomb-damaged bunker. The cache contained 3,800
rounds of 30 cal., 500 rounds of 50 cal., and nine rounds-
of 57 mm recoilless rifle ammunition -- a total of
some 350 pounds of ammunition.
11. The most lucrative of the Prairie Fire interdiction.
operations during the 1970 wet season was Operation
Tailwind, a three-day long reconnaissance-in-force opera-
tion carried Out some 15 miles west of Chavane. Operation
Tailwind was launched on 11 September when three platoons,
totaling 136 troops were inserted by helicopter into an
area near enemy Route 165/966 close to the Binh Tram 36
area of operations. Although met with almost continuous
enemy harasSment, the heavy application of close air
support sustained the operation's momentum and allowed
the force to enter several enemy installations (presumably
on the outer periphery of BT 36) before being exfiltrated
on 14 September. Early into the mission, friendly troops
captured and subsequently destroyed an ammunition cache
containing an estimated 30 tons of supplies.* In addition,
some 850- pages of enemy documents were seized and re-
turned to MACV for analysis.** Allied losses sustained
during the 80-hour duration of Operation Tailwind were
relatively moderate. Three troops were killed, and
fifty were wounded (but only five required hospitaliza-
tion). Estimates of enemy killed by air strikes numbered -
over 400. The operation was costly, however in terms
of helicopters. Two helicopters were shot down during
extraction attempts. Another dozen helicopters were so
heavily damaged by enemy fire as to be unservicealple...
Operation Gauntlet
12. Operation Gauntlet, the major ground interdiction
program undertaken duting. this wet season, was launched--
,
* Found in the cache were: 500 140mm. rockets, 300 82mm,
rockets, 2,000 23mm. rounds, 12,-500 rounds of small arms
ammunition, and 40 bicycles.
** According to MACV reporting, these documents contain
highly significant information on the 559th Transportation
Group. As of' 25 September-, 400 pages of the documents had
been classified Category A the highest rating for
intelligence Value.
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on 29 August 1970 and concluded on 30 September. The
Operation, including approximately 5,000 irregular
troops, had as its primary mission the interdiction
and harassment of enemy lines of communication (LOC's)
in Southern Laos, and the displacing of enemy units
deployed along the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau
overlooking the Se Kong River and Route _16. Given this _
mission, the interdiction operations of Operation Gauntlet
cannot be evaluated primarily in terms of the amounts of
supplies destroyed and captured.
13. Another factor which drastically limited any
potential pay-off from Operation Gauntlet in terms of
supplies destroyed was. the fact that it took place at
the height of the wet season when supply movements
through the Panhandle were at the lowest level of the
year.
14. The quantity of supplies captured or destroyed
by Operation Gauntlet forces was small -- some 23 short
tons of rice and little more than 1 ton of weapons and
ammunition.* The loss of these supplies will be of little
consequence to the enemy. Three Communist LOC's were
also temporarily interdicted during the Operation, Route 23
at Ban Toumlan, the Se Bang Hieng River well west of
Route 23 and Routes 96-165 in the Chavane area. These
interdictions probably had a marginal effect on supply
movement since, as stated above, the level of logistic
activity in these areas and throughout the Panhandle
was at an extremely low level.
15. Gauntlet -forces have also had some additional
success in destroying enemy. supplies by calling in air
strikes against enemy facilities. One of the more -
dramatic examples of this activity was an air strike
which resulted in 20 Large secondary explosions and 200
smaller secondary explosions. It.is probable that the
ground-air cooperative ventures of this type result in
much greater-destruction of supplies than does ground
action alone.
� 16. Although the effects of Operation Gauntlet have
been slight in terms of the capture or destruction of
* An itemized listing is contained in the Appendix.
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1
enemy supplies, the program has had a measure of success
in other respects. It was a contributing factor to the
developments which forced the North Vietnamese to make a
number of troop deployments to improve their tactical
position in South Laos. Intercepted enemy communications
make it clear that these deployments were undertaken
primarily as a precautionary measure against precisely
such operations as Gauntlet. Thus, by the time Operation
Gauntlet had started, the North Vietnamese had greatly
.increased their capabilities to cope with intruders.
Since early May, the 968th Front -- the North Vietnamese
tactical arm in the area -- had been bolstered by at
least one regiment and two independent battalions. In
addition, Hanoi had infiltrated about 8,000 troops
to South Laos and redeployed from South Vietnam major elements
of their 2nd Division as well as the 141st Regiment to the
Tchepone area of Laos.
17. The successful retaking of Phou Nong Tao and
PS-26 by Gauntlet forces also has had a significant
impact on the enemy's logistic capabilities. The
holding of these positions has denied the enemy free
access to Route 16 and the Se Kong river, critical
areas which he must control before the westward expansion
of his logistical system can be completed. Extensive
seeding of mines along Routes 23 and 16 will also _
complicate the enemy's use of these routes.
18. Operation Gauntlet has also met with some
success in its harassment of enemy forces. Gauntlet
forces reportedly killed some 600 enemy troops and
wounded another 500. Inflicting these casualties was
not without its own high costs because Gauntlet forces
suffered 147 killed-,in-action and 677 wounded-in-action.
More importantly, Gauntlet casualties -account for a
significantly higher share of manpower resources than do
enemy casualties.
19. Phase II of the South Laos interdiction program
which is to be launched on October 20th offers some
prospects of significantly greater success in terms of
the destruction-of-enemy supplies. Phase _II will place
irregular forces along those north-south routes in
South Laos which are major channels for the movement
of supplies. It will also be taking place during the
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period when the enemy will have started his dry season
logistic campaign and supply movements should be at
high levels. It should be noted, however, that the
irregular forces will be operating in areas critical
to the enemy. Consequently, they will be vigorously
defended and the casualties sustained by the irregular
forces will undoubtedly be much greater than they were
during Operation Gauntlet.
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SERB-SPOKE
APPENDIX
Weapons and Ammunition Captured in
Operation Gauntlet
Weapons Unit
60 mm mortar 3
RPG-2 14
RPD machine gun 4
AK-47 36
Recoilless gun 2
SKS 2
M1 1
Bren Lgun 1
Pistol 1
Ammunition Units
57 mm recoilless 45 rounds
30 caliber 4 cases
60 mm mortar 54 rounds
82 mm mortar 9 rounds
B-40 rocket 51 rounds
RPD ammunition 1,500 rounds
Hand grenades 17
AK-47 ammunition 4,130 rounds
8
MI-SPOKE
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C T sc 15057/70 and
SC 15057/70/a
Copy No. 10
- 3311
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code, Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information; its security must be maintained in accordance with
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-
GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages
to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director
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GROUP I
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SEG-REX
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STATISTIC {AVE NOT DE.EN KEPT ON A PRE-GAUNTLET �
CK.RATION GAUNTLET AND POST-GAUNTLET BASIS. OUR PROGRAM:
..
FOR THE SOUTH LAOS INTERDICTION PROGRAM RUNS FROM 29 AUG
TO P ESENT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SFKONG RIVER INTER-
DICTION PROGRAM. OUR STAT ISTICS ItOli SEKONG START ON 22 JUNE
1 0 PRESENT,
2. CLASH/ ASUALTY 'STATISTICS 29 Aua - 7 OCT I 422
C ASHES WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN 464 ENEMY KIA AND .531 WIA
IN A DEFINITE: CATEGORY, WITH ANOTHER 132 KIA AND 160 IOTA
IN A PROBABLE CATEGORY; FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE SUFFERED 147
KIA AND .4"77 WIA.
f.3ERONO RIVER INTERDICTION PROGRAM
14 ACCOUNTED FOR 15 ENEMY BOATS AND 73
:SNEMY KIA CONFIRMED BY 1"01..YGI:iAPH EXAMP/AT ION, CARRIED IN
A PRO ABLE CATEGMY ARE ANOTHER 47 BOATS SUNK WITH 100
STFC-11-ET
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ENEMY KIR. THESE WILL EITHER t cONFIPMED OR DENIED
retLW14P#ED
WHEN WE ARE ABLE TO er-777t THE TEAMS, THERE HAVE BEEN
THREE TRUCKS DESTROYED AND TWO DISA&LED SINCE 29 AUGUST,
WITH SEVERAL OTHERS ARE REPORTED BUT NOT CONFIRMED*
4. 1..;.00TY EITHER CAPTURED OR DESTROYED*
FOODSTUFFS:
(I) HICE, 20.7 "'DNS DESTROYED.
(2) SALT: 44 LS DE2TROYa.
P. WEAPON
(1)
09 COMM MORTAR SITE.
) 14 'RV&
(4) 4 RPD LM.'
(5) 36 AK-47 /OS ULT RIFLES'.
(6) .2 DK-i:12
CO 2 SKS'S.
(B) I N-I RIFLE.
(9) M-I CARDINES,
(1Z) 1 in
( I I) - PISTOL
3 - 60MM MeIRTARO.
SECRET
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Co MUNITIONS:
� (1) 45 ROUNDS 57MM RR,
(2) 4 CASES CAL .*30 AMMUNITION,
(6) �54 ROUNDS 62MM MORTAR AMMUNITION.
- (4) 4 82MM MORTAR SHELLS*
(5) 51 .D..,40.1-1.0=S.
(6) 15. RPD LNG AMMO DRUMS.
-(7) ..-17 HAND CRENADES.
(0 15 AK...47. MAOA/INS.
-0) 4 CASES AK-7 AMMUNITION.
D. MSC LLANFOUS:
(1) 4 PONCHOS.
(2) 6 1:1.ANKET S.
(3) 1 FIRST AID KIT AND ASSORTED MEDICAL
SUPPLIES.
(4) �1 DAR OF SOAP
(5) 4 GROUND CLOTHES,
(C) 1 NYLON SLEEPING eAci,
(7) 3 HAMMOCKS.
SECRET
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PAU 4 VIENTIANE 27615 5-t-e�R-4-21_
(8) 8 CANTEENS.
(9) 2 MOSQUITO BARS.
(10) 6 NVA PITH HELMETS.
(11) 2 FIELD SHOVELS*
(12) 25 HUTS DESTROYED.
(13) 30 HUTS DE3TROYED EIY TACAIR*
(14) 1 RUCKSACK,
(15) 1 PR bOOTS.
(1) 1 KNIFE
(17) 1 HAND FLARE.
GUALITATIVE RESULTS%
A. FRIENDLY PRLSENCE IN TOUMLAN VALLEY FOR ALMOST
TWO WEEKS. AN TOWLA4 THE CENTRAL VILLAOE IN THIS
Va.LEY, WAS CAPTURED BY FRIENDLY UNITS 23 SEPTEMbER.
ON BOLOVENS PLATEAU, THE TWO PRIMARY OBJECTIVES,
FNOU 00NO TAO AND PS-26, WERE CAPTURED 00
1 t;EPTEHD q AND 26 SEPTEMBER RESPECTIVELY.
C. THE FIRST TIME IN ALMOST FOUR YEARS, A LAPGE
OF IRRUA Ag UNITS WERE SUCCESSFULLY INSERTED INTO
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I.,ACTION NO.
rAGE 5 VIENTIANE 27615 ECHCI
THE CHAVANE TARGET' AREA, IN A PERIOD OF THREE DAYS,
22 6UEHRILLAS WERE HELI-LIFTED INTO ILI'S NORTH AND
SOUTH OF OHAVANE. IANGIDLE RESULTS INCLUDE THREE TRUCKS
1,:ESIROYE1I AND SECTIOPS OF RIES 165 AND 96 MINED E$IDES TOP1IN
01 T}1EE ROUTES, A SUBSIDIARY RESULT WAS A nrcH DEGRE5. OF CONCERN BY
1HE L1FMY AS REFLE TED IMMO SPECIAL INTELLIOENCE CHANNELS
LOUT RAIDERS IN HIS EE(R AREAS.
D, Faun CONMANDO RAIDER TEAMS WERE ABLE TO OPERATE
IN TUE VAN BAC TARCEI AREA FOR FOUR WEEKS FROM A JUWJLE
E CAMP. TANGIBLE ,ESULTS INCLUDE THE BOATS (CA/ZRIED
1 PlODaLE CATEGORY) SUNK, WHILE SEVERAL SUCCESSFUL
1-Llu.unEL AMBUSHES WEPE CONDUCTED BY THESE TEAMS. ALSO
TASAIR WAS DIRECTED INTO SEVERAL SUSPECTED ENEMY BN AND CO
12ADCUARTERS WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS,
L4 RESULTS OF AIR STRIKES ON ENEMY
:,.%TERILL DIRECTED bY INTERDICTION FORCES CANNOT ACCUMILLY EE LISTED
BUT MEV. IS tlO DOUBT THAT THESE STRIKES ACCOUNTED FOR TIN;
XI EST L.Nn'E.
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Approved for Release: 2024/09/27 C05000043
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES
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Approved for Release: 2024/09/27 C05000043
DATE1 5 OCT 1970
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(47)
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