CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/08/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03448347
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: August 13, 1955

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
13 August 1955
Copy No. 9,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
pocumENT NO. _41-
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
1:1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _20/0
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: ././1/4.14a_CL_ REVIEWER: _
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTENTS
1. MOLOTOV REPORTED CENSURED FOR ANTI-
YUGOSLAV STAND (page 3).
2. KEIRUSHCHEV'S REPORT TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE
ON YUGOSLAVIA (page 4).
3. SOVIET TROOPS APPARENTLY TO REMAIN IN
HUNGARY AND RUMANIA (page 5).
4. USSR CONTINUES OVERTURES TO SAUDI ARABIA
(page 6).
5.
6. PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT STRENGTHENS POSITION
(page 8).
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L MOLOTOV REPORTED CENSURED FOR ANTI-YUGOSLAV
STAND
CIA
11 Aug 55
SECRET
CS pp 307
Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov was
censured by the Communist Party cen-
tral committee at the July plenum for
his stand on Yugoslavia,
Molotov had allegedly opposed send-
ing the high-level Soviet delegation to Yugoslavia and, at
a plenum shortly before its departure, had violently crit-
icized Yugoslavia and suggested that it be dealt with like
any other capitalist country. The censure is reported to
have stated that Molotov did not understand that Yugoslavia
was still socialistic and that a Communist Party leader,
in order to promote the general objectives of Communism,
should try to analyze the reasons for Yugoslavia's devia-
tion rather than take a dictatorial attitude toward the mat-
ter.
Comment
This reported rebuke indicates that
there was a policy difference over
Yugoslavia, with Molotov exhibiting the inflexibility in
foreign affairs for which he has long been noted. Bulganin's
comment at the summit conference that it may be neces-
sary to get rid of Molotov as foreign minister before the
October conference may indicate that Molotov is out of
step with the party presidium on other matters as well.
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2. ICHRUSHCHEV'S REPORT TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE
ON YUGOSLAVIA
Khrushchev reported to the central
committe�hat close Soviet-
Yugoslav ssible, since
Yugoslavia is essentially a socialist state, but that party
rapprochement must be gradual because the Yugoslays
have deviated considerably from Soviet ideology. Khrush-
chev said that during his visit to Belgrade the Yugoslays
had acknowledged this nationalist deviation, and that Tito
had told him he is a Communist at heart and would never
join the capitalist camp.
The Yugoslays said that they had no
economic or military obligations to the United States, but
that they would not break with the US now. Such a break
would require two to three years.
Comment The major elements of Khrushchev's
report coincide generally with other
Information regarding the Belgrade conversations. In
order to make his mission to Belgrade appear more fa-
vorable to high Soviet officials, however, Khrushchev
may have overstated the pro-Soviet views of the Yugo-
slays�particularly the Yugoslav admission of "nation-
alist deviation" which Belgrade has refused to make.
If the Yugoslays said this, however,
It would have complemented Khrushchev's admission of
Stalinist excesses in dealing with Belgrade at the time
of the break, and have removed the last major barrier
to the gradual resumption of party relations between the
two countries.
The Yugoslays may anticipate that
they will be independent of American aid in two or three
years, but it is unlikely that Tito plans to re-enter the
Soviet bloc.
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3. SOVIET TROOPS APPARENTLY TO REMAIN IN
HUNGARY AND RUMANIA
Rumanian prime minister Gheorghiu-
Ders prepared statement to the Unite&
Press on 11 August indicates that So-
viet troops now in Rumania and Hungary
will remain after all Soviet forces are evacuated from
Austria.
The Rumanian premier said, "If the
foreign troops were withdrawn from...West Europe...
the necessity of the presence of Soviet troops in Rumania
would be removed...and these troops would be withdrawn."
His reference to the Warsaw treaty as justification for the
continued presence of Soviet troops in Rumania foreshadows
an early announcement of new legal arrangements under
that treaty.
There have been numerous unconfirmed
reports that, contrary to Marshal Zhukov's order of 31
July, some of the Soviet troops which are being withdrawn
from Austria will be stationed in Hungary and Rumania.
The rail route of troops already leaving Austria, however,
strongly suggests that the forces in Austria will move back
to the USSR.
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4. USSR CONTINUES OVERTURES TO SAUDI ARABIA
Soviet ambassador Lavrentiev in
Tehran has reiterated a Soviet offer
to supply Saudi Arabia uncondition-
ally with any quantity of arms, ac-
cording to Saudi deputy foreign minister Yasin, who is
visiting Iran with King Saud. Yasin told Ambassador
Chapin that Lavrentiev said the USSR would enter into a
"pact of guarantee" with Saudi Arabia or any other Mid-
dle Eastern state if the "other side" would do the same.
King Saud earlier told Chapin in more
general terms of this offer, and said that Saudi Arabia
had been most loyal in its agreement on the Dhahran air
base, but that the United States had not carried through
with military and other aid which Saudi Arabia had been
led to expect.
Comment This is the second time within ten
days that the Saudis have called the
attention of an American ambassador to Soviet offers of
military aid. Both the Saudi and Egyptian governments
appear to be using Soviet approaches to extract additional
assistance and concessions from the United States.
It is doubtful that any Soviet offers to
supply arms have been as specific or far-reaching as
claimed by the king and Yasin. Such offers, if made,
were probably general in nature and intended to further
Moscow's efforts to establish closer relations with Mid-
dle Eastern states.
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6, PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT STRENGTHENS POSITION
President Magsaysay is now in a
considerably strengthened position
to eliminate Senator Recto as a chal-
lenge to his administration. Magsay-
say maneuvered the Nacionalista Party executive com-
mittee on 10 August into endorsing each of the foreign
policy programs which Recto has continually challenged.
In the closing minutes of its special session the same
day, the Philippine congress passed a land tenure re-
form bill, a public works bill and other measures urged
by the president since shortly after his inauguration in
January 1954.
Now that he has obtained a clear re-
pudiation of Recto and approval of some of his own major
programs, Magsaysay may decide in the interests of
party unity to refrain from pressing his opposition to
Recto's senate candidacy. Recto apparently retains the
support of such Nacionalista stalwarts as Senator Jos4
Laurel and his son, the house speaker, who might break
with Magsaysay if Recto leaves the party
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