CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/07/24

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03448341
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
September 20, 2019
Document Release Date: 
September 26, 2019
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 24, 1955
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15722066].pdf297.47 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 "7,0A TOP SECRET WOM/fel 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 24 July 1955 Copy No. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. 28 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: C:// AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE; iiNd.o. REVIEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 7'01' SECRET /Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 AL* Ask Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 SUMMARY GENERAL 1. USSR informally proposes establishment of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia (page 3). SOVIET UNION 2. Soviet delegation's reaction to President's inspection proposals (page 3). 3. Mikoyan calls for increased trade with US (page 4). SOUTH ASIA 4. Pakistani governor general's death expected soon (page 5). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 5. Government party seen losing strength in Israeli elections (page 6). LATIN AMERICA 6. Peron reported considering asylum in Uruguay (page 6). 7. Communist involvement in Saigon explosions suspected (page 7). 24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Tt1P grrl?T'T Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 Ac �1-1716t1tni GENERAL 1. USSR informally proposes establishment of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia: Comment: This would be a logical step in advancing the growing Soviet diplomatic offensive in the Middle East aimed at undermining American defense policy there. The timing of the proposal probably reflects Moscow's judgment that Saudi Arabia might now be receptive because of its hostility to the Turkish-Iraqi pact and its unsettled relations with the United States. Prior to World War II, the USSR and Saudi Arabia had diplomatic relations. King Saud, basically anti-Communist, is likely to postpone action on this matter. His ultimate decision will probably depend on his personal reaction to American policy at any given time. SOVIET UNION 2. Soviet delegation's reaction to President's inspection proposals: the Soviet representatives at ureneva were nonplussed by President Eisenhower's proposals of 21 July on exchange of military blueprints and aerial photography. He said, "You Amer- icans have built up a house of friendship and conciliation, and then suffocated us with the bricks that came tumbling down all around us." He said the proposal caused the Soviet delegation a lot of confusion. "We had thought there might be a rabbit in the hat, but we did not expect anything on this scale." 24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 hile he recog- nized the proposal as a dramaticauy contrived propaganda maneu- ver, he thought--on the basis of the President's performance at Geneva�that it was more than mere 'propaganda. the possibility that Marshal Zhukov might come to the United States, and added that Khrushchev, whom he described as a man of "infinite curi- osity," would also like very much to come. He brus protocol difficulties the latter's visit would create. 3. Mikoyan calls for increased trade with US: Deputy Premier Mikoyan told the Amer- ican embassy in Moscow that a top-level political understanding, should result in an increase in trade between the United States and the USSR. He particularly stressed Soviet imports of machinery and noted that both he and Deputy Premier Pervukhin recognized that the United States is ahead of the USSR in both de- sign and manufacture of many types of machinery. While not spe- cific as to the types of goods the ussit would export, he said that goods would be found which would interest the United States. Mikoyan ignored the comment that the present low level of trade was the result of the Soviet policy ini- tiated in the late twenties and noted that a revival of trade would be beneficial to both sides. Comment: There have been several recent indications that the USSR seriously wants to increase trade with the US. Premier Bulganin, in his report to the central committee on 4 July, sharply criticized Soviet development of tractors and farm machinery, noting that, "We lag behind the best foreign models." Bulganin's speech, Khrushchev's special interest in agriculture, and the current tour of US farms by a Soviet deputy minister of agriculture may be harbingers of a So- viet effort to arrange large-scale purchases of agricultural ma- chinery in the United States. 24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Pret�trt rf rt re rri Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 4107 Owing to Soviet trade policy and to the lack of suitable Soviet exports to the United States, there is little likelihood of a significant increase of trade over the next few years. (Prepared by ORB) SOUTH ASIA 4, Pakistani governor general's death expected soon: Pakistani governor general Ghulam Mohammad is not expected to live be- yond the end of July, according to a statement made in confidence by Prime ms er o mma All to American charg�eath. Mohammad Ali clearly implied that arrangements had been made to announce simultaneously Ghulam Mohammad's death and the appointment by the queen of a new governor general. Heath comments that Prime Minister Mohammad All, Interior Minister Mirza, Law Minister Suhrawardy, and Governor-designate of West Pakistan Gurmani appear to be the leading candidates for the governor general's post. The prime min- ister, however, has indicated he preferred not to be "held prisoner" as governor general. Comment: The most likely combination seems to be Mirza as governor general and Mohammad All as prime minister. Suhrawardy does not appear to have the strength to bargain seriously for the prime ministership, though his allegiance would certainly be useful to the government. Mirza does not trust Sihrawardy, but he might be willing to give Suhrawardy a cabi- net post more important than his present one. Gurmani, who has no wide political follow- ing, would probably be satisfied with the provincial post he is now slated to occupy. 24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 1...111-4,�,1 � La I NEAR EAST � AFRICA 5. Government party seen losing strength in Israeli elections: he consensus of political observers in Israel is that the governing Mapai Party and its coalition partner, the neral Zionist Party, will lose some strength in the parliamentary general elections on 26 July. The gainers will be the Herut Party on the right, the Progressives in the center, and Achdut Haavoda on the left. Other parties are expected to retain their present strength. These observers agree, however, that Israel's next government, like the present one, will be a coalition based on Mapai. Comment: It seems probable that the new Israeli cabinet will be dominated by the personality of Mapai leader David Ben-Gurion, former prime minister and present minister of defense, who has stated he will reassume the prime ministership. If Achdut Haavoda replaces the conserva- tive pro-Western General Zionists as Mapai's principal coalition partner, the new Israeli government might take an even more ag- gressive attitude toward the Arabs and be less amenable to West- ern influence than it has under Prime Minister Shared. LATIN AMERICA 6. Peron reported considering asylum in Uruguay: 24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Tnr, crrnrrr Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 %Jr OLI�Ult/L:4 / Comment: Mounting pressure for Peron's resignation is being exerted by increasingly confident opposition groups, and the situation is reported to be potentially explosive. There is now evidence of some type of armed organization of civil- ians and retired officers. Moreover, an increasing number of young army officers appear disillusioned, despite the army high command's continuing support of Peron. Peron is reported consideration of Montevideo would appear to be largely influenced by its proxim- ity to Buenos Aires, since there is probably no other country in which he would encounter greater personal hostility. Peron told Ambassador Nufer on 19 July that if he resigned he would continue to act as head of the Peronista Party. The possibility of asylum for Peron may have been a subject for discussion between Bathe Berres and Peront Minister of Interior Borlenghi, who fled to Montevideo from Argen- tina in early July after being replaced because of pressure from the army. Possible disturbances or demonstrations by labor groups are expected on 26 July, the third anniversary of Evita Peron's death. 7. Communist involvement in Saigon explosions suspected: The American embassy in Saigon reports that the blasting of several electric power substations and the headquarters of the anti-Communist youth organization on 23 July may have been the work of Binh Xuyen or Viet Minh agents. In this connection, it remarks ,that the distinction between these groups appears to be vanishing in view of information indicating 24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341 'two' Ni100 Viet Minh infiltration of the Binh Xuyen. The embassy also ex- pressed concern that these successful attacks may be a forerunner of the destruction of the main power plant, which would make it difficult for the major portion of the European population to remain In Saigon. Comment: Other reports have indicated that the Viet Minh is giving aid to the various dissident groups in South Vietnam. Moreover* these blasts appear to have been en- gineered with great skill.. The Communists have hinted that "some- thing" would happen in South Vietnam if pre-election consultations did not commence on 20 July, and Sino-Viet Minh propaganda has taken on a distinctly tougher tone in the past several days. 24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2079709/16 C03448341