CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/07/24
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
03448341
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
September 20, 2019
Document Release Date:
September 26, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 24, 1955
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15722066].pdf | 297.47 KB |
Body:
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
"7,0A TOP SECRET WOM/fel
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
24 July 1955
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 28
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: C://
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE; iiNd.o. REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
7'01' SECRET
/Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
AL* Ask
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. USSR informally proposes establishment of diplomatic relations
with Saudi Arabia (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Soviet delegation's reaction to President's inspection proposals
(page 3).
3. Mikoyan calls for increased trade with US (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Pakistani governor general's death expected soon (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Government party seen losing strength in Israeli elections (page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
6. Peron reported considering asylum in Uruguay (page 6).
7. Communist involvement in Saigon explosions suspected (page 7).
24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Tt1P grrl?T'T
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
Ac �1-1716t1tni
GENERAL
1. USSR informally proposes establishment of diplomatic relations
with Saudi Arabia:
Comment: This would be a logical step
in advancing the growing Soviet diplomatic offensive in the Middle
East aimed at undermining American defense policy there. The
timing of the proposal probably reflects Moscow's judgment that
Saudi Arabia might now be receptive because of its hostility to
the Turkish-Iraqi pact and its unsettled relations with the United
States. Prior to World War II, the USSR and Saudi Arabia had
diplomatic relations.
King Saud, basically anti-Communist,
is likely to postpone action on this matter. His ultimate decision
will probably depend on his personal reaction to American policy
at any given time.
SOVIET UNION
2. Soviet delegation's reaction to President's inspection proposals:
the
Soviet representatives at ureneva were
nonplussed by President Eisenhower's
proposals of 21 July on exchange of
military blueprints and aerial photography. He said, "You Amer-
icans have built up a house of friendship and conciliation, and
then suffocated us with the bricks that came tumbling down all
around us." He said the proposal caused the Soviet delegation a
lot of confusion. "We had thought there might be a rabbit in the
hat, but we did not expect anything on this scale."
24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
hile he recog-
nized the proposal as a dramaticauy contrived propaganda maneu-
ver, he thought--on the basis of the President's performance at
Geneva�that it was more than mere 'propaganda.
the possibility
that Marshal Zhukov might come to the United States, and added
that Khrushchev, whom he described as a man of "infinite curi-
osity," would also like very much to come. He brus
protocol difficulties the latter's visit would create.
3. Mikoyan calls for increased trade with US:
Deputy Premier Mikoyan told the Amer-
ican embassy in Moscow that a top-level
political understanding, should result in
an increase in trade between the United
States and the USSR. He particularly stressed Soviet imports of
machinery and noted that both he and Deputy Premier Pervukhin
recognized that the United States is ahead of the USSR in both de-
sign and manufacture of many types of machinery. While not spe-
cific as to the types of goods the ussit would export, he said that
goods would be found which would interest the United States.
Mikoyan ignored the comment that the
present low level of trade was the result of the Soviet policy ini-
tiated in the late twenties and noted that a revival of trade would
be beneficial to both sides.
Comment: There have been several
recent indications that the USSR seriously wants to increase trade
with the US.
Premier Bulganin, in his report to the
central committee on 4 July, sharply criticized Soviet development
of tractors and farm machinery, noting that, "We lag behind the
best foreign models."
Bulganin's speech, Khrushchev's special
interest in agriculture, and the current tour of US farms by a
Soviet deputy minister of agriculture may be harbingers of a So-
viet effort to arrange large-scale purchases of agricultural ma-
chinery in the United States.
24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Pret�trt rf rt re rri
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
4107
Owing to Soviet trade policy and to the
lack of suitable Soviet exports to the United States, there is little
likelihood of a significant increase of trade over the next few
years. (Prepared by ORB)
SOUTH ASIA
4, Pakistani governor general's death expected soon:
Pakistani governor general Ghulam
Mohammad is not expected to live be-
yond the end of July, according to a
statement made in confidence by Prime
ms er o mma All to American charg�eath. Mohammad
Ali clearly implied that arrangements had been made to announce
simultaneously Ghulam Mohammad's death and the appointment by
the queen of a new governor general.
Heath comments that Prime Minister
Mohammad All, Interior Minister Mirza, Law Minister Suhrawardy,
and Governor-designate of West Pakistan Gurmani appear to be the
leading candidates for the governor general's post. The prime min-
ister, however, has indicated he preferred not to be "held prisoner"
as governor general.
Comment: The most likely combination
seems to be Mirza as governor general and Mohammad All as prime
minister.
Suhrawardy does not appear to have the
strength to bargain seriously for the prime ministership, though
his allegiance would certainly be useful to the government. Mirza
does not trust Sihrawardy,
but he might be willing to give Suhrawardy a cabi-
net post more important than his present one.
Gurmani, who has no wide political follow-
ing, would probably be satisfied with the provincial post he is now
slated to occupy.
24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
1...111-4,�,1 � La I
NEAR EAST � AFRICA
5. Government party seen losing strength in Israeli elections:
he consensus of political observers
in Israel is that the governing Mapai
Party and its coalition partner, the
neral Zionist Party, will lose some
strength in the parliamentary general elections on 26 July. The
gainers will be the Herut Party on the right, the Progressives
in the center, and Achdut Haavoda on the left. Other parties
are expected to retain their present strength.
These observers agree, however, that
Israel's next government, like the present one, will be a coalition
based on Mapai.
Comment: It seems probable that the
new Israeli cabinet will be dominated by the personality of Mapai
leader David Ben-Gurion, former prime minister and present
minister of defense, who has stated he will reassume the prime
ministership.
If Achdut Haavoda replaces the conserva-
tive pro-Western General Zionists as Mapai's principal coalition
partner, the new Israeli government might take an even more ag-
gressive attitude toward the Arabs and be less amenable to West-
ern influence than it has under Prime Minister Shared.
LATIN AMERICA
6. Peron reported considering asylum in Uruguay:
24 July 55
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Tnr, crrnrrr
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
%Jr OLI�Ult/L:4 /
Comment: Mounting pressure for Peron's
resignation is being exerted by increasingly confident opposition
groups, and the situation is reported to be potentially explosive.
There is now evidence of some type of armed organization of civil-
ians and retired officers. Moreover, an increasing number of
young army officers appear disillusioned, despite the army high
command's continuing support of Peron.
Peron is reported consideration of
Montevideo would appear to be largely influenced by its proxim-
ity to Buenos Aires, since there is probably no other country in
which he would encounter greater personal hostility. Peron told
Ambassador Nufer on 19 July that if he resigned he would continue
to act as head of the Peronista Party.
The possibility of asylum for Peron may
have been a subject for discussion between Bathe Berres and Peront
Minister of Interior Borlenghi, who fled to Montevideo from Argen-
tina in early July after being replaced because of pressure from
the army.
Possible disturbances or demonstrations
by labor groups are expected on 26 July, the third anniversary of
Evita Peron's death.
7. Communist involvement in Saigon explosions suspected:
The American embassy in Saigon reports
that the blasting of several electric power
substations and the headquarters of the
anti-Communist youth organization on
23 July may have been the work of Binh Xuyen or Viet Minh agents.
In this connection, it remarks ,that the distinction between these
groups appears to be vanishing in view of information indicating
24 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448341
'two' Ni100
Viet Minh infiltration of the Binh Xuyen. The embassy also ex-
pressed concern that these successful attacks may be a forerunner
of the destruction of the main power plant, which would make it
difficult for the major portion of the European population to remain
In Saigon.
Comment: Other reports have indicated
that the Viet Minh is giving aid to the various dissident groups in
South Vietnam. Moreover* these blasts appear to have been en-
gineered with great skill..
The Communists have hinted that "some-
thing" would happen in South Vietnam if pre-election consultations
did not commence on 20 July, and Sino-Viet Minh propaganda has
taken on a distinctly tougher tone in the past several days.
24 July 55
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2079709/16 C03448341