CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/08/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03448335
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: August 2, 1955

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rr03:7/90-A TC)-irr5
2 August 1955
Copy No. 99
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 20/0
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: /VOW_ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Arik.
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V tIS.4 I
SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Molotov may be retired as Soviet foreign minister before October
conference (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Resignation of Sun Li-jen may weaken Chinese Nationalist re-
gime (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Viet Minh changes attitude toward American consular personnel
(page 4).
4. Indonesian Communist Party
(page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Comment on planned expansion of Yugoslav-Soviet trade page 5).
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SOVIET UNION
1. Molotov may be retired as Soviet foreign minister before October
conference:
Bulganin said at Geneva that "perhaps it
will be necessary to get rid of Molotov
as foreign minister before the October
conference,"
It is improbable that there are any serious
policy disagreements between Molotov and the other Soviet leaders
and he will probably, therefore, retain his position on the party
presidium.
Gromyko, as the senior first deputy for-
eign minister, would appear the most likely candidate to succeed
Molotov. If the USSR wishes to repudiate the "hard" approach to
foreign relations, however, Gromyko might be passed over for
someone more "reasonable" and conciliatory, such as Molotov's
other first deputy, V. V. Kuznetsov.
FAR EAST
2. Resignation of Sun Li-jen may weaken Chinese Nationalist regime:
General Sun Li-jen, who was forced to re-
sign on 29 July, as personal chief of staff
to Chiang Kai-shek, told the American
charg�n Taipei on 30 July he expected
to be arrested on charges of involvement in an army plot to stage a
mass protest demonstration during a presidential review on 6 June�
Sun said that "confessions" implicating him had been extracted by
torture from young officers seized when their plan was discovered.
The charg�elieves that the detention of Sun would not only damage
the prestige of Nationalist China in the United States and elsewhere,
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110,
particularly among Overseas Chinese, but would arouse "dis-
sension if not disaffection', in the Nationalist army. It would
also provide the Chinese Communists with a propaganda bonanza
in their campaign to induce defections from the Nationalists.
Comment: General Sun has the reputa-
tion of being the most competent officer in the Chinese National-
ist army. He has been outspokenly critical of the dictatorial
qualities of the generalissimo and the Nationalist regime. His
following in the army has probably been reduced since he was re-
lievdd as groundforce commanclerlast year and may be confined
to younger officers at division level and below.
Should the younger officers attempt a
coup at some future date, they might receive support from offi-
cers in the Nationalist high command who are anxious to remove
the unpopular Peng Meng-chi as chief of staff.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Viet Minh changes attitude toward American consular personnel:
The American consul in Hanoi reports
that the attitude of Viet Minh officials in-
volved in the registration of consulate
personnel changed from surliness on
27 July to affability on 30 July. The British vice consul has also
experienced this change. The Communists are no longer denying
status to the consulate and have begun to deliver mail, including
an official Viet Minh document addressed to the "Consul of the
United States of AmeriAa.",
Comment: Since assuming control of
Hanoi in February, the Viet Minh has constantly harassed the con-
sulate. Efforts to force the withdrawal of the consulate evidently
have been put aside in order to bring Viet Minh policy in line with
that of Peiping and Moscow.
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4. Indonesian
Communist Party:
Comment: The growth of Communist in-
fluence in Indonesia during the past two years can be attributed
primarily to the tolerance of the Ali regime, which was heavily
dependent on the party's parliamentary support. The incoming gov-
ernment, supported by the army, is likely to be much less toler-
ant.
The Communists are capable of harass-
ing the new government to a considerable degree, however, be-
cause they control Indonesia's strongest labor and peasant organi-
zations.
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Comment on planned expansion of Yugoslav-Soviet trade:
Yugoslavia announced on 30 July a supple-
mentary trade agreement with the USSR
which will increase trade between the two
countries in 1955 from $10,000,000 to $16,000,000 each way. This
increase will bring Yugoslavia's planned over-all trade with the
Soviet bloc to $52,250,000 each way, or to approximately 17 per-
cent of its total annual foreign trade.
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*sr, `4411
Yugoslavia may have sought this increase
in trade with the USSR because of the deterioration in its balance
of payments position. Belgrade is still being forced to use some of
its available financial resources in the West for the import of food-
stuffs. The shortage of food has recently necessitated an increase
in domestic prices.
Tito will probably show increasing inter-
est in Soviet bloc trade as a means of obtaining a balance between
exports and imports, thereby avoiding the credit problems con-
nected with trade with the West. Titob speech on 27 July revealed
considerable concern over Yugoslavia's economic situation.
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