PRINCETON CONSULTANTS MEETINGS OF 17-18 MARCH 1955

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03436489
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: March 25, 1955

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25 March 1955
STAFF MEMORANDUM we 13-55
SUBJECT: Princeton Consultants Meetings of 17-18 March 1955
PARTICIPANTS
Chairman
--r�bbie-t E. Smith
Consultants
Dunham
Klaus Knorr
William L. Langer
Col. George A. Lincoln
Max F. Milliken*
Philip E. timely**
William Reitzel
Joseph R. Strayer
Board of National Estimates
---ghemmeitint
Harold F. Linder
Staff Members
Robert W. )corner
To Soviet Reaction to Ratification of the Paris Accords
� �
1. This question was discussed at the first Morning ,s meeting,
when Mr. WITH asked for consultant reactions to one alternative
covered in NIE 11-55, namely, the possibility of the Sovi to settling
for a reunified but neutralized Germany. MOSELY felt that the possi-
bility was worth examining, but that its probability was extremely
low. In his view the Soviets would regard it as much too complicated
an arrangement, and one over which they would not have full control.
He pointed out that the question of control VB. non-control is ex-
tremely strong in their thinking; they would be very reluctant to.
111iich and morning 18 March.
e* 17 March only.
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see their present police control over East Germany replaced by a re.
unified Germany in which anti.Soviet feeling would probably increase,
They would also recognize that the Oder.Neisse question would almost
certainly be raised by a unified Germany, which would join with the
western powers in order to increase its bargaining power over the
border question. LANGER concurred that Soviet agreement to unify
Germany was highly unlikely because of a basic distrust of the West,
and because by so doing they would be giving up a controlled area
(East Germany) for a unified Germany which they did not have the capa-
bility to subvert, KNORR agreed, adding that the Soviets had no real
reason to be alarmed at the Paris Accords since they would make no
basic difference in the world strategic position. However, LANGER
considered that the Soviets Were concerned over the Paris Accords,
particularly the twelve German divisions, which the Soviets probably
visualised as multiplying to considerably mere.
2. LINDER suggested that the possible appeal of a disarmed,
if unified, Germany to the Soviets should not be overlooked; that
they might view it as an alternative which would pose very serious
difficulties for the US, particularly the re-allocation of the troops
which the US would have to remove from West Germany.
3. MILLIKAN urged that, in considering alternatives open to the
USSR, more attention should be given to whether such alternatives were
ones which some people in the Soviet hierarchy would seriously con.
eider, since differences in viewpoints now seem to be possible under
the new collegial system. He was not sure which groups would find
the German unity alternative appealing but suggested it might appeal
to the younger bureaucrats (the Mikoyan type), as well as the newly
appointed marshals, or the new Party leaders. He used as an example
the fact that Malenloov had adopted a view which involved certain
risks, but had displayed a willingness to try something new. MILLIKAN
urged that more attention should be given to similar possibilities�
Although he concurred with MDSELYIs position, he felt that such al.
tornatives should be considered�
4, MILLIKAW added an economic reason for Soviet reluctance to
allow reunification -- the fact that the technicallyminded bureau.
crate in the. USSR would oppose it because it would add the economic
capability of East Germany to the West and because of the affinity
of East Germany for economic relations with the West rather than with
the USSR. LENDER replied that the economic advantage of East Germany
to the West is over-emphasised, that the West is not starving for East
German goods, to which !WELT commented that the Bloc is starving for
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East German goods, LINDER then asked if the Soviets could not get
these goods through trade, which Germary wants, and mom= replied
that this would be an erroneous view of Soviet trade policy, which
is politically motivated.
:-.50 KNORR advanced the possibility that the Soviets could con-
ceivably make a firm reunification proposal, but only for tactical
and propaganda purposes; they would then insist upon Impossible terms
to prevent its actual accomplishment. LINCOLN found this eventuality
unlikely because: (a) the Paris Accords are vulnerable to Soviet mis-
chief; (%) neutralization is a meaningless term in the Current inter-
national scene; (c) a united Germany would be a great hazard to the
USSR in the long run; and (d) the Kremlin is conservative, and doesn't
take chances with that it has - only with what it hasn't got. The
final consensus was that the arguments against a genuine unification
proposal are most convincing, though the Soviets may WO it as a tacti-
cal proposal to upset the West (INDRM6 STRAYER); but that it is a
point worthy of being considered.
II, Critipe of NIE 1144-54
6. The consultants were asked to comment on the organization
and coverage of 11-4-54 as guidance for our new Soviet estimate.
They were asked to bear in minds (a) that it was being written for
the NSC as background for the US budget discussions, and that for this
purpose perhaps a shorter paper would suffice, but that (b) it was also
being written for those who briefed men at the NSC level, and for this
purpose perhaps 1144-54 was not unduly long. There was general agree-
ment with reference to retaining the present length of 11-4-54. How-
ever, STRAYER felt that on certain issues 11-4-54 represented a primary
source, while on others merely a summary of other primary sources; this
made for unevenness of treatment, He asked if it could not be made
wholly a summary of other papers which could also be read by those
interested. MILLIKAN replied that the other papers would not be read,
that 1144-54 was too important to be shortened, and that the present
length is eminently desirable. LANGER agreed, but added that since
people at the highest level would not read it through, a 10-12 page
essay might be useful -- with more lengthy special economic or mili-
tary studies included as annexes. LINCOLN felt that even 10-12 pages
would not be read by policymakers and that the present four page Con-
clusions is probably all they would get to. However, he pointed out
that the next lower level of planners and strategic thinkers would read
it thoroughly in its present length, MOSRLY also felt that 1144-54 could
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not be substantially cut, and that if it were reduced to a series
of blanket assertions its firmness would be much impaired.
7. There was also a general feeling that* if possible, Niro
should be made more literary and readable productions, in spite of
the coordination procedure. LANGER cited as an
example of this type of writing* and MILIIKAN commented that we
ought to push tolerance on length as far as possible by adding this
quality of readability. LINDER agreed that this type of "Foreign
Affairs" writing did not have sufficient impact, and felt that, if
possible, the "Fortune" type of writing ought to be used. KNORR
found the question of readability was not so significant providing
the NIE was well organized (which he thought 11-4-54 was).
8. Numerous other comments were made on format and organiza-
tion, including suggestions for use of larger, more easily read type;
more use of subheads, naps, charts, and perhaps even pictures; a
table of contents indicating varying degrees of importance of informa-
tion; inclusion of a section emphasising what is new or different
from the preceding estimate, in order to focus attention; inclusion
of a bibliographical note; elimination of double-column format; and
finally, less frequent use of the phrase "we believe". LINGER found the
double column page hard going and suggested hiring a consultant on
readability to check the format.
9. On the substance of 1144-54, LANGER and LINCOLN favored
a much fuller discussion of Sino-Soviet relations, even if it were
covered in other papers. MILLIKAN suggested that the economic sec-
tion be shortened and that major problems or courses open to the
USSR in special areas be treated rather than giving a general des-
captive survey. He urged that the section on Soviet agriculture
be expanded since it is their major economic problem. KNORR felt
that the economic section might be more usefully organized in terse
of Soviet capabilities for doing such things as sustaining a war;
sustaining the civilian population during a war; sustaining rapid
economic growth; and carrying out foreign aid programs, MBA,
LINCOLN* and REITZEL all criticized the sections on military capa-
bilities, calling for a more sophisticated analysis rather than an
"inventory approach". There seemed to be little agreement* however,
as to how this sophistication should be introduced. KNORR thought
that perhaps military capabilities could be related to certain types
of war* but was not certain this could be done short of war-gaming.
He suggested that a reduction in the size of Chapters IIII-XVI, and
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an expansion of Chapter XVII might partially accomplish what he
had in mind and make a more hard-hitting document. LINCOLN felt
that an analysis of the use of armed forces to support cold war
policies ought to be included, and REITZEL concluded that the inter-
mediate reasoning between the inventory of planned military strengths
and ultimate military intentions should be included.
III. Soviet Internal Political Developments
10. The consensus seemed to be that some elements of
collegiality existed in the present leadership, that although Khruschev
appears to be dominant he has not developed a Stalin type controls
and that this uncertain situation does not seriously impair govern-.
ment operations, weau found it extremely difficult to arrive at
any firm conclusions or to figure who is coming out ahead. He em-
phaaized that the recent struggle has been more a struggle of persons
than of policies, and that the policy differences should not be
exaggerated since it is hardly possible to judge who is responsible
for what policy. He was convinced that Malenkev has been the seep.-
goat in a personal struggle for power, and that he (MOSELY) has mis-
judged the situation by assuming that the placement of Khruschev in
the Party Secretariat had meant Presidium control over the Secretariat.
He now feels that Khruschev may have achieved real dominance through
his position as First Secretary. He added that the facts parallel
the 125 . 129 period when Stalin kept a collegial facade.
11. LANGER on the other hand felt that there was nothing in
the new situation to nark Khruschev as the real power, as a *new
Stalin", and MILLIKAN warned not to underplay the influence of the
military. He commented that Zhukov may now have considerably more
range of action than any military figure under Stalin and that, as
a matter of fact, military considerations may have influenced the de-
cisions on agriculture since military and heavy agricultural machine
production are interchangeable. MDSELY mattered that the assumption
that Zhukov has anything other than a strictly Party aim needs much
more proof than has been evidenced. In his opinion Zhukov always has
been, and is still a loyal Party man, and the Party has complete con-
trol over the military. The army is not a source of policy imitia.
tive, and could not, for example, arrest a prominent political figure.
12. In LANCER1s view there seemed to be a lack of promptness
and drive in Soviet policy decisions at present, particularly by
comparison with Peiping. ?MEL! denied this lack of drive, and felt
rather that the Soviets have been moving fast and intelligently since
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Stalin's death. MILLIKAN emphasized that in the present Soviet
set-up, even though basic doctrinal lines may be agreed upon, the
opportunities for "bureaucratic dispute" are tremendous and there
is apparently a considerable amount of it going on. !WELT agreed,
but added that in the USSR a dispute can easily be turned to the
doctrinal or treason level, and this Is what makes it so difficult
to determine the validity of so-called policy conflicts. In his
opinion, Malenkov would probably disappear from View shortly.
LANGER felt that the fundamental question to be answered in the
political field is *whether the collective leadership is there be-
cause the top people want it, or because they are forced to accept
it temporarily. STRAYER commented that sooner or later, under this
system, some one individual has to take over and give it direction.
KNORR supported MILLIKAN's position that the military will limit the
chances of one man's taking power, even if the military doesn't openly
take over itself, and MOSEL! countered by re-emphasizing the point
that it is the Party Presidium which makes the decisions. He ad.
nitted that, looking at the problem in this way, the system could
run without a one.man head, that the Party Presidium was the "distri-
butor-cap" of the whole Soviet system. The Presidium of the Council
of Ministers is merely a fiction and its members derive their status
from being chairmen of committees of the Party Presidium. However,
the role of the Party Presidium and its Committees is the subject
about which we know least, MOSELY could not define Khruschev's post.
tion,within the Presidium of the Party. In attempting to square
his feeling of Khruschev's dominance by virtue of his position on
the Secretariat with these statements on the Presidium's role, he
admitted that it could not be ascertained whether Khruschev was argu.
ing in the Presidium or merely listening to arguments and then making
unilateral decisions like Stalin.
IV. General Soviet Bloc Strategy
13. At the final session devoted to Soviet problems the con-
sultants considered whether there was any evidence of a shift in
Soviet general strategy because of internal political developments,
the offshore islands problem, etc. Would they still avoid courses
of action involving dubetantial risk of general war? The consultants
generally seemed to agree that the Soviets will attempt to avoid
risky courses of action, and LANGER commented that they seem to be
attempting to tide over the period in which they will lack parity in
capabilities for nuclear delivery. LINCOLN felt that during this tiding.
over period they would slowly cultivate positions for future advance and
that this should be carefully watched. LANGER, however, emphasized
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the necessity for taking the long-range historical view of Soviet
development; he felt the time would cone when they would tire of
constant struggle and tension and would begin to ease off. REITZEL
agreed, pointing out that there is always an evolutionary tendency
in international affairs. There was general agreement that if an
easing off did Occur it would take a very long time (certainly beyond
the period of the new Soviet estimate), and STRAYER commented that
if it came it would be first evidenced internally. LANGER cited
the following as possible indicators of a change in Soviet policy:
(a) the future disposition of Malenkov; (b) developments when the
Montreux Convention comes up for consideration again in 1956; (c)
Soviet contributions to peaceful use of atomic energy; and, (d) the
Soviet attitude toward Finland. He emphasized that it would have to
be an accumulation of many things, but that they must be looked for,
and ventured that if the Soviets became nice people at the present
time wed not be in a position to recognize it.
14. The consensus on Soviet strategy was that the Soviets
are not going to take any undue risks, that their strategy would re-
main flexible that we should expect nothing spectacular, and that
there very likely would be an emphasis upon political activity, sub-
version, and foreign aid programs rather than upon military action.
V. Taiwan and the Offshore Islands
15. Impact of US policy statements. The discussion turned re-
peatedly on the difficulties and dangers presented by widespread
uncertainty abroad as to US policy with respect to the offshore islands.
The Consultants generally agreed that the non-Communist world does not
view the offshore islands as an outpost of Western civilization, and
would therefore be extremely critical of US participation in their
defense. LANCER stressed that the "guessing game" aspects of US policy
cut both ways and that, if the Chinese Comnunists attacked the islands,.
the burden of proof would be on us to convince the rest of the world
that Taiwan Was the actual target. STRAYER felt that HIE 10044-55 should
have discussed such US difficulties in the event the Chinese attacked,
claiming "these islands are all we want and are all we taking."
16. No agreement was reached as to the effect of the most re-
cent US policy statements on the Chinese Communists' estimate as to
the risks involved in attacking the offshore islands. KNORR felt
that the Communists would interpret the latest US statements as
reducing such risks, believing that the US was saying "we won't
commit our forces if you make it clear that you're just taking the
islands and are not going near Taiwan," LINCOLN, MILLIKAN, REITZEL,
DUNHAM, and LANCER generally felt that there is no change and that
the Chinese Communists probably continue to believe that not toe
great risks are involved. LANCER added that the Chinese probably feel
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that we're bluffing again and are really telling them that they can
have the offshore islands if they'll just behave. UNDER, in con-
trast, considered that our last statements had had a big impact and
that the Chinese probably now felt that we were prepared, as we were
not in Korea and Indochina, to use nuclear weapons.
17. The Soviet view of the Offshore Islands-Taiwan problem.
LANCER thought the USSR look's with little favor upon its ally's
policies in the Taiwan area. He felt that the USSR found it "highly
inconvenient" to have Peiping champing at the bit. In his view the
USSR had been trying since Geneva to put a damper on an assertive ally
who has been marching from victory to victory. The Soviets do net
want the Chinese to embroil them in general war with the US at a time
when US nuclear superiority is so high. This applied particularly to
the offshore islands, for if the USSR wanted general war, it would
start it itself on its own terms. Thus the Soviets are willing to
let 'Lie Taiwan area question sinner away, but don't want it to get
out of hand. In a sense, the situation is like that of Germany and
its more impatient Austra-Hungarian ally in 1914. STRAYER agreed
that it was not in the Soviet interest to keep the US stirred up over
the Far East* thus continuing to pass our military budgets; rather*
it would be wiser for the USSR to lull us to sleep. In LINCOLN 'a
view, the USSR was patiently allowing its ally considerable latitude;
it "looked with equanimity upon the offshore island brawl" but drew
the line at Taiwan and it felt confident it could restrain China if
necessary through its control of China's logistics. DUNHAK's position
was the furthest from LANCER, holding that the USSR has nothing to lose
by continued war-by-proxy and thus would be happy to see the US bogged
down in the "morass of China."
18. There was no agreement as to whether the USSR is likely to
believe that a US-Chinese war could be kept limited. LANCER felt that
the USSR was extremely cautious, fearing that the tempo of such a
US-Chinese war would mean that "the ball is rolling now" and that
US attacks might not be confined to China. KNORR disagreed, feeling
that the USSR would doubt that the US would attack it via China, and
would judge that both itself and the US would have the opportunity to
keep hostilities within bounds. LINCOLN took a mid-positions the
Soviets would estimate that hostilities arising out of the offshore
islands could be kept in bounds, but that this might not be so in the
case of Taiwan.
19. There was likewise no agreement as to whether the USSR
in the last analysis would risk general war to save the Peiping regime
from destruction. LANCER, KIVIIRs and LINCOLN inclined to the view
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that the USSR would back down in such a pinch, LINCOLN adding that it
might not be altogether displeased to see the Peiping regime go down
the drain. STRAYER took the opposite view, that the USSR would risk
general war. REITZEL felt that the USSR's decision would hinge on
whether it thought it couldp by intervening, get a favorable decision
within the Far East theater: that the USSR would thus enter the war
if its estimate was "yea," but not otherwise. NOM! ended the discus-
sion by pointing out that it was difficult to envisage how "the
destruction of the Peiping regimen could be accomplished, even with
nuclear weapons. All consultants agreed that this hypothetical question
was an "absurd" one, and that the USSR would never let itself be placed
in this position.
20. There was substantial agreement that the USSR was probably
concerned over the long-term problem created by its Chinese ally.
LANGER stated, that, since there is no one left in Moscow who compares
with Mao Tse-tung as a theoretician, the world Communist ideological
center had in a sense already shifted to Peiping. LINCOLN stressed
the demographic factor, i.e. the Soviets probably aren't happy about
the fact that there will be close to 1.billion Chinese in a few years
who will be looking for nearby areas into which to migrate. LANGER,
LINCOLN, and REITZEL agreed, with LINDER dissenting, that the Soviets
may also be concerned that China will, as its strength grows and out
of its leadership's ignorance concerning the West, in time act reck-
lessly against US forces.
21. Chicom intentions re the Offshore Islands. No agreed view
was reached as to Chinese Communist intentions toward the islands.
STRAYER felt that the advantages accruing to the Chinese would be
greatest from a continuance of the present general policy, that of
keeping the US in a stew with its allies, yet not risking US military
counteraction. MILLIKAN, LINCOLN, and LANGER leaned toward the 4-2
position in NIE 100-4-55 that the Communists were bent on taking the
islands despite US protestations of intent. LANGER added that the
China that took its chances and intervened in Korea in 1950 will do
so again in 1955 with respect to Quemoy and Matsu, Further, that the
tone of the 12(?) March text of NIE 1004-55 errs in that it says
that all we have to do is yell at the Chinese Comnunists and they'll
pull back, or that, if hostilities begin, all we have to do is poke
them one and they'll yell uncle.
22. LINCOLN thought that the Chicoms might even attack in order
to trigger the US into using nuclear weapons in retaliation, in the
hope that by subsequently playing dead they could reap incalculable
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political advantage from world opinion outraged at the US action�
LANGER, MTLLIKAN, and REITZEL agreed that this possibility deserved
estimative consideration. Remembering Peiping's success with its
germ warfare campaign, REITZEL though such a gambit would be a
natural�
230 LINCOLN also thought there would be advantage to the
Chinese Communists in attempting to take the Matsus and Quemoys
simultaneously� For if they took only one of these groups, this would
push the US into a new situation in which it mould be forced to state,
without equivocation, that it would defend the remaining group and
with nuclear weapons� Hence, much depended on our estimate as to
whether the Chicoms are capable of taking both island groups at the
sane time� In the Consultants' view, the importance of the offshore
islands was not primarily military but psychological� Since their
importance had been blown up out of all proportion, the US would
suffer greater prestige loss from a Tachen-type evacuation of these
islands now than it would have a few weeks ago; but this loss of
prestige would be confined to Asia, with little or no loss in Europe�
240 Various views were expressed as to whether Communist China
would continue fighting should hostilities over the offshore islands
lead to US attacks against the mainland� LANGER, STRAYER, and DUNHAM
leaned to the view that the Chinese would find it difficult to back
down once a war situation had arisen, and would offer such military
resistance as they could� LINCOLN disagreed, believing that the
Chinese would seek a cease-fire and a transfering of the situation
to a political phase; in support of this view, LINCOLN cited the lack
of present evidence that the Chinese are preparing for any kind of
peripheral war with the US. SMITH and RETTZEL held that the Chinese
action would be governed by the course of military events: that China's
quest of a cease-fire would be in direct proportion to the degree to
which it was losing the wan
250 Consequences of US use of Nuclear Wea ens� The Consultants
were in geiial accord a use onue ear weapons against the
Chinese Communists would produce an initial shook effect upon world
opinion� LANGER felt this most strongly, believing that a great
shock would occur no matter what kind or size of nuclear bomb were
employed� This would cause a "chemical reaction" among many world
leaders who would act irrationally saying "this is it 8" Such reactions
would be less, in LANGER'S view, were the first use of nuclear weapons
that of atomic artillery� Longer-term world reactions would be conditioned,
in the opinion of KNORR, STRAYER, REITZEL, and DUNHAM, by the circumstances
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under which the US had used nuclear weapons� For example, reactions
would be moderate if such weapons were used in the event of an attempted
invasion of Taiwan, or if they were used against invasion targets at
sea where, clearly, no noncombatants would be hit� LANGER did not
agree that such circumstances would greatly moderate initial shock
effects*
260 All agreed that Japans reaction would be uniquely sensitive�
MILLTKAN, LANGER, AND STRAYER thought that the Japanese public reaction
would be extreme and that the government would go over to a neutralist
position; MILLIKAN also offered the thesis that the Japanese were
already in a state of shock in 1945 when hit by the atomic bombs, that
they in a sense pulled a curtain over this experience, shoving it into
their subconscious; they meanwhile came to have confidence in the
humaneness of the US Occupation; but that the Bikini fall-out experience
of 1954 dragged up to consciousness all the Hiroshima-Nagasaki tragedy�
No agreement was reached, however, as to whether the initial shock effect
would wear off in time� DUNHAM and STRAYER thought it would, if the US
action had succeeded and no expanded war had occurred and if only tac-
tical weapons had been used� MILLTKAN agreed, but felt that this
eventuality would demand the most masterful diplomacy on the part of
the US. LANGER doubted that the shock effect on Japanese opinion
would wear off, and thought that the US positim would become untenable
in the long run�
270 In answer to KENTIs question as to whether the Chinese Com-
munists would use a nuclear weapon against US targets in the Far East,
STRAYER doubted that the Chinese would ever get to this stage; their
aims in the Taiwan area were limited and they were probably content to
keep the pot boiling at about its present temperature. LINCOLN pointed
to a danger involved if the initial US use of nuclear weapons failed to
achieve its military mission; in this situation, fear of and confidence
in US deterrent power would be gravely weakened world-wide� LANGER
thought it conceivable that the Chinese Communists might drop one on
themselves in an effort to deceive world opinion.
280 The Chairman summarized the dominant themes of the discussion
of the Formosa Straits issue as being:. (a) a leaning toward the G-2
view that the Chinese Communists will probably attack the offshore
islands come what may; and (b) a message to US policy-makers that if
we want to defend the offshore islands, we should do so under strict,
onerous, military and geographical limits, lest the enemy mis-read our
intentions and take counteraction which would lead to a greatly expended
area of conflict�
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