PRINCETON CONSULTANTS MEETINGS OF 28-29 APRIL 1955

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03436475
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2013-02252
• Publication Date: May 10, 1955

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE /LUBEC!
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
lo May 1955
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO, 17-55
SUBJECT: Princeton Consultants Meetings of 28.29 April 1955
PARTICIPANTS
Chairman
--IESE7m. Smith
Consultants
William 14, Langer
William Ho Dunham
Max F.
William Reitmel
Col, George Lincoln
Philip E. /Wooly
Joseph R. Strayer*
Klaus Knorr
Raymond J. Sontag
Calvin B. Hoover
I. BANDUNG CONFERENCE
Board of National Estimates
Paul A. torsi
Harold Linder
Staff Members
Imeitei77 Cooper
Robert L. Hewitt*
John W9 Huimenga
Jahn Heires
(b)(3)
William P0 Bundy
Consensus: While the strong anti.Communist stand made at Bandung
by Several of US allies was gratifying, Chan made the greatest gains
by his soft talk. Several staunch anti-Communist leaders came away from
the meeting convinced of Chou' s desire to lessen tensions, Moreover,
Ghouls refusal to engage in debate obviated any peacemaking by Nehruo
As a result, the latter gained little from the meeting and in fact
probably lost stature as an Asian leader.
MIILIKAN: The West gained to the extent that the assurances Chou
gave to the Asian countries will be hard to go back an. On the other
hand, cheats peace tactics are more difficult for the West to counter
than aggressive military action. KNORR: Whymas there surprise at
Chants action? It is probably apparent to the Chinese Communists that
* 28 April way.
if* 29 April only.
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much was to be gained at Bandung by adopting an attitude of "sweet
reasonableness," HOOVER, with MILLIKAN agreeing: Chou's action
vas =rely a tactic and not an indication that Communist China will
eschew violence or will aceept peaceful settlement of such a basic
issue as contra of Taiwan. In this tactic, Chou exploited the prestige
'which Cann:mitt China gained from Comraunist military victories in Korea
and IndoChina.
LANGER: Chou :ley also have adopted, his soft approach because he
believed the Indians were becoming disturbed by Chinese threats to
resort to utlitary action in the Taiwan strait,. Emma Nehru is
probably bitter about the "nilitaristie policies of the West,
particularly of the US, and is inclined to overlook Chinese truculence.
SONTAG: India, under Nehru's leadership, will probably not oppose with
force Chinese Comnunist advances short of its own border. The soft
approach of the Chinese Conounists at Bandung served to convince Nehru
that his is the right course. =LIM: India might be tough in a
crisis and, for example, come to the aid of Burma, Moreover, the fact
that India can turn to the West for help at any time, gives it a
potential source of strength in its deallng with Communist China,
LINCOLN: Nehru probably considers that the Asian problems are primarily
political, and that the US has been too military in its approach,
II. ARE CHANGES IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP SIGNIFICANT 73 RELATION TO POLICY
MOSLEY: While there is no solid evidence, it is probably fallacious
to associate specific Soviet policies with particular leaders, In
fact, as in any government, disputes among top rank leaders must take
place constantly. LINDER: Perhaps, on occasion, a policy issue is
used as a pretext to rationalise the :lotion of a:successful power-seeker.
STRAYER and HOOVER: There exists in fact a direct association
beteeen certain leaders and certain Soviet policies, LANGER: We
should not draw sharp distinction between a struggle for power and
policy disputes because both are probably always involved. On the
other hand, with the exception of Germany and China policies there
are probably no serious differences on the basic principles which underlie
policy, MILLIKAN: Moreover, the relative importance of differences
regarding policy has probably increased since the death of Stalin.
Consensus: In general, the Soviet government currently appears
to have greater flexibility in operation than during Stalin's era.
In part this is probably a manifestation of collective decisioni-tldng in
the absence of a single person who has the ultimate power of decision.
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in. COMPOSZTION OF LEADERSHIP AND ROLE PLAYED BYTHE MILITARY
MOSLEY: There is nothing to indicate any real conflict between
the old Bolsheviks and the younger leaders from the professional
managers group, The latter have been trained by the former and while
they are now coming into polio, rase, they are still under the
guidance of older hands,
SONTAG: The trey maybe a real source of difficulty for Soviet
Isadore, psi tieularlsr if the historical analogy of the Prussian officer
corps applies, The loyalty of the Prussian officer was to his awn
corps, to its code end to its leaders, BOSLEY: Disagreed. Loyalty
to corps or to person does not supersede loyalty of the Soviet ariy.
to the government. The Party has control of selection and promotion of
officers. The Army has remained aloof from internal party and leader
conflicts, Even Bulge:limo if he gets into difficulties, could not
move a "corporal's guard" for political purposes. HOOVER: While this
may be so, the Ar4e may now be exerting its power in a subtle way
rather than seeking to seise power overtly,
IV. SINOeSOVIET RELATIONS
SONTAO, with HOOVER concurring: The categorization of the Sin*.
Soviet relationship as an alliance wrongly implies the existence of
a relationship stel)arto that between the US and the UK,
including the supposition that one partner might easily leave the other.
LINCOLN: The possibility of a split between the Soviet Union and
Communist China cannot be excluded for the middle and long tern.
For example, the Chinese may eventually attempt. to alleviate population
pressure by expanding North and West as they have dove before. LANGER:
The Chinon have not forgotten their historical conflicts with the
Russians and the fact that the Chinese once controlled the Maritime provinces.
The ma orin of the consultants seemed to agree that "alliance"
probe, was a proper wor or inoeSoviet relationship, particularly
since, in their view, comma interests are more important than ideology
in binding the two countries together. MILIEU, MOSLEY, end HOOVER:
The presuppositions, the tactical and strategic concepts, and the
totalitarian control of society developed from the communist ideology
are more important than the ideology itself, STRAYER: The bond of
ideology would have strength only so long as the national interests
of the Soviet Union and Communist china did not become too divergent,
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V. MEANING OF THE SOVIET ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE LUSTRIAN MATT
In generale the Consultants agreed that the Soviet action ens
designed, in large me'i4aeuFrGlolem down or temporarily to halt German
rearmament. There was agreement that Soviet withdrawal from Austria
did not represent a costly retreat by the Soviets. MOSLEY: The
Soviets acted precipitously as a result of french agreeing to German
rearmament, The Austrian agreement indicates to the Germans that they
could do better through direct negotiation with the Soviets, The
Soviets probably believe that by appearing to be willing to negotiate
they can delay rearmament for a couple of years, during which time
there would always be hope for a, favorable change in the situation, For
example, a Socialist government might come to pewter and seek to
negotiate with the Soviets,
On the other hand, there vas general avow:met that the Soviet
Union would not agree to a siedler withdrawal from East Germany. KNORR
and Fiona: The possibility exists that the Soviets might accept the
risk and agree to the withdrawal of foreign farces from Germany and
to German self.reunification, believing that the West would net accept
such a propoael and would fear the onus for blocking German reunification*
SMUG: The Soviets 'would never seriously propose or accept any
proposal whidh called for unification on the basis of neutralization
because they realize that arty major couatry� and particularly Germany,
could not be kept in such a position. FUrthermore� Soviet leaders
must realize that before World, War II Soviet growthmas blocked by
Germany and, to a liasser extent, by Japan,. Therefore, the Soviets
will never accept a policy Mhich creates once again an armed, unified
Germany. STRAYER: It is possible, however, that the develepment of
new weapons may render invalid the concept of buffer. states,
The Consultants agreed generally that Soviet action with respect
to Austria probably resulted in part from Soviet fear that war will
develop between Communist China and the US, The Soviets desire to stay
out of such hostilities and at the dame time to appear as a typeace.loving"
country to the European allies of the US, in anticipation of the
weakening of NATO in these circumstances. MOSLEY: The Soviets might
hope that in such a situation US allies in Europe, in seeking to die.
associate themselves from the war in the Far East, might request with.
drawal of US forces from bases in Europe. LANGER: The Russian action
should perhaps be conceived of as a pledge of 'peaceful" intentions on
the part of the USSR. HOOVER: By the Austrian move, the Soviets
gained greater flexibility should hostilities begin in the Far East ..
the Soviet Union could stand aside as a third party or intervene as it
chooses, MOSLEY: Moreover, the Soviets might not oppose a, war in the
Far East between Commenist China and the US if they were convinced it
could be kept localized, believing they would gain to the extent that
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Chinese dependence an the Soviet Union for supplies increased and that
US relations with its European allies were weakened,
The Consultants did not seem to accept as a third possibility
that the bovlet salon was part of a general Communist policy directed
to a worldwide detente. LANGER: While he believed this was a possibility
that should be considered, be believed such was probably not the case,
The Soviets might take this course of action because they found the
increasing cost of the armemezrts race too great a burden, because they
feared that the US would retaliate against the USSR should hoatilities
begin anywhere in the world, and because internally, they Were somewhat
disorganized by the death of Stalin and had not fully worked out a
replacement organisation. SONTAG: /t was dangerous to pmrsue this line
of reasoning, Why should the Communists quit and seek a detente
when in fact the situation in the non.Communist world is rotten?
VI. SOVIET ECONOMIC S/TUATI0N
tramevonameisdiransmoioll...00.
HOOVER: The economic situation, particularly with respect to
agriculture, in actually worse than he Soviet estimate indicated.
While there improbably no actual starvation in the Soviet Union
food is hard to get, However, this economic weakness is not likely to
Twee the Soviet leaders to seek a detente or to adopt a "friendly'
foreign polio)',
KNORR: The Soviet agricultural situation is not at a crisis stage
but is rather a long term problem, The principal components of the
agricultural problem are: the relatively poor location of the bulk
ofarabkland (north of 40 parallel - LINCOLN); inability to maximise
the peasant contribution; and insufficient availabilityofresources
for investment in this sector of the econage. In the long run, unless
the agricultural problem is overcome the Soviets will not achieve their
goals and the Soviet leaders will be faced with increasingly difficult
choices as defense costs increase, consoler demand grows, and the need
for investment remains high, LANGER: Tended to agree with longer
term concept, The Soviets are planners and consider possible shortages
in terms of the effect on other programs, Thus agricultural shortfalls
must be considered with the increasing cost of arms and the possibility
of war-demands from Communist China. They are aware that in a peaceful
period they would have more resources available to further their planned
development; however, there are no signs that they are about to act
on this assumption,
VII, FUTURE WAR: SOVIET CALCULATION OF RISKS AND POSSIBILIT! OF
fAcIffitmil
The Consultants appeared to agree that both the Soviet union and
the US wesitravoid major war in the future because the destructiveness
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of new weapons renders a nprofitable" victory impossible, (However,
there was not agreement concerning the possibility of keeping local
wars local or the possibility that local wars Will occur in the future.
REITML: While general war would be avoided because of the
balance of forces local aggressions, in which conventional weapons
alone would he used, wlfl probably occur. LANGER: The Soviets do
not seek major ear,' However, the principal deterrent is not a balance
of forces but the fact that the US, at least for a certain future
period, wdll have superior nuclear capabilities. Shoat' the US
emplcy. tactical nuclear weapons in a local ware Soviets might estimate
they would shortly become a target. In such a situation, the Soviets
might decide not to sit and wait far the blow but would laundh a
surprise attack against the US, LANGER, MOSLEY, and KNORR: Such wars
would be limited to the Far East because a war in Europe could not avoid
the inclusion of major powers and the use of all weapons, MOSLEY: The
Soviet Union would be cautious and would always calculate the possibility
of quick victory against the chances that a local war could be kept
localized. HOOVER: There still exists grave danger that general
war'eould occur because even the horror of general nuclear war might
not prove to to sufficient to keep a local war local, LINCOLN: Maybe
the question of whether limited war will occur is not the right one,
Perhaps it is more likely that countries will bring pressure on political
negotiations by flexing their muscles rather than seeking to prove
their strength in a power contest,
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