THE OUTLOOK IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03398197
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 27, 1968

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-MEMORANDUM FOR: iir.4 Rostov
Sent tar your information at the request
of the Director.
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Eatimates
Attachment:
Memorandum for the Director, dated 26 February,
"The Outlook in Vietnam"
27 February 2969
( DATE)
/ 5# Gi2 i4 (//7/) 49;14.--4ic
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10.101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(471
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
This is the Memorandum requcmted by Paul Nitze.
OCI and the Clandestine S ices concur.
George Carver does not agree ith the last page:
he thinks that either outco (a) or outcome (b)
is more probable than (a t that one cannot at
this time choose between and (b).
cc: DDI
Director
National Estimates
26 February 68
(DATE)
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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Zacautive RegistrY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
26 February 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Outlook in Vietnam
1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects
of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over
a long term. It is addressed only to the specific question
put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to
involve a continuation of combat into the indefinite future at
a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it
is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable
to sustain such a level beyond a few months.
2. The current phase of combat will have a critical
bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to
be decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will last,
but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results
and the longer term implications will be fairly clear to Hanoi,
Saigon, and Washington. At present, the key questions concern:
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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(1) the the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their
current challenge, and whether they can continue the fighting
thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese
political and military establishment to cope with the tasks
imposed by the present Communist offensive.
Communist Plans and Prospects
3. Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to
register significant military successes against US and
especially ARVN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses,
physical destruction and disorganization on the GVN as to
produce a total situation favorable to a negotiated settlement
on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely to have a
rigid timetable, but they probably hope to achieve decisive
results during the course of the summer. The high importance
which Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evident from
the risks and costs of the enterprise.
4. The toll on Communist forces has been considerable,
even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of
law level recruits and impressed civilians. To some extent
these losses have been offset by measures already taken. Heavy
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infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North
is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was
made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the
guerrilla and Main forces could still be committed. And, at
present, the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas,
where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able
to recoup their recent losses, though at some sacrifice in
quality.
5. In any case, the Communists probably will maintain their
offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept
the high losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses
indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be capable
soon again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude
and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are almost
certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including
major battles with US forces, assaults on selected cities, and
rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installationc.
6. It is possible that the Communists regard the present
campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will
commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term.
On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their present
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push falls short they will wish to be able to sustain a
protracted struggle. Hence they will probably not exercise
their capabilities in such a profligate manner as to deny
themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle should
the present phase fail to produce a decisive result.
GVN/ARVN Prospects
7. The will and capability of the GVN and its armed forces
remain the keys to the eventual outcome.
8. In the main, the ARVN has acquitted itself fairly well
since 30 January, though the record is uneven. Morale has held
up on the whole, and we know of no unit defections. However,
the ARVN is showing signs of fatigue and in many areas it has now
lapsed into a static defensive posture. Security in the country-
side has been sharply reduced. A long and costly effort would
have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. It is
highly unlikely that the ARVN will be inspired enough or strong
enough to make such an effort -- certainly not in the near future.
9. The GVN also performed adequately in the immediate
emergency, particularly in the Saigon area. There now appears
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to be a greater recognition of the need to push forward with
additional measures, but the Communist challenge has not yet
proved a catalyst in stimulating an urgent sense of national
unity and purpose.
10. The overall position of the Government has been weakened.
Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet offensive; its
control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular
attitudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received
virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying
to the government side. Passivity is likely to continue as the
dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military
defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government.
While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse,
its ability to provide energetic leadership throughout the
country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible
that over the next few months certain provinces, especially
in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authority.
U. The psychological factor is now critical for South
Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus. The widespread
rumors that the US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic
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of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US
attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there
are no signs of a crisis of confidence within the government.
12. If major military reverses occur, the political and
military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness.
If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and
inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the Communists and the
general offensive appears to be contained, then the GVN might
manifest new energy and confidence and draw new support to
itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than
even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the present phase
without being still further weakened.
Alternative Outcomes of Present Phase
13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a high level
of military activity for at least the next two or three months.
It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then Obtain,
given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our
best estimate is as follows:
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a. The least likely outcome of the present phase is
that the Communist side will expend its resources to such
an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady
advances by the US/GVN.
b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that
the GVN/ARVN will be so critically weakened that it can play
no further significant part in the military and political
prosecution of the struggle.
c. More likely than either of the above is that the
present push will be generally contained, but with severe
losses to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that a
period will set in during which neither will be capable of
registering decisive gains.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
Chairman
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3.3(h)(2)
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3.3(h)(2)