THE OUTLOOK FOR INDONESIA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03391795
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: July 18, 2018
• Case Number: F-2017-01285
• Publication Date: March 2, 1966

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
2 March 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DDCI
SUBJECT: The Outlook for Indonesia
NOTE
This memorandum supplements an OCI intelligence memorandum
on the subject: "The Situation in Indonesia" dated 24 February 1966
(OCI No. 0782/66),
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
C-RE T declassification
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DISCUSSION
1. After five months of intense maneuvering, Sukarno has
boldly reasserted his authority over his main political opponents,
Indonesia's army leaders. No matter how the generals respond
to this challenge and who ultimately emerges on top, events since
the abortive pro-Communist coup of 30 September have so changed
the Indonesian scene that a return to previous political patterns
appears unlikely.
2. Since early October, somewhere between 100,000 and
500,000 Indonesians have been killed. For the most part, the
victims were Communists, other leftists, and their sympathizers.
Additionally, however, there were thousands -- perhaps tens of
thousands of other victims, killed to settle ethnic, local,
and personal feuds. The slaughter has left a legacy of hatred
and suspicion which will make it more difficult than ever before
for Indonesians to achieve national unity and to make the
accommodations necessary to the establishment of a stable and
effective government. In particular, the gulf between Muslim
orthodoxy and Communism now seems unbridgeable, even by Sukarno.
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3. Among those killed during the recent "white terror"
were about half the PKI politburo and. numerous local.,Party leaders._
The PKI will require many years, even with Stkarno's support,
to regain its former strength. Its prestige has also been badly
damaged -- by its inept performance during the attempted coup
and its failure to offer significant paramilitary resistance
afterward. Its carefully cultivated nationalist image has
suffered as a result of revelations, true and false, concerning
its ties to Communist China. Though the PKI retains millions of
adherents and sympathizers, a substantial underground apparatus,
and great influence within Sukarno' s "palace clique," it will
probably not in his lifetime be in position for a peaceful takeover
of the Djakarta government.
4. With regard to the Army, prior to 30 September one
could envision a post-Sukarno Indonesia in which the generals
chose to work together with the Communists in the interest of
avoiding an inconclusive civil war. Such an accommodation now
appears unlikely. The present crop of Army leaders can no longer
have any illusions about Communist plans for a complete takeover,
to include the liquidation of their military opponents. Under
these circumstances, it is probable that Stkarno's death wtthin a
year or so would lead to the prompt seizure of power by the Army.
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Now,
5. With his PKI allies badly weakened, Sukarno must build
a new balance of forces if he is to stabilize his political
poifition. He will have little difficulty in drawing left-wing
Nationalists and opportunistic Muslim elements to the banner of
his proposed "Sukarno Front." But neither grouping possesses
the outstanding agitprop capabilities which made the PKI so
useful to Sukarno. With his encouragement, therefore, the
Communists will move covertly to re-establish control of the
myriad existing leftist organizations that will provide his
real support.
6. This time/ however, bringing his moderate and Muslim
opponents to heel will be more difficult for SlIkarno. His
prestige has been damaged by his rumored involvement in the events
of 30 Septenber, his inability to protect his adherents, and his
indifference to growing economic hardships. Perhaps the greatest
Obstacle to a reassertion of his authority is the overt
commitment which millions of Indonesians have recently made to
the anti-Communist cause.
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7. In the final analysis, Stkarnols fate will hinge on his
ability to tame the anti-Communist generals once again. If he
succeeds in carrying off his current political gambit against
Defense Minister Nasution without serious hindrance from the
military, he will move again, with increased boldness, to remove
and denigrate other commanders who oppose his pro-Communist policies.
Control of the Army must be Sukarno's top priority project; he knows
now, if he did not know in Septenber: that he cannot settle for
less if "Sukarnoism" is to survive his death.
8. There is an even chance that the generals will soon contest
Sukarno's recent reasseTtion of authority, probably with demands for
the ouster of his top leftist advisor, Slibandrio. Even if the
generals fail to act decisively or their moves are unsuccessful,
this would not necessarily mean a rapid return to a pre-October
Indonesia with Sukarno in full command. His efforts to regain his
former position would be handicapped by the factors noted above:
a weakened Communist Party, a less malleable non-Communist
opposition, and an officer corps shorn of many illusions concerning
his "NASZOM"concepts.
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9. In addition, Sukarno mould be facing a deteriorating
economic situation 'Which is having an increasingly severe impact
on the bureaucratic and intellectual elite. In these circumstances,
government departments and regional military administrators mould
probably grow less attentive to Sukarnols directives and more
inclined to act autonomously in the economic field in behalf of their
oun constituencies. A situation of de facto fragmentation of the
country might arise.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ivSHERMAN KENT
--- Chairman
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SECRET
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
This memora um was prepared in
response to y r request. Representatives
of OCI pay
icipated.
SHER/IAN KENT
2 March 1966
(DATE)
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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