JOSEPH ALSOP'S COLUMN OF 16 MARCH 1966: RELATIONS TO PUBLISHED INTELLIGENCE OF FIGURES APPEARING THEREIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03391789
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2022
• Case Number: F-2022-01326
• Publication Date: March 16, 1966

Approved for Release: 2022/10/19 C03391789
16 March 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Joseph Alsop's Column of 16 March 1966: Relations
to Published Intelligence of Figures Appearing Therein
1. None of the figures used in Alsop's column coincide with
those of any intelligence papers we know of, yet they are in the
same ball park. The column, like that of 28 February, probably
reflects slightly garbled second or third hand pieces of informa-
tion with Alsopian interpolation to fill the gaps.
2. Alsop's talk of "revised intelligence estimates
(which) predict a buildup of enemy regular units to no less than
18 divisions'. is an embellishment of his 28 February column, which
also referred to the "revised estimates" leading to the "vaudeville
peace-offensive." No National intelligence Estimate talks of the
buildup in terms of divisions and no intelligence paper we know of
speaks of more than 8 or 10 divisions organized as such.
3. Regarding Alsop's figure of 6000 tons a month (200 tons
a day) as the predicted flow of traffic down the Ho Chi Minh trail,
there is no intelligence estimate of what will came down the Ho
Chi Minh trail. There are estimates of requirements at various
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Nury
levels of combat for various numbers of Communist troops. Of
these, even the highest hypothetical calculation is less than
Alsop's 200 tons a day. And there are estimates of the capadity
of these routes, all of which are much higher than 200 tond a day.
4. The remark about "hand-tailored intelligence analysis
concluding that the truck movement over the Ho Chi Minh trail
would not be seriously hampered, even if all the fuel depots in
North Vietnam were completely destroyed" is a somewhat overstated
version of what has appeared in a number of intelligence publica-
tions in the past few months. Perhaps the most important such
statement appears in SNIE 10-1-66, the pertinent conclusions of
which are attached as an annex to this memo.
5. W. Alsop's figure for the truck fleet necessary to
accomplish the supply job through Laos appears to be wholly his
own calculation based on his figure of 6000 tons a month. No
comparable figure has been published by the intelligence community,
and our transportation people calculate the truck requirement
at a fraction of his 2000-3000 figure.
ABBOT SMITH
Acting Director
National Estimates
- 2 -
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ANNEX
A. The combined impact of destroying in-country stockpiles,
restricting import capabilities, and attacking the southward LOCs
would greatly complicate the DRV war effort. The cumulative drain
on material resources and human energy would be severe. The
postulated bombing and interdiction campaign would harass, disrupt,
and impede the momyment of men and material into South Vietnam and
impose great overall difficulty on the DRV. However, we believe
that, with a determined effort, the DRV could still move sub-
stantially greater amounts than in 1965.*
B. However, the cumulative effect of the campaign would
almost certainly set a limit to the expansion of PAVN and VC
mainforce units and activities in South Vietnam. There are too
many uncertainties to permit an estimate of just where that
limit would be set.
* Air Force dissents.
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-741a
Matter of Fact.
f
� � � � � � � � By Joseph Alsop
The Northern Bombing
THE CAT Is out of the
bag. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff have been publicly re-
vealed as pressing the Presi-
dent to in-
tensify the
bombing of
North Vie t-
nam still fur-
ther, and es-
pee i ally to
permit the
de st ruction
of the vital
North V i e t-
namese oil
fuel stores.
As usual in Lyndon John-
son's Washington, the whole
problem of the northern
bombing has been muddled
and obscured as much as
possible. So it may be as
well to remove some of the
muddle before analyzing the
Joint Chiefs' recommenda-
tion.
To begin with, when the
peace offensive and bomb-
ing pause came to an end,
there was a report that the
permitted bombing area in
the North was much mere
limited, by the President's
order, than it had been be-
fore the pause began. The '
report was officially denied.
But it was also used as a
lever for a spate of other
reports that the President's
post-pause policy was to
"limit the war," which. were
not denied.
Alsop
THE REALITIES behind
all this were quite different
from the public appearance.
First, the military planners
in both Washington and Sai-
gon believed that the high-
est pri o r it y, immediately
post-pause, should be given
to bombing the bridges and
other useful targets on the
lines of communication di-
rectly feeding the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. These are in the
most southerly provinces of
North Vietnam. And in this
manner, the initial bombing
area was in fact temporarily
restricted.
Second, however, far from
"limiting" our effort against
the North, the President has
already authorized a major
intensification. T h e ap-
proved sortie rate�the num-
ber of missions flown
against northern targets�
was tripled after the pause
ended. Weather permitting,
therefore, we are now drop-
ping three times as many
bombs on northern targets
as we did pre-pause.
This earlier decision to
triple the weight of bomb-
ing points, of course, to-
wards just the kind of fur-
ther intensification that the
Joint Chiefs are now press-
ing on the President. Two
things stand in the way.
One is the fact that the
biggest fuel depot in North
Vietnam is in the outskirts
of Haiphong, and the second
biggest is in the outskirts
of Hanoi. The other, is a
hand-tailored intelligence
analysis concluding that the
truck movement over the
Ho Chi Minh Trail would
not be seriously hampered,
even if all the fuel depots in
North Vietnam were com-
pletely destroyed.
The analysis in question
rouses the unavoidable sus-
picion that its preparation
was somehow linked to the
President's invariable han-
kering to conserve what he
calls his "options"�in this
case, the option of not bomb-
ing in the Hanoi and Hai-
phong areas. At any rate, i
those who reached the con-
clusion summarized above
must clearly have been tak-
ing lessons from Alice in
Wonderland's chum, t h e
White Queen, who proudly
boasted that she had often
managed to "believe Six im-
possible things before break-
fast."
NOTWITHSTANDING the
analysis, it is clear that the
President will eventually
discover he has no option
whatever, except to follow
the recommendation of the
Joint Chiefs. The facts leave
him none, and it is a bit
shocking that the facts have
not been faced and the key
decision has not yet been
taken.
Briefly, the revised intelli-
gence estimates that caused
such a panic in Washington
and produced the vaude-
ville-peace offensive, predict
a buildup of enemy regular
units in South Vietnam to a
level equivalent to no less
than 18 divisions. The esti-
mates also predict a rise in
deliveries our the Ho Chi
Minh Trail to a level well
above 6000 tons a month.
The latter is the key
figure in the estimates, for
without tonnage coming in
to sustain them, the addition
of new enemy regular forces
in the South would actually
be counterproductive. Given
the character a the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, the character of
the terrain it traverses, and
the distances that have to
be covered, a huge truck
movement, involving 2000 or
3000 vehicles, will be needed
7 to lay down 6000 tons
modity carried by those
trucks. How then can the
President refrain from do-
ing everything in his power
to halt or at least to greatly
diminish the truck move-
ment?
For the need is most e
phatically not for area-bomb
ing of Hanoi and Haiphong
The need is for pinpoint
bombing to destroy the fuel
depots in the outskirts of
these cities and elsewhere
in North Vietnam. It is a
purely military need.
The President constantly
proclaims his worry about
"pressure from the Hawks."
He ought instead to welcome
a public demand to get on
with the war by doing what
needs doing. And in this
case, he will surely have to
do what needs doing in the
end.
5) 1966, The Washington Post Co.
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