CUBA-NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN INSURGENCIES

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03312210
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-01950
• Publication Date: April 15, 1980

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NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
1 iP 198a
Dear Zbig,
Attached is the monthly report on Cuba-
Nicaragua: Support for Central American
Revolutionaries. We appreciate your evalu-
ation of this report--dated 27 March--and
are pleased that you and your staff find it
valuable. In response to your request for more
information on Cuban training for insurgents,
we have included specific information on the
numbers of Central American revolutionaries
going to Havana and the travel routes they are
taking.
Yours
(b)(3)
Bruce C. Clar
Director
Attachment: a/s
The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski /1
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500 /i\IFO! tk,n.
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NOFORN/NOCONT CT/ORCON
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
15 April 1980
MEMORANDUM
CUBA-NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN INSURGENCIES (U)
SUMMARY
Cuba reacted to Salvadoran Archbishop Romero's murder last month by
launching a strong campaign to Zink the US Government to the killing.
It also reportedly cautioned Salvadoran leftists against using the
incident to provoke a direct confrontation with the junta and rightist
forces. (s NF NC OC)
Cuba continues to train, arm, and advise Salvadoran insurgents; in
addition, the PLO--at Soviet and Cuban urging--is providing training and
funding. (.5 NF NC OC)
During the past month, mounting evidence indicates that arms for
Salvadoran leftists are being funneled clandestinely through Costa Rica
and that small numbers of insurgents may be receiving training in
northern parts of that country. The Costa Rican Minister of Public
Security and several of his subordinates probably are directly involved
in supporting such clandestine activities. President Carazo may have
had some knowledge of these activities, and the government will come
under increasing pressure to curtail such clandestine support. (S)
We also have unconfirmed reports that as of mid-March, the
Nicaraguans were providing guerrilla training for some 250 Salvadorans
This memorandum was requested by the National Security Adviser to
the President. It responds to specific questions and is not intended to
be an analysis of the overall relationship between Cuba/Nicaragua and
Central America. It was prepared by the Latin America Division of the
Office of Political Analysis under the direction of the National Intelli-
gence Officer for Latin America, and coordinated with the Clandestine
Service and the Office of Strategic Research. Information in this
memorandum reflects information available through 15 April 1980.
PA-M-80-10181
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in northern Nicaragua and that a new international brigade is being
formed in Panama�similar to that which fought in Nicaragua--for
service in El Salvador and Guatemala. Nonetheless, reports of the
brigade's plans appear overblown, suggesting that the Panamanian
brigade leader is exaggerating his support to attract recruits. (S NF
NC OC)
At the same time, however, the Panamanian Government increasingly
appears to be hedging its bets on the outcome in El Salvador, partly by
facilitating increased travel through Panama of insurgents for Cuban
training. General Torrijos also is probably giving his high level
leftist advisers increasinaZu free rein in providing support to the
Salvadoran left.
Havana's efforts to spur support and cooperation among Guatemalan
insuraent aroups
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Hondurans recently completed guerrilla
and intelligence training in Cuba, and another group is being sent
to Cuba for training via Panama City.
EL SALVADOR
in late
March the Cuban Ambassador to Panama stated that Havana
viewed the murder of Salvadoran Archbishop Romero as a
plot by rightwing elements in El Salvador to lure the
left into the open where it could be crushed by military
and rightist forces. The Ambassador reportedly said that
Havana--believing that the left is not yet prepared for
such a direct confrontation--advised Salvadoran leftist
groups through the Revolutionary Coordinator of the
Masses not to take to the streets to protest the killing.
(S NF NC OC)
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Following Romero's murder, Havana launched a deter-
mined and seemingly vindictive propaganda campaign as-
serting that the United States bears the "gravest re-
sponsibility" for the killing; accusing Washington of
collusion with the local oligarchy and the military
junta; and describing the US Ambassador to El Salvador as
an interventionist and a provacateur. One editorial
noted that Romero had just spoken out against Washington's
plans to intervene in El Salvador and that his murder was
preceded immediately by official US statements accusing
Cuba of supplying arms to the Salvadorans. (U)
Commenting on the media attack, a senior Cuban of-
ficial indicated privately that Havana resented recent US
statements that the Castro regime was behind the violence
in El Salvador. He said that although Cuba had never
hidden its association with revolutionary groups in El
Salvador, the violence there was not of Cuba's making. (C)
Havana's vehement campaign linking the US to Romero's
murder is not typical of its normal propaganda on El
Salvador, suggesting that Castro may have intended it as
a warning against further US accusations of Cuban support
for Salvadoran terrorists. Havana apparently is attempting
to demonstrate its capability to deal with an escalation
in US rhetoric. (C)
(b)(1)
reporting that 18 to 20 Salvadoran
leftists, some Nicaraguans, and an unspecified number of
South Americans were being trained by the PLO--probably
at Cuban and Soviet urging--near Beirut in the use of
bazookas, machine guns, mortars, and all types of demo-
lition equipment and explosives. We previously reported
that the PLO was under pressure from the USSR and Cuba to
provide training and financial support for Latin American
revolutionary movements. (S NF NC OC)
The Costa Rican Connection
The mounting evidence and public accusations of a
Costa Rican connection with the Salvadoran insurgents
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leads us to believe that:
--The Salvadoran guerrillas and their allies have
used Costa Rica as a safehaven and have received
arms on a small scale through Costa Rica.
--Small numbers of insurgents have been trained in
Costa Rica.
--Such clandestine activities have the support of
Public Security Minister Echeverria,
--President Carazo may have had some knowledge of
these activities, and the government will come
under increasing pressure to curtail such clan-
destine support.
A Costa Rican citizen who lives in northern Costa Rica
recently told a US Embassy officer in San Jose that in early
March he personally observed a DC-6 land at Liberia airport
in northwestern Costa Rica and unload rations, weapons, and
supplies onto a pickup truck. The Costa Rican was told by
an airport official whom he knows well that the airport
administrator had traveled to Cuba in late February and that
the DC-6 flight was but one of several.
(S NF NC OC)
The Costa Rican also maintained that an estate in the
area which had been used to train Sandinistas last year now
was occupied by some 60 Salvadoran, Nicaraguan, and Costa
Rican guerrillas. They reportedly were receiving training
from three persons, including a female member of the FSLN.
(S NF OC)
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In late March, the Minister of Defense in El Salvador
stated publicly that large shipments of arms and sub-
versive propaganda are being brought into El Salvador
from Costa Rica and that Salvadoran insurgents had been
operating in northern Costa Rica for some time. He did
not accuse the Costa Rican Government of complicity but
said he had urged Security Minister Echeverria to take
action. (U)
San Jose newspapers have launched a major press
campaign demanding a full government investigation,
noting that over 200 small airfields in Costa Rica could
be used for arms smuggling without the government's
knowledge. Demands by the Costa Rican media that the
government--and particularly its Security Minister--not
become involved in the subversion of El Salvador contrast
sharply with the widespread self-censorship the press
imposed on Costa Rican assistance to the Sandinistas
until the final stages of the Nicaraguan civil war. The
strong public outcry will make future clandestine oper-
ations more difficult. (C)
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We do not have any reporting that bears directly
on President Carazo's cognizance of such clandestine
activities. Nonetheless, we suspect that he may have had
some knowledge of these actions; such operations and the
rumored involvement of high level individuals have been
an open secret. The explosive political potential of the
charges and Carazo's relative inaction also argue that
the President may not have been totally ignorant. (S)
The recent media outcry and the greater political
costs of a continuation of these activities as the pre-
campaign for the 1982 elections gets underway strongly
suggest that Carazo will take measures to curtail the
support. A mix of factors--including official complicity,
the availability of substantial sums of money for bribes,
an already functioning support structure, and limited
security force capabilities--makes it unlikely, however,
that clandestine support will be completely stopped. (S)
Panamanian Involvement
Havana continues to utilize Panama as a transit point
for Central American insurgents traveling to and from Cuba
for training. in
February and March alone Panama expedited the travel of some
320 Central American leftists--mostly Salvadorans--to
Cuba for training.
members of
the international brigade--led by former government official
Hugo Spadafora--that fought alongside the FSLN during the
Nicaraguan civil war are now recruiting new volunteers to
fight in El Salvador and Guatemala.
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Training in Nicaragua
As of mid-February 250 Salvadorans were receiving
training at an FSLN-controlled camp lust north of Cosiguina
in northern Nicaragua. (b)(1)
The (b)(3)
trainees were receiving instruction in guerrilla warfare
and the camp
still was functioning in mid-March.
THE GUATEMALAN INSURGENCY
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A small number of
Cuban advisers may be assisting several of these groups,
but they probably are operating in a liaison capacity or
were sent to the country on a temporary basis to assess
the guerrillas' strength and needs.
HONDURAN DEVELOPMENTS
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all of the 40 to 50
members of the special apparat who were receiving guerrilla
and intelligence training in Cuba now have returned to
Honduras. Another group of approximately the same size--
which fought in Nicaragua--also has completed its training.
All the trainees returned to Honduras via Panama City,
traveling on Cuban documentation in several small groups.
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