PROSPECTS FOR HUSSEIN AND JORDAN IN THE PRESENT CRISIS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03294246
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-02009
• Publication Date: September 24, 1970

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
24 September 1970
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Prospects for Hussein and Jordan in the Present Crisis
1. The fighting in Jordan has ruptured that country's fragile political
and social fabric, already strained by the June 1967 war and subsequent
developments -- especially the rise of the fedayeen movement. The size of
the Palestinian segment of Jordan's population (about two-thirds), the numbers
and the determination of the fedayeen themselves, and the support rendered
them from Syria and Iraq make it virtually impossible for Hussein to beat
them into permanent submission. These factors alone bring us to judge that
Hussein cannot continue to rule in Jordan in the manner that he did, say
during the years 1957-1967. Jordan itself and its role in the area will be very
different from what they have been. The following paragraphs explore some
of the possibilities and their implications.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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Deterioration of the Jordanian State
2. Over the past two years or so, Hussein's authority has progressively
eroded, while the Palestinian guerrillas have won increasing freedom of action.
Invoking patriotism and the sacred cause of liberating Palestine, the several
guerrilla organizations have imported and borne arms, established secure
areas, virtually governed major refugee camps, and moved about within Jordan
pretty much as they pleased. Most Palestinians have little use for the
Hashemite monarchy, regarding Hussein and his grandfather as having been
all too willing to deal with Israel. Some of the Palestinian guerrilla organiza-
tions -- notably the Syrian-backed Sa'iqah, the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation
Front, and George Habbash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) -- consider Hussein as at least as great an enemy as Israel and, in
practice, have devoted more effort to fighting the monarchy than the Israelis.
Other fedayeen leaders and organizations, in particular Yasir Arafat and his
associates who control Al-Fatah, the largest guerrilla group, saw certain
benefits in "sharing" power with Hussein, since they derived advantages from
this position without the responsibilities of government. They did not seek a
showdown with the King, but feared not to side with more extreme fedayeen
when the crisis broke.
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3. In the past year, the King has made several attempts to achieve
an accommodation with the fedayeen, who had become virtually a law unto
themselves in Jordan's capital. Each agreement, negotiated with a committee
purportedly representing the important commando organizations, has broken
down; each agreement has lasted a shorter time than the previous one; each
breakdown has resulted in shooting incidents between guerrillas and army --
several of them very serious. The fedayeen organizations which were willing
to accept some restrictions on their activities have been unable to control all
their own followers; the PFLP has refused to honor any agreements. East
Bank (original Jordanians) elements, including much of the army command and
some of Hussein's own relatives, urged him on several occasions over the
past two years to employ his army to restore his dwindling authority. Despite
mounting provocations, the King backed off repeatedly from a full scale show-
down. Although it appeared the Jordanian army was stronger than the
fedayeen, the King evidently feared that his own position could be seriously
endangered and the country torn apart by the animosities ensuing from the use
of force on a scale required to subdue the guerrillas and reestablish his
authority.
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Possible Outcomes of the Civil War
4. It is premature to predict the final outcome of the present fighting
in Jordan. It may go on until one side gains clear advantage over the other.
It may be brought to halt by a truce or cease-fire; other Arab leaders will
certainly press for this solution, in part to arrange things so that organiza-
tions dedicated to liberating Palestine can continue to operate in Jordan. The
Jordanian army and its opponents as well may find that their respective
logistic deficiencies will compel a slowdown in military operations. But,
no matter how it ends, the Jordan that emerges from the fighting will be
substantially different from that of the past. The possibilities include
geographic partition, Htisseint s sharing power with military commanders
concerned to suppress the fedayeen, a nominally unitary government which
in effect cedes substantial authority to the fedayeen, and a chaotic situation
with no clear functioning authority.
5. Even if Hussein wins the military contest without outside help, the
resort to massive force -- although the real extent of damage and casualties
remains unclear -- is sufficient to drive a deep wedge between Hussein and
his supporters on the one hand and the Palestinians on the other. This is so
despite the fact that many of the latter have little use for the fedayeen. The
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government in Amman would face a massive job of restoring government
services, reestablishing public order, and somehow building a degree of
public support. Unless it conveys the impression of doing passably well at
these tasks, even those elements basically well-disposed toward Hussein would
be hesitant to risk association with it, especially since it would be beset with
enemies, both domestic and foreign.
6. The likelihood of external intervention against the fedayeen
appears to have waned, although the possibility might arise again. If Hussein
should come to reestablish control over Jordan as a consequence of inter-
vention by non-Arab forces, he might hang on as ruler of Jordan for a time.
Over an extended period, however, the political and psychological burden
of owing his survival to non-Arab forces, which had defeated Palestinian
patriots and heroes, would become insupportable. He would be subject to
heavy political pressures from outside Jordan and bitter hatred from within.
The chances of assassination would go up; even some of his military establish-
ment would probably turn against him. While Hussein has been written off
many times in the last dozen years and still survived, he has never faced a
challenge of this magnitude, nor has he found it necessary for foreign troops
to fight his battles. It is our best judgment that, if Israel were to intervene
to "save" Hussein, he would be out of power -- and very likely dead -- in a
matter of months.
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7. But, barring such a drastic contingency, developments in Jordan
over the coming months will be heavily influenced by a variety of factors.
Domestically, these include the military strength remaining to the contestants.
The Jordanian army, on the whole, is likely to have increased confidence in
itself and to want to continue a prominent role in the country. The fedayeen
forces have lost heavily in men and materiel; yet they put up a very stiff
fight. Their leadership is in obvious disarray, but many among them are
more determined than ever to topple Hussein, and sympathy for them among
Palestinians has probably increased. Whether they attract the mass of
Palestinians to support them in a serious effort to overthrow Hussein is
still unclear, but it is certain that much of the Palestinian element of Jordan
will nurse extreme hatred of the King and the army for real or fictitious
atrocities.
8. External factors will also play a part. Syria and Iraq -- long
hostile to Hussein -- will be disposed to meddle in Jordan's troubled
internal situation. The Jordanian government since 1967 has received
sizable subsidies from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya. The latter two
have suspended their payments; Libya will almost certainly not resume its
subventions, and Kuwait is unlikely to do so. Nasser has suffered a setback,
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however things develop in Jordan. He would be apprehensive about possible
Israeli military moves in the event of a clear fedayeen victory in Jordan. Yet,
he could not approve of a military regime in Amman which had crushed the
guerrillas. While his ability to affect Jordanian affairs is now limited, depending
on the course of events, he may at some point intervene to throw his weight
on one side or the other, or try to broker an accommodation.
Partition
9. Apart from the formidable domestic obstacles in the way of putting
Jordan back together, Hussein could count on few outside friends to help.
His immediate neighbors are rapacious. Although the Syrian intervention
has aborted, Damascus will continue to support the fedayeen in the north.
Iraqi forces will probably continue to operate virtually autonomously in a
small region along Jordan's main east-west road. Each desires the ousting
of Hussein and the expansion of its version of Baathism. To this end, each
would be prepared to carve a chunk of Jordanian territory for itself, and
to sponsor a Palestinian government -- composed chiefly of its own tame
fedayeen -- for the area it might control. Some kind of Palestinian entity
might conceivably be set up in these areas, but it would have difficulty in
establishing its independence, given Syrian and Iraqi determination to control
it. Arafat and his associates in Al-Fatah would be unhappy at Syrian-Iraqi
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annexing of Jordanian territory, but they probably would have little choice
but to go along. Arafat would probably find Syria a more acceptable sponsor
than Iraq. If Jordan were partitioned in some such fashion as this, Hussein
might hold on to the remaining two-thirds of the country, although the city of
Amman would probably be almost constantly in turmoil, thanks to the large
Palestinian element among its half million people.
Military Predominance
10. The Jordanian regime's action against the fedayeen appears to
have been forced on Hussein by the weight of opinion among the military
commanders. They and/or their successors will continue to demand and
almost certainly get an increased role in the government of Jordan, whether
the outcome of the present crisis finds Jordan partitioned or intact. We think
that this military participation in government will be substantial and that
Hussein's days as sole ruler, able to change cabinets and dictate policy,
are over. Depending on the course of events, Hussein's position could vary
from that of being compelled to listen to and, on important matters, heed a
council of advisors to that of being a front for a cabal of military officers.
His temperament would not tolerate the former easily, and he would probably
abdicate rather than continue long in the latter role.
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A New Attempt at Compromise
11. Much less likely than the two situations just discussed, though
not to be excluded, would be a sharing of the government of Jordan between
Hussein and the fedayeen. Given the latter's losses and present disarray, some
of their leaders might be willing to try and patch up an accommodation with
Hussein once again. The King would now be skeptical of this, but external
pressure, withholding of subsidies, and domestic weakness could compel him
to try this sort of solution, perhaps not immediately, but over a period of
time. Such an accommodation would be couched in terms of support for the
Palestine cause, but the fedayeen would seek to free themselves as much as
possible from government control. Hussein and the military would resist such
a trend, and in time a new crisis would almost certainly develop.
* * * * * * * *
12. The above scenarios are illustrative, rather than exhaustive. The
course of developments in the next days and weeks will have much to do with
the shape of the future in Jordan. At best the political situation there is
likely to be fragile and subject to sudden change. At worst, the country could
slide into chaos, without a government able to maintain order or to provide
services for the population. It is not too far-fetched to suggest that Jordan,
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SECRET.
created in 1921 primarily to provide a position for a deserving wartime ally of
Britain, may be reaching the end of its allotted lifespan.
Implications for the Arab-Israeli Issue
13. Developments in Jordan have clearly altered the picture with
respect to any Arab-Israeli negotiations. Jordan is unlikely to have a
government secure enough to try and reach an accommodation with Israel.
Fedayeen resistance to negotiations will probably command broader
support among Palestinians and perhaps in other Arab quarters as well.
Without Jordanian participation, Egypt would feel more inhibited with regard
to any moves toward a settlement. This does not, in the long run,
necessarily rule out Egyptian participation in negotiation efforts, but it
does present Nasser with a new and quite different set of problems.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI
For your information. This was prepared at
the request of the DCI and he specified a limited
outside distribution.
AES, etc.
Copies to: DDI
DDP
D/OCI
Attachment:
�Memorandum, dated 24 Sept 70
"Prospects for Hussein and Jordan
in the Present Crisis"
24 Sept 70
( DATE )
P0 M
(asdied'
NO. I 0 I REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Frank Hand
(47)
The Director would like to have the attached
Memorandum passed to the Secretary.
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Estimates
Attachment:
Memorandum dated 24 Sept 70
"Prospects for Hussein and Jordan
In the Present Crisis"
24 September 1970
(DATE)
FORM NO. 10 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Toni Latimer
The DCI would like to have this memo given
to Dr. Kissinger.
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Estimates
Attachment:
Memorandum, dated 2*3
"Prospects for Hussein
In the Present Crisis"
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
Sept 70
and Jordan
24 September 70
( DATE)
(47)
MEMORANDUM FOR: vAckn. Noel Gayler, USN
For your information.
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Estimates
24 September 70
( DATE)
(47)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Meinbers (except AEC&FBI)
The Director of Central Intelligence
suggests that you pass the attached memorandum
on to your principals.
ABS
24 September 70
(DATE)
FORM NO. 10 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
MEMORANDUM FOR:The Dire_ _Jr
Attached are the two papers you discussed
with Huizenga yesterday morning. '7Ve have gone more
elaborately into the subject of Soviet reactions than you
really asked for but felt that t1 paper might be more
useful to you in this fuller foifn. It has been discussed
and revised by the Board. 4ie second paper has not
had this full treatm t th gh the Board members
approved generally. We tjiought it might be useful
for you to have it at dpcefin this form. If you have
suggestions or questi about it we can proceed to
perfect it on Thursday.
4-411-/Ve,(
ABBOT SMITH'
Director, National Estimate
23 September 1970
(DATE)
( 4 7 )
FORM NO,
I 0 I REPLACES FORM 10.101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
( 4 7
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