CIA/FBI BRIEFING OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS (HSCA)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03250231
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2022
• Case Number: F-2020-01118
• Publication Date: May 17, 1978

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� :ii...CI..6t/FBT Briefing .of � the House � Select COTTIffitt,,Je
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FROM:
Benjamin F.
Chief, �
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
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Chief, Soviet/East European Division
Benjamin F. Pepper
Chief, SE/ORP
SUBJECT CIA/FBI Briefing of the House Select
Committee on Assassinations (HSCA)
1. On 16 May 1978 Mr. Ben Pepper, Chief, SE/ORP of
CIA, and Messrs. Jim Adams and Jim Nolan of FBI Headquarters
briefed HSCA Chairman Representative Louis Stokes,
Representative Samuel Divine, the ranking Republican of
HSCA, and Robert Blakey, Chief of the Staff of HSCA.
Also present was Mr. Drew Clark of FBI Headquarters. This
briefing was the third and last of three planned briefings
aimed at limiting the proliferation of information, which
might be damaging to the security of ongoing FBI and CIA
operations. (The first two briefings were of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Oversight
Committee on Intelligence and have been reported on
previously.) It had been agreed by the FBI and CIA,
particularly in view of the interest �aroused by Epstein's
book "The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald" and questions
regarding Nosenko's and FEDORA's bona fides, that these
briefings were in order. By briefing selected members of the
committee and staff, it was hoped that further inquiries
into FEDORA and possibly other sensitive sources would be
diminished.
2. In the course of our 75 minute briefing session the
following points were made by CIA and FBI briefers:
a. Both agencies are firmly committed to the
view that Nosenko is a bona fide defector. The point
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was made by Mr. Pepper that while Nosenko was
considered bona fide, we did not believe that his
access to information concerning Oswald was such
that any firm judgment could be made on the basis
of his information as to KGB involvement with Oswald.
Presenting the most sinister hypothesis, namely,
that Oswald had been dispatched as a KGB agent to
assassinate Kennedy, Mr. Pepper pointed out that if
such a decision had been made, someone the likes of
Nosenko, a KGB captain in Moscow, would most likely
not have been aware of the plan. Therefore, the
question of Nosenko's bona fides was not really
germane to the question of Oswald's status vis a vis
the KGB. Blakey took issue with this point, statTiT
that he was more interested in an alternative
hypothesis, that is that the KGB had had some
relationship with Oswald, but did not dispatch him
to assassinate President Kennedy; therefore sent
Nosenko out to provide evidence that no such relation-
ship had existed. Blakey hypothesized further that
this was done because the Soviets were deeply "concerned
with the possibility of nuclear war resulting from
the Kennedy assassination.
b. Whereas Epstein's book highlights the importance
of two apparent indications of FEDORA supporting Nosenko's
"legend" (Nosenko's rank and the recall telegram) this is,
in fact, not necessarily the case. A brief explanation
was afforded those being briefed. It was also stressed
that the points of concern raised by Epstein in response
to reporting on Nosenko were relatively unimportant
factors in the judgement relative to Nosenko's bona fides.
Mr. Nolan offered to show Mr. Blakey the approximately
25 pages of FEDORA reporting on Nosenko but requested
that this paper be viewed by only Mr. Blakey and at FBI
Headquarters. Mr. Blakey took the position that this
was unacceptable, that he had to have at least six
additional members of his staff read this material.
Representative Divine, who, by the way, is a former
FBI Special Agent, was very supportive of Nolan's
position and told Blakey that he thought the Bureau's
reporting �should only be seen by him, Blakey. Chairman
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Stokes, however, supported Blakey's position. The
compromise that evolved was that Blakey will review
the material ard, if he then still feels that others.
on his staff should be made privy to this information,
the 'matter will be negotiated further., (My view is
that the Bureau will probably end up having to accede
.to Blakey's demands.)
c. Acknowledgement was also made that there was .a
difference of opinion between the FBI and CIA in
respect to FEDORA's bona fides. It was admitted that
FEDORA had been an FBI source who had been turned over
�to the CIA when he returned to the Soviet Union.
Mention was made of the fact that the FBI questions
his bona.fides and the CIA believes him to be bona
.fide.. We also stressed. that the information appearing
in Epstein's book and, related articles was enough for
the KGB to identify FEDORA with ease. -
d. The monster plot was outlined with emphasis
placed on the fact that the origin of this theory
had been speculation of KGB defector Anatoliy
Golitsyn. We pointed out. that this theorizing,
accepted at the time by many in. the positions of
authority both in the CIA and FBI, had led to conclusions
that virtually every Soviet defector and source in-place
after Gplitsyn had subscribed to the thesis that the
Sin6-Soviet split was actually a KGB deception operation.
3. For the record it should be noted that Chairman
Stokes seemed to be as interested in CIA's treatment of
Nosenko while under interrogation as he was in Nosenko's
bona fides. He told me that Nosenko had reported to the
committee on the conditions he suffered and asked me if I
could collaborate Nosenko's claims. I responded that,
lacking the specifics of Nosenko's claims,.I could not
collaborate in any detail, but that I personally would be
inclined to believe that Nosenko spoke the truth in this
regard.
4. After the meeting was over .Blakey took me aside
and somewhat conspiratorily said he would like to speak with
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Don Gregg and me alone concerning Nosenko. Plans were made
to get together at CIA Headquarters at 0900 on 19 May.
5. General Comments: I believe that our briefings
of the three Congressional committees were useful. If we
had not given them, I believe knowledge of FEDORA and
perhaps other sources would have proliferated uncontrollably.
I am not suggesting that the course of action we pursued
will succeed or that proliferation will not take place or
that eventually there will not be a leak providing U.S.
Government confirmation of FEDORA's agent status (it would
be the last nail in his coffin), but I do,think,that our
try was worthwhile. Time will tell.:
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Distribution:
Original - C/SE
1 - C/CI
1 - C/SE/OP/S
1 - C/SE/ORP chrono
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Benj min F.
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