CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/06/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03194478
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: June 24, 1958

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24 June 1958
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CENTRAL
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BULLETIN
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24 JUNE 1958
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Budapest under tight police control.
Kadar may be losing out to Stalinist
opposition.
Yugoslays expect continued Sino-
Soviet pressure against them, and
call for "support" in fight against
Stalinism.
Most ow demonstrations against Dan-
ish and West German embassies con-
stitute Soviet Government reprisals.
Czech party's drive to eliminate
"bourgeois influences" will create
harsher police state.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - General Shihab now favors
cease-fire and political truce. Cippo-
sition still insists that Chamoun leave
the country and a new parliament be
elected.
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1 VI LJE-A,11.1...'d 1
0 liammarskjold prepared to warn Nasir
against continued intervention in Leb-
anon and to request UN sanctions and
condemnation if warning is unheeded.
0 UAR commander in Syria given orders
to "engage" on 25 June if Israelis ig-
nore warnings to stop digging in Lake
Hula area.
Cyprus - Security forces in control,
with island tense. Greeks in Istanbul
fear Turkish action against them.
III. THE WEST
0 Rightists in France and Algeria,
including Georges Bidault, critical
of De Gaulle's agreement with
Tunisia on troop evacuation issue.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 June 1958
I ii)/(24-6 DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Hun ar . In Budapest, the post-Nagy atmosphere is
one o terror. Amid reports of new trials in the offing, the
police have been reinforced and are said to be arresting
persons who talk openly of the affair. The only top official
comment on the execution has come from two Stalinists in
the party and the regime; this suggests that ICadar's faction
may be losing control of the party. [Page 1)
Yupslavia: Belgrade expects a continuation of the
Sino-Soviet bloc campaign against Yugoslavia that has devel-
oped in recent months, The Yugoslays do not discount the
possibility of "military pressure." Belgrade has reacted
strongly to the execution of Nagy, and sees his "murder" as
a "dreadful warning" to those who oppose the return of Stal-
inism in the Soviet bloc. The Yugoslays have called on anti-
Stalinist elements in the Communist world to give "moral
and political support" in the fight against Moscow.
USSR: The organized demonstrations against the Dan-
ish and West German embassies in Moscow constitute the
Soviet Government's reprisal against violent demonstrations
against Soviet missions in at least six Western countries, in-
cluding Denmark and West Germany. The only precedent for
such actions in Moscow occurred in November 1956, when
there were nonviolent demonstrations involving the embassies
of the countries involved in the Suez crisis.
(Page 2)
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Czechoslovakia: Prague's decision to strengthen its
security forces and to improve the political reliability of
the army is designed to eliminate "bourgeois influences"
and will have the effect of establishing a harsher police
state. The Czech Communist party declared that this task
was of overriding importance if Czechoslovakia is to move
forward in the development of "socialism." This decision
follows the recent CEMA meeting which will apparently re-
sult in a lowered standard of living for Czechoslovakia.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: Army commander Shihab now favors a mil-
itary cease-fire and a political truce to prepare the ground
for a more lasting political compromise. Opposition lead-
ers still insist that President Chamoun must leave the coun-
try and that a new parliament must be elected. There have
been no major military developments, but Chamoun believes
new rebel offensive actions are likely within the next few
days. :Page 3)
UN-Lebanon: Hammarskjold is firmly opposed to the
introduction of any outside military force, under UN aus-
pices or otherwise, fearing it might set off a much larger
conflagration. He sees the UN's responsibility as confined
solely to the elimination of foreign intervention. If Nasir
ignores his warning that the UAR interference must cease,
Hammarskjold is prepared to request economic sanctions
and to brand the UAR an "aggressor."
(Page 5)
*UAR-Israel: The UAR joint command in Cairo has or-
dered the First Army in Syria to follow a policy which envisages
an "engagement" on 25 June to halt Israeli digging activity in
the Lake Hula area. The military action, orders for which
24 June 58 DAILY BRIEF
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taken only if propaganda against the Israelis and a warning
(Page 6) (Map)
conveyed through the UN truce observers nn the Tgraeli-
Syrian border fails to obtain results.
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Cyprus: Security forces on the island are in control,
but the situation remains tense. The Greek minority in
Istanbul is fearful of the increasingly bellicose atmosphere.
There is no evidence of unusual military activity in west-
ern or southern Turkey. (Page 7)
III. THE WEST
France: Rightist elements in France and Algeria, in-
cluding Georges Bidault, are sharply critical of De Gaulle's
agreement for a partial evacuation of French troops from
Tunisia. Their disillusionment with the general will prob-
ably intensify, as he moves to withdraw some French forces
from Morocco. (Page 8)
DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Hungary's Kadar Silent on Nagy Execution
The only authoritative Hungarian statements to date on
the executions of Nagy and his associates have been made by
two Stalinists who are reported to be leading the opposition
to Kadar--Antal Apro and Karoly Kiss. This supports in-
formed speculation in Budapest that Kadar may be in danger
of losing control of the party.
Kadar, in view
of his close connection with Nagy during the national upris-
ing and statements he made at that time in support of Nagy,
was "undoubtedly" opposed to this solution of the problem.
Kadar may have avoided participation in the announce-
ment of the Nagy execution, in an effort to disassociate him-
self as much as possible, but his own equivocal position in
the affair will play into the hands of his opponents in the par-
ty and may lead to the deterioration of his position in Mos-
cow.
The first reaction of the Budapest populace of shock,
horror, and disgust at the Hungarian regime--and even
more at the USSR--has now developed into an atmosphere
of tension and fear--the most intense since the mass ar-
rests of last autumn. Police have reportedly been rein-
forced and are arresting anyone who openly discusses these
events. Although no overt demonstrations have taken place
in Budapest, the wife of a legation employee observed a
near-demonstration on 17 June when market workers ex-
citedly discussed the matter in loud and angry tones. Hun-
garians now feel that Nagy and Maleter, by refusing to ad-
mit the regime's charges against them, have increased their
stature to the point that they can be regarded as martyrs, ac-
cording to the legation.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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I" ILFEdIN 1 1I11
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Soviet-German Demonstrations
The violent attacks on the Danish and West German em-
bassies in Moscow--organized in retaliation for the demon-
strations which took place at the Soviet embassies in Copen-
hagen and Bonn over the week end protesting Nagy's execution--
reflect the Soviet Government's reaction to the demonstrations
against Soviet missions in at least a half dozen other Western
countries. They also are designed to inhibit additional pro-
tests in the free world. These latest Soviet actions contrast
with the nonviolent demonstrations before the British, French,
and Israeli embassies at the time of the Suez attack and do
not appear specifically aimed at Denmark or West Germany.
Rather they are defensive reactions, revealing the USSR's
sensitivity to the extremely adverse world reaction brought
on by the news of the Hungarian executions.
They were also apparently intended to show displeasure
over what Moscow considers the failure of Western govern-
ments to exercise adequate control over the demonstrations.
Gromyko on 19 June summoned the Danish ambassador in
Moscow and protested that the Danish Government, despite
advance knowledge, failed to provide necessary protection
and that the police encouraged the participants. Similar
though less violent demonstrations are known to have taken
place at Soviet missions in the United States, Canada, Argen-
tina, Uruguay, Switzerland, and Norway.
The Moscow demonstration against the West German Em-
bassy, coming one day after the 17th anniversary of the Nazi
invasion of Russia in World War II, could seriously damage
the USSR's efforts to improve relations with Bonn. The crowd
is reported to have reached 1,000 in number and the intensity of
the attack suggests it may have gotten out of control.
CONFIDENTIAL
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II, ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanese Situation
Lebanese army commander General Shihab_________
he now favors a
mili-
tary cease-fire and a political truce which would allow the
Lebanese to "catch their breath" and prepare the ground
for amore lasting political compromise. The general
thought it would be a long time before normal conditions
could be restored. Shihab complained of the tiredness of
his army and its grumbling over keeping President Cha-
moun in power, and said his men needed a week "in which
to wash up, and change their boots and socks." However,
he reiterated his belief that the President must finish his
term of office.
Opposition leaders maintain their tough attitude toward
President Chamoun and continue their efforts to overthrow
the government. They still insist that he must leave the
country on 24 July when his term expires and that parlia-
ment must be dissolved and new elections held. They favor
the designation of an emergency "chief of state" to serve
from six months to a year. During this period, the army
under General Shihab would keep the peace. A new parlia-
ment and then a president would be elected after the interim
period. President Chamoun stated on ne ex-
pects a large-scale attack by Kamal Jumblatt's Druze forces
on 24 June against the roads from Beirut to Damascus and
Sidon, as well as an attack on the Beirut International Air-
port. Chamoun said he hoped that General Shihab for once
would respond to this threat, instead of "producing another
plan" of action against the rebels,
battles are brewing in the Balabakk area and
that any attacks from villages will be met with artillery
fire.
It is doubtful that Shihab will take any effection action
against Jumblatt, since conditions verging on camaraderie
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LIT LILA,...111:e I
between army and Jumblatt units prevail. Army and Sum-
blatt men conducting patrols along roads meet frequently
to exchange pleasantries, and at times have ridden together
in the same vehicles. There have been instances reported
where these joint patrols have searched passing cars to-
gether. I The general's view of the situa-
tion was aptly illustrated when he was queried about his civil-
ian attire recently. He replied that "it was Sunday."
Despite the presence of UN Secretary General Ham-
marskjold in Cairo, the UAR continues its support of rebel
forces, one of Nasir's top intelligence chiefs
ordered the IJAR am 3assador in Beirut to give extremist
opposition leader Saib Salam financial assistance "so that
he may continue his work."
a request for "40 books"
irom the "great man here," presumably a reference to
bombs for terrorist activities.
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Hammarskjold Opposed to Use of Any Outside Military Force
in Lebanon
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold is firmly opposed
to bringing any outside military force into Lebanon, under
UN auspices or otherwise, fearing it might set off a much
larger conflagration. Taking the position that the UN's re-
sponsibility is confined to the elimination of foreign interven-
tion, Hammarskjold hopes to achieve this by warning Nasir
of the serious consequences of continued UAR interference
in Lebanese affairs. If unsuccessful, the secretary general
is prepared to request the Security Council, and if necessary
the General Assembly, to vote economic sanctions against
the UAR as an "aggressor." He is scheduled to return to New
York on 26 June.
Hammarskjold's opposition to a UN military force in Leb-
anon stems, in part, from his belief that an adequate force--
which he sets at 7,500 men�could not be raised quickly, if
at all, from among the small-member nations of the UN. He
regards UN use of forces from the major powers as impossi-
ble, presumably because this would entail use of Soviet forces
and also because of the precedent set by the UNEF's composi-
tion. He believes any UN force would have to fight its way
across Lebanon in order to reach the border area, with con-
sequent killing of Lebanese nationals. He also fears that the
predominantly Christian composition of any UN force would
raise an "ugly religious issue" with repercussions throughout
the Arab world.
Hammarskjold's personal observations and his talks with
Lebanese Government leaders have evidently convinced him
he cannot now stake the UN's prestige and possible future ef-
fectiveness in the Middle East on the Lebanese situation. Con-
ceding extensive infiltration by the UAR, which he estimates
at 5,000-6,000 infiltrators, he still believes the rebellion is
largely an internal affair which must be resolved by the Leba-
nese themselves once UAR intervention ceases.
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ISRAELPSYRIAN BORDER )
.f�
* Approximate location
of Israeli drainage
ditch,
Demilitarized zone
MILES
LEBANON
Lake has been drained
to roughly one-fourth
the area shown here.
ISRAEL
80624
SYRIA
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%taw, Nine
UAR Plans to Counter Israeli Activities in Lake Hula Area
Continuing Israeli canal-digging operations in the Lake
Hula area along the Syrian border have evoked a plan for
United Arab Republic (UAR) forces to counter the Israeli
"aggression." The UAR joint command headquarters in
a three-stage policy culminating in an "en-
gagement" if the digging activities have not ceased by 25
June. The first stage of the plan, to be implemented on
22 and 23 June, was described as a propaganda attack
against the Israeli operations. In the second stage, a
warning is to be issued to the Israelis through the UN
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). If the digging
is still continuing on 25 June, the "engagement" will be
ordered.
The present phase of the Lake Hula controversy be-
gan in late March when the Israelis dug a drainage ditch
which crossed certain Arab-owned lands within the de-
militarized zone. An exchange of fire between Syrians
and Israelis resulted in a survey of the boundary of the
demilitarized zone by UNTSO personnel which was ac-
cepted by both sides. However, fighting broke out again
on 27 and 30 May. A resurvey of the boundary was ac-
cordingly made, but former Palestinian Arabs residing
in Syria still contend that the Israeli ditch violates their
lands. In addition, the Israelis are constructing a road
which roughly parallels the border. This may be contrib-
uting to Arab apprehensions.
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.11.06.41.41.e
Cyprus
Members of the Greek minority in Istanbul "fear for
their lives," according to the American consul general in
Istanbul. Isolated incidents, including assaults on several
Greeks, have occurred recently as long-time Greek-Turkish
animosity has been intensified over the Cyprus controversy.
The relatively mild reaction of the press in Istanbul to an-
nouncement of the new British proposals for Cyprus may
help to calm the tense situation.
The reported killing by the British of Colonel George
Grivas, alias "Digenis," leader of the Greek-Cypriot under-
ground organization EOKA, on 22 June could have far-reach-
ing effects.. if true. His death or Imminent capture, how-
ever, has been reported several times during the three
years since EOKA launched its all-out campaign against
the British on 1 April 1955.
Grivas has been able to inspire intense loyalty from
his followers, and his death would be an incalculable loss
to EOKA. The tightly organized, right-wing, terrorist
organization has been able by violence and the threat of
violence to intimidate a large part of the Greek-Cypriot
population to support actively, or at least not oppose, its
aims and activities. As most of Grivas' lieutenants have
been killed or captured, and there is no one known at pres-
ent who could replace him, EOKA might rapidly disinte-
grate into small groups, operating without benefit of co-
ordination. British efforts to prevent future EOKA attacks
would thus be made easier, although isolated acts of vio-
lence might still occur.
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110' NW"
III. ThE WEST
French Rightists Increasingly Disillusioned With De Gaulle
Rightist elements in France and Algeria are sharply
critical of Be Gaulle's agreement for partial evacuation of
French forces from Tunisia. Former Premier Georges
Bidault has warned De Gaulle of possible repercussions if
French troops "retreat" from Tunisia and subsequently from
Morocco. The All-Algeria Committee of Public Safety on 20
June criticized the Tunisian agreement and Be Gaulle's de-
cision to bring Socialist leader Guy Mollet with him on his 2
July visit to Algiers.
Be Gaulle's visit may serve to crystallize opposition and
also to clarify the position of the army, without which the
extremist civilian groups would be ineffective. It is unlikely
that De Gaulle would undertake this second trip to Algiers un-
less he felt sure of complete army support.
Meanwhile, extremist leaders continue to organize opposi-
tion to Be Gaulle. The Algiers Committee has inaugurated a
biweekly newspaper to coordinate the actions of all public
safety committees. Paul Antier, leader of the rightist Peas-
ant party, says he is working closely with Pierre Poujade
and with General Chassin's public safety groups to organize
a clandestine resistance to the De Gaulle government. Antier
predicts a rightist take-over in France within two months.
He believes the majority of De Gaulle's former right-wing
supporters have lost faith in De Gaulle's ability to achieve
either an Algerian settlement or financial stability for France.
The public safety movement in France so far appears to have
only limited support, although it will probably grow as De
Gaulle's plans for onst ittiti nna 1 raxri c ..on and for North Africa
become clearer.
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