CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/06/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03194469
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: June 20, 1958

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20 June 1958
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. �
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
TO: IS
HEXT
AUTH:
DATE.1M_ REVIEWER:
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I L i h..., 1..4 1,..,l t L.a I
20 JUNE 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
As a result of the Hungarian execu-
tions, the Poles feel isolated. They
see the end of Tito's influence in the
bloc and fear a return to Stalinist
control of the satellites.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - Rebels using lull to pre-
pare for further action. Coup plans
by military elements suffer setback.
Cyprus - Greece and Turkey turn
down British plan, but are willing
to disCuss problem further. If
Makarios denounces British policy
publicly, terrorism by Greek
Cypriots is probable.
Fall of East Pakistan cabinet
facilitates President Mirza's ef-
forts to replace Prime Minister
Noon's coalition in Karachi.
Japanese official's statement about
relations with Communist China
considered trial balloon.
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Laos - Pressure increasing for
withdrawal of the International
Control Commission.
Morocco has not yet responded to
French offer on troop evacuation
issue.
effort to step up operations against
French and Moslem collaborators.
III. THE WEST
De Gaulle will probably ask for US
help on French nuclear weapons
program.
Chile - Leftist trend improves
chances of Socialist presidential
candidate who now may also have
President Ibanez' support.
LATE ITEM
USSR - Soviet central committee
adopts additional Khrtishchev agri-
cultural policies, but impression
of political tension remains.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 June 1958
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Poland: Polish officials are troubled and the public is
disturbed by the Hungarian executions and interpret them
as a threat to Poland's "road to socialism." The Poles feel
isolated because they now believe Tito no longer has any
ability to influence policies within the bloc. They fear a re-
turn to Soviet control over the bloc similar to that of the
Stalin era. (Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: Rebel elements are apparently using the tem-
porary lull in Military activity to prepare for further action.
The evacuation of families of employees of private American
firms may be viewed in the UAR as an indication of imminent
Western intervention. Plans by some military elements to
oust Chamoun are reported to have suffered a setback on the
night of 17 June. (Page 2)
Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East: No political
or military solution to the Lebanese crisis is in sight. The
army has not been employed to its full capabilities. An at-
tempted military coup dretat by some of its senior officers to
oust Chamoun remains a distinct possibility. There is evi-
dence of continuing covert intervention by UAR irregulars
and of the infiltration of considerable quantities of UAR arms.
There is, however, no evidence of UAR intention to intervene
with regular military forces. A request by Chamoun for in-
tervention in Lebanon in the near future is possible. The call
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might take the form of a request for Western intervention
or for a greatly expanded UN observer corps, possibly a
UNEF. Available evidence does not indicate an intention
by the Soviet bloc or Israel to become militarily involved.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, a deliberate initiation of
hostilities is unlikely: however, serious incidents may occur.
*Cyprus: Neither Greece nor Turkey accepts the Brit-
ish plan for Cyprus as announced in Commons on 19 June,
but both are willing to discuss the problem further. How-
ever, while Turkey in'Sists on a tripartite conference with
an open agenda, Greece accepts only bilateral contacts with
the UK. The UK insists that its plan be the basis for dis
cussion. Makarios apparently regards the British plan as
basically unacceptable. British forces on Cyprus can prob-
ably cope with any situation that arises, and barring acci-
dents, violence will probably not erupt as long as discus-
sions continue. (Page 4)
Pakistan: The fall of the East Pakistan provincial gov-
ernment will promote President Mirza's effort to replace
Prime Minister Noon's national coalition with one more
amenable to his control. If political instability increases,
Mirza may carry out his threat to impose dictatorial rule.
(Page 6)
Japan - Communist China: Chief cabinet secretary
Akagi of the new Japanese cabinet outlined to a press con-
ference on 19 June, probably with Prime Minister Kishi's
approval, the conditions for improving relations with Com-
munist China which could pave the way for eventual recogni-
tion. This statement probably is designed to overcome Pei-
ping's present hostility toward Japan and is also a trial
balloon to obtain domestic and foreign reaction.
(Page 7)
Laos: Sentiment among political leaders and the popu-
lace is rising for the withdrawal of the International Control
Commission, whose presence is considered an infringement
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on the country's sovereignty. Interior Minister Katay's
newspaper has threatened mob action against the commis-
sion. (Page 8)
Morocco - France: Morocco has not accepted the con-
itional French offer reiterated on 13 June to withdraw part
f the 30,000 French ground forces in Morocco, probably be-
ause it wants all French forces evacuated. A Moroccan
overnment communiqu�ssued on 14 June announcing that
rance would withdraw from ten posts in eastern Morocco
as designed to relieve popular pressure for total French
evacuation pending Premier Balafrers return from the Tunis
conference. (Page 9)
Algeria:
the nationalist rebels, who previously showea some con-
cern over De Gaulle's approach to Algerian problems, are
still trying to step up guerrilla and terrorist opera
against the French and any Moslem collaborators.
(Page 10)
Watch Committee conclusion-- North Africa: The agree-
ment between France and Tunisia for the phased withdrawal
of French forces, with the exception of those at Bizerte,
should serve to reduce the possibilities for serious incidents.
No evidence is available of Soviet bloc efforts to exploit the
current crisis in North Africa.
III. THE WEST
France: De Gaulle will probably ask the United States
for assistance in carrying forward Frances program to
manufacture its own nuclear bomb.
(Page 11)
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Chile: The leftist trend in Chile, evident since April,
improves the chances of the Communist-backed Socialist
Salvador Allende, who now may have gained the support of
President Ibanez for the September presidential election.
However, Allende is still believed to be running slightly be-
hind the right-wing candidate. (Page 12)
LATE ITEM
*Soviet Central Committee Meeting: The comni.Unique
issued by the Soviet Communist party central committee
after its meeting of 17-18 June represents, on the surface
at least, another gain for Khrushchev. He has added two
of his proteges as candidate members of the presidium and
has had the committee adopt a decree which carries further
his agricultural policies by abolishing compulsory deliveries
of produce to the state by collective farms. It is unlikely,
however, that the committee, and especially its members
serving in foreign capitals, would have been called suddenly
into session for the second time in six weeks for this pur-
pose alone. There remains, therefore, an impression of
continuing political tension. (Page 13)
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�eONFfiPEN-T-t*L *se
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Polish Reaction to the, Hungarian Executions
Polish feelings of isolation within the Sino-Soviet bloc--
re-emphasized during the current dispute with Yugoslavia--
have been intensified by the executions of Imre Nagy and
Pal Maleter. The Poles probably consider the primary pur-
pose was to coerce Gomulka into greater conformity with
bloc practices.
Gomulka has withstood increasing bloc pressures, dur-
ing and since his May tour of Rumania, Hungary, and Bul-
garia, over his position in the bloc's dispute with Yugoslatnia.
Without Tito, Gomulka has no effective ally in the Commu-
nist world; the executions dispel any hopes be may have had
of finding support in the Hungarian leadership. Press re-
ports from Warsaw allege that Gomulka in May received
assurances from Kadar that no action would be taken against
the.: "counterrevolutionaries." The executions have probably
alarmed the Polish leader.
Polish newspapers printed the news of the Hungarian
trials on 17 and 18 June without comment. Polish party
reaction can best be4rneasured at this time by the con-
spicuous absence of regime leaders at the tenth anniversary
celebration in Warsaw of the Polish-Hungarian friendship
treaty on 18 June. Observance was limited to restrained
editorials and a concert on 17 June.
The Chinese party, in an 18 June People's Daily article,
equates the slogans of the 1956 Hungarian revolution--"na-
tional independence," "equality with the Soviet Union," and
"special _paths to socialism"--with hostility to the USSR
and advocacy of a return to capitalism. These slogans are
peculiarly descriptive of Gomulka's brand of Communism.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanese Situation
Lebanese President Chamoun, through an intermediary,
has informed UAR President Nasir that he has no intention
of leaving office before his term is over and that he is un-
willing to have a prime minister other than of his own choice.
Chamoun stated that while opposition leaders would be al-
lowed to escape, from Lebanon, all paramilitary groups in
the country would be disarmed once peace is restored. If
Nasir agreed to refrain from interference in Lebanon,
Chamoun said he would be willing to "go to the limit" in
eliminating differences between the two countries.
Nasir showed apparent interest in the proposals without,
however, indicating his opinion of them. Chamounis sug-
gestions apparently are in reply to feelers for a settlement
put forth by Nasir some time ago. Chamoun stated on 18
June that if General Shihab and the Beirut area commander
still maintained on 19 June that their forces were unable to
control the situation, he would instruct Foreign Minister
Malik at the UN to lodge another complaint against the UAR
and to point to the inability of the UN to control the situa-
tion. This move apparently would be intended to pave the
way for a call for American and British intervention. France
has sent a light cruiser to stand by to "protect French na-
tionals in Lebanon."
In Syria, preparations for support of the rebels continue.
Syrian soldiers have been ordered to change to rural civil-
ian dress for action in Lebanon and two Syrian officers have
been sent to Beirut to direct commando operations,
Two thousand men of un-
specified nationality are said to be training in Syria for in-
filtration into Lebanon.
Rebel concentrations in the Basta Moslem quarter of
Beirut are repotted to be larger than those preceding the
14 June attempt against the Prison of the Sands and govern-
ment offices. The rebels may attempt to break out of the
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Basta in order to impress UN Secretary General Hammar,
pkjold with their strength and to create the impression that
this is a domestic issue. Small rebel bands are reported
to be active 25 miles southwest of Beirut.
The military coup planned to unseat President Chamoun
on the night of 17 June misfired when the plotters informed
General Shihab of their intentions. The general stated that
while he would not prevent their action, a coup would split
the army into two warring factions. The generaPs lack of
enthusiasm, plus a rebel attack on forces commanded by One
of the plotterS, was sufficient to discourage the conspirators
temporarily. Whether the general's lack of enthusiasm will
permanently forestall the coup is unknown. He is reported
to have gone on sick leave on 19 June.
A pro-Chamoun army faction has also been discussing
plans for a coup which would remove General Shihab and
neutralize anti-Chamoun officers, including Chief of Staff
Tawfiq Salan.
The Syrian Social National party (SSNP), which has sup-
ported President Chamoun with armed partisans, has become
convinced that either there will be an:army coup of some sort
or American intervention. Of the two possibilitips, a coup is
more acceptable to the SSNP since it fears that American
intervention would be considered in the area as proof that
the United States is the enemy of nationalism. The SSNP
would probably side with the pro-Chamoun plotters, since
its interests coincide more closely with Chamounis pro-
Western and moderate Arab Nationalist policies.
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. Cyprus
Prime Minister Macmillan's announcement on 19 Tune
of Britain's new proposals for Cyprus was greeted in Athens
by a government spokesman's statement that the plan was
"fundamentally unacceptable" to Greece. Archbishop Ma-
karios has not yet commented publicly but will probably re-
ject the plan, although possibly not in unequivocal terms,
thus leaving room for further negotiations. Makarios has
reiterated that he would accept sell-government for Cyprus
as long as eventual self-determination were not specifically
precluded and he now is willing to "consider" the permanent
ruling out of enosis. He is very much opposed, however, to
provisions of the British plan permitting Cypriots to obtain
Greek or Turkish nationality since he fears that this would
lead eventually to partition of the island. Regardless of
Makarios' decision, he will probably attempt to restrain
EOKA from launching attacks on Turkish Cypriots, as such
attacks would sustain the Turkish thesis that the two commu-
nities cannot live in peace.
At the North Atlantic Council meeting on the Cyprus is-
sue on 19 Ipne, no agreement was reached as Turkey insist-
ed on a tripartite conference, at which the British plan would
be considered along with other suggested solutions, while
Greece would agree only to bilateral negotiations with Lon-
don. The Greek representative declared the British propos-
als unacceptable, claiming they were aimed at eventual
partition of Cyprus. Secretary General Spaak's suggestion
that bilateral negotiations, possibly under his good offices,
might lead to a tripartite conference was neither accepted nor
rejected by the Greek and Turkish representatives.
London will probably insist that any negotiations focus
on its new proposals but is apparently willing to discuss
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modification of both details and timing of implementation.
The British cabinet has decided to implement the plan un-
ilaterally if it is not accepted by Athens and Ankara. The
British apparently hope that violence can be sufficiently
curbed to permit gradual ending of the emergency and that
a constitution could then be drafted in consultation with Ma-
karios.
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Government of East Pakistan Resigns
The resignation on 18 June of the East Pakistan pro-
vincial government makes it more likely that President
Mirza will succeed in replacing Pakistan's national gov-
ernment led by Prime Minister Noon with a coalition
amenable to Mirza's control. The increased political in-
stability could encourage Mirza to carry out his threat
to impose dictatorial rule. Either eventuality is almost
certain to cause postponement of the national elections
scheduled for November.
Former Prime Minister Suhrawardy's Awami League�
which led the provincial coalition, also provides the chief
support for Noon's Republican government at the national
level, and its defeat in East Pakistan will weaken its in-
fluence nationally. This will facilitate Mirza's efforts, in
cooperation with the opposition Moslem League: to unseat
Noon.
The East Pakistan government fell when the leftist
National Awami party, led by pro-Communist Maulana
Bhashani, refused to support the Awami League in a con-
fidence vote. Since the ability of opposition forces to form
a durable coalition is dubious, Mirza may eventually as-
sume direct control of the provincial administration.
Recent indications that the President may be planning
to dispense with parliamentary government altogether and
take over himself
he is summoning all Pakistani army general officers
to a conference within the next week to discuss the possibil-
ity of proclaiming a state of emergency under which the
President would assume all governmental powers. Action
would be taken on 14 August, Pakistan's independence day,
if the army officers concurred in Mirza's plan.
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JapaneSe Cabinet Secretary Proposes Recognition of
Ccommunist China
Munenori Akagi, powerful chief cabinet secretary in
the new Japanese Government, has openly proposed that
Tokyo "pave the road" toward future recognition of Com-
munist China. He also told a press conference on 19 June
that the China problem could be solved only by recognizing
the Nationalist Government in Taipei and the Communist
regime in Peiping as "separate sovereign governments
'Without connection with each other." He said that Foreign
Minister Fujiyama and Minister of International Trade and
Industry Takasaki share these views.
The cabinet secretary's statements, which probably
were made with Prime Minister Kishi's approval, may be
a trial balloon to test domestic and foreign reaction before
Tokyo decides on a specific China policy. They may also
be intended as a conciliatory move to induce the Chinese,
Communists to relax their trade embargo against Japan.'
Akagi stated that the question of sending a special envoy
to Peiping would be considered officially when Commu-
nist China's hostility toward Japan is eliminated.
Although Akagi disclaimed a "two Chinas" solution--
71e probably would consider Nationalist China strictly as
Taiwan�proposals such as his have been consistently re-
jected by Peiping. The Chinese Communists have declared
that they will not accept diplomatic recognition from na-
tions that continue to recognize the Nationalist Government
and have emphasized that they will not compromise on this
issue even if. it impedes their campaign to win broader in-
ter ,national recognition.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Climax Nears in Dispute Over Dissolution of International
Control Body in Laos'
The desire of non-Communist Laotians for the prompt
withdrawal of the International Control Commission (ICC),
now that all steps for the integration of the Communist
Pathet Lao have been completed, is bringing to a head broad
issues involving a conflict of free world and Communist in-
terests in the Indochina area. Under terms of the 1954
armistice reached at the Geneva conference cochaired by
Britain and the USSR, separate control commissions have
been operating in each of the three Indochinese states
pending specified political actions to reconcile the former
local combatants.
Canada, which together with Poland and India constitutes
the ICC, supports the Laotians' position and threatens to
withdraw unilaterally if the other two members continue
to oppose dissolution. Communist opposition apparently
stems from a desire to retain an active hand in Laotian
affairs, as well as from concern that dissolution of the
ICC in Laos 'would set a precedent for dissolution of the
ICC in Cambodia and in Vietnam. India fears that unilateral
Western renunciation of any part of the truce mechanism
will lead the Communists to declare the 1954 armistice
void, leaving North Vietnam to exercise a free hand through-
out Indochina.
A recent threat in Laotian Interior Minister Katars
newspaper of possible mob action against the ICC unless
it soon leaves is indicative of Laos' apparent intention to
force the issue. The problem threatens to precipitate an
international squabble involving such other participants
in the 1954 Geneva ennforpnee, 7s Communist China and
F7e,
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Morocco Noncommittal on French Troop Withdrawal Offer
The Moroccan Government communique of 14 June,
announcing French ggreement to evacuate ten small posts
on the Algerian border in eastern and southern Morocco,
was probably designed to relieve popular pressure for
total French withdrawal until Moroccan Premier Balafrej
returns from the Tunis conference. Rabat, probably with
the intention of holding out for complete evacuation, has
not accepted a conditional French offer to withdraw a
sizable proportion of the French ground forces in Morocco.
Balafrej was noncommittal when French Ambassador
Parodi on 13 June reiterated the proposal, originally made
on 4 April, to withdraw the 30,000 French ground troops
in Morocco if Rabat wbuld. agree to continue operation of
French bases where some 16,000 naval and air personnel
are training. France would also insist on retention of
enough ground troops to service these bases.
Parodi had told Balafrej that France would regroup
its ground forces in eastern and southern Morocco in
larger bases along the Algerian border, possibly in two
to six weeks, but for the time being could not withdraw
these troops completely from the border area. Although
Balafrej reaffirmed earlier oral assurances that the
Moroccan Army would take over effective control to pre-
vent Algerian rebel movements across the border, he did
not offer the written assurances Parodi requested. Ac-
cording to Parodi, Balafrej agreed to arrange for the
lifting of Moroccan restrictions on French Army move-
ments. These restrictions have not, however, been lifted.
The American ambassador considers that France's
refusal to evacuate its troops along the Algerian border is
a defeat for Parodi, who has recommended their removal,
and creates a difficult problem for the Balefrej govern-
ment, which is faced with a strong popular demand for
their-withdrawal from this area.
sifs
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Algerian Rebels Attempting to Step up Guerrilla Operations
the rebels are trying to step up their guer-
rilla and terrorist operations. Their principal objective' is
to convince Algerian Moslems who now might be inclined to
cooperate with the De Gaulle government's "reconciliation"
policy of the FLN's strength and determination to achieve rec-
ognition of Algerian independence "at any price."
.xhorts rebel fighters to "spread
terror and insecurity everywhere" by intensifying terror-
ism in "all its forms," sabotaging roads and "all other means
of communidation," and scattering propaganda tracts aimed
at various recipients--including Algerian Jews who are to be
told that the new French regime presents a danger of fascism
and "radical laws." The fighters are further urged to con-
centrate on the persons and properties of "the big landholders
among the enemy" and told that "the (Moslem) population must
not have any contact with the enemy in any way."
the FLN's
determination to "make the municipal elections fail" and called
for "an intensive propaganda campaign to enlighten the peo-
ple" and for "generalized action" throughout the north central
region of Algeria.
Earlier reports indicated that
FLN leaders were seriously concerned over the possible ef-
fects on the Algerian masses of De Gaulle's promise of po-
litical eaualitv. One of these reports
--said a
major FLN terrorist campaign aimed at provoking counter-
terrorist reprisals by Europeans against the Moslem popula-
tion would begin "sometime after 25 June."
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III. THE WEST
De Gaulle Gives Top Priority to French Atomic Bomb Program
Premier 'de Gaulle is giving top priority to the nuclear
question and has made it clear that France must have its
own bomb, according to a French Foreign Ministry official.
The official indicated that when Secretary of State Dulles
visits De Gaulle in early July, De Gaulle will press for US
cooperation in making atomic weapons. The US Embassy
believes that France primarily seeks technical information.
Many Frenchmen see the manufacture of nuclear devices
as a means of restoring French prestige and re-establishing
France's status as a great power. De Gaulle% statements
have indicated his own strong personal conviction in this re-
gard.
An official in the French Atomic Energy Commission
stated in early June that France was determined to carry
out nuclear tests but said there was no practicable way to
accelerate plutonium production. The embassy believes
lack of plutonium precludes a French test before sometime
in 1959. Previous reports indicated an intention to begin
testing in the fall of 1958. In April, a French AEC official
stated that France was planning a "meaningful" series of
tests, rather than one or two for prestige reasons, and
strongly protested any agreemeritto halt nuclear weapons
testing without an effective ban on production on the grounds
that France had invested too much time, effort, and money
tote denied entry into the "atomic club."
The statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesman this
week that De Gaulle had ordered a unilateral reply to Ithru-
ahchev's', letter of 11 June, stressing an indissoluble link
between cessation of tests and bomb production, is in line
with the unwillingness of France to make any commitment
'which would hamper its atomic program.
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Trend Favors Communist-backed Presidential Candidate
In Chile
The strong leftist trend in Chile since the April out-
burst against US copper tariff policies and the subsequent
cancellation of President Carlos Ibanez state visit to the
United States is helping the presidential candidacy of the
most vocally anti-US candidate, Salvador Allende. Allende,
a left-wing Socialist backed by the illegal Communist par-
ty,- has proposed a revision of the basic Chilean copper
law which would be highly unfavorable to US-owned copper
companies. The trend is aided by the formation of an anti-
conservative parliamentary coalition, which controls both
houses of Congress.
Allende reportedly has promised favors to members
of an influential clique of Ibanez' confidential advisers
headed by the editor of the government newzpaper in re-
turn for the President's support.
Allende's chief rival in the 4 September presidential
election will be the conservative-backed candidate, Jorge
Alessandri, whose popular father was president of Chile
both before and after the Ibanez dictatorship of the late
twenties. While Ibanez is anti-Communist, the Commu-
nist party has been able to play on his hatred of the
Alessandri family by planting rumors with persons close
to the President of Alessandri's provocation of strikes and
conversations with generals.
Although he is identified with the left, Allende is a
member of the Chilean aristocracy, and his recent refer-
ences to the usefulness of US developmental capital sug-
gest that he might end his cooperation with the Communists
if elected.
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Now,
LATE ITEM
Soviet Central Committee Meeting
The communique issued by the Soviet Communist party
central committee after its meeting of 17-18 June represents,
on the surface at least, another gain for Ithrushchev. He has
added two of his proteges as candidate members of the presid-
ium and has had the committee adopt a decree which carries
further hi S agricultural policies by abolishing compulsory de-
liveries of produce to the state by collective farms.
Although there is no hard evidence of what other subjects
were discussed, it is unlikely that the committee, and especi-
ally its members serving in foreign capitals, would have been
called suddenly into session for the second time in six weeks
only to approve these personnel and agricultural changes.
There remains, therefore, an impression of continuing politi-
cal tension.
However, any discussion of foreign policy issues deal-
ing with the summit, or the Middle East, or problems of bloc
unity--including the execution of Nagy--would probably not
be announced. On the other hand, a plenum decision on the
new Seven-Year Plan might have been expected since the draft
plan was scheduled to be ready by 1 July.
The addition of two new candidate members. N. V. Pod-
gorny and D. S. Polyansky, to the party presidium�the only
personnel changes announced--brings the total membership
to 15 full and 10 candidate members. After serving since 1953
as party secretary in several regional posts, Polyansky was
named chairman of the Russian Republic Council of Ministers
in March 1958, when Khrushchev became USSR premier. Pod-
gorny has been first secretary of the Ukrainian party central
committee since last December. Both men were elected full
members of the party central committee for the first time at the
20th party congress in 1956, both have had extensive experience
CONFIDENTIAL
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CUM lilt./V 1 1AL
in key agricultural areas, and both have come into prominence
since KhruShchev became party first secretary in 1953.
Under the compulsory delivery system, the state had ob-
tained cheaply large quantities of agricultural goods from the
collective farms; the remainder was sold by the farms at con-
siderably higher prices to state agencies and on the free mar-
ket and delivered to the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS's) as
payments for work performed. Revision of this cumbersome
system, which has hampered planning and profit calculations,
is a logical sequel to dissolution of the MTS's, decreed in April.
If the new system results in an increase in revenues for the
collective farms, a large portion will still be absorbed by pur-
chases of machinery from the former MTS's.
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