CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/06/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03194464
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: June 3, 1955

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3 June 1955
Copy No. 94
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: /
AUTFI: HR 70-2
DATE: 94/840 _REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. USSR may participate in Geneva air show (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. South Korean official denies Seoul intends to withdraw mission from
Japan (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. French fear Indian initiative in arranging all-Vietnam election (page 4).
4. Burma and USSR near agreement on rice (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
5. Comment on Afghan economic mission to Moscow (page 5).
NEAR EAST AFRICA
6. UN observers expect Israeli attempt to seize Gaza strip (page 6).
7. Mass violence in Casablanca feared (page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Soviet ground forces in Germany receiving large number of new
medium tanks (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
9. French reportedly view July as "premature" for Big Four conference
(page 8).
10. Comment on Soviet-Yugoslav communique (page 9).
* * * *
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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SOVIET UNION
1.. USSR may participate in Geneva air show:
The secretary of the Soviet legation in
Bern on 1 June told Swiss sponsors of
the air show scheduled for 24 June - 17
July in Geneva that the USSR was seri-
ously considering participation. The Soviet embassy earlier in-
dicated that the USSR wished to participate on the same scale as
the United States.
Soviet officials in Bern had informally
indicated that the USSR was considering sending three MIG jet
fighters and other types. The secretary of the Soviet legation
asked for detailed information on the Geneva airport for the pos-
sible accommodation of Soviet jet bombers and stated that if the
bombers could not land they might overfly the field.
Comment: Soviet participation in the
Geneva air show might be designed to raise questions in Western
Europe as to American air supremacy.
Since the runway at Geneva could handle
Soviet jet light, medium, and probably heavy bombers, a Soviet
decision not to land there would probably stem from a reluctance
to make these types available for close inspection.
FAR EAST
2. South Korean official denies Seoul intends to withdraw mission from
Japan:
Counselor Yu of the South Korean diplo-
matic mission in Japan told American
officials in Tokyo on 1 June that, contrary
to rumors, his government was not con-
rawmg 1 s diplomatic mission from Tokyo in the
near future.
3 June 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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He said the United States would be consulted in advance if such a
move were seriously considered.
Yu, who has been co-operative with Ameri-
can officials in Japan, is close to Rhee and probably would be aware
of any plans for closing the mission in Tokyo.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. French fear Indian initiative in arranging all-Vietnam election:
The French Foreign Ministry believes that
India is preparing a plan under which the
International Control Commission would
act as intermediary between the Vietnamese
Minh in connection with arrangements for
the elections specified by the Geneva agreement.
The French think that any unilateral action
of this nature by the Indians, or by the ICC as a whole, would be
strongly opposed by the Vietnamese government. They fear that if
the Ho and Diem regimes are not brought together on 20 July on
Western initiative, the Viet Minh will take the initiative and claim
that a violation of the Geneva agreement has occurred.
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The Vietnamese government has not yet
formulated its position, but the foreign minister believes that sup-
port for the principle of completely free elections should be de-
clared promptly. He has said the Vietnamese could not enter. direct
discussions with the Viet Minh and suggested that some body such
as the UN act as a go-between. Another Vietnamese official has
stated the government could not engage in talks with the Viet Minh
until a national assembly had been elected.
4. Burma and USSR near agreement on rice:
Comment:
A purchase by Moscow of 200,000 tons of
rice would raise the Sino-Soviet bloc's share of Burma's rice ex-
ports in 1955 to over 600,000 tons--more than 50 percent of total
export sales to date. While Burma still will have about 1,000,000
tons of rice to dispose of, sales of this magnitude will encourage
the Burmese to continue their conciliatory attitude toward Com-
munist countries.
SOUTH ASIA
5. Comment on Afghan economic mission to Moscow:
An Afghan delegation arrived in Moscow
on 28 May to discuss a freight transit
agreement with the USSR to offset Paki-
stani economic pressure.
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The Afghan approach to the USSR ap-
parently represents a vigorous reaction on the part of Prime Min-
inster Daud to a threatened blockade of Afghanistan's regular trade
routes through Pakistan. It is probably designed primarily to in-
duce Pakistan to modify its position in the dispute between the two
countries and to put pressure on the West to withhold support from
Pakistan.
The switching of Afghanistan's normal ex-
port-import traffic from the established transportation pattern
through Paldstan to one through the Soviet Union would be uneco-
nomic. If the Soviet Union deemed it sufficiently advantageous
politically, however, it could devise a channel of trade. Compler
tion of a favorable agreement would give the Afghans a better bar-
gaining position in negotiations with Pakistan.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. UN observers expect Israeli attempts to seize Gaza strip:
United Nations military observers in
Israel are convinced that Israeli forces
will in the immediate future attempt to
drive Egyptian troops and Arab refugees
out of the Gaza strip, according to Colo-
nel Ely, a deputy to UN truce supervisor Burns. These observers
believe the Israeli army could take the Gaza strip in a matter of
hours.
Comment: Israeli seizure of the Gaza
strip would likely lead to full-scale hostilities with the Arab states.
Tel Aviv appears to be at the point of decision on its future policy
toward Arab border infiltrations. Faced with national elections in
late July, the governing Mapai party may decide on a tougher policy
in order not to lose votes to "activists" of other parties. It is not
yet clear, however, whether the Israeli leaders are ready for war.
Egyptian prime minister Nasr told General
Burns on 1 June that he could not keep Egyptian troops from firing
first on Israeli patrols approaching their positions, and added that
"If the Israelis want war, I suppose it will have to come."
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7. Mass violence in Casablanca feared:
European residents of Casablanca are in
danger of massacre, in the opinion of
Philippe Boniface, a retired French of-
ficial residing there. A former French
cttrectOfI security in Morocco confirmed to the American consul
general in Rabat that there is danger of an outbreak of mass violencc,
even though there are heavy concentrations of French troops and
police in the city.
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Soviet ground forces in Gerxnany receiving large number of new
medium tanks:
It is estimated that nearly 1,000 new-model
medium tanks (T-54's) have been shipped
to East Germany from the USSR during the
past five months. This represents about
one fourth of the present authorized medium tank strength of Soviet
ground forces in Germany. At the current rate of delivery, Soviet
forces in East Germany would be completely re-equipped with the
new tanks by mid-1956.
When delivery of new tanks to East Germany
began in significant quantities early in 1955, priority was apparently
given to Soviet tank divisions. There are indications that some of the
mechanized divisions may now also be receiving these tanks.
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The older T-34 medium tanks are ap-
parently not yet being withdrawn from Germany, and some may
have been transferred to Soviet rifle divisions. Retention of the
T-34's in service in Germany would increase the total authorized
tank strength of Soviet units there.
WESTERN EUROPE
9. French reportedly view July as "premature" for Big Four conference:
Comment: Now that four-power talks for which
Paris and London pressed so strenuously have been agreed upon, the
French and British want to be sure that they are not begun without care-
ful preparation, so that no chance for a detente will be missed.
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10. Comment on Soviet-Yugoslav communiqu
The Soviet-Yugoslav communique of
2 June stresses for the most part issues
on which Moscow and Belgrade were
already in general agreement, glossing
over such questions as the re-establishment of closer party ,
on which the USSR presumably hoped to gain concessions from Tito.
The most noteworthy aspect of the part of the declaration
referring directly to relations between the two countries appears to
be its vagueness. Such statements as those rarring to an "exchange
of socialist experience" and "mutual cooperation" in the peaceful uses
of atomic energy could conceivably be a cover for far more significant
agreements, the details of which remain to be worked out It is far
more likely, however, that any noteworthy meeting of the minds on
specific issues, such as settlement of Yugoslavia's economic claims,
would have been publicized in detail as signs of visible success of the
negotiations in Belgrade.
Soviet agreement to include a statement that "questions of
different forms of socialist development ar:- solely the concern of
individual countries" is an important concession to Yugoslavia.
The communique fails to show Yugoslav support for the Soviet
position on controversial international issues, except that it endorses
Communist China's right to membership in the United Nations and
the satisfaction by peaceful means of its "legitimate rights" to
Formosa. Both of these Belgrade has supported in the past. On
other international issues, such as disarmament, German unification,
and European security, the declaration is so vague as to be almost
meaningless. It can, nevertheless, be exploited to enhance Moscow's
efforts to present the USSR as a champion of peace and relaxation of
international tensions.
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