CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/06/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03194458
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: June 14, 1958

Noe
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
-TOP-SECRET-
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
14 June 1958
Copy No.
Ct \TRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
NO CHANGE IN
DOCUMENT NO.
.! DECLASSIFIED
CLASS, CHANGED TO: Tieloo
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
HR 2
DAT REVIEWER:
-TOVS-Eat-E-T-
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
. Nge, 414, 111 It Ms II
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
16,,LoLdita..?
14 JUNE 1958
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's letter of 11 June pres,
ages demand for early agreement
on foreign ministers' meeting and
hints at some flexibility on summit
agenda topics.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - Military action continues
apace after arrival of UN observers.
Some army officers considering coup
to put Shihab into presidency.
Communal clashes continue on Cyprus.
Demonstrations against foreigners pos-
sible in both Greece and Turkey where
governments are under heavy pressure,
0 Japan - Prime Minister Kishi tries to
limit opportunities for factional disputes
in new cabinet.
� Moroccan and Tunisian leaders to meet
on 16 June; Algerian rebel leaders in
Cairo state they will join discussions.
IIL THE WEST
De Gaulle under increasing rightist
pressure in France to form a "gov-
ernment of public safety." Conces-
sions to right would encourage Com-
munist efforts to claim leadership
of anti-Gaullists.
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
\\\\
''�\\\ \\"\\N \\\\\ \\\�\\.\\ \\\\\\Ns\\\\\\� "\\\X\ \\.\\ \\.\\\ \\\\��\\�\�., \XX\N� \X\
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
aLgt-INZel
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 June 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet summit tactics! Premier Khrushchev's letter of
11 June appears designed to set the stage for a Soviet demand
that an early date be agreed on for a foreign ministers' meet-
ing. The letter, which will probably soon be published, con-
tains the thus far secret 5 May Soviet agenda proposals. It
suggests that the USSR might not insist on including all its
proposals on a summit agenda and probably would be will-
ing to include all Western-propose pt Eastern
Europe and German reunification. (Page 1)
Soviet military activity!
Soviet Long Range Air Force activities associated
with Kutaisi annear to have ceased s of 31 Mav
II. ASIA-AFRICA
*Lebanon! The arrival of UN observers has not yet caused
any slowdown in military action. The rebel force threatening
the Beirut-Damascus highway has been driven back, while
fighting has continued around the rebel stronghold in Tripoli.
Some army officers are advocating that General Shihab take
over as president and are considering a coup d'etat as a means
to this end. (Page 2) (Map)
\\\\\\\\\X\\\\\X\\\
44:
:44
\ww
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
' Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458\
Cyprus-Greece-Turkey: Greek and Turkish Cypriots
continue to clash despite British efforts to control the situa-
tion. In Greece, whgre the stability of the government It-
sell may be threatened, popular anger and resentment
against the Turks, British, and Americans raise the dan-
ger of outbursts despite government restrictions. In Tur-
key, popular emotions are being whipped up by continuing
mass demonstrations, which the government is encourag-
ing. At the same time, a cabinet crisis appears to be de-
veloping with Prime Minister Menderes under heavy pres-
totake a firm position on the Cyprus issue.
(Page 4)
Japan: Prime Minister Kishi has placed his _closest
supporters in the major posts of his new cabinet to consoli-
date his personal leadership. While he has included in-
fluential factional leaders in the cabinet and in party posts,
they will be in a poor position to hamper his policies.
(Page 6)
Morocco-Tunisia: Premier Balafrej and Deputy Pre-
mier Bouabid will go to Tunis on 16 June, ostensibly to
ratify the treaty of friendship and solidarity negotiated
last March. This will be the first meeting between Moroc-
can and Tunisian leaders since the advent of De Gaulle,
and their discussions probably will be dominated by the
Algerian problem. Algerian rebel leaders in Cairo state
they will join the talks in Tunis.
(Page 7)
III. THE WEST
France': Although the pressures on De Gaulle for the
formation of a "true government of public safety" remain
centered in Algeria, extreme rightist pressures in France
are mounting. Pierre Poujade, leader of the antitax movement,
14 June 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
A\-=Z\e: 2019/08/20 \-\\a\\\941\\\\\-\\x\\\\x\\sxxx
ilaAL416�11.44 A
has thrown in his lot with the French Committees of Public
Safety, and retired air force General Chassin has announced
the formation of his "Popular Movement of 13 May." These
two leaders are demagogues rather than skilled organizers
like Leon Delbecque. Any concessions by De Gaulle to
rightist pressure will probably encourage the Communists
In their efforts to make the party the rallying point for op-
position to De Gaulle. (Page 8)
14 June 58
DAILY BRIEF iii
SECRET
4,:44
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's Letter on a Summit Conference
Premier Khrushchev's letter of 11 June to the lead-
ers of the three Westernpowers follows recently renewed
Soviet propaganda charges that the West is using the am-
bassadors' talks to delay a summit conference. It is prob-
ably intended to prepare the ground for a Soviet demand for
an early foreign ministers' meeting. By including in the
letter the detailed Soviet agenda proposals of 5 May and a
strong denunciation of key Western counterproposals on
Germany and Eastern Europe, the USSR is seeking to
document its charges that the West is to blame for the lack
of progress toward the summit and also to bring pressure
on the West for concessions on an agenda.
Moscow has recently intensified its propaganda charges
of Western obstructionism and has publicized East Ger-
man claims that Secretary Dulles had issued detailed in-
structions on methods for blocking a conference, particular-
ly the insistence on discussing Eastern Europe and German
unification.
The letter states that the USSR does not insist on dis-
cussing all Soviet-proposed topics and indicates a probable
willingness to discuss all Western topics except Eastern
Europe and German unification, including methods of
strengthening the United Nations- a subject rarely men-
tio ed in previous Soviet notes.
SECRET
14 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Baniyas
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
-30-inch pipeline
Tripoli
Beiru
Bayt ad Din�
Sidon �
Rashayaf'
1'.
Nabi Uthman �
alabalq,er."
0 N
s..of..sr..s.� � *
SRAEL
31- nch pipeline
TO JORDAN &
\SAUDI ARABIA
12-inch pipeline
"-.16-inch pipeline
-- Selected Roads
20 40 60
0514 80607 2
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
I Ji iJL4, z tL-t 1
NM,
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanese Situation
After heavy fighting, Lebanese security forces on 13
June pushed back jumblatt% Druze.rebel forces MoVing,toviard
the Beirut-Dmascus road. Pro-Chamoun partisans com-
manded by Mughabghab have re-entered the fight, and
heavy losses are reported to have been inflicted on Sum-
blatt's men. A new rebel thrust is expected from near
the Syrian border along the Beirut-Damascus road. Heavy
fighting is continuing in Tripoli.
A number of senior Lebanese Army officers and rela-
tives of army commander General Shihab are considering a
coup d'etat which would bring the general to power as chief
of state. Realizing that Chamoun would spurn any ultimatum
to resign, the group envisages his arrest. Abd al-Aziz
Shihab, recently resigned secretary general of interior and
a party to the coup, has stated that Chamoun's arrest could
be easily arranged, since the group controls the presidential
guards.
As for General Shihab, he now admits that he has the
"presidential bug." While he is not inclined to run for the
presidency constitutionally or to attempt a coup himself,
he would not try to prevent one on his behalf. Meanwhile,
he has been negotiating with certain tribes in the al Harmal
region, apparently in an attempt to wean the tribesmen away
from their alliance with pro-Chamoun partisans.
Opposition quarters are said to be in "deep gloom" over
the establishment of the UN watchdog group. Extremist lead-
er Saib Salam has declared that he "considers the Security
Council resolution irrelevant to our problem" and apparent-
ly intends not to cooperate with the observers. All Cairo
newspapers on 13 June carried a statement that "Lebanese
nationalists have mobilized all their forces to achieve a de-
cisive victory following the Security Council resolution."
The government's tightening financial situation has led
Lebanese officials to approach the Iraq Petroleum Company
TOP SECRET
14 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
WI -LLIUI
New,
and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company for loans totaling
$8,430,000. The companies will apparently refuse outright
loans, but may devise a scheme to provide some aid in the
form of accelerated transit fee payments. Before the Suez
war, Lebanon received yearly transit fees amounting to
about $3,900,000 from IPC and about $1,200,000 from Tapline.
Lebanon apparently is also ready to seek aid from the US.
Continuation of the crisis might undermine the stability of
the Lebanese pound to such an extent that some form of
stabilization fund would also be requested.
TOP SECRET
14 June 58
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
rifts"
Cyprus, Greek, Turkish Situation
A mounting wave of communal violence on Cyprus is
frustrating British attempts to restore order, and there
are severe repercussions in Athens and Ankara.
On 13 June, following receipt of the new British pro-
posals, Greek Premier Karamanlis submitted his resigna-
tion to King Paul, stating that his pro-Western policies had
failed. The King refused to accept the resignation but fears
that he cannot convince Karamanlis to carry on. As there
is no other outstanding leader in the governing National Radi-
cal Union, Karamanlis' withdrawal would throw the Greek
political scene into chaos and probably would lead eventual-
ly to a government by a leftist-oriented popular front or by
a rightist dictatorship.
Opposition leaders and the press, criticizing Karamanlis'
"soft" policy, have demanded that Greece lodge an appeal
with the UN Security Council since the government's action
in taking the issue to the North Atlantic Council was "useless."
Turkey is denounced for initiating the riots on Cyprus, Britain
for partiality toward the Turks, and the US for failing to sup-
port the Greek demand for self-determination. The govern-
ment has issued instructions against demonstrations, which
will be difficult or impossible to present if the present pace
of violence continues on Cyprus.
A small ray of hope lies in Archbishop Makarios' apparent
willingness to examine in detail the new British plan for Cyprus.
Greek Cypriot leaders on Cyprus appear inclined to accept the
plan with modifications. Their acceptance would remove con-
siderable pressure from the Karamanlis government.
In Turkey, the situation is becoming more explosive as
emotions are fanned by government-sponsored mass demon-
strations throughout the country. Tank-su, ported troops
with fixed bayonets are preventing violence uuring and follow-
ing the demonstrations, but isolated incidents are a constant
SECRET
14 Tune 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
taJ .1.4�...e.111. Le 1
danger. Ankara, with full knowledge of the British pro-
posals, has shown no tendency toward easing its demand
for the partition of Cyprus.
Prime Minister Menderes is reported to be under heavy
pressure, regarding the critical economic situation as well
as Cyprus. A caucus of the incumbent Democratic party, in
session since 10 June, is said to be voicing severe criticism
of Menderes and Foreign Minister Zorlu, with 'a majority of
the-deputies requesting Menderes to step down.
Earlier speculation that three cabinet members includ-
ing Minister of Agriculture Okmen would be dropped sug-
gested that Menderes was about to purge his cabinet of all
dissident elements, but he apparently overplayed his hand
and aroused an intraparty revolt of major proportions. Okmen,
who is a capable financial specialist and considered friendly
to the United States, is regarded as a contender for the pre-
miership. He was brought back into the cabinet following
last October's elections, probably as a concession by Men-
deres to the dissident element in the Democratic party.
While criticism of the Menderes regime has reached an
all-time high, the prime minister may again be able to out-
maneuver his opposition. In a desperate effort to salvage
his regime he may try to exploit inflamed emotions over
Cyprus to divert popular attention from domestic political
and economic problems.
6/I
SECRET
14 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Lt./1Ni I Ll Can
Nage
Nee
New Japanese Cabinet
The speed and decisiveness with which Prime Minister
Kishi formed his new cabinet suggests that his ability to
control the competing factions in his ruling party has in-
creased as a result of the mandate he received in the 22
May election. While the cabinet is representative of all
major party factions, Kishi's close supporters are in
firm control of the major posts, including foreign affairs,
finance, justice, and agriculture and forestry.
Kishi, by appointing a political leader, his brother
Eisaku Sato, as minister of finance broke a precedent
of having financiers or bankers in this post. This should
assure the cooperation arid support, which was previously
lacking, of a vital ministry in the formulation and execu-
tion of policies for Ia.panese participation in the economic
development of foreign areas such as Southeast Asia.
While the press has, as usual, expressed distrust of
the new cabinet, business interests have welcomed it as
likely to be one of the most stable in recent years. Kishi's
assertion of his leadership appears to be a significant
step toward reducing factional and political rivalries in
the government.
II a
14 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
NI' 1 L., LI 1
"%pi NNW
Moroccan and Tunisian Governments to Confer in Tunis
Moroccan Premier Balafrej and Deputy Premier Bouabid
are scheduled to go to Tunis on 16 June at the invitation of
President Bourguiba. Ostensibly they are to ratify the Treaty
of Brotherhood and Reciprocity negotiated in Rabat in March
1957, but more probably their purpose is to confer on mutual
problems arising from the continued Algerian war and the
change in the French Government. An announcement from
Cairo that a delegation of the Algerian National Liberation
Front (FLN) would also be in Tunis raises the possibility
that the FLN may take advantage of this meeting to consult
both governments regarding the formation of an Algerian
government as provided by the Tangier conference of North
African parties. Probably, however, neither Morocco nor
Tunisia is yet willing to risk the inevitable repercussions
in relations with France which would be caused by sanc-
tioning an Algerian government at this time.
The Tunisian Government fears French efforts to play
the Moroccans and Tunisians off against each other and prob-
ably will continue to press Morocco for a united front vis-a-vis
France. The Moroccan Government, which has lagged behind
Tunisia in backing Algerian independence, now appears con-
vinced of the need for policy coordination and in the future
seems likely to follow the general lines of Bourguiba's policy
toward France and Algeria.
14 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458
Lit, It La I
I I I. THE WEST
Rightist Pressures on De Gaulle Mounting in France
While the main impetus for the formation of a "true
government of public safety"--the elimination of the pres-
ent system of parties and politicians--is still centered in
Algeria, similar rightist pressures for changes are mount-
ing in France.
Poujade, rightist leader of the small shopkeepers, has
decided to throw in his lot with the French Committees of
Public Safety, and retired air force General Chassin has an-
nounced the formation of the "Popular Movement of 13 May."
These developments may result in more demagoguery than
effective organization. The personal political standing and
organizational strength of Poujade have declined sharply
since 1956. Chassin is characterized as a very energetic,
impulsive individual; a Ministry of Interior official stated
In late May that his following was mainly composed of
scattered small groups.
There is growing evidence of liaison between rightists
in France and in Algeria. Pierre Laguillarde, member of
the Algeria committee, stood by Chassin at the latter's
press conference. Poujade stated that his committee would
work in liaison With the Algiers committee. Leon Delbecque,
one of the leaders of the Algerian revolt, recently said the
13 May action in Algeria was only the first phase of the revolu-
tion aiming at the formation of a nationwide committee of
public safety in France.
Rightist efforts to mount a coordinated campaign in France
for De Gaulle "to complete the revolution" may well facilitate
the Communists' attempts to organize a broad anti-Gaullist
front, particularly if De Gaulle should appear to be bending
uxder rightist pressures.
SECRET
14 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194458