CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/05/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03192929
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: May 28, 1958

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28 May 1958
Copy No. 140
CENTRAL
INTE.LLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR taking cautious line on De Gaulle,
hoping his accession might serve some
Soviet interests or lead eventually to
a popular-front government.
Nonaggression pact offered NATO by
Warsaw Pact members in further re-
minder of Soviet summit agenda pro-
posal.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - Chamoun's opponents likely
to settle for nothing short of his resig-
nation. Government forces continue
reluctant to take strong action.
Indonesian Communist party at peak
of strength.
(13 Ceylon - Government's declaration of
emergency should bring communal
strife under control for the time being.
(..) Tunisia counters French offer to re-
group forces with demand for total
evacuation except from Bizerte.
II L THE WEST
France - Advance paratroop elements
probably have prepared drop zones in
France in anticipation of air-borne in-
vasion by French troops from Algiers.
Leftist demonstrations scheduled for
today may bring violence.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 May 1958
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DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR-France: The Soviet Union has been taking a cau-
tious attitude toward De Gaulle against the possibility that
he may assume power. Moscow appears anxious to avoid
actions which might prejudice its chances of taking advan-
tage of those nationalistic De Gaulle policies which Moscow
believes would serve Soviet interests. The Soviet leaders
probably hope De Gaulle's assumption of power would fa-
cilitate French Communist efforts to establish unity of ac-
tion with the Socialists and eventually lead to a popular-
front government. Page 1)
Soviet summit tactics: The draft nonaggression treaty
offered by the Warsaw Pact nations to the NATO powers is
intended to give added impact to a proposal which the USSR
has been consistently proposing for consideration at the
summit. The text is basically similar to a pact proposed
by the USSR at the Geneva summit conference in July 1955.
The proposed signatories on behalf of the Warsaw Pact are
the same countries that the bloc has urged be included at
a summit meeting: the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Rumania.
Soviet military activity:
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: Prime Minister Sulh's public assertion on
9/r 27 May that the government would not seek to change the
constitution to permit President Chamoun to run for a
second term is unlikely to promote a settlement of the
political crisis. Sulh's statement falls short of demands
of the extreme opposition, who seek Chamoun's imme-
diate resignation, and it may not satisfy even the mod-
erate opposition. Meanwhile, the antigovernment forces
continue to receive direct assistance from the UAR, while
Lebanese military authorities continue reluctant to take
strong action against the opposition.
(Page 4)
Indonesia: The Indonesian Communist party, with an
estimated membership of as many as 750,000 and the sup-
port of one fifth of the electorate, has attained more in-
fluence than ever before. Any effective anti-Communist
action in the foreseeable future would depend on army ac-
tion and on President Sukarno's support of such an under-
taking. The party's current strategy, however, appears to
be to avoid giving any provocation which might precipitate
army action, and to work toward improving its electoral
following for the 1959 general elections. Page 6)
Ceylon: As a result of widespread disorders, the
Bandaranaike government declared a state of emergency
on 27 May, accompanied by a ban on Singhalese and Tamil
extremist groups responsible for the disturbances. The
government's action probably will be supported by most of
the public and should bring the communal conflict under
control for the time being. Coming at a time when pro-
longed strikes are severely straining the economy, how-
ever, this development will lead to stronger political
pressures against the government.
(Page 8)
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Tunisia: The Bourguiba government has rejected an
offer of the French Government to remove immediately
from Tunisia some 2,000 troops, located largely in the
south, and has demanded instead a timetable for the evac-
uation of all French forces outside Bizerte, numbering
some 9,000. Tunisia has also offered to begin negotia-
tions on the status of the Bizerte base, but only if a time-
table for withdrawal is agreed on.
(Page 9)
III. THE WEST
*France: Pflimlinis offer to resign in spite of the vote
of confidence given him by the National Assembly further
weakens the forces opposed to the return of De Gaulle to
power. President Coty may turn to De Gaulle in an effort
to avoid widespread disorders and a possible move against
Paris by the Algerian junta. Drop zones are reported to
have been prepared in France by advance paratroop ele-
ments and an invasion by air-borne troops may take place
on 28 or 29 May, depending on the weather. Reports of
new public restlessness over the crisis may increase the
prospect of violence during leftist demonstrations sched-
uled for today. (Page 10)
28 May 58 DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR Taking Cautious Attitude Toward De Gaulle
The USSR has been taking a cautious public line to-
ward General de Gaulle in order to gain the best possible
relations with him and to take advantage of those of his
policies that Moscow feels would serve its interests. Am-
bassador Thompson believes that Moscow is uncertain
whether De Gaulle would seek to establish a dictatorship
and suppress the Communists and consequently is playing
the situation by ear. While Moscow presumably hopes
that the situation will eventually lead to a popular-front
government, its immediate concern is merely to encourage
Communist-Socialist cooperation.
There have been signs that the USSR expects that De
Gaulle would damage NATO unity and seek closer relations
with Moscow, but it probably is also concerned about the
possibility that De Gaulle might be able to adjust the Al-
gerian situation in such a way as to undercut the National
Liberation Front and thereby reduce the chances for Com-
munist influence in North Africa.
Soviet propaganda, while critical of De Gaulle, has
centered its fire on the military leaders in Algeria and
other right-wing groups, and specific criticisms of De
Gaulle have been attributed to the French Communists or
have been made only by Soviet correspondents in Paris.
The French Communist propaganda attack on De Gaulle
has inte sified, however, and now includes the claim
that ,M USSR opposes him.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Kirovograd
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28 MAY 1958
RECENT MOVEMENTS BY
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28 May 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Soviet Military Activity in Black Sea Area
Air-borne Forces Transports from Yedtovg, Kirovo-
grad, and Krivoy Rog, located in the northwestern and
southern European USSR,t were noted flying into Nikolayev
in possibly logistic operations. By 25 May as many as 20
Yedrovo-based transports were at Nikolayev.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanese Situation
Prime Minister Sami Sulh in a broadcast to the Leba-
nese people on 27 May declared that his cabinet "will not
present any bill to Parliament for an amendment of the con-
stitution. The statement, planned for delivery to Parlia-
ment but broadcast because of the lack of a quorum, has
already been rejected by extremist opposition leader Saib
Salam, who still demands Chamoun's resignation. It is
even doubtful that it will be acceptable to leaders of the
"Third Force," which has been attempting to bring about
a compromise solution to the political impasse. Sulh's
statement, which included a long indictment of UAR sub-
versive activities and intervention in Lebanon during the
past two years, noted that when such Egyptian interference
began, a second term for Chamoun was not an issue. Thus,
he declared, opposition efforts to blame Lebanon's present
troubles on Chamoun's second-term aspirations are with-
out fouridatioL,
�711P�se_curitv_situati eaionan ed.
some securi-
ty forces operating in the north are isoiatea oy tne destruction
of numerous bridges and are being supplied by airdrops. Anti-
government forces continue to receive arms and ammunition
as well as personnel reinforcements from the UAR.
30 busloads of armed men were sent over from
Syria on 26 May via the Damascus-Beirut highway.
Lebanese military authorities, especially General Shihab,
appear reluctant to take strong action against either opposition
leaders or insurgents fighting the security forces. The much-
heralded "Balabakk campaign" against the rebels has amounted
to little more than occupation of the streets, with rebels holding
the remainder of the town.
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The explosion of a bomb in a loaded streetcar on 26
May and Saib Salam's outright rejection of Sulh's statement
may work to the disadvantage of the extremists and incline
the moderate opposition more toward the Chamoun camp.
Shihab might as a result take more effective action against
terrorists and insurgents in the countryside. Cairo radio
states, however, that Salam has "warned" that "the people's
forces in Lebanon" will "appeal to the Arab states" for volun-
teers if the Lebanese Government utilizes citizen auxiliary
security forces.
The long-term effects of the current disorders are be-
coming obvious to the entire Lebanese public. Commerce
is at a complete standstill, considerable amounts of capital
have taken flight, and Lebanon's previous position as the
"Switzerland" of the Middle East has been seriously impaired.
It is doubtful that Lebanon will regain its status as a haven
for foreign investment. The economic loss during the past
three jweeks equals the value of the country's important ap-
ple op--$7,000,000.
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The Indonesian Communist Party
The Indonesian Communist party (PM) is the largest
political party in Java and the second largest in the coun-
try. Of Indonesia's numerous parties, the PM is the best
disciplined and hardest working, arid its leadership is able
and dedicated. It is in a position to influence government
policy through four cabinet members who are at least fel-
low travelers, and through 18 Communists and sympathiz-
ers among the 45 members of the National Council estab-
lished as part of President Sukarno's "guided democracy"
concept. The Communists also wield great economic power
through SOBSI, Indonesia's largest labor federation, whose
claimed membership is 2,000,000 and whose affiliates con-
trol vital oil, plantation, and transportation workers' un-
ions. These unions form the nucleus of PM strength out-
side Java. The PM has been steadily developing grass-roots
support through a variety of front organizations.
The Communists have exploited the central govern-
ment's preoccupation with the dissidents in the past three
months to increase their influence in the management of
Dutch firms seized during the anti-Dutch campaign late last
year. Their position has also been strengthened by the
strong support they have given to Sukarno's "guided demo-
cracy" concept and, more recently, to the central govern-
ment's campaign to suppress the dissidents. In addition,
the Communists stand to benefit from the propaganda and
material support the bloc has been extending to Indonesia.
In view of the ineffectiveness of Indonesia's non-Com-
munist political parties, any effective anti-Communist action
in the foreseeable future would have to be taken by the army,
and its success would depend on Sukarno's support. Army
spokesmen have indicated that in the absence of provoca-
tion, there would be no outright suppression of the Commu-
nists; however, the army has recently taken a few steps to
curb Communist activity and Chief of Staff Nasution has
claimed he will "take care" of the Communists after the
dissidents are eliminated, provided he is given American
arms. Sukarno has also indicated a desire for closer rela-
tions with the US, but it remains to be seen whether he will
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be willing to sanction effective army action against the Com-
munists, who have been his strongest supporters.
In the meantime, the PKr s strategy is to maintain its
momentum, without resort to violence, in the hope of win-
ning the national elections in 1959. The Communists' con-
fidence in their ability to come to power through parliamen-
tary means is underscored by Secretary General Aidit's
recent $tatement in opposition to the dissolution of polit-
ical pirties, a cardinal point in Sukarno's program for
/ r ,dtalizing Indonesia.
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State of Emergency Declared in Ceylon
The Ceylonese Government's proclamation of a state
of emergency and the ban it imposed on 27 May on two ex-
tfemist Tamil and Singhalese communal organizations in
Ceylon probably will bring under control the riots initiated
on 22 May.
The principal issue involved in the disorders is the
demand of the Federal party�the main political organiza-
tion representing the island's 2,000,000 Tamil-speaking mi-
nority�that Tamil be given equal status with the official
Singhalese language and that Tamil-speaking people of In-
dian oi.folo. '.)e given wider political and administrative
rights.
The agitation apparently was initiated by a militant
Singhalese group in an effort to exploit the annual conven-
tion of the Federal party held from 23 to 26 May. The riots
and demonstrations which it sparked have resulted in about
20 deaths and the intervention of the armed forces. The ex-
tremist elements probably do not command the support of
the Singhalese-speaking majority.
The Federal party's reported decision to postpone un-
til sometime before 20 August a civil disobedience campaign
which it had previously announced for 23 May suggests the
Tamil leaders recognize their loss of some popular support.
Furthermore, they have already been assured of parliamentary
consideration of their demands despite the abrogation on Q
of an agreement reached last year which made some conces-
sions 1:0 the Tails, Any Tamil attempts to create trouble
while serious strikes and labor violence in Colombo continue
would only antagonize the government and lessen the possi-
bility of securing favorable legislation.
In view of the government's firm action,
against the Singhalese extremists, further widespread dis-
turbances are unlikely, although minor demonstrations
probb1y will continue.
-eeNH-141544-1--1-AL_
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