CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/05/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03192927
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: May 26, 1958

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26 May 1958
Copy No. 140
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. nor'_
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REVIEWER:
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet test vehicle launching on 24
May; for Guided Missile Intelligence
Committee statpmpn+ nap page 1.
Khrushchev considered guiding force
behind Soviet attacks on Yugoslavia.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - Government forces make
gains in new military attacks against
opposition. Chamoun may be ready to
drop second-term ambitions.
Nasir planning to reduce power of some
Syrian officials.
Indonesia - Djakarta forces may land
near dissident capital of Menado shortly.
Sukarno considering possible cabinet
changes. 0
French-Tunisian armed clashes lead
to new demands that French withdraw to
Bizerte. Morocco likely to step up its
demands for French withdrawal.
IIL THE WEST
Showdown on General de Gaulle's return
to power expected soon.
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A
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 May 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet missile launching: The USSR launched a
probable IdBM test vehicle on the Tyura Tam missile
test range at 1031 GMT (0631 EDT) on 24 May.
the vehicle reached the vicinity of the impact area on
1, ) Kamchatka Peninsula. The last previous ICBM test
vehicle firing occurred on 4 April 1958. For statement
by Guided Missile Tntell-tgence Committee, see Page 1.
Page 1)
Bloc-Yugoslav dispute: The Yugoslav ambassador
In Moscow has expressed the opinion that current Soviet
policy toward Yugoslavia was initiated by Khrushchev.
He rejects the idea that Khrushchev is subject to pres-
sure either from within the Soviet leadership or from
without. Ambassador Thompson accepts this appraisal,
with the reservation that the Chinese Communists may
\
, l) have influenced Khrushchev's policy toward Yugoslavia.
V Peiping's summary of the Chinese Communist party con-
gress, which ended on 23 May, endorses Soviet policy
toward Yugoslavia and expressly cites Khrushchev's
leadership. Khrushchev's routine birthday greetings to
Tito, while conciliatory in language, do not suggest any
Soviet concessions. (Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: Following a showdown between President
Chamoun and army commander General Shihab, government
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forces have launched a military offensive and have taken
Halba and Balabakk. Fighting broke out in Sidon on 25
May. A UAR news agency quotes the first military com-
muniquds from an alleged "Free Lebanese Government."
President Chamoun may be ready to abandon his ambitions
for a second term, but he is determined to complete his
present term of office. Foreign Minister Malik will pre-
sent Lebanon's charges of UAR intervention to the UN Se-
curity Council on 27 May. (Page 3)
(Map)
United Arab Republic: Nasir may soon begin a series
of moves aimed at reducing the authority of Syrian Vice
President Hawrani and other officials in the Syrian sector
of the UAR who have shown signs of independence from
Cairo. Nasir will seek to avoid any dramatic showdown,
and will probably maneuver to bring about changes grad-
ually by undercutting Hawrani's support and increasing the
power of Interior Minister Sarraj.
(Page 5)
*Indonesia: Central government paratroop and amphib-
ious landings near the dissident capital of Menado appear
to be imminent. In Djakarta, President Sukarno is con-
sidering several plans for reorganizing the cabinet. He
appears likely to accept a plan calling for the dropping of
some leftists and the retention of Djuanda as prime min-
ister. (Page 6)
*Tunisia-Morocco: The clash between French and
Tunisian military units, which began at Remada on 24 May,
has continued. French air force units from Algeria re-
portedly bombed Tunisian positions on 25 May. French
diplomatic officials have apparently. accepted President
Bourguibals demand that France promise to withdraw
its forces to Bizerte, but _there, is some doubt that lo-
cal French �military leaders in. Ttuxisia will comply.
Morocco is likely to continue pressing for immediate with-
drawal of French troops, especially from eastern Morocco.
(Page 8) (Map)
26 May 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
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I I I. THE WEST
*France: The conflict between civil and military au-
thority in France will probably come to a head today in the
special session of the National Assembly. The French gov-
ernment probably can no longer try to maintain the fiction
that Paris controls the situation, and may be forced to de-
cide that there is no alternative but to request General de
rnifitc, fn (lc-me to Dower.
General Salan has
told an emissary from Pflimlin that unless the premier re-
signs on 26 May, the military in Algeria will move against
France. The dissidents claim support would come from the
French army in Germany and from armored units near Paris.
Admiral Auboyneau, commander of the Mediterranean fleet,
on 25 May announced his support for the Algerian military.
The French Communist party has ordered its members to
be ready for a general strike call.
(Page 9)
26 May 58
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet Test ICBM Firing on 24 May 1958
At 0631 EDT (1031 GMT) the USSR launched a vehicle
on the Tvura Tam missile test ranffe
, the missile was probably an ICBM test
vehicle which reached the vicinity of the impact area.
The Tyura Tam guided missile range has been active
on practically every day since 17 May in practice sessions
preparatory to a launching attempt. Indication of the im-
minence of an operation was strengthened by the presence
at Tyura Tam range head of three specific indicator type
aircraft.
The operation continued through a normal countdown
sequence with the hourly alerts indicating some slight fluc-
tuations in time lost and gained. The entire operation
reached zero time at 1031 GMT, a net gain in countdown
time of about one-half hour or a seven and one-hall hour
countdown.
Evidence is firm that a launching occurred, that the
vehicle reached the Kamchatka area, and that it probably
was an ICBM test vehicle.
The previous ICBM test vehicle firing was on 4 April
1958.
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Bloc Dispute With Yugoslavia
The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow has told dip-
lomatic colleagues that he does not believe there has been
conflict within the Soviet hierarchy over policy toward
Yugoslavia. In his opinion, this policy was inaugurated
by Khrushchev personally and has been fully backed by the
party presidium. He rejected the idea that Khrushchev is
subject to pressure either from within the Soviet leader-
ship or from without--the latter apparently referring to
Communist China.
Ambassador Thompson supports this appraisal, with
the reservation that he thinks the Chinese Communist posi-
tion may have influenced Khrushchev's Yugoslav policy.
Possibly to suppress speculation that the Chinese were
backing Stalinist opponents of Khrushchev on the issue of
Yugoslav revisionism, Peiping has pointedly endorsed the
role of Khrushchev personally. In its summary of the pro-
ceedings of the Chinese Communist party congress held be-
tween 5 May and 23 May, Peiping approved as "necessary
and correct" the steps taken toward Yugoslavia since 1954
by the Soviet party central committee "headed by N. S.
Khrushchev."
The proceedings at the congress show no retreat from
the blanket condemnation of the Yugoslav party program ex-
pressed in Peiping's 5 May blast at Belgrade. On 10 May,
however, the Chinese Communist foreign minister expressed
the opinion that government-to-government relations would
not suffer as in 1948.
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II. ASIA-AFRICA-
The Situation in Lebanon
Lebanese President Chamoun's "ultimatum" to Army
Chief of Staff Shihab on 23 May succeeded in evoking from
Shihab a plan for more decisive military action against in-
surgent forces in Lebanon. Shihab's subsequent regrouping
and redeployment of Lebanese security forces, including
the formation of a mobile reserve, apparently have resulted
in substantial gains for the government. Unconfirmed reports
indicate that government forces have recaptured Balabakk
and gained full control in Halba, and that insurgents are flee-
ing across the Syrian border. Street fighting which erupted
in Sidon on 25 May has ended in a truce. The army's plan
also involves conclusive operations in Tripoli where,
explosions de-
stroyed the city's water tanks on 24 May.
The already tenuous unity of the government, however,
is threatened by an internal crisis. A compromise proposal
that Chamoun abandon his attempt to obtain constitutional
changes permitting a second term for himself has been pre-
sented by Parliamentary Deputy Raymond Edde.
The cabinet reportedly met in emergency session late
on 25 May to consider the proposal, and several ministers
are believed to have threatened to resign if Chamoun did not
accept the proposal. Two Sunni Moslem ministers had pre-
viodsly resigned.
Foreign Minister Malik will present Lebanon's complaint
regarding United Arab Republic intervention in the Lebanese
rebellion to the United Nations Security Council on 27 May.
A canvass of the six nonpermanent mem-
bers of the council reported on 21
May revealed that although all were prepared to support Lebanon
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if it submitted "a strong complaint," most preferred at that
time to avoid a meeting unless "absolutely necessary." The
member feared that discussion of the Lebanese com-
plaint would stir up debate on other subjects such as Egypt's
interference in Yemen and Algeria.
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Nasir Showdown With Vice President Hawrani
May Be Imminent
UAR President Nasir may be readying for a show-
down with Vice President Akram Hawrani and other
Syrians in the UAR cabinet who have displayed too much
independence of the Cairo regime. Nasir has said that
he became "increasingly hostile" toward Hawrani during
their recent trip to the USSR, according to a usually re-
liable source. He plans to visit Damascus soon, after
which he might take action to curb the influence of Hawrani
and others.
The conflict between Hawrani's social revolutionary
ideas and Nasir's aUthoritarian�, opportunistic approach
to solving the problems of the Syrian-Egyptian union has
become increasingly apparent. Nasir's order for the aboli-
tion of political groupings, including Hawrani's powerful
Baath party, in order to insure his own freedom of move-
ment in the UAR's northern region has met covert resist-
ance from the Syrian leader. Also, Hawrani's persistent
and open championing of an early move to confiscate much
of the holdings of large landowners has violated Nasir's
sense of political timing.
The problem of putting checkreins on Syria's most ef-
fective politician is a delicate one, and Nasir would prob-
ably avoid giving the impression of an open break. If Nasir
decides that Hawrani and other Syrians must be inactivated,
however, he may either attack and eliminate Hawrani's sup-
porters or allow Syrian Minister of the Interior Sarraj to
increase his already extensive authority to such an extent
that Hawrani will be effectively barred from exerting any
influence on Syrian affairs. Sarraj is not popular among the
majority of Syrians, but the strength of his control over the
security forces appears sufficient to suppress any counter-
move on the part of Hawrani's followers.
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.C.41-1(L
New %we.
Situation in Indonesia
The Indonesian Army is making final plans for its
assault on the dissident capital of Menado.
both paratroops and amphibious forces will be used and
that small marine detachments and intelligence agents
have already infiltrated the area to prepare for the land-
ings. Menado to fall within three days of
the attack.
In Djakarta, President Sukarno is considering three
plans for cabinet reorganization, although he will make no
changes until after the defeat of the North Celebes dissidents.
Sukarno will probably choose to
reshuffle the Djuanda cabinet, ousting the leftists, since this
choice would evoke less opposition than any other. The army,
under Chief of Staff General Nasution, is continuing to press
for a complete cabinet change, postponement of the 1959 gen-
eral elections, and increased power for the executive branch
of the government. Although Nasutionis plan probably would
permit a settlement of the dissident problem, it would also
invite considerable Communist opposition which non-army
elements, including President Sukarno, may fear they could
not handle. Communist party Secretary General Aidit has
already stated, in a campaign speech for regional elections
in Borneo, that postponement of general elections would be
a "sin against the people."
In Central Sumatra, reconstruction problems are be-
setting central government administrators. Colonel Jani,
war administrator for the area, told the assistant American
army attache that trouble can be expected if the government
"does not move and quit talking." Currently the problems are
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Now' Now,'
mainly those of passive resistance to occupation officials
and lack of local civil servants who fled with or were intim-
idated by the dissidents. It is estimated, however, that the
equivalent of four dissident battalions are still in North and
Central Sumatra capable of waging guerrilla warfare indef-
initely.
Sumatran regionalism is now stronger than be-
fore the revolt, and the basic obiections to the Djakarta re-
gime remain.
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#111%
Co�nstantine
ALGERIA
26 MAY 1958
TUNISIA
�ENCH TROOP DISPOSITIONS
IZERTE
MATEURt 13000
Bone � TUNIS --
2850
�MIEDJ E Z EL BAT3
420 -
SFAX
� -
680
1 700 IN AREA
REAVDA
Miles 290
TRIPOL ITANIA
L I BYA
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Pressure MOTIrits in Tunisia and Morocco fortcracuation
Of French Troops
The fighting which broke out on 24 May between French
and Tunisian military units at Remada in remote southern
Tunisia--the second clash within three days--seems certain
to evoke new Tunisian demands for the immediate total evac-
uation of the 22,000 French troops from the country. Pres-
ident Bourguiba indicated last month that he might revoke the
concessions made to the Anglo-American good offices mission
that he would negotiate a new arrangement for the continued
use by France of the base at Bizerte. Dourguiba is reported
to have threatened to protest to the_UN Security Council if
the French do not promise to regroup their forces at Bizerte,
and French diplomatic officials have apparently acceded to
his request There is some doubt, however, that French mil-
itary leaders in Tunisia will comply.
The 24 May clash, in which five French soldiers were
killed and 14 wounded, was precipitated by the efforts of the
French units at Remada--which on 18 May surrounded two
Tunisian roadblocks some 25 miles outside their base--to
retain control of certain caravan routes which may be used
to transport arms into Algeria. The Tunisian Government
claims that the French Air Force bombed and strafed Tuni-
sian positions the morning of 25 May. The same day, France
lodged a formal protest with the Tunisian charge in Paris,
Bourguiba extended the state of emergency existing in the
border provinces to include all of Tunisia, and anti-French
demonstrations were held at Bizerte and Mateur.
The Remada incident probably will also result in new
pressure in Morocco for the evacuation of French troops
there, particularly those in eastern Morocco which the Bal-
afrej government on 14 and 20 May urgently requested Paris
to withdraw. French Foreign Minister Pleven told American
Embassy officials in Paris on 23 May that the desired with-
drawal was "not possible under present circumstances." Af-
ter the establishment of the Algiers Committee of Public
Safety on 13 May, a Moroccan Foreign Ministry official con-
ferred with officials in Tunisia. He informed the American
Embassy in Rabat that he had been impressed by the identity
rf views between hic government and that of Tunisia.
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III. THE WEST
The French Crisis (as of 0200 hours)
The 26 May special session of the National Assembly
will probably bring to a head the conflict between the civil
and military authority in France. The government in the
next few days may be forced to choose between risking wide-
spread civil unrest and setting the stage for an orderly take-
over by De Gaulle. It seems unlikely that Pflimlin's efforts
to treat the Corsican and Algerian situations separately can
succeed, and any steps he might take against "sedition" in
Corsica will risk provoking an open split in the military in
France or even its complete alienation. There is a strong
possibility that Gaullist supporters in France and Algeria
might use the special session to make an all-out bid for Gen-
eral de Gaulle's return, particularly since parliamentary
support for Pflimlin is wavering.
Gen-
eral Salan told Pflimlin's emissary that =less the premier
resigned on 26 May, airborne troops would launch an attack
on Paris. He claimed that they would be supported by French
army units in Germany and two armored units outside Paris,
and that French security forces have been won over to the
side of the Algerian junta. The admiral of the Mediterra-
nean fleet has announced that he fully supports the action of
the army in Algeria.
Public sentiment in favor of the general is apparently
increasing.
The Communist Party has told its militants to be ready
for a general strike. A number of observers now believe that
while Communist and Socialist militants may offer some strong
resistance initially, their ability to get broad support from the
rank-and-file of either party appears to be limited.
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Now"
DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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