CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/11/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03192683
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: November 21, 1957

Approved for Release: 2019712/10 C03192683
21 November 1957
3.3(h)(2)
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
Copy No,,
3.5(c)
NO ,AN(.[ IN (2!...A:31), .7(
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS,,r.t. tCA
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 401_ -
AUTH: HA 70-2
1)ATE.1.411(1)_, REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOPS
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
fr.% 411161
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
0
CONTENTS
'11,4 1. BRITISH SEEKING NEW NATO MILITARY DOCTRINE
(page 3).
20 DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
(page 4).
3. USSR OFFERS TO AID EGYPTIAN ECONOMY
(Daze 5).
PC.1� 4. USSR'S THREAT TO BOYCOTT UWDISAR.MAMENT TALKS
(page 6).
Sift 5. YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS
it-t)
(page 7).
6. IRAQ URGES JORDAN TO ASK FOR IRAQI TROOPS
(page 8).
7, VEMENT-RRITISH TALKS INCONCLUSIVE
) (page 9).
tII 8. CHOU EN-LAI'S STATEMENT ON TAIWAN'S "LIBERATION"
(page 10).
9. SUKARNO ACCELERATING ATTACKS ON THE WEST
10. FINLAND'S CABINET CRISIS
(page 12).
11. NEW DISTURBANCES LIKELY IN GUATEMALA
Noforn) (page 13).
c 12. WIDESPREAD STRIKE IN CEYLON
21 Nov 57
(page 14).
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
IL AIL..f
1. BRITISH SEEKING NEW NATO MILITARY DOCTRINE
Comment on;
Britain's proposal for a new NATO
strategy review stems from its own
current defense reappraisal, and re-
flects the general uncertainty in Europe
over the post-sputnik defense of the
Continent.
The permanent secretary of the British
Defense Ministry suggests that a committee composed of the
US-UK-France military Standing Group plus three civilians not
representing governments, and possibly headed by Secretary
General Spaak, be set up to study revision of strategy and mis-
sions "so that they make sense and are economically feasible."
The US mission to NATO notes that the main reason for bring-
ing in nongovernmental participation would be to arouse public
support for some new concept. Last spring many members ex-
pressed a need for a high-level statement outside normal NATO
channels to convince the public of the consistency and purpose
of Western defense plans. The mission believes, however, that
NATO members other than Britain are now satisfied with pres-
ent guidance and intra-NATO review.
Such a special strategy review might,
however, provide the answer to the Macmillan government's
search for a way to make reversal of its own defense policy
more palatable to British public opinion. The government evi-
dently is considering reducing its reliance on a nuclear deter-
rent of its own.
21 Nov 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
Teir.-,SECRELF_
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Noir'
2. DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
Comment on:
Some officials in the British Foreign
Office are now questioning the policy
of ostracizing Egyptian President Nasir,
particularly in view of the increased
Soviet threat in the Middle East and Nasir's continuing po-
sition as the most active native threat to British interests
in the area. A high-level Foreign Office official told the
American embassy recently that he personally thought the
time had arrived to "wipe the slate clean of past events."
He reasoned that the West's deliberate withdrawal had al-
ready left the USSR a free hand in Egypt and Syria for too
long and that the West should switch to active competition.
London has intimated that diplomatic rela-
tions will be resumed if Anglo-Egyptian financial talks in
Rome are successful. Differences appear to have narrowed
sufficiently for an agreement to be concluded shortly, should
both governments decide on political grounds to do so. Nasir
appears eager for the agreement, which would largely un-
block Egyptian sterling balances in return for a compensation
payment by Cairo of about $84,000,000 for seized British prop-
erty.
Resumption of diplomatic relations would
presumably be interpreted in the Middle East as a reversal
of British policy toward Egypt. However, in an effort to min-
imize the damage to relations between the West and friendly
Middle East governments and to the internal position of these
governments, London will probably continue to assert that its
basic policy toward Nasir has not changed, while making
changes very gradually.
21 Nov 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release:.2019/12/10 C03192683
*9141,
3, USSR OFFERS TO AID EGYPTIAN ECONOMY
Comment on:
Premier Bulganin's announcement on
19 November that the USSR has agreed
to "help Egypt economically and tech-
nically in advancing its national economy"
suggests that the USSR will attempt to fill
a major gap in the Soviet-Egyptian rela-
tionship Although the USSR over the last
two years has considered Egypt the prin-
cipal lever of Soviet policy in the Middle East, it has not given
Egypt any broad-scale economic assistance, According to
Egyptian press reports, the USSR has offered Egypt a credit
equivalent to $175,000,000.
The timing of the offer indicates that it
is designed to exploit Egypt's mounting concern over its internal
problems, and to forestall a re-establishment of commercial
ties with the West, In thanking Bulganin for appreciating Egypt's
"problems and difficulties," Egyptian Defense Minister Amir, who
has been touring the USSR, spoke at great length on Soviet-Egyptian
friendship, which he declared is "worth more than millions of
pounds sterling,"
21 Nov 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
Sge-714F-T
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
%we Nepal
4. USSR'S THREAT TO BOYCOTT UN DISARMAMENT TALKS
Comment on:
The USSR's announcement that it will
boycott future UN Disarmament Com-
mission negotiations probably was in-
tended to force a deadlock on this issue
which could be used to bolster a call
prior to the Paris NATO meeting for a high-level East-West
conference to discuss disarmament and other world problems.
Although the USSR has in the past participated in international
negotiations without parity in representation, its present intrans-
igence based on the latest demonstrations of military and tech-
nological advances expresses the growing Soviet insistence that
in the future Communist nations must be accorded at least equal
representation in such meetings.
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov
stated that the Soviet Union's absence from future Disarmament
Commission meetings would not prevent further negotiations at
a new summit conference or through diplomatic channels. In
an interview on 14 November, Khrushchev had stated that the
Soviet proposal for a new UN disarmament commission composed
of all UN members "does not preclude other forms and methods
of talks: bipartite, tripartite, and so forth."
The Soviet leaders may believe they could
use a temporary boycott of UN disarmament talks to good advan-
tage in exploiting the political impact of their scientific gains to
increase pressure on the West for concessions to Soviet views on
disarmament. /
\a
Soviet boycott will induce world public opinion "to bring greater
pressure to bear on the governments of the capitalist countries,"
which eventually "will be compelled to seek agreement:
21 Nov 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
--SFERE�T
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
%awl Ned
5, YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS
Comment on:
The Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement
reached this summer and fall may
be deteriorating, although Belgrade
still appears to be following the "wait-
and-see" policy it adopted following
Zhukov's ouster.
In the strongest statement of Yugoslav
views on the development of socialism
since the polemical exchanges with the USSR last winter, the
7 November issue of the party' weekly theoretical journal,
Komunist, expounded views in marked contrast to those of
IChrushchev in his anniversary speech and attacked "people"
who try dogmatically to generalize their own experience as
a model for other countries.
Despite the fact that Tito's ailments had
prevented him from seeing Soviet Ambassador Zamchevsky
subsequent to the "Zhukov affair," the Yugoslav Foreign Secre-
tary informed US Ambassador Riddleberger on 19 November
that he could confer with Tito at Brioni next week.
Yugoslavia's failure to attend a 14-nation
conference of Communist party historians in Prague from 19
to 23 November suggests that Belgrade will continue to avoid
meetings which would tie it to the bloc.
21 Nov 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
%we 14S
6. IRAQ URGES JORDAN TO ASK FOR IRAQI TROOPS
Comment on:
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuni
Said says he has sent a message through
official channels urging Jordangs King
Hussayn to ask for a brigade of Iraqi
troops which, in Null.% view, would have a "stabilizing and en-
couraging effect" on the Jordanian public. Nun i said he had
cleared this message with King Faysal and Iraqi Prime Minis-
ter Jawdat, and that he had assured Hussayn that the Iraqi gov-
ernment would at once respond favorably to such a request. As
of 20 November, no reply had been received from Hussayn.
Nun i may have acted on British inspira-
tion. Selwyn Lloyd has felt that foreign intervention might be
needed in the Jordanian situation. However, Iraqi army author-
ities, who apparently have not been consulted, might well be
reluctant to undertake such a move, involving continued living
in the field for troops, so soon after the field maneuvers in
northern Iraq and before the Iraqis have developed arrange-
ments for their own or other friendly air cover,
only one battalion is stationed at
pumping station H-3, the supply point nearest the Jordanian
border. The Iraqis required about two weeks for the move
the last time they sent significant reinforcements to H-3.
Recent statements by other Iraqi officials,
including the prime minister and the foreign minister, have in-
dicated that the Iraqis would seek specific approval of King
Saud before making a military move. Such a move may be dis-
cussed by Saud and Jordanian Foreign Minister Rifai, who is
scheduled to fly to Saudi Arabia on 21 November,
21 Nov 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
111100,1
7. YEMENI-BRITISH TALKS INCONCLUSIVE
Comment on:
the Czechs may be willing to discuss Yemen's need for person-
nel to operate Soviet bloc military equipment. The Imam's re-
cent difficulties in suppressing a revolt in eastern Yemen ap-
parently have convinced him that trained foreigners are needed
to make certain his domination of rebellious tribes and thereby
ensure the succession of Prince Badr. Czech provision of per -
sonnel to operate combat equipment InYemen would significantly
reverse previous Soviet bloc practice in the Middle East.
21 Nov 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
L.../
*Ole
8. CHOU EN-LAPS STATEMENT ON
TAIWAN'S "LIBERATION"
Comment on:
Chou En-lai, in an interview with
a West German correspondent on
19 November, reiterated his offer
to recognize Chiang Kai-shek as
"director of Taiwan" if the Chinese Nationalists accept
"peaceful liberation." This may herald new emphasis on
liberation propaganda aimed at Taiwan. Preoccupied with
domestic problems and bloc affairs, Peiping has devoted
scant attention to the subject for some months.
Reflecting the regime's scorn for Nation-
alist military capabilities, Chou said he hoped the Nationalists
would attempt an attack on the mainland because Peiping could
then "solve the problem of Taiwan more quickly!' He declared
that Taiwan's "liberation" could have been solved "very speed-
ily" if it were not for the island's "occupation" by American
military forces.
Asserting that America's policy on the
China question is changing to support the "two Chinas" con-
cept, Chou stated that this is unacceptable both to Peiping and
to Taipei. He declared Communist-Nationalist negotiations
and the return of the island to Peiping's control are only "a
matter of time!'
In recent radio propaganda to Taiwan, Pei-
ping has propounded the line that Soviet missile successes will
reduce the reliance the Nationalists can place on continuing US
support, particularly since American military bases "will lose
their significance."
While Chiang Kai-shek himself has never
shown any interest in a deal with Peiping and has held firmly
to his goal of return to the mainland, dissatisfaction among
Nationalist middle-level officials, younger army officers, white-
collar workers, and intellectuals over the lack of opportunity for
advancement on Taiwan makes these groups susceptible to Com-
munist subversion.
21 Nov 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 10
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
{-1 -A. AL.I.L I AL
Novi %do'
9. SUKARNO ACCELERATING ATTACKS ON THE WEST
Comment on:
president Sukarno's active leadership
of the Indonesian campaign to "regain"
,West Irian apparently has committed
him to some form of anti-Dutch action
/should current efforts in the United Na-
tions be unsuccessful. Through his
public statements, which include a threat
to "startle the world" if the United Nations
does not endorse Indonesia's claim, he is gambling his per-
sonal prestige as the symbol of Indonesian independence. In
the past he has frequently maintained that his country's inde-
pendence can never be considered complete until Dutch rule
over West Irian is eliminated.
Sukarno is planning to
break diplomatic relations with the Netherlands and possibly
with Australia over this issue, and to begin the nationaliza-
tion of Dutch commercial interests. To offset the consequent
damage to the Indonesian economy, Sukarno, impressed by
the example of Syria, would orient Indonesia increasingly toward
the Sino-Soviet bloc and accept additional trade and aid from
those countries. The Indonesian cabinet allegedly does not sup-
port these plans but is not prepared to oppose them.
Sukarno's vilification of the Dutch recently
was extended to the US in several lectures at the Bandung mil-
itary academy, Ac-
cusing the US of being in league with other imperialistic West-
ern nations bent on destroying Indonesian sovereignty, Sukarno
argued that Indonesia must join "prOgressive" nations--the
Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian bloc�in stamping out coloni-
alism and promoting socialism. Sukarno was
vehement against the West and advocated Indonesian Commu-
nist party and Soviet policies "right down the line."
21 Nov 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 11
efiffl7TT,4 1.
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Noe'
10. FINLAND'S CABINET CRISIS
Comment on:
In an apparent effort to force a
solution of Finland's five-week-
old cabinet crisis, President
Kekkonen has instructed Prime
Minister Sukselainen of the Agrarian party to investi-
gate the possibility of a six-party government, includ-
ing the Communist-front Finnish People's Democratic
League (SICDL). Over the week end Sukselainen had
attempted to form a four-party government, excluding
the Conservatives and the SKDL, but had failed�appar-
ently because of the split in the Social Democratic party
between the party leadership and the trade-union hierarchy.
It is unlikely that the democratic parties
will agree to the inclusion of the SKDL�a proposal which
Kekkonen had previously told the American ambassador he
might make as a tactical move, apparently to shock party
leaders out of their bickering. There is, however, less
and less possibility for a normal party government, since
the various parties are maneuvering for advantage in the
July 1958 parliamentary elections and no one is eager to
assume responsibility for the drastic measures needed to
curb inflation. The most likely outcome is a "nonpolitical"
caretaker government of professional experts to hold of-
fice until the July elections.
21 Nov 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 12
Approved for for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
4
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
AL., a
*ftwol `44110,
11, NEW DISTURBANCES LIKELY IN GUATEMALA
Comment on:
and, as a last resort,
financed and,
clandestinely supplied t with weapons.
could lead to widespread bloodshed.
The Communist-infiltrated Revolu-
tionary party (PR) is planning mass
demonstrations if it does not receive
in the next few days the right to par-
ticipate in the 19 January elections.
A PR official said that, if the demon-
strations failed to achieve their aim,
the party would call nationwide strikes
a popular uprising. The party is well
is being
PR demonstrations
Communists within the Revolutionary
party are becoming bolder, they
are considering forcing the removal of the present party lead-
ers, whom they regard as too conservative.
Serious disturbances would probably
touch off a military coup by one of several army factions now
considering such action. Miguel Ortiz Passarelli, winner of
the abortive 20 October presidential election,
has military support
for a coup, but that he would have to act fast because there are
four other plots afoot.
21 Nov 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 13
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683
.14.I.JILN
%Roo riset
120 WIDESPREAD STRIKE IN CEYLON
Comment on:
A sudden widespread and apparently
growing strike involving 23 unions and
up to 80,000 workers in Colombo and
other parts of Ceylon has closed down
power and light installations, railways,
telegraph services, and newspapers,
and may seriously embarrass the
Bandaranaike government before it
is settled.
Trotskyite unions are reported to be
staging the strike to support demands for higher pay and
better working conditions. N. M. Perera, leader of the
opposition Trotskyite Nava Lanka Sama Samaja party, has
for some time threatened a general strike if workers' de-
mands are not met by the government. Pieter Keuneman,
leader of the orthodox Communist party, controls many
municipal workers' unions and may be tempted to throw his
support to the strikers.
Prime Minister Bandaranaike, who held
a three-hour emergency cabinet meeting on 20 November and
talked to union leaders, has little to offer the workers. His
government faces serious financial and economic problems,
including a drought and a new and less favorable rice-rubber
contract with Communist China. Increased wages to urban
workers might start a demand by the far more numerous tea
and rubber estate workers which the government would be even
less able to meet.
21 Nov 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 14
-CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03192683