CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1956/09/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03192443
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: October 25, 2019
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2019
• Publication Date: September 9, 1956

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CURRENT
/ INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
rr/
/42
9 September 1956
Copy No.
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3.3(h)(2)
DOCUMENT NO ,
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CLASS. CH.P,NVID
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AUTH: HR 70-2
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4
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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AMY'
CONTENTS
1. PRAVDA WARNS AGAINST USE OF FORCE IN EGYPT
(page 3).
2. EGYPT DISPLAYS CAUTION ON ACCEPTING SOVIET
PILOTS FOR SUEZ (page 4).
3. FRENCH MILITARY MOVES IN SUEZ CRISIS
) (page 5).
4. MOROCCAN SULTAN MAY BE READYTOBEGIN TALKS
ON AMERICAN BASE RIGHTS ( page 6).
5. NEW PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER REPORTEDLY AP-
POINTED (page 7).
6. INDONESIA PLANS FURTHER ACTION AGAINST NETHER-
LANDS (page 8).
7. ARGENTINE POLITICAL SITUATION UNSETTLED
(page 9).
9 Sept 56
THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(page 10)
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I. PRAVDA WARNS AGAINST USE OF FORCE IN EGYPT
A sober but qualified warning to Britain
and France against the use of force in
Egypt was contained in a Pravda article
on 8 September by V. Kuznetsov�presumably Vassili V.
Kuznetsov, Soviet deputy foreign minister. Kuznetsov
stated that a localized conflict "could at any moment assume
the proportions of a major war" which could "possibly" ex-
pand beyond the Near and Middle East. "One must say
straightforwardly;' he continued, "that such a situation
would mean a blow to Britain and France and would be preg-
nant with serious consequences for them' Kuznetsov added
that "In their struggle against the machinations of the im-
perialist forces, the people of Egypt and the Arab countries
are not alone:'
While other Soviet spokesmen�includ-
ing Shepilov and Khrushchev--have made similar statements,
the timing of the article and the stature of its author were
intended by Moscow to give it additional weight. This sug-
gests that the USSR has become more concerned over the
threat of British and French military action and its appar-
ent inability to exercise control over the situation through
Nasr.
9 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
CONFIDEN-Thffi
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2, EGYPT DISPLAYS CAUTION ON ACCEPTING SOVIET
PILOTS FOR SUEZ
Comment Nasr may feel that acceptance of Soviet
pilots at this juncture might provoke
Britain and France to withdraw their pilots. Nases indicated
caution also suggests that he wants to avoid alienating the
United States at this time. Egypt may therefore move slowly
on accepting pilots from the Soviet bloc and give priority to
pilots from "neutral" European countries. On 6 September,
Egypt gave orders to Egyptian personnel in the United States
not to make any statements or announcements whatsoever on
the subject of pilots.
9 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
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3. FRENCH MILITARY MOVES IN SUEZ CRISIS
Comment
While the French seem to be continuing
military preparations, the Mollet government appears to
be reconsidering the bellicose policy it seemed to have set-
tled on about 1 September. At that time, Italian ambassador
to France Quaroni was convinced that Paris had decided on
military action if Nasr failed to accept unconditionally in-
ternational management of the canal.
Most government officials probably
still expect that military action will be necessary and that
breakdown of canal transit or Egyptian mistreatment of
foreign pilots could serve as excuses for military action.
Since no French military intervention is likely without Brit-
ish concurrence, Paris may hope to bri7 a about a situation
om "WJ1 Britain could not withdraw.
9 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
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4. MOROCCAN SULTAN MAY BE READY TO BEGIN TALKS
ON AMERICAN BASE RIGHTS
The sultan of Morocco is said to be con7
sidering making a liberal offer to the
United States in connection with the bases
with the tacit understanding that generous
American economic aid for Morocco would be forthcoming,
Meanwhile, however, the sultan plans to
send his defense minister to Paris in an effort to obtain ex-
clusive Moroccan sovereignty over American air bases in
Morocco. Aware that success is unlikely, the sultan wishes
to go on aving attempted direct negotiations with
France.
Comment The sultan has already made several ef-
forts to learn what American aid might
be expected in return for continued use of the five bases.
Paris has requested that no aid be offered Rabat until pres-
exit Moroccan-French financial and defense negotiations are
completed.
The Moroccans are adamant in their po-
sition that negotiations regarding the French-owned bases
must be bilateral, while France wants tripartite negotiations.
9 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
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5. NEW PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER REPORTEDLY
APPOINTED
Comment on:
Pakistani president Mirza on 8 Septem-
ber asked H. S. Suhrawardy, the Awami
League's national leader, to form a new
government,
Suhrawardy
is Pakistan's most competent politician
and parliamentarian. He is moderate
in outlook, and despite strong leftist
elements in his party, no major change
in Pakistan's foreign policy would be likely under his lead-
ership. However, he believes that power should center in
the prime minister rather than in the president, and this
view could lead to a clash with Mirza.
The new government will have to be a
coalition since no single party possesses a majority in the
central assembly. With Suhrawardy as prime minister, it
would probably be an Awami League-Republican coalition.
If Suhrawardy is unable to organize a majority, the alter-
native would be a United Front-Republican coalition�possi-
bly with Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, who resigned on 8 Sep-
tember as prime minister as well as from the Moslem
League, reassuming the premiership as an independent.
Mohammed Al's resignation was prob-
ably inspired by the recent assumption of power in East
Pakistan by the opposition Awami League. The current up-
heaval marks the final elimination from power of the Moslem
League which founded Pakistan nine years ago< "
9 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
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6. INDONESIA PLANS FURTHER ACTION
AGAINST NETHERLANDS
The Indonesians expect the Dutch will
respond to each action with protests and reprisals aimed
at "injuring the credit and dignity of Indonesia in the eyes
of the international world in general and of the United States
and the United Nations in particular!'
Comment In early August, Indonesia repudiated
debts to the Netherlands assumed in
1949. President Sukarno and the National Party, which
heads the coalition cabinet, regard the elimination of all
Dutch interests in Indonesia as a major goal of Indonesian
foreign policy. The gradual nationalization of Dutch enter-
prise is expected to continue, and Indonesian officials are
reportedly considering the transfer of Indonesian funds from
Dutch to British or Swiss banks and the increased use of
other than Dutch shipping and airlines.
The capability of the Netherlands for
reprisals in the event of further Indonesian measures are
relatively limited. The Hague would presumably continue
to seek support from friendly countries in remonstrating
with Djakarta, and would probably consider an appeal to
the United Nations.
9 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
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7. ARGENTINE POLITICAL SITUATION UNSETTLED
The political situation in Argentina
appears uneasy, according to the
American army attach�n Buenos
Aires. He predicts "trouble" in sev-
eral provinces by 11 September, but
overnmen is expected to maintain control of the
situation, despite considerable disagreement within the
ruling group.
Comment
Plotting and discontent have been
chronic since the overthrow of Peron
in the revolt of 16-19 September 1955. The abortive
Peronist-nationalist uprising in June of this year under-
scored this discontent. There may be disturbances before
or during the anniversary of Peron's ouster, but the gov-
ernment can probably keep such disturbances from getting
out of hand.
9 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 9 September)
Lebanon accepted the
Saudi Arabian invitation to attend the meeting of Arab mili-
tary representatives now being held in Riyadh to discuss aid
for the Jordan national guard,
Lebanon, trying to avoid strong ties
with the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian bloc, has successfully
stalled on a Syrian-Lebanese military pact since last Novem-
ber. Egypt probably views such a pact as a propaganda victory
for Egypt and would probably not insist on a pact with any real
military significance.
According to a French press report, Egypt
on 7 September released the Israeli-chartered Greek merchant
ship Panngia which it had detained since May. The Panngia was
en route from Haifa to the Gulf of Aqaba port of Eilat. Israel
made an official protest to the UN Security Council at that time,
and has since protested and publicized the continuing blockade
of Israeli ships through the canal and detentions of some Israeli-
chartered ships.
9 Sept 56
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
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