THE OUTLOOK FOR HASHEMITE RULE IN JORDAN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03192034
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-02009
• Publication Date: April 5, 1971

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OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
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MEMORANDUM
The Outlook for Hashemite Rule in Jordan
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5 April 1971
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CENTRAL INTEUIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
5 April 1971
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Outlook for Hafihemite Rule in Jordan*
1. The fedayeen challenge to King Hussein reached the
point last September where his writ hardly extended beyond the
palace walls. Never having really accepted the Hashemite
Monarchy, many Palestinians looked forward to its downfall,
and to the most militant nationalists among them this seemed
almost in sight. The antagonism of Palestinians toward the
Monarchy derives strength from two emotional attitudes --
resentment that the Hashemite regime was imposed upon them
by outsiders and fear that it might make a deal with the Israelis
at their expense.
2. The fedayeen campaign produced a critical situation
for several weeks laot fall. But that challenge failed and the
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates and coordinated within CIA.
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Exciodod from automatic
downgrading and
dodouPication
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smashing defeat which the Jordanian Army administered, and its
constant pressure on the fedayeen since, has put the Hashemite
throne in its solidest position for many years. Hussein has
installed a government dominated by East Bank conservatives
and backed by the Army establishment who support his policy
of maintaining control over the fedayeen. His most important
opponents are cowed and fragmented, and the larger number who
dislike the regime, but whose disapproval has been more passive,
have lapsed into their customary frustrated acquiescence.
3. The King's author!ty has not only been reasserted and
prospects for the continuation of his rule improved but he has,
for the first time, a credible successor. In the months since
the September showdown his brother, Crown Prince Hasan, has shown
more and more promise. Hasan appears mature beyond his 23 years.
He seems more ready to employ force than his brother Hussein,
although this may derive from his somewhat simplistic view of
affairs and comparative inexperience in dealing with the Jordanian
srene. When the King was absent from the country late in 1970,
Hasan, as regent, in cooperation with Prime Minister Wasfi Tal
continued the planned campaign against the fedayeen, keeping
Hussein informed. The Crown Prince grew in experience, and respect
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for him in the Army -- which has cultivated him assiduously --
and the East Bank establishment was enhanced.
4. Should something happen to the King in the near future
Hasan would probably succeed with minimal disruption. Hasan is
intelligent and better educated (he graduated with a degree in
Political Science from Oxford) than the King. He does not have
the King's charisma, however, nor his sophistication. He has
had the experience of ruling in the King's absence; he has the
Army in back of him and support within the Jordanian establish-
ment. His youth wight be a disadvantage; although Hussein suc-
ceeded to the throne in 1952 at the age of 17. He would probably
find it more difficult than Hussein, for a time at least, to
obtain the external financial support on which Jordan depends.
While Hasan's experience in ruling nowhere matches that of the
King, he in time might well become as good or better ruler for
Jordan.
5. While many Palestinians expressed bitter resentment
during the Army's bloody suppression of the fedayeen last
September, in the past several months there has been a re-
consideration. A sizable number of the Palestinian middle
class living on the East Bank are a part of the Jordanian
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"establishment" and never did support the fedayeen; others
have reccntly come to see their interests threatened by the
fedayeen's rampaging. Many Palestinians on both sides of the
Jordan River, apparently decided after the September fighting
that their desire for law and order cutweighed their sense of
Palestinian nationalism -- at least as it was exemplified by
the atrocity-prone fedayeen. Also, inhabitants of the refugee
camps are reported to have become fed up with the firefights
between Jordan security forces and fedayeen in the camps. Many
Palestinian intellectuals had never really agreed with those
extremist fedayeen elements who favored a takeover of the
Jordanian regime. The goal was not change in Jordan but a free
hand against Israel -- better the orderly tyranny of the alien
Hashemites than the feckless rule of an irresponsible fedayeen.
6. In addition, the realization was spreading among the
Palestinians that the fedayeen had not achieved any success in
regaining the lost territories, nor had they much prospect of
doing so. Even in the refugee camps support for the fedayeen
is reported to have dwindled. Many Palestinians have now come
to believe that the Jordanian regime has better prospects of
* A paraphrase of the old Arabic proverb, "Better the tyranny
of the Turks than the justice of the Arabs."
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ending the Israeli occupation of the West Bank than have all
the fedayeen exertions. Looking into the future, many Palestinians
fear that a separate West Bank Palestinian state would be Israeli-
dominated, as well as economically unviable. Thus they see their
future as lying in some arrangement with Amman, preferably an
arrangement providing considerable autonomy for the West Bank
Palestinians. In an important sense, both the Palestinians and
the Amman government need each other and each party realizes the
fact. Relations between the two never will be cordial, nor fully
trusting, but the necessity for a working relationship will tend
to dampen their mutual hostilities.
7. Such a community of interests may make it easier over
time for Hussein to reach a settlement with the Israelis, as long
as he does not appear to "sell out" the West Bankers and gains
some arrangement in the Arab part of Jerusalem so that a semblance
of Arab sovereignty is maintained. If the prospects for a reas-
sertion of Arab sovereignty over the West Bank seem good, the great
majority of Palestinians are likely to side with Hussein against
the fedayeen extremists -- or at least remain neutral. Even a
significant proportion of the fedayeen probably would settle for
a peaceful return to their West Bank homeland.
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8. Changes in Jordan's neighbors' attitudes, especially
Syria and Iraq, have eased King Hussein's problems. The ousting
of the "doctrinaire" Baathist regime in Damascus by General Asad,
began yet another new era in relations between the two countries.
Asad has put Syrian-backed fedayeen under wraps, adopted a more
pragmatic approach to foreign and domestic affairs, and softened
the regime's policy on a possible Arab-Israeli settlement. Relations
with Jordan have turned from meddling and incitement to limited
cooperation; however, Jordanian resentment for the Syrian invasion
last September still rankles. An additional plus for Jordan has
been the lack of a Syrian ganging-up with the Iraqi Baathists
against Hussein. The reopening of TAPLINE by the Syrians also has
helped to normalize relations. The failure of Iraqi troops stationed
in Jordan to intervene on the fedayeen side last September and the
consequent withdrawal of the troops has greatly eased Hussein's
internal security burden. Jordanian troops no longer have to
be tied up keeping an eye on the Iraqis, although they still have
forces watching the Syrian border. While the Iraqi regime has not
appreciably diminished its attacks on the Hashemites, the improved
relationship with Damascus and the departure of the Iraqi troops
give King Hussein more maneuverability in the Israeli context.
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9. Hussein's relationship with Egypt remains extremely
important. Nasser's death gave Hussein more flexibility in
dealing with internal problems, e4ecially the Palestinians and
fedayeen. Even alter the defeat of Egypt in 1967 Nasser re-
mained a hero to most Palestinians and his influence over them
was considerable. Egyptian President Sadat's forthcoming
position also has made the idea of a negotiated settlement with
Israel more acceptable and the cease-fire on the Suez Canal has
generally calmed the situation. At the same time, however,
the Jordanians harbor fears that Cairo may agree to a separate
agreement with Israel, thus undercutting Jordan's limited
negotiating position -- a fear that might be justified. An
Egyptian settlement with Israel, however, might ease the way
for a Jordanian peace with Israel, unless the Israelis decided
that, after an agreement with their main enemy, they could be
tougher with Jordan.
10. A breakdown of the Jarring mission would take away
many of the advantages in Husc-,in's present position and a
resurTtion of the Egyptian-Israeli "war of attrition" would
produce immediate complications. Pressures from the Palestinians
in Jordan and from the surrounding Arab states for a resumption
of harassment actions against the Israelis would be considerable.
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An upsurge of fedayeen acdvities against Israel and in Jordan
would be inevitable, which would lead to frequent clashes with
Jordanian troops. However, the regime in all probability would
be able to cope with them.
11. The government of Jordan is faced with severe economic
and fiscal problems which could make the regime's position more
difficult. The 1967 war caused considerable economic disruptions
that have lift been overcome and increased the country's dependence
on fore,,I aid. Fedayeen activities and Israeli responses
furthr- disrupted economic activity, especially cultivation in
the Jordan valley. Initially, these ecoromic efiects of the war
and fedayeen activities were mitigated by the annual $105 million
Khartoum Subsidy from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait ($40 million each),
and Libya ($25 million), which greatly helped the government's
foreign exchange holdings. The withholdings of subsidies by
Libya and the interruption of pay 2nts by Kuwait have aggravated
the government's fiscal position.
12. Government expenditures have risen greatly since 1967;
defense expenditures have more than doubled. The budget deficit
for 1971 is expected to exceed $100 million, with no chance of
foreign budget support of this magnitude in sight. The Army has
increased in strength from a 48,000 pre-1967 figure to about
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58,000 today. King Hussein is faced with the difficult choice
of not paying salaries and other government obligations or
cutting the Army down in numbers. Yet, the Army is the main-
stay of the regime. Any strict austerity program -- e.g.,
import curtailment or salary deferral -- would arouse the
discontent of several segments of the population, such as the
military, civil servants, merchants, and urban elements. Covering
the deficit by drawing down currency reserves could shake public
confidence and lead to a disturbing flight of capital. Deferral
of weapons procurement also is politically dangerous and would
be likely to undercut Army morale.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
13. The prospects for the Hashemite regime have improved
considerably in the past several months. Its future no longer
appears to rest so completely on the life or death of Hussein;
his brother Hasan apparently has capabilities for the role and
the support of the political forces that count, particularly the
Army. The ability of the Palestinians, and especially the fedayeen,
either to overthrow the regime or effectively sabotage an arrange-
ment with the Israelis would appear minimal over the short term.
But Jordan will remain chronically short of money and dependent
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on external sources of financing for the foreseeable future.
But the essential nature of Jordan remains -- which is that
it is less a viable state than an arrangement accepted because
the alternatives look worse to most interested parties in and
out of the country.
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