CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03191624
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
April 26, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 30, 2019
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Publication Date: 
November 2, 1967
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PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602386].pdf307.54 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 Tiecret 1 0 2 November 1967 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 et Controlled Dissem 'ALI, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Dir,--etor of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing i.hrrent, intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart- pleat of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-, duced by CIA and marked with an asterisk. interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent .iintiediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the :Olt of further information and more complete analysis. i..2ttairi intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically lur no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 1.8, Sections 793, 794, and 798. 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 TOP CRET 3.5(c) 2 November 1967 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1) USSR: Second ABM radar has operational capability. (FT�ge 4) Panama: Four parties may bolt Robles coalition. (Page 5) Congo (Kinshasa): Congolese claim clash with mer- cenaries on Angola border. (Page 6) USSR: Security tightened (Page 7) Afghanistan: New prime minister (Page 7) Egypt: Attitude hardens (Page 8) Ecuador: Continued student demonstrations (Page 8) TO CRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 - T HAILAND I i 040 71,141.1 Quer NORTH \ VIETNAM Demilitarized Zone UANG TRI 1/4...,1/' 1 0 � [I-IUA THIEN)- \ L e..._...) c, QUANG NAM 1,1 CORPS ) ri QUANG TIN (. .1/4"...QUANG ./ NGAI i7 KONTUM Hue 1 BINH DIN F4 PLEIKU CAMBODI) PHNOM, PENH,,V DARLAC QLIANG DUC r- �Phu � Lo Ni hPHIAlLng -SA\BINH LONG .0 NC e NINH K' BINH OLiONG KIEN PHONC TIJONG HO DINH TUON GO CON --:., LoNc KI HOAX) KIEN 4.N..PHONG ... GI A Ner/N"' VINH ...,, 3 BINH i ,_,:iLIONG THIEN \ X UYEN ...,...,. >,..�....jr , .._ -.1_......,-(--- -.) BA CORPS UYFN Bin PHU BON TUYEN \C!..: Lat. DUD LAM DONG LONG KHA NH PH UOC BINH TUY 57 PHU YEN . , KHANI.er_ HOA GAM RANH NINH THUAN/ BINH 7 TUY Hi CORPS Vung Tau Capital Special Zone CORPS SOUTH VIETNAM 0 25. 50 7.5 100 Miles 0 25 50 75 1,5o Ifilometers 68516 11-67 2 Nov 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 TOP REF 3.5(c) *South Vietnam: The Communists kept up the pres- sure on allied positions at Loc Ninh on 2 November for the fifth consecutive day. The assaults on Loc Ninh may be in part a diversion to the Communist build-up around Song Be and Phuoc Binh, some 30 miles to the east. Two regiments--the North Vietnamese 88th and the Viet Cong's 275th--have recently moved into the area. Ambushes and blocking positions have been set up along routes allied reaction forces would be likely to use to reinforce the Song Be - Phuoc Binh area. The Communists may be aiming to launch a new series of regimental attacks in this area similar to those in early 1965. 2 Nov 67 1 TOP ET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C031916243.5(c) 2 Nov 67 2 1_1_(12,S.EeIZT`-_,T Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) DIP--SEeitET- 3.3(h)(2) 2 Nov 67 3 _laP-SPECTIFF Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.3(h)(2) � 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) iap-stit-TrErr USSR: Another segment of the Soviet ABM system probably has achieved operational capability. The Skrunda and Olenegorsk radars cover the north- ern attack corridors to European USSR and can track multiple targets for the Soviet ABM system. Some of the defensive missile launchers at Moscow will be fin- ished next year, and the system is expected to be fully operational in 1971. Even then, its capability to defend against a sophisticated ballistic missile attack will be limited. 2 Nov 67 4 T-O-P-5ECIZET Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C031916243.5(C) rIS/E-gEeKET Panama: Four of the eight parties in the govern- ment coalition seem likely to break away and form an electoral alliance with opposition leader Arnulfo Arias. The four parties oppose President Robles' choice of Finance Minister David Samudio as head of the gov- ernment ticket in the presidential election in May 1968. The hopes of the rebel parties that Minister of the Presidency Ramirez might emerge as a compromise can- didate have been dashed by his losses to Samudio in the election of delegates to the Liberal Party's nominating convention. The prospect of an Arias victory, however, could yet force Robles to make a last-ditch attempt to salvage his ramshackle coalition by settling on another candidate. The intense political maneuvering has forced the canal treaty issue into the background. Unless Robles can patch up his coalition, his administration will be so weakened that it will be unlikely to expend any ma- jor effort on the treaties during its final months in of- fice. 3.5(c) 2 Nov 67 5 -1.:SIP-S-Reltrr Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C031916243.5(c) *Congo (Kinshasa): (Kinshasa): Congolese Army units and "mer- cenaries" engaged in battle last night at Kisenge on the Angolan- Katangan border This possibly could be a first step of a mercenary "invasion" from Angola which has been rumored for some time. 3.3(h)(2) There have also been encoun- 3.3(h)(2) ters between Angolan nationalists and Portuguese author- ities, during which the Portuguese have chased the rebels over the Congolese border. It is possible that another such clash took place and, given the Congolese' present nervous state of mind, observers assumed that the white 3.5(c) men were mercenaries. 2 Nov 67 6 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) T-44-P�SEC RE'1' NOTES Afghanistan: The King yesterday appointed Nur Ahmad Etemadi as prime minister to succeed Moham- mad Maiwandwal who resigned because of poor health. Etemadi is considered conservative and pro-West and unlikely to initiate any major shifts in Afghan foreign or domestic affairs. 2 Nov 67 7 �8-ECITPT (continued) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) TJI/P_SEeRET Egypt: Egypt's position on acceptable terms for a settlement of the Middle East impasse has hardened recently. An article in the newspaper Al-Ahram 3.3(h)(2) said the amended Indian UN draft resolution was as far as Cairo would go toward finding a political solution to the Middle East crisis. This may be in part a tactical position, but the hardened stance probably re- flects Cairo's pessimism on the chances of getting an 3.5(c) acceptable Middle East resolution. 3.3(h)(2) *Ecuador: Student demonstrators in Guayaquil have intensified their activities in an attempt to force the resig- nation of Mayor Assad Bucaram. In the third day of vio- lence there were several casualties and the headquarters of Bucaram's political party was set afire. Army tanks have been called into the city to protect the municipal palace. The central government in Quito, seemingly in- different to Bucaram's fate, has been reluctant to get in- volved in the conflict but if the situation continues to de- teriorate there could be serious repercussions for the 3.5(c) national government. 2 Nov 67 8 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 3.5(c) cret Top edIet Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624 Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03191624