CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/06/27
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03191557
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Publication Date:
June 27, 1959
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27 June 1959
Copy No, C 62
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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NEXT REVIEW DATE: /4.1 ()_
AUTH: HR 70-2
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JEA..AVIL I
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27 JUNE 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Haile Selassie expected to accept some
of the various offers of Soviet assistance
during his forthcoming visit to Moscow.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Ceylon--Armed forces called out to pre-
serve order.
Morocco plans to ask officially for mil-
itary equipment from US.
III. THE WEST
Surface calm in Argentina; still rifts
among the armed forces.
Caribbean roundup.
LATE ITEM
USSR to fly Kozlov to New fork in its
largest transport, apparently in new
bid for aviation prestige.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 June 1959
DAILY BRIEF
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Ethiopia: Soviet leaders will offer Emperor Haile
Selassie various proposals for educational, economic, agri-
cultural, and military assistance during his first visit to the
USSR beginning on 29 June,
The Emperor, who wishes to stress
his independence of the United States and associate Ethiopia
more closely with Pan-Africanism, can be expected to ac-
cept some Soviet aid as a demonstration of this policy.
(Page 1)
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Ceylon: Governor General Goonetilleke on 26 June issued
a gene-Fir Mobilization order calling out Ceylon's armed forces,
to prevent the outbreak of civil disturbances and to maintain
essential services disrupted by a month-long wave of leftist-
led strikes. These strikes were designed to weaken Prime
I'Minister Bandaranaike's government in the period before Par,-
liament reconvenes on 30 June. At the moment, however, ex-
treme leftist parties plan to boycott the opening session of
Parliament, apparently with the intention of creating more po-
litical and economic confusion before directly challengi
Bandaranaike's control with a no-confidence motion.
Page 2)
Morocco: The government plans to make a formal request
of the United srates early next week for military equipment to
modernize Morocco's 31,000-man army. Such supply was agreed
14,1) to in principle in April. Negotiations would add strains to US-
French relations. Failure to begin the talks, however, might)
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!lead to increased pressure for the evacuation of US air bases in
Morocco and prompt Rabat to look to the Soviet bloc for arms.)
(Page 3)
III. THE WEST
Argentina: The formation of a new cabinet, though still
incomplete, has produced surface calm. Deep rifts and confu-
sion continue among the armed forces, which are the main
sources of pressure on President Frondizi. While a small mil-
itary group is still trying to promote a coup, negotiations involv-
ing compromise on new military command assignments may
counteract these efforts. (Page 4)
� Caribbean area: The determination of leftist and liberal
elements led by the Fidel Castro government of Cuba and Pres-
ident Betancourt of Venezuela to overthrow the Trujillo dicta-
torship in the Dominican Republic and the Somoza regime in
Nicaragua has brought the contenders close to war. It also
seriously threatens the stability of other governments, par-
ticularly the weak and unpopular regime in Haiti. Military ac-
tion has thus far been confined to rebel incursions into Nicara-
gua and the Dominican Republic, but may extend to counterac-
tion by the beleaguered regimes against governments supporting
the insurgents. Generalissimo Trujillo told the American Em-
bassy on 20 June that "defensive military action" against Cuba
will become "imperative" in the event of further insurgent land-
ings. The armed forces chief of Nicaragua also has considered
military action against hostile governments.
Latin American Communists, who are particularly influen-
tial among the Cuban-backed rebel groups, would probably win
influence in any post-revolutionary governments. The Commu-
nists are exploiting anti-dictator sentiment in the area and
charge the US with attempting to crush popular democratic move-
ments. Former Costa Rican President Figueres, who backed
27 June 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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the abortive early June attack on Nicaragua led by anti-
Communists, now feels that "all is lost to Communism" in
Nicaragua because the opposition is turning to Cuba for sup-
port nd is accepting Communist assistance.
The Organization of American States (OAS) faces the most
serious crisis in its history. President Betancourt told the
American ambassador on 23 June that the only alternative to
war in the Caribbean is the elimination of Trujillo. Venezuela,
he said, will oppose any OAS consideration of the situation,
which he feels could only aid Truji19
(Page 5)
LATE ITEM
*USSR: The USSR informed the US Embassy in Moscow on
26 June that it had decided to use a CLEAT (TU-114) rather than
a CAMEL (TU-104), to convey First Deputy Premier Frol Kozlov
non-stop to New York on 28 June for the opening of the Soviet
trade exhibit. A. N. Tupolev, the designer, and his collaborator
A. A. Arkhangelsky are to accompany Kozlov on this flight.
It is believed that the USSR has only one CLEAT, a four-
engine, double-deck, turboprop transport with an estimated
180-passenger capacity. It has been displayed four times on
ro the ground in Moscow since November 1957.
evidence of test flights this spring,
'ff% It has since flown to Albania, during Khrushchevis visit there,
and has made one trip to Paris.
This flight, however, will be the first known use of the air-
craft to transport an important personage and the presence of
the designer,Tupolev, underlines the importance the USSR at-
taches to the success of the flight from which it undoubtedly ex-
pects to attain considerable prestige.
er'
27 June 59
DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow to Press Aid Offers During Visit of Haile Selassie
Soviet Ambassador Karavaev told high Ethiopian officials
early in June that a broad selection of proposals for educa-
tional, economic, agricultural, and military assistance would
be presented during Emperor Haile Selassie's official visit to
the USSR scheduled to begin on 29 June,
Moscow was particularly inter-
ested in undercutting US military assistance and eliminating
the US military installation at Kagnew near Asmara.
The Emperor, who is trying to stress his "independence"
from the United States and associate Ethiopia more closely
with Pan-Africanism, will probably accept some form of Soviet
aid as a demonstration of this policy, although he does not
want additional bloc personnel in Ethiopia. A Soviet Embassy
official in Addis Ababa stated in April that "if the Emperor asks
for a loan he will get it." In February a visiting Soviet agricul-
tural team expressed interest in an assistance program, and a
five-man delegation arrived in Ethiopia on 10 June, apparently
to discuss plans to expand the Soviet hospital in Addis Ababa.
Soviet officials have regularly pressed Haile Selassie to set
a date for his visit since the invitation was extended by Soviet
President Voroshilov in January 1957. Prague is the only other
bloc capital the Emperor is scheduled to visit during this tour.
27 June 59
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II.' ASIA-AFRICA
Labor Agitation Growing in Ceylon
A month-long wave of leftist-led strikes in Ceylon, which
have seriously affected transportation and communications net-
works, resulted in Governor General Goonetilleke's issuing a
general mobilization order to the armed forces on 26 June to
maintain essential services and prevent popular disturbances.
The strikes have affected virtually every vital sector of
the economy. Colombo port has been the most severely hit.
Growing labor unrest and bad weather have caused the rate of
cargo handling to decline steadily since early May. On 25 June
port operations were halted completely by a strike. The Gov-
ernor General promptly ordered troops into the port,but their
usefulness may prove limited and their presence is likely to
cause protests by the workers.
Both floods and strikes have disrupted land transportation
and communications services. About 800 employees of the
nationalized bus system struck on 22 June, and 600 employees
of the Central Bank struck on 25 June. By granting the workers'
demands in almost every case, the government has weakened its
own position and has increased the likelihood of further strikes.
Continued labor agitation could soon result in serious pop-
ular unrest and active consideration by conservative elements
of plans to oust the government. Leftist opposition groups,
however, apparently now consider it necessary to weaken the
government further before attempting to vote it out of office.
The Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj and the Communist party re-
portedly plan to boycott the opening session of Parliament on 30
June when they had previously been expected to introduce a no-
confidence motion.
CO DENT-124.
27 June 59
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Formal Moroccan Request for US Arms Imminent
(King Mohamed V has indicated that Rabat early next week
will officially request US military equipment to be used to mod-
ernize Morocco's 31,000-man army. In a preliminary demarche
on the subject last March--to which the United States responded
by stating its willingness in principle to make American arms
available--Moroccan Defense Minister Aouad, who is close to
the King, spoke of $19,000,000 to $23,000,000 worth of tanks,
trucks, communications equipment, machine guns, ammunition,
observation aircraft, and helicopters)
Moroccan Security Director Laghzaoui, acting as a spokes-
man for the King, told American Ambassador Yost on 24 June
that the delay in following up Aouad's approach was due to oppo-
sition until recently on the part of Premier Ibrahim and Vice
Premier Bouabid, who reportedly argued that Czechoslovakia--
with which the former Balafrej government contracted for some
arms last year--had demonstrated greater willingness than the
US to make prompt and unconditional deliveries. The King;
Laghzaoui said, is particularly anxious to associate these adherents
of the divided Istiqlal party's left wing with negotiations for the
purchase of US arms, and hopes negotiations can be started be-
fore his scheduled 4 July departure for a vacation in Europe)
ouch negotiations would add further strains to already dif-
ficult US-French relations. French Foreign Minister Couve de
Murville reacted strongly in April to news of the American deci-
sion in principle. Failure to follow through with the talks and
conclude some agreement satisfactory to the Moroccans, how-
ever, might lead to greatly intensified and officially sanctioned
pressure for the evacuation of US air bases in Morocco. Fur-
thermore, Laghzaoui told Ambassador Yost he was convinced a
"fiasco!' would prompt his government to turn at once to the
Czechs.)
27 June 59
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I I I, THE WEST
New Argentine Cabinet Calms Surface Tension
Argentine President Frondizi's formation of a new cabinet,
although still incomplete, has had a surface calming effect.
However, deep rifts and confusion continue among the armed
forces, the main sources of pressure on the President. Frondizi's
appointment of Alvaro Alsogaray, an outspoken advocate of free
enterprise, to head the key Economy Ministry and temporarily
the Labor Ministry caused improvement in the peso exchange
rate and stock prices. At the same time, this evidence of
Frondizi's determination to press the US-backed stabilization
program drew sharp criticism from labor, various opposition
parties, and even segments of the administration party.
Because of this criticism, Alsogaray is having difficulty in
filling the six secretarial posts under his jurisdiction�the last
ones to be assigned in the cabinet of eight ministries and twelve
secretaries. Aside from Alsogaray, founder of the small Civic
Independent party, other opposit ion figures have refused to enter
the cabinet. Moreover, the largest opposition party issued a
manifesto on 24 June calling for Frondizi's resignation, repeating
the demand made a day earlier by retired Admiral Rojas, vice
president in the preceding Aramburu government.
Rojas' demand that Frondizi resign or face revolution shortly
probably contributed to the already deep rift in the navy and per-
haps in the army, where a breakdown in discipline has undermined
effective command. Aided by the cabinet changes, negotiations un-
der way to select compromise officers to replace the service
secretaries and to hold the top commands could counteract the ef-
forts of the small group of plotters intent on ousting Frondizi.
SECRET
27 June 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
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oi.:A.AN.E. 1
The Caribbean Crisis
The determination of leftists and liberals led by the Fidel
Castro government of Cuba and President Betancourt of Vene-
zuela to overthrow the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican
Republic and the Somoza regime in Nicaragua has brought the
contenders close to war. The situation also seriously threatens
other governments, particularly the weak unpopular regime in
Haiti. Military action has thus far been confined to rebel incur-
sions into Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, but may extend
to counteraction by the beleaguered regimes against governments
supporting the insurgents. Generalissimo 'Trujillo told the Ameri-
can ambassador on 20 June that "defensive military action" against
Cuba will become "imperative" in the event of further insurgent
landings. The armed forces chief of Nicaragua has also considered
action against the hostile governments.
Latin American Communists, who are particularly influential
among the Cuban-backed rebel groups, would probably win influ-
ence in any postrevolutionary governments. The Communists are
exploiting anti-dictator sentiment in the area and charge the US
with attempting to crush popular democratic movements. Former
Costa Rican President Figueres, who backed the abortive early June
attack on Nicaragua led by anti-Communists, nowfeels that "all is
lost to Communism" in Nicaragua as the anti-Somoza forces turn
to Cuba for support and accept Communist backing.
The Organization of American States (OAS) faces the most
serious crisis in its history. President Betancourt told the Ameri-
can ambassador on 23 June that the only alternative to war in the
Caribbean and a fiasco for the OAS is the elimination of Trujillo.
Venezuela, he said, will oppose any OAS co sideration of the situa-
tion which, he feels, could only aid Trujillo.
,.
Since 14 June, the Dominican Republic's 29-year-old Trujillo
dictatorship--the hemisphere's most ruthless--has been staggered
by three Cuban-based rebel incursions, which appear to have in-
volved up to 200 insurgents. Dominican officials privately admit
"substantial" army losses. There are indications of collaboration
with the rebels by local civilians and there may have been some
army defections. Even if the initial incursions fail, as Trujillo
27 June 59
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claims they already have, further landings are expected and the
myth of Trujillo's invulnerability has been broken.
In Nicaragua, the 1 June landings from Costa Rica by about
100 members of the opposition Conservative party failed to spark
a revolution despite a coordinated businessmen's strike in the
capital. The exiles have now turned to Cuba for support; a Nicaraguan
rebel force in the Honduran border area, which clashed with Honduran
army elements on 25 June, is apparently led by a Nicaraguan associated
with a pro-Communist group of exiles based in Cuba. The initial rebel
failure suggests that President Luis Somoza, who has liberalized the
regime he took over in 1956 from his father, does not face the wide
domestic opposition the rebels had counted on. Nevertheless, the
government expects further attacks and doubts its ability to withstand
continued foreign-backed incursions.
The weak unpopular Duvalier regime in Haiti, caught in hostile
Cuban-Dominican maneuvering and simultaneously harassed by a
wave of terrorism by emboldened opposition groups, is near panic.
Alerted for an invasion by Haitian exiles from Cuba and fearing
the intervention of Dominican forces, it has asked for a US naval
patrol of its shores.
Prime Minister Castro of Cuba, who is said to feel that the
Dominican revolution will progress slowly like his own two-year
struggle in Cuba, is faced with increasing unrest on the home front,
particularly over his drastic agrarian reform law. The Cuban mili-
tary is alerted for counterrevolutionary attempts and believes anti-
Castro exiles in the Dominican Republic are pep ring for imminent
action. On 26 June p Cuba informed the OAS that it h d broken rela-
tions with the Dominican Republic.
The Venezuelan coalition of President Betancourt, implacable
enemy of Trujillo, has also shown signs of strain. Rumors of armed
forces plotting and dissension have been renewed recently. (SE-
-SEC-fitur"
27 June 59
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDE N*I :AL
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