CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/05/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03191539
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 13, 1959

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. IX
i - DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: 112S0Cos
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13 MAY 1959
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Recent Eltrushchev speeches attempt
to convey attitude of reasonableness
coupled with claims of Soviet mili-
tary predominance.
Further reorganization of Soviet
agriculture likely.
USSR planning pipeline connecting
Urals-Volga oil field with refineries
In East Europe.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Morocco asks for joint commission
to fix precise evacuation period for
US bases.
Communist press steps up pressure
on Qasim to legalize parties and ap-
point Communists to cabinet.
Nine independent African states to
hold conference on AlRerian orob-
lem this summer.
Indochina - France to curtail its
financial contributions to ICC.
TOP ET
IIL THE WEST
0 De Gaulle willing to discuss "over-
all problems" of Algeria with rebel
leader Abbas.
IV.
� Conclusions of special USIB com-
mittee on the Berlin situation.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 May 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Geneva: Since returning from his vacation on 26
April, Khrushchev has made a series of statements combin-
ing assurances of Soviet reasonableness with claims of Soviet
military predominance. In the latest of these pronouncements--
a speech in Kiev on 11 May--he asserted that the USSR's inter-
national situation is "better than ever before" and went so far
as to claim that "perhaps it will not be long" until the USSR be-
gins to "curtail" its missile production. Khrushchev again
expressed confidence that a summit meeting will be held re-
gardless of the outcome of the present talks, and hinted that he
favors a series of heads-of-government meetings.
(Page 1)
USSR: Iihrushchev's criticism of the USSR Ministry of
Agriculture in a speech at Kiev on 12 May indicates that ex-
tensive further reorganization of Soviet agriculture is in the
offing, possibly involving some decentralization which could
include abolition of the ministry and transferral of its person-
nel to the field. Such a move would carry forward Khrushchev's
reorganization of Soviet economic administration. He has taken
a direct personal interest in Soviet agriculture, and is evidently
continuing to seek some way to achieve the ambitious goals which
he has set. (Page 2)
USSR - Eaptern Europe: EIlhe USSR is to build jointly with
East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 2,400 miles
of oil pipelines connecting the Urals-Volga oil field with refin-
eries in East Europe.' The line is scheduled .to begin opera-
tion in 1963-64 and apparently will be able to deliver at reduced
costs the estimated 320,000 barrels per day of crude oil which
these countries will require from the USSR by 1965. The East]
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tguropean countries are to be responsible for producing or pry-
curing materials for the pipeline and an Italian firm allegedly
has agreed to help build the section passing through Polish te - ei
tory.] (Page 3) (Map) �
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Morocco - US bases: 1:Temier Ibrahim again raised the
issue of US tenure of its air bases in Morocco during an 8 May
discussion with the US ambassador. Asserting that progress
in weapons technology should enable the US to quit the bases
within about a year, Ibrahim has proposed the formation of a
joint US-Moroccan commission to fix the precise evacuation
period. Ibrahim also reiterated his earlier suggestion that one
of the bases be evacuated promptly as a demonstration of US in-
tentiol!), (Page 4)
Iraq: The Communist-controlled press is intensifying its
pressure on Qasim to legalize political parties and to appoint
avowed Communists to the revised 18-post cabinet. Editorials
during the past few days have sharply attacked the government
on this issue, and have referred to Qasim in tones less laud-
atory than usual. The strongly pro-Communist ministers of �
economy and health have publicly backed the party's demands,
and the leading Communist newspaper is seeking endorsements
from other cabinet members. (Page 5)
African conference: The independent African states are
planning to hold a conference at the ministerial level on the
Algerian problem during the latter part of July, possibly in
Guinea,
UN representatives of these nine states have agreed upon most
of the details. Such a conference, which may result in greater
African involvement in the Algerian problem, would certainly
provoke adverse French reaction.
(Page 6)
Indochina: tThe role of the International Control Committee
in Indochina may soon be sharply reduced as a result of France's
13 May 59
DAILY BRIEF ii
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tclecision to curtail its present financial contributions. The UK,
cochairman with the USSR of the 1954 Geneva conference which
ended the Indochina war, believes that Moscow may seize upon
this issue to call another meeting of the nations concerned:I
(Page 7)
III. THE WEST
France -Algeria: De Gaulle is reported willing to discuss
"over-all problems" of Algeria with rebel leader Ferhat Abba.9
who may eventually accept direct talks in Paris. De Gaulle's
recent optimistic public statements concerning the end of the
war suggest that he now feels prospects for rebel acceptance
of his offers are brightez3 (Page 8)
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached
by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee
pointed out that its conclusions are to be used in context with
SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that
estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959).
1. So long as negotiations are in progress or
the USSR estimates that the prospects for a summit
meeting are good� it will probably not g.2 so far as to
turn over access controls to the GDR. tgowever, the
USSR may play up the possibility of such action at any
stage in the negotiations should it consider greater
pressure to be advantageoul4 The actual physical trans-
fer of controls could be accomplished with little or no
warning.
2. At Geneva, the Soviet Union delayed the open-
ing of the foreign ministers' conference by its efforts
to extort the highest possible status for the East Ger-
man "delegation" and increase the likelihood of seating
13 May 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Poland and Czechoslovakia as full conference par-
ticipants. Meanwhile, the bloc has been attempting
through a wide variety of media to give the impres-
sion of reasonableness as far as negotiations are
concerned, but backed up with great military strength.
3. While there are no reliable indications of a
bloc intent to blockade Allied or West German access
to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin, in the
near future, the USSR could take such actions with
little or no warning.
4. There have been no significant changes in
Soviet capabilities to respond to possible Western ac-
tions in the event of turnover, harassment, or block-
ade.
13 May 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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I
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev Uses Rocket Claims to Back Negotiating Position
Khrushchev's 11 May speech in Kiev is the latest in a series
of statements made since his return from vacation on 26 April in
which he has combined assurances of Soviet reasonableness in
negotiations with claims of military predominance. Calling the
foreign ministers' conference the first step in the cause of eas-
ing international tension, he expressed confidence that a summit
meeting will be held regardless of the outcome and hinted that he
favors a series of heads-of-government meetings.
At Kiev, he also asserted that the USSR's international sit.
uation is "better than ever before" and remarked that the Soviet
Union has good rockets "in the xequired number" and "perhaps"
before long will "curtail" their production. He warned that al-
though in a war the West could inflict "no little destruction" on
the USSR, the Western powers would be threatened with "inevit-
able catastrophe."
he is not
woi lea tnat a war might begin over Berlin as a result of a deli
orate decision, but that he is concerned that an incident might
precipitate hostilities. He declared that England and France
could be effectively destroyed with only five rockets each and
West Germany with four-.1 In an interview with West German
Socialist editors on 5 May, he said the Soviet Union has "enough
rockets for Arnericaitoo."
.Ctirushchev's boasts regarding Soviet missile capabilities
probably were designed to reinforce his claim that the interna-
tiOnal balance of power has shifted to the bloc's favor. While
it is probable that the Soviet Union might now have what it re-
gards as a sufficient number of short- to medium-range ballis-
tic missiles (i. e., 100- to 350-nautical-mile range), it is ex-
tremely doubtful that sufficient quantities of the longer range
missiles exist that production would be curtailed}
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1 11.11-d
Khrushchev Criticizes the USSR Ministry of Agriculture
Khrushchev, referring to agricultural problems during a
speech on 11 May in Kiev, charged that the Ministry of Agri-
culture and its local organs had failed in many ways to meet
present day needs. Khrushchev said that the ministry staff
must become organizers of production and suggested that the
salaries of such officials be according to results obtained at
the farms they supervise. He also declared that the time had
come to reorganize agricultural research work completely,
suggesting that this and other services of the ministry be put
on a "commercial basis."
Khrushchev's speech is the latest in a series of recent
criticisms directed at the ministry. The Soviet press has car-
ried several articles discussing the advantage of relieving the
ministry of its jurisdiction over forestry and the Repair and
Technical Stations (RTS), and of reducing its role in administer-
ing state farms. "Kolkhoz Unions" have been suggested to re-
place the ministry in administering collective farms and to be-
come the main organizational link in agriculture, possibly up
through the republic level. In the field of scientific technology,
the ministry has been scored for failing to encourage initiative
on the part of agricultural innovators.
Recent organizational and personnel changes, which also
may point the way to extensive agricultural reorganization, were
the consolidation of the Agricultural Bank into the new Investment
Bank announced on 4 March, the appointment on 16 April of Nikolay
G. Ignatov to the post of titular president of the RSFSR� which re-
lieved him of his responsibilities in the agriculture field, and the
replacement of Vladimir Mylarshchikov as head of the party
central committee's Department of Agriculture for the RSFSR.
It appears probable that the Third All-union Collective Farmers'
Congress, originally scheduled for the "beginning of 1959," has
been postponed to give the regime more time to resolve auestions
of agricultural reorganization.
CONFI AL
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PLANNEO SOVIET4.
SWEDEN!,
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Pipeline oil
Crude Oil Region
200 400
MILES
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Soviet - East European Pipeline
To accommodate East Europe's increasing demand for
oil from the USSR, 2,400 miles of pipelines are planned by
1964 to connect the Urals-Volga oil field with refineries in
East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The
lines will substantially reduce transportation costs and presum-
ably be adequate to handle the estimated 320,000 barrels per
day which these countries expect to receive from the USSR by
1965. Rail transportation handled most of the 80,000 barrels
per day delivered by the USSR in 1958.
(�he
T USSR presented plans for construction of these oil
lines and for procurement of pipe at a meeting of the bloc Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance in December 1958. The
USSR will construct the line from the Urals-Volga oil field to
Mozyr by 1963. Poland and East Germany will be responsible
for supplying equipment for construction from Mozyr to the
Polish border, and Czechoslovakia and Hungary will jointly
build the section from Mozyr to the Czech border. Earh East
European country will bear the costs of construction within its
borders, except in Poland where East Germany will share con-
struction costs4
It is probable that some material will be sought in the
West. According to one press report, an Italian firm agreed
in April to assist in the construction of the section passing
through Polish territory. The USSR is to supply technical as-
sistance and "rent" heavy machinery to the satellites.
The Soviet Union is now seeking pipe in the West for
the construction of another line from the Urals-Volga area to
Klaipeda on the Baltic Sea. This line is planned to supply oil
for the West European market.
QRE
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I
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Morocco Advanc r w Bases
[Moroccan Premier Ibrahim has advanced new proposals
for the future of the five American air bases in Morocco, con-
centrating on the key issue of US tenure. In a conversation
with Ambassador Yost in Rabat late last week, Ibrahim sug-
gested a public declaration by the US accepting the establish-
ment of a joint US-Moroccan commission to settle this question.
Such a declaration, the premier said, might also publicize US
recognition, already given in private negotiations, of the principle
of evacuation and Moroccan sovereignty over the baseq
(ibrahim asserted that the Moroccan Government would not
require "immediate" evacuation, but considers that the progress
being made in weapons technology should enable the US to abandon
the bases in twelve months or so. He also reiterated a suggestion
he had made earlier that the US give up one of its bases immediate-
ly as a demonstration of its intentions. He expressed the view
that such a gesture would have excellent effects on public opinion
throughout the Arab world and particularly in Morocco--where
the premier is undoubtedly concerned about increasingly sharp
opposition attacks on his government's failure to achieve any
progress toward the evacuation of the basesj
C_So far the Ibrahim government has not reintroduced the sug-
gestion made by former Premier Balafrej last September that pend-
ing evacuation the bases should not be used for "strategic" purposes4
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� 1�1 1L.FL.U1 14-1.1-I
Communist-controlled Iraqi Press Intensifies Pressure
On Qasim
The Communist-controlled press in Iraq has stepped up
its campaign for restoration of an officially sanctioned polit-
ical party system and for inclusion of avowed Communist party
representatives in the Iraqi cabinet. It has reminded Prime
Minister Qasim of the services which the Communists have
rendered and has insisted that a return to party activity is es-
sential for making Iraq a "true democracy." Stating that the
present nonparty "national union" system had been advocated
by former Deputy Premier Arif and other "reactionary plotters,"
one paper has called for a party-based coalition government.
The press has avoided direct editorial attacks on Qasim, but
has begun to refer to him as "prime minister" and "dutiful son
of the people" and not, as heretofore, as "sole leader." Pro-
Communist Economy Minister Kubba and pro-Communist Health
Minister Shawwaf have publicly backed the party's demands, and
the leading Communist newspaper is seeking endorsements
from other cabinet ministers.
A decision is to be expected soon on at least some new cab-
inet appointments, following the government's announcement on
28 April that the cabinet has been revised and expanded to in-
clude a total of eighteen portfolios.
CA:7s a result of his conversations with the prime minister a
few days ago, Foreign Minister Jawad feels that Qasim will m
selections only on the basis of "individual merit" and will not ap-
point representatives of any particular party. Jawad and several
other non-Communist government officials, believing that the
Communists are overplaying their hand, are hoping for "reassur-
ing developments" before the end of
T1AL
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African Nations to Hold Conference on Algerian Problems
Nine independent African nations, excluding the Union of
South Africa, are planning to hold a conference at the foreign
minister level in late July to discuss the Algerian problem.
However, several states�Liberia, Ethiopia, and Ghana--are
known to have questioned the desirability of such a conference.
The plan for the conference stems from a request by the-
Algerian Provisional Government on 31 March that African
governments meet in July to consider the Algerian situation.1
The conference would probably ,consider the possibility of giv-
ing the Algerian rebels political and material aid as well as
means of influencing world public opinion about the rebellion.
(Liberia hesitated to endorse the conference plan because
it has not recognized the rebel government] but, along with
Ethiopia, reportedly agreed to attend inThe name of African
unity. Both states are likely to exert a moderating influence.
Apparently Guinea has been a leading proponent of a con-
ference, and has proposed its capital as a possible site. A
conference at Conakry, while enhancing President Toure's tat-
ure, as an African nationalist leader, would put further strain
on the already tense relations between France and Guinea.
TO RET
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France Cuts Support for ICC in Indochina
[financial stringencies may soon force a further reduction
in the scope of the International Control Commission (ICC) in
Indochina. The ICC ended its activities in Laos last July. Ex-
isting funds for ICC activities will be exhausted in a few weeks,
and France, which has been shouldering most of the financial
burden, is unwilling to appropriate additional funds unless the
ICC in Cambodia is dissolyed or adjourned and the ICC in Viet-
nam drastically retrenched-1j
e ICC, comprising India, Canada, and Poland, was es-
tablished in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to supervise imple-
mentation of the political and military provisions of the 1954
Geneva armistice agreements ending the Indochina war. Its
original importance and authority have greatly diminished with
the gradual return of more settled conditions in the area, al-
though in divided Vietnam it still remains a significant factor.
The UK, Canada, and the US favor gradual phasing out of the
ICC. India, anxious to preserve the status quo in Indochina, is
not only opposed to any change in the status of the armistice
machinery in Indochina, but has supported Communist bloc ef-
forts to reconvene the ICC in Laos.'
IT-he Communist bloc believes the ICC provides important
propaganda and political opportunities to block the extension of
Western influence in Indochina and can be expected to oppose any
move to undermine it. The UK, cochairman with the USSR of
the 1954 Geneva conference, believes that Moscow might seize
upon the financial issue to call a second meeting of the nations
concerned. Because of its official capacity in this matter, the
UK fears it would be hard put to resist such a Soviet move.1
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III. THE WEST
De Gaulle Reported Ready to Discuss Over-all Problems With
Algerian Rebel Leader
trip Gaulle has indicated to Algerian rebel leader icernat
Abbas that he is willing to discuss "over-all problems" rather
than merely a cease-fire,
Since De Gaulle has refused to send a rep-
resentative to meet Abbas outside France, Abbas eventually
may come to Paris for direct talks with the French President.
a cease-fire would be followed by a
referendum proposing a specific Algerian political status but not
opening the way to independence7
tMost of De Gaulle's public statements on Algeria have
been sufficiently ambiguous to be interpreted by liberals as
leaving the door open for negotiations with the rebels and by
rightists as indicating only a cease-fire would be considered.
Despite numerous reports of secret contacts between De Gaulle's
representatives and rebel leaders since last fall, negotiations
failed to materialize and prospects for talks have improved only
since the rebel military situation has worsened./
[De Gaulle's recent optimistic public reference to the ap-
proaching end of the fighting suggests that he feels prospects
for rebel acceptance of his offers are brighter than previously.
There have also been reports that he anticipates difficulty over
Algeria later this year with the rightist-dominated National As-
sembly, and that he has offered a top cabinet post to Socialist
Guy Mollet, who favors a liberal solution'.7
SE
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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