CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/07/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03190728
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: July 20, 1959

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20 July 1959
Copy No. C 63
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE CHANGE IN CLASS. IX
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: ISA
NEXT REVIEW DATE: rie GO /1)
'ID�UATTYI Tilk REVIEWER:
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20 JULY 1959
I. THN COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR launcifs 12th successful ICBM
on 18 July.
Khrushchev reassures Poles on status
quo in Eastern Europe.
Gromyko shows interest in proposal
for small subcommittee of UN Disarm-
ament Commission.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Ethiopia receives offer of aid from
Czechoslovakia.
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II L THE WEST
0 French claim Algerian rebels using
US arms.
LATE ITEMS
0 Iraq--Kirkuk disorders apparently
suppressed; Qasim promises pun-
ishment for troublemakers.
()Comment on situation in Cuba.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: The USSR launched an ICBM on the Tyura Tam
Missile rest Range at about 1415 EDT on 18 July. From
communications radar and telemetry intercepts, the flight
Is judged to have terminated in the previous impact area--
on or near the Kamchatka Peninsula. Three telemetry links
were reported from the launch area and two from the term-
inal area. The countdown was delayed more than an hour for
reasons not yet known. This was the 12th Soviet ICBM firing
believed to have reached, Its intended impact area.
USSR-Poland: Khrushchev's pledge at Szczecin 'on 17
July to defena both the frontier between East and West Ger-
many and the Oder-Neisse line was probably intended to re-
assure the Poles, during this period of East-West negotia-
tions, that Moscow would permit no change in the status quo
in Eastern Europe. He probably also intended to warn the
West that any solution to the Berlin-German problem must
be based on a "two Germanys" approach in order to put at
rest any hope for a reunified Germany which would be either
Western oriented or independent. His endorsement of Gomulka
and Polish agricultural policies may sharpen the contrast be-
tween liberal Polish practices and the increasingly restrictive
measures followed in the other satellites.
(Page 1)
USSR: tGromyko has shown interest in suggestions made
by Dag Ha.mmarskjold for creating a ten-
nation subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission to be
1.
VA
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ic-omposed of five Western, three blot, and two neutral coun-
tries. The Soviet foreign minister observed that agreement
could be reached quickly if the matter were raised informally
at the foreign ministers' conference. Moscow probably be
lieves that since disarmament can be expected to be on the
agenda of any summit conference, such a group wodld provi
a useful forum to which to refer the negotiations at the close
of the heads-of-goveriunent talks/
(Page 3) �
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Ethiopia-Czechoslovakia: Negotiations for Czech eco-
nomic aid to Ethiopia will begin soon, according to a commu-
nique issued at the end of Haile Selassie's visit to Prague.
Czechoslovakia offered to deliver capital goods on a credit
basis and to negotiate� economic and technical-cooperation
agreements.
While in Moscow Haile Selassie sent word to Addis Ababa,
according to an unconfirmed report, that he wanted steps taken
to cancel the agreement for the US military communicatioris
center at Asmara. A number of high-level officials in Addis ,
Ababa, alarmed by the Emperor's acts while he has been abroad,
are rumored to be plotting against him. A coup, however, ap-
pears unlikely at the present tim_.e3
(Page 4)
III. THE WEST
France: Premier Debra, in a further effort to halt pro-
posed US arms shipments to Tunisia, has charged that arms
and ammunition of US manufacture have been found in posses-
sion of the Algerian rebels, possibly passed to them by Tuhis.
Debra told Ambassador Houghton in Paris that shipments of US
arms to Tunisia should be held up pending an investigation.
Meanwhile, tension is reported building up along the Tunisian-
Algerian border, apparently as an aftermath of the 14 July rebel
attack on a French outpost.
20 Jury 50
DAILY BRIEF ii
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LATE ITEMS
*Iraq: The violent disorders in Kirkuk which began on 14
July apparently have been suppressed. Prime Minister Qasim
on 19 July publicly condemned the violence there and threatened
"severe punishment" for the instigators, as well as for poten-
tial troublemakers elsewhere in Iraq. Qasirn stated that the
authorities will deal with "enemies of the people." The Commu-
nists, acting on the occasion of the celebration of the Iraqi rev-
olution on 14 July, precipitated the outbreak by playing on the
traditional hatred between Kurdish and Turkoman elements. b-
subordinate army units joined the Communists in the disorders,_,J
(Page 6)
*Cuba: President Urrutia's forced resignation on 17 July
has giFfir demonstrated Fidel Castro's wide support among the
Cuban masses. He is expected to use this support to try to iso-
late his opposition, which he contends emanates largely from a
� reactionary minority with special interests. Castro's dictatorial
action against Urrutia, however, may weaken his position among
segments of the important middle class, where respect for dem-
ocratic forms has always been strongest. Newly appointed Pres-
ident Dorticos, who is likely to be a pliant front man for Castro,
has announced that the cabinet will remain unchanged at this time.
Communist demands for representation in top government posi-
tions are unlikely to be acceded to, at least in the near future.
The Communists, however, are doubtless encouraged by Urru-
tia's ouster, which apparently was brought on in part by the
former President's strong anti-Communist statements of 13 July.
20 July 59
DAILY BRIEF iii
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev in Poland
While many of Khrushchev's public remarks since his ar-
rival in Poland on 14 July have been devoted to foreign policy
Issues, he has chosen topics which are of special interest to
the Poles. At Szczecin on 17 July, he avoided direct refer-
ence to the talks in Geneva, but reaffirmed that the USSR
"firmly defends and will defend" its proposals on Germany
and Berlin.
In an effort to reassure the Poles that any future East-West
agreements would preserve the status quo in Eastern Europe,
he pledged Moscow's continued support for preserving both the
frontier between East and West Germany and Oder-Neisse line
"as if they were Soviet borders." This statement probably was
also intended as a warning to the West that any solution to the
Berlin-German problem must be negotiated in the context of
"two Germanys" in order to put at rest any hopes for a reuni-
fied Germany which would be either Western oriented or inde-
pendent.
Khrushchev's reiteration of his plea for a Baltic "zone of
peace" and warnings against the establishment of Western rocket
and nuclear bases on Scandinavian soil were probably in anticipa-
tion of a major theme during his forthcoming Scandinavian visit.
The premier'sfirm endorsement of Polish party leader Gomulka
is the most important development in Soviet-Polish relations to
come from Khrushchev's visit, which is his first official one to
Poland since the "Polish October" three years ago. Praising
Polish developments in general, Khrushchev announced at Poznan
on 18 July his support of Gomulka's slow agricultural socializa-
tion program; at least, he endorsed Gomulka's concept that so-
cialization can be achieved only by voluntary methods and open
peasant support.
Khrushchev thus accepted Gomulka's cautious moves in this
controversial field at a time when other satellites are intensifying
CONFIDENTIAL
20 July 59
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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their programs to achieve a realization of socialism by 1965.
The differences in speed of socialist construction among the sat-
ellites is a potential source of intrabloc friction.
Khrushchev emphasized repeatedly the strength and indus-
trial power of the USSR in a fairly direct effort to impress the
Polish people and leaders with the validity of Soviet policies and
the virtues accruing to those who "march along together" on the
road to socialism. The latter point implies greater encourage-
ment to the Polish party to speed up its advance to socialism and
may have been designed to encourage a narrowing of the differ-
ences between Poland and the bloc.
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Plan for UN Disarmamgnt uommission buDcommittee
i Secretary General Dag Harnmarskjold on 14 July out-
lined to Secretary Herter a plan for organizing the Disarmament
Commission which he said he had discussed at length with Soviet
UN delegate Zorin six months ago. Hammarskjold's proposal
would create a bureau to be composed of a chairman and rappor-
teur from the neutral countries and two vice chairmen, one from
a bloc country other than the Soviet Union and the other from a
small Western nation. To this group would be added the US, the
UK, France, and the USSR to form a subcommittee of the Dis-
armament Commission. Hammarskjold agreed that one additional
representative from each side might be added, making a ten-nation
body composed of five Western, three bloc, and two neutral nations.]
Elammarskjold approached Gromyko with
his proposal but did not mention specific nations. Gromyko viewed
the plan with interest, stating he was convinced that if the matter
were raised informally among the four foreign ministers, agree-
ment would be reached quickly. He said he favored keeping the
forum small and added that parity would not be a necessary in-
gredienS
(Moscow probably believes that, in view of the probability of
the disarmament issue appearing on the agenda of any summit con-
ference, a body along the lines of Hammarskjold's suggestion would
provide a useful forum to which to refer negotiations on this sub-
ject at the close of the heads-of-government talks�in particular
negotiations on Soviet proposals for disengagement in Central
Europe, atom- and rocket-free zones, and troop and armaments
cuts. Moscow might also hope that such a body could exploit the
Irish proposal for preventing the further spread of nuclear weap-
ons, which the Czech representative to the United Nations told
the Dutch representative Prague would suppoilq
20 July 59
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*quo,
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Further Bloc Aid to Ethiopia
Negotiations for Czechoslovakian economic assistance to
Ethiopia will begin soon, according to a communiqu�ssued
at the end of Emperor Haile Selassie's visit to Prague. Czecho-
slovakia has offered to deliver capital goods on a credit basis
and to negotiate economic and technical-cooperation agreements
between the two countries. According to an Ethiopian official,
the credit will total $20,000,000 and will include the purchase of
Czech military equipment. The only previous Czech aid to
Ethiopia was a $2,000,000 line of credit extended last year for
the purchase of hospital equipment and supplies.
The Soviet Union, under its recently granted $100,000,000
credit,Bs studying a plan for the construction of a pharmaceu-
tical plant in Ethiopia, as well as plans for training 15,000 retired
Ethiopian soldiers in agriculture and establishing the necessary
farms to accommodate them)
VIoscow probably will provide both technical
assistance and equipment for the agricultural program.
Ethiopia estimates the total col of that
program at about $44,000,000.
1/1eanwhile, it is rumored in Addis Ababa that a number of
high-level officials are alarmed by these agreements and are plot-
ting a bloodless coup to overthrow Haile Selassie and set up a cbn-
stitutional monarchy headed by the Crown Prince. According to
the rumors, the alleged plotters claim support from among high
army and church officials--as well as from the Crown Prince.
They plan to abrogate the recent bloc agreements and seek addi-
tional economic aid from the US. Another unconfirmed report
indicates opposition to instructions the Emperor allegedly sent
from Moscow, that the Ethiopian Parliament should at its open-
ing session in early November abrogate an agreement permitting
US operation of a military communications installation in Asmara,
Eritrea)
..g.n attempt to depose Haile Selassie in the foreseeable future
appears unlikely, in view of his widespread popularity and close.]
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20 July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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lersonal control over the country's military forces�especially
over the Imperial Bodyguard, which is considered the only ef-
fective fighting for
..q
Ethiopian officials generally have expressed elation over
the "successes in Moscow." Although some top officials re-
portedly feel the Emperor may have gone too far; even the
discontented and potential opposition elements apparently be-
lieve he gained in stature as a result of the bloc agreements.
20 July 59
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LATE ITEM
The Iraqi Situation
The violence which began in Kirkuk on 14 July during cel-
ebrations of last year's revolution apparently has been sup-
pressed. Local Communists capitalized on the traditional
hatred between Kurds and Turkomans to create an incident
which developed into widespread street fighting., Armed Com-
munists, heavily armed Popular Resistance Forces, and some
army elements killed a number of leading notables and dragged
their bodies through the streets.
Eihe acting commander of the 2nd Division. headquarters of
which are at Kirkuk, was unable to control his own troops and
reportedly was compelled by Communist officers and men to
remain in his headquarters. Communist soldiers and Popular
Resistance men killed the divisional intelligence officer and
several other officers4
(Alarge number of officers of this division were purged
following the Mosul rebellion last March and were replaced by
reserve officers, many of them Communists. The division's
previous, pro-Communist commander had since March�with
out authority--armed the Popular Resistance with numerous
automatic weapons. The combination of these circumstances
emboldened the Communists to ac9
In a speech on 19 July, Prime Minister Qasim publicly con-
demned the outbreak in Kirkuk and threatened "severe punish-
ment" for the instigators, as well as for any potential trouble-
makers elsewhere in Iraq. Qasim warned the Communists and
other self-appointed guardians of the state not to take the law
into their own hands, stating that the authorities will deal with
"enemies of the people." He implied that "naive" soldiers at
Kirkuk had been deceived by some subordinate officers and de-
clared, "Soldiers must obey orders issued by their officers and
the Supreme Command,"
20 July 59
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CONFIDENTIAL
Noe Now
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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