CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/10/16
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CURRENT
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INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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16 October 1957
Copy No. 138
DOCUMENT NO.
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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Norl Noe
CONTENTS
0.42, 1. SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY APPEAL TO WEST EUROPEAN
SOCIALIST PARTIES (page 3).
D-re-
2. SUPREME SOVIET TO MEET ON 6 NOVEMBER
(page 5).
3. POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO
MEET (page 6).
4. FRENCH COMMUNISTS MAY FORCE RIOTS ON 17 OCTOBER
(page 7).
5. BONN CONSIDERING BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH YUGOSLAVIA (page 8).
6. BELLIGERENT SYRIAN ATTITUDE ON ISRAELI BORDER
(page 9).
7. SYRIAN CHIEF OF STAFF MAY VISIT KING SAUD ON
20 OCTOBER (page 10).
n-40 8. PRESIDENT MIRZA STILL NEGOTIATING TO END PAKISTANI
GOVERNMENT CRISIS (page 11).
Oa- 9. SECOND INDONESIAN NATIONAL CONFERENCE PLANNED
FOR NOVEMBER (page 12).
02_ 10. NEHRU'S VISIT TO JAPAN
(page 13).
0-1L, 11. THREAT OF COUP IN GUATEMALA GROWING AS ELEC-
TION NEARS (page 14).
CLIL--- 12. JUNTA CHIEF KEBREAU REASSERTING CONTROL OVER
HAITI (page 15).
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1. SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY APPEAL TO WEST
EUROPEAN SOCIALIST PARTIES
Comment on:
The appeal which the central committee of
the Soviet Communist party addressed to
Socialist parties in seven West European
NATO countries on 15 October was appar-
ently designed to advance four major objec-
tives:
(1) to focus world attention on Soviet charges of Western
plotting against Syria and underline Soviet support of the Syrian-
Egyptian axis;
(2) to encourage Socialist parties in the NATO countries
to bring pressure on their governments to block alleged Amer-
ican and Turkish plans to intervene in Syria;
(3) to generate suspicion of American aims in the Middle
East and divide the United States and its European NATO allies;
(4) to lay the groundwork for a revival of the pre -Hungary
efforts to establish closer relations with non-bloc Socialist par-
ties and to encourage their cooperation with local Communists.
The Soviet central committee's message to
the British Labor Party reiterated charges made by Soviet
spokesmen and in diplomatic notes over the past month of Amer-
ican and Turkish military preparations for an attack on Syria.
It pointedly reminded the Laborites that Britain, by the opera-
tion of its NATO obligations, might be drawn into a "military
adventure by the United States and Turkey."
The message asserted there was "a certain
rapprochement" between the views of the two parties on inter-
national issues. It proposed "joint action" to maintain peace in
the Middle East and called upon the Labor party to support the
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USSR's proposal for a four-power declaration condemning
the use of force and interference in the interng affairs of
Middle East countries, as well as a "mutual stoppage" of
arms deliveries to the area.
The Soviet leaders probably will use the
forthcoming 40th anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik
revolution to make renewed appeals to the Socialists for co-
operation in the name of "international working class unity."
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2. SUPREME SOVIET TO MEET ON 6 NOVEMBER
Comment on:
The convening of a special session of the
Supreme Soviet on 6 November, "devoted
to the 40th anniversary of the October rev-
olution;' presumably is intended to give the
appearance of popular backing to the official statements that
are scheduled to be made on that date in connection with the cel-
ebration. The Soviet leaders may use the meeting to obtain
formal approval for the major address which is traditionally
delivered by a leading member of the hierarchy on the evening
of the sixth. This address may include a report on the inter-
national situation and on foreign policy, particularly with ref-
erence to the Middle East, the earth satellite and ICBM devel-
opments.
The Supreme Soviet has already met twice
this year, as required by the constitution, but another meeting
had been expected at the end of the year to give formal approval
to the 1958 state budget and probably to adopt the economic plan
for 1958. These plans may therefore also be discussed, t this
meeting.
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3. POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TO MEET
Comment on:
the antici-
pated tenth plenum of the central com-
mittee of the Polish United Workers'
(Communist) party will be held in Warsaw within the next
few days.
Gomulka will probably use the plenum for
new attacks on both conservative and revisionist factions in
the party, and to consolidate majority support for the policies
he plans to present at the party congress scheduled for Decem-
ber. The central committee will probably approve the program
to be discussed and set a specific date for the congress, the
first such meeting since Gomulka's accession to power in Octo-
ber 1956.
Press censorship, a principal cause under-
lying the Warsaw student demonstrations of early October, will
probably also be discussed at the plenum'. A Trybuna Ludu edi-
torial on 11 October condemned criticism of the type featured
in Po prostu, the suppressed journal of the extreme revisionists,
as antigovernment in intent. Warsaw has been quiet since the
student riots, but dissatisfaction among Polish intellectuals has
increased in recent weeks as a result of tightened press censor-
ship and restrictions on travel to the West.
Although the Stalinist wing of the Polish party
suffered a severe setback at the ninth plenum in May, it remains
a possible threat to the stability of Gomulka's regime, despite some
success on Gomulka's part in eliminating Stalinists from lower party
echelons.
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4. FRENCH COMMUNISTS MAY FORCE RIOTS ON
17 OCTOBER
Comment on:
�t"
The French Interior Ministry's ban on the
demonstrations scheduled by the Commu-
nist party for 17 October regarding Algeria
is indicative of the government's touchiness
as the political crisis enters its third week.
If the Communists go ahead with their an-
nounced intention to demonstrate regardless
of the ban, some disturbances can be ex-
pected.
Although Communist demonstrations have
been banned in the past when there was a
likelihood of disorders, the government is
probably particularly alert now to avoid any
situation which might induce violent rightist
counteraction. Paris police concern over the
demonstrations was evident in an official rec-
ommendation on 14 October that US personnel
steer clear of the city on 17 October.
Further social-economic unrest is possible
as pressure builds up for new wage hikes in the face of climbing
prices. Members of the gas and electricity unions have sched-
uled a 24-hour work stoppage for wage increases on 16 October,
and unrest is growing in the metallurgical industry. The Social-
ist-oriented Workers Force is increasingly fearful that it may
not be able much longer to restrain demands from the rank and
file for an all-out campaign for wage increases.
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5. BONN CONSIDERING BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH YUGOSLAVIA
Comment on:
Chancellor Adenauer's immediate reaction
to Yugoslav recognition of East Germany
was to favor breaking diplomatic relations
with Belgrade, and State Secretary for
Foreign Affairs Hallstein has told Amer-
ican officials that he sees no possibility of
avoiding such a break.
Bonn has been anticipating the Yugoslav
action, but with some differences of opinion within the Foreign
Ministry as to what retaliatory measures should be taken. Some
officials reportedly feel that recognition of East Germany by some
non-NATO countries is inevitable and that for Bonn to break com-
pletely with Belgrade would prejudice its prospects of improving
relations with Poland and other bloc countries.
Hallstein had previously expressed the opin-
ion that one possible solution would be to leave an economic mis-
sion in Belgrade, and then establish similar missions in Soviet
bloc countries. Hallstein feels, however, that Adenauer will
proceed cautiously with any modification of present policies toward
bloc countries, and that it is unlikely Bonn will establish diplomatic
relations with any of them in the near future.
The Bundestag faction of the Christian Dem-
ocratic Union and Christian Social Union at its meeting in Berlin
on 15 October decided unanimously that no rush measures should
be taken in answer to the establishment of diplomatic relations
between Yugoslavia and East Germany, and that the Federal Gov-
ernment's countermeasures should be studied with great care.
Foreign Minister von Brentano, who reported in great detail on
the Yugoslav move, pointed out that the German answer will be
styled in such a way that it will not handicap West Germany's
policy toward the east.
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6o BELLIGERENT SYRIAN ATTITUDE ON ISRAELI BORDER
Comment on:
Syrian Assistant Chief of Staff Nafuri
informed the UN armistice commission
on 13 October that he had issued orders
to Syrian forces at the front to fire on an
Israeli surveying party if it continued
working, according to the American army attach�n Damas-
cus. Nafuri contended that the Israeli party was working in
Syrian territory. When a UN inspection indicated this was not
the case, and the senior Syrian delegate to the mixed armistice
commission advised Nafuri to act cautiously, Nafuri reportedly
ignored him.
Lt. Col. Akram Dayri, the commander on
the Israeli front, is reported to be an impetuous officer who
has caused armistice commission officers concern for some
time. They fear that he might provoke Israeli-Syrian hostili-
ties.
Nafuri may have adopted an aggressive stand
to bolster his position and influence in the armyo The recent
dispatch of Egyptian troops to Syria, as well as the Soviet Union's
support for Syria, will continue to encourage among Syrians the
attitude displayed by Nafuri.
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7. SYRIAN CHIEF OF STAFF MAY VISIT KING SAUD
ON 20 OCTOBER
Comment on:
Syrian Chief of Staff Bizri has not yet
made his previously reported visit to King
Saud.
Bizri would
be able to make the trip, which he had earlier
h Cairo, between 15 and 20 November.
aud instructed his embassy in Damascus to ask Bizri
to alter the date of his visit to 20 October, by which time Saud
presumably will have returned from Lebanon.
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8. PRESIDENT MIRZA STILL NEGOTIATING TO END
PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT CRISIS
Comment on:
After three days of fruitless nego-
tiations for a new coalition govern-
ment in Pakistan, President Mirza re-
portedly approached Awami League
ea er rawar y on 14 October to effect a reconciliation
which would return the prime minister to power. Suhrawardy
resigned on 11 October after Mirzals Republican party had
withdrawn its support from the Republican-Awami League
coalition government, although he agreed to stay on tempo=
rarily in a caretaker capacity.
Mirza proposed that Suhrawardy either "explore" the possi-
bility of forming an all-party government led by himself or
alternatively consider new conditions for a realignment of the
Republican-Awami League coalition. Suhrawardy appeared
reluctant to negotiate a national coalition unless Mirza form-
ally commissioned him. Confident that he has popular support,
Suhrawardy is convinced that Mirza now realizes he cannot obtain
a stable government without him.
Mirza on 15 October accepted a different coalition
between the Republicans and the opposition Moslem League, ex-
cluding Suhrawardy's Awami League. The government would be
headed by I. I. Chundrigar, Moslem League parliamentary lead-
er. This coalition is contingent, however, on the approval of the
Moslem League president, who plans to consult with Republican
leaders on 16 October.
Mirza probably is dealing with both parties in
the hope of forcing a solution most advantageous to his own posi-
� tion. His final decision may be withheld until the competition for
a workable coalition is concluded.
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9. SECOND INDONESIAN NATIONAL CONFERENCE
PLANNED FOR NOVEMBER
Comment on:
Prime Minister Djuanda has told the
American ambassador in Djakarta that
he plans to call a second national con-
ference which would convene on 15 No,
vernber andthat he is trying to persuade
former vice president Hatta to be its chair-
man. The conference, unlike the one held
in September which covered a wide range
of problems, will deal only with economic and reconstruction
matters. Djuanda probably hopes that in thus limiting the con-
ference agenda there will be a better chance to reach an under-
standing on some of the provinces' outstanding grievances and
thereby halt the trend toward national fragmentation. Djuanda
undoubtedly also feels that if Hatta chairs the conference, the
provinces--which have been demanding that Hatta be given a
responsible government position�will feel impelled to attend
the meeting and support its recommendations.
Djuanda,'s chances of reaching any signifi-
cant agreement with the provinces at a second conference appear
slim as there has been no slackening of the antigovernment sen-
timent since the September meeting. The disaffected provincial
commanders seem not only to be increasingly firm in their united
opposition to Djakarta, but they reportedly are disillusioned with
Hatta's failure to speak strongly for regional interests. Recent
reports suggest that relatively greater stress is now being
placed on the achievement of political rather than economic ob-
jectives. Among these are the adoption of a national policy of .
anticommunism and the removal of Chief of Staff Nasution.
President Sukarno, who remains the key fac-
tor in the situation, continues to refuse concessions to the prov-
inces and still advocates giving the Communists an important
role in the government. On 11 October, he reportedly warned
National party leaders that unless they cooperated with the
"progressive forces" in Indonesia their party would "decline!'
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10. NEHRU'S VISIT TO JAPAN
Comment, on:
During Prime Minister Nehru's nine-day
visit to Japan which ended on 13 October,
Nehru and Prime Minister Kishi agreed
that a ban on the manufacture and use of
mass-destrudtionweapons is urgently
needed. However, they could not recon-
cile Nehru's insistence on an immediate,
unqualified suspension of nuclear tests
for two years with Kishi's call for a tem-
porary suspension during which time an effective supervisory
and control mechanism would be worked out.
According to a Japanese Foreign Ministry
official, Nehru favored recognition of Communist China by all
nations, but Kishi remained adamant against such recognition
at this time. Japanese officials professed the belief that Nehru
does not regard the dangers from Communist China and the
USSR seriously enough, and Nehru's neutralist attitudes appear
to have had little effect in Tokyo.
The Indian prime minister showed great
interest in long-term arrangements for the stabilized supply
of iron ore from India to Japan and in Kishi's offer of credits
to India to finance the import of capital goods from Japan.
They agreed that experts should hold substantive discussions
on these issues, but the Japanese Ministry of Finance opposed
credit extension on the ground that it is a "political loan" which
Japan cannot afford.
The subject of an Asian development fund
was omitted from the final communiqu�but the course of dis-
cussions revealed that Nehru continues to regard it unfavorably.
In general, Nehru indicated that he wanted to concentrate on
India's problems rather than concern himself with world affairs.
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it THREAT OF COUP IN GUATEMALA GROWING AS
ELECTION NEARS
Comment on:
General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, the
leading opposition candidate in the 20 Oc-
tober Guatemalan presidential election, is
gaining wide popular support and there are in-
at attempts may be made to stage a coup.
Defense Minister Juan F. Oliva, Guatemala's
strong man, would probably not permit .49. Ydigoras victory and
has almost certainly been urged by associates to stage a pre-
election coup. He is reportedly seeking a pretext, such as ex-
pected antigovernment demonstrations by the weak but vehement
leftist groups, to show that the army must rule to keep order.
At least some segments of the administration's political machine,
the National Democratic Movement (MDN), would probably sup-
port an Oliva coup, since they are concerned over the failure of
MDN presidential candidate Miguel Ortiz Passarelli to build up
the popular support expected.
Surveys throughout the country show substan-
tial Ydigoras support among the country's politically conscious
minority, and MDN leaders privately concede that Ydigoras will
carry Guatemala City. The MDN is relying for victory on its
tight control in rural areas, where illiterate Indians can be voted
repeatedly. Ydigoras supporters know this and have warned that
a fraudulent election would justify rebellion. Ydigoras himself
has told the American embassy that losing the election would be
proof enough of fraud for him.
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12. JUNTA CHIEF KEBREAU REASSERTING CONTROL
OVER HAITI
Comm_ent on:
Brig. Gen. Kebreau, chief of Haiti's
military junta,
appears to De
regaining a dominant position in the army
following a brief period during which of-
ficers supporting former dictator Magloire
were believed in control.
President-elect Duvalier seems likely to
be only a puppet president, subject to oust-
ing by the army at his first show of indepenth
ence. His inauguration has been postponed
from 15 October to 22 October, and there is
increasing speculation that it may be postponed indefinitely.
Reports that a high-level delegation from
the Dominican Republic is scheduled to confer on Kebreau one
of the highest Dominican decorations suggest that he may have
made a deal with Dominican dictator Trujillo. The American
embassy in Ciudad Trujillo suggests that the Dominican Republic
may be attempting to establish political influence in Haiti by of-
fering economic aid. Some support is offered this theory by
Kebreau's apparent unconcern over withdrawal of US economic
aid and by the government's indifference toward the deterioration
of its relations with the United States.
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