CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/09/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03190609
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: September 15, 1957

pproved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03190609/
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CURRENT
'#1
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03190609
15 September 1957
Copy No. 136
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_REVIEWER:
DATE. - -
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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CONTENTS
. TURKISH AIR FORCE MAKING "WARTIME" PREPARATIONS
(page 3).
� 7
,0 2. SHAH OF EKS BACKING FOR STRONG RESPONSE
TO USSR[ (page 5).
Q-42 3. TOP YUGOSLAV LEADERSHIP MAY BE DIVIDED OVER
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH USSR age 6).
XI) 4. INDONESIAN ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE ENDS
(page 7).
Ao 5. GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER PROPOSES COMMONWEALTH
STATUS FOR CYPRUS (page 8).
6. RESURGENCE OF RUMORS 7_F_A_CTP WITHIN THE
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (page 9).
02-- 7. NEW CURBSLOWS flCTINE IN. INDIAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE
RESERVES (page 10).
15 Sept 57
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1. TURKISH AIR FORCE MAKING"WARTIME" PREPARATIONS
The Turkish air force is concentrating com-
bat-ready squadrons and a considerable
rvf onmha t qunnlies on
quantity the Syrian
border,
general ill wui towa..11,
Syria pervades the Turkish air base at 13aiikesir,
combat-ready pi-
lots and aircraft have been assigned to fighter-bomber squad-
rons for movements to Adana in southern Turkey. Crews and
aircraft remaining at Balikesir are on a wartime alert. Anti-
aircraft emplacements at Balikesir have been camouflaged and
the gun crews placed on a 24-hour alert. Support units are en
Merzifon
Esenboga
sir Eskisehir �
o
TURKEY
15 SEPTEMBER 1957
ter-Bombers
31 Jet Recon
73 Piston Transports
=Planned Deployment
290
mites
Diyarbakir
�Gaziantep
IRAQ
15 Sept 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
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route to Adana, and the aircraft and crews are on a 45-minute
stand-by alert for movement to Adana.
approximately
300 napalm containers and "mix" being loaded for shipment,
along with quantities of 250-pound fragmentation bombs.
Comment
The total planned deployment of the Turkish
air force will result in the transfer of four
F-84 squadrons and two F-86 squadrons to bases in southern
Turkey, thus increasing Turkey's air strength in that area from
approximately 70 jet aircraft to over 200.
The scheduled deployment of Turkish army
units to the vicinity of the Syrian border is also under way.
Twenty medium tanks of the 5th Armored Brigade passed through
Gaziantep, about 75 air miles east of Iskenderun and about 40
miles north of the Syrian border, Ion 10 September, No unusual
troop activity has been reported.
15 Sept 57
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2. SHAH OF IRAN SEEKS BACKING FOR STRONG
RESPONSE TO USSR
Comment on:
he Shah of Iran was greatly disturbed
y Soviet Marshal Vershinen's recent
hreatening remarks in the Soviet press
n which Iran was included among those
ountries where alleged American bases
could be knocked out by medium-range
eapons. The Shah indicated to Ambas-
sador Chapin on 12 September that he is
ready to issue a sharp rejoinder if assured "concrete military
backing" from the United States. He further indicated he might
be prepared to allow American bases in Iran if his analysis of
Soviet reasoning leads to a re-evaluation of Iranian defense
policy. The Shah said he might even request intermediate range
ballistic missile installations.
While he stated Iran would not withdraw from
the Baghdad pact if increased American military aid were not
forthcoming, the Shah said he would be forced to re-deploy Iran-
ian military forces on the basis of Iran's own defense interests.
The Shah probably is genuinely concerned
over Soviet intentions regarding Iran, but is also trying to ex-
ploit the tension in the Middle East to obtain substantially in-
creased American military aid.
15 Sept 57
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3. TOP YUGOSLAV LEADERSHIP MAY BE DIVIDED OVER
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH USSR
the Yugoslav
Communist party is moving toward a
crisis over the extent and direction of improvement in Yugo-
slav-Soviet 'relations. even prior to the
Hungarian revolution, Vice President Kardelj, backed by
the Slovene and part of the Croat central committees, was
nyInnearl +n +hp pIttPnt of rannrochement.
Khrushchev's tougher internal ru e, coup e
Tito's "pro-Soviet course," must be distasteful to Kardelj and
the more "Westernized" sector of the party.
Comment Kardelj, the party's leading theoretician,
has been Yugoslavia's most outspoken critic
of the Kremlin and may be more suspicious of the present
Soviet leaders and their objectives than Tito. Differences
among Yugoslav leaders over the long-term effects of a grow-
ing rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow would ex-
plain the recent postponement of the Yugoslav's seventh party
congress from November to next April.
on the basis of their talks with Yugoslav leaders
eiBFgicte earlier this month, Yugoslavia is moving closer
to the USSR, especially on international issues, and that the
major significance of the Tito-Khrushchev talks in Rumania
was Tito% agreement not to "provoke matters" in Eastern
Europe.
15 Sept 57
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4. INDONESIAN ROUND-TABLE CONFERENCE ENDS
Comment on:
he Indonesian national round-table con-
erence concluded on 15 September and
ppears to have succeeded in arresting at
east temporarily the trend toward national
ragmentation. The final resolution ap-
roved the recommendations formulated
y the various subcommittees, welcomed
e Sukarno-Hatta statement of willingness
o cooperate, and stated that "normal re-
lations between the central government and
the regions have been restored on the basis of the constitution
and existing law, as is appropriate in a constitutional state."
Premier Djuanda announced that the confer-
ence's decisions would become the "guiding principles" for the
government. He also stated that a joint committee representing
both the government and the regions would be established to deal
with all future problems.
The measure of the conference's success re-
mains to be determined. It is still by no means certain that
Djakarta will be able, even if willing, to meet the financial and
political demands of the regions. In addition, there are no indi-
cations of progress toward meeting regional demands for the re-
moval of Chief of Staff Nasution and for the reduction of Commu-
nist power and influence.
All available information strongly suggests,
moreover, that Sukarno and Hatta are as far apart as ever despite
their platitudinous statement agreeing to cooperate. Although
the conference has made Sukarno
aware of the magnitude of regional discontent, there is little reason
to believe he is prepared to make any significant concessions on
such demands of Hattap and the regional leaders as revising his con-
cept of "guided democracy," repudiating his Communist support,
or giving Hatta a position of real leadership in the government.
15 Sept 57
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No,
5. GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER PROPOSES COMMONWEALTH
STATUS FOR CYPRUS
Comment on:
Greek Foreign Minister Averoff suggested
to NATO Secretary General Spaak on 11 Sep-
tember as a possible solution of the Cyprus
dispute that the island become an independent
m mber of the S�llish Commonwealth for 20 y3ars, after which
time its status might be reconsidered. This plan has some chance
of being accepted, although the Turks would probably resist it as
merely a first step toward enosis. Athens may be proposing this
solution to avoid a UN resolution that might preclude eventual
union of the island with Greece.
Athens now feels the Cyprus dispute has
weakened the eastern flank of NATO's defenses and sees the
need of improving relations with Britain and Turkey. The Greek
government may also fear an adverse effect on its domestic sup-
port unless some progress is made toward a settlement of the
Cyprus dilemma during the forthcoming session of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly.
Implementation of the commonwealth proposal
would offer a chance fel:r passions to cool. permit British reten-
tion of base rights, and allow the British to keep the pro-Commu-
nist element; uAl the isl,zmi under control.
15 Sept 57
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6.. RESURGENCE OF RUMORS OF A COUP WITHIN
THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT
Comment on:
Within the past few days z
a resurgence
of rumors of a coup within the Argentine
government to oust President Aramburu
in order to continue the provisional regime in office beyond
the 1 May date on which he has repeatedly promised to turn
over the government to elected authorities. The rumors al-
lege that a coup would be supported by various military offi-
cials who believe that oil development through foreign assist-
ance is a prerequisite to improving the country's acute economic
plight and who fear that the constituent assembly--bogged down
by political maneuvering at Santa Fe--may nationalize oil and
electric power resources and so frustrate the needed oil devel-
opment.
Aramburu evidently felt compelled to counter
these rumors on 11 September by informing the press that his
recent absence from work was because of flu
of government dissension should not be heeded.
,the denial was interpretec1 in opposition
quarters as an indication that for the moment Aramburu has won
out in an internal struggle with Vice President Rojas and others
trying to postpone indefinitely the general elections scheduled
for 23 February.
Various demonstrations--which may lead
to violent clashes�are scheduled for 16 September, the second
anniversary of the revolt against Peron. The Peronistas,who
are outlawed as a party, have asked their followers to wear black
arm bands on the 16th.
15 Sept 57
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7. NEW CURB SLOWS DECLINE IN INDIAN FOREIGN
EXCHANGE RESERVES
Comment on:
The latest figures of the Reserve Bank
of India suggest that the measures
adopted by the Indian government to
halt the decline of its foreign exchange
reserves are beginning to take effect. These reserves,
which declined by approximately $18,000,000 a week from
the beginning of the current fiscal year in April to mid-
August, declined by an average of only $8,225,000 a week
during the past four weeks, and now stand at the equiva-
lent of $792,500,000.
Beginning late in 1956, the Indian govern-
ment adopted a policy of placing increasing restrictions on
nonessential foreign exchange expenditures which culminated
in a complete ban on the licensing of consumer goods imports
during the third quarter of 1957. While the large backlog of
such goods already contracted for prevented these measures
from taking immediate effect, they should be able to hold the
rate of decline near that of the past four weeks for the next
few months.
This slowdown in the rate of decline will,
if continued, enable the government to postpone until early
1958 asking parliament to lower the required reserve level be-
low $630,000,000. India, however, will still seek large-scale
foreign loans for the estimated $1,billion it needs for essen-
tial imports to fulfill the hard core of the Second Five-Year
Plan (1956-61).
15 Sept 57
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