CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/09/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03190608
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: September 14, 1957

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CURRENT
� INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
14.September 1957
Copy No. 136
Derr;Utila',1 NO.
t]() :;.MGE 1;.:1 CLAS3.
TO:
I REVEV,1 DATE:
DATE. .REVIEWER:
- �
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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(1)
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CONTENTS
CONTENTS
1. INDICATIONS OF SOVIET PROBABLE ICBM LAUNCHING
(page 3).
2.
3.
LIMITED Lritini-n-43.P OF ISRAELI FORCES NEAR SYRIAN
BORDER (page 4).
CALL-UP OF EGYPTIAN RESERVES REPORTED (Top
(page 6).
)1-4) 4. SYRIAN AMBASSADOR SEES FIRMER SOVIET LINE TOWARD
WEST ) (page 7).
0-t 5. BULGANIN NOTE TO TURKEY
(page 8).
6. SOVIET POLICY ON PRODUCTION OF MODERN WEAPONS
(page 9).
7. SOVIET PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM MAY BE
IMMINENT (page 10)0
8. AUSTRIANS PUSH PLAN TO GIVE CREDITS TO POLAND
THROUGH OEEC
(page 11).
9. JAPAN APPROVES EXCHANGE OF TRADE MISSIONS WITH
PEIPING (page 12).
10. HATTA SETS CONDITIONS FOR RE-ENTERING INDONESIAN
GOVERNMENT (page 13).
11. THAI ARMY CHIEF DEMANDS PHIBUN'S RESIGNATION
(page 14).
12. VIOLENCE IN ECUADOR THREATENED BY FORMER PRESI-
DENT'S RETURN (page 15).
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1. INDICATIONS OF SOVIET PROBABLE
ICBM LAUNCHING
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2. LIMITED BUILD-UP OF ISRAELI FORCES NEAR
SYRIAN BORDER
A limited build-up of Israeli forces
within the "defensive zone" along the
Israeli-Syrian border coincides with
a larger assembly of forces including
a reinforced armored-infantry brigade
in the Eilabun maneuver area outside the defensive zone
farther to the west. These developments were observed by
the American army attach0 who made a reconnaissance
of Israel's northern military command on 11 September. The
LEBANON
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Bailey Bridge
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13 SEPTEMBER IL
70913 A
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Page 4
"SEGRETT
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attach�elieves, however, that these movements, along with
maneuvers to be held in the Eilabun region on 17 and 19 Sep-
tember, are precautionary.
The attach� party was prohibited by
Israeli military police from proceeding beyond Hulata into the
demilitarized zone south of Lake Hula. The army attach�t-
tributes this to an Israeli desire to hide military preparations
possibly in the vicinity of the controversial Bailey bridge over
the Jordan River. In the opinion of the attach�the Israeli de-
fense force will maintain a defensive attitude for the present,
although, as currently deployed in the Syrian border area, it
is capable of limited offensive action.
Comment The Israeli troop movements appear to in-
volve a redeployment of troops already
on active duty. Israeli army strength remains at about 55,000,
augmented by about 25,000 quasi-military personnel in border
settlements.
The Israeli maneuvers scheduled for 17
and 19 September will include a parachute brigade. These exer-
cises and the build-up reported by the attach�re probably di -
reedy related to Israel's determination to complete the drain-
age of Lake Hula by enlarging the Jordan River channel within
the demilitarized zone. Syria reportedly has demanded that
Israel cease this activity.
The "defensive zone" on either side of the
Israeli-Syrian border was established by the armistice agree-
ment of 1949 between the two countries. Under its terms each
side is permitted to maintain in the zone only military forces of
a specified size and strength. Tanks and armored vehicles are
excluded.
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3. CALL-UP OF EGYPTIAN RESERVES REPORTED
The Egyptian army has ordered 411
reservists recalled to active dutyJ
Included in the call-up are all men who com-
pleted compulsory military service within the past five years.
Plain-clothes police in Alexandria are stopping men in the
streets and demanding to see their military certificates. If
the individual is shown to be a reservist, he is taken to the
nearest police station and then sent to Cairo.
The Egyptian Interior Ministry has in-
structed the Alexandria government to reorganize civil de-
fense and to conduct air-raid drills.
Comment Recall of reserves would complement
other Egyptian precautionary measures
which reflect uncertainty over the intentions of Turkey, Israel,
and the Western powers regarding Syria. While Egypt has no
organized reserve corps, unorganized trained reserves are be-
lieved to number about 40,000. Egyptian ground forces have
been maintained at about 99,000 men, including 759500 in the
rprnilar army
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Tcroil
4. SYRIAN AMBASSADOR SEES FIRMER SOVIET LINE
TOWARD WEST
Reference:
Soviet policy as manifested in the London
disarmament talks and in the 3 September
notes to the Western powers on the Middle
East represents a "stiffening" toward the
West0 the factors un-
derlying this "increased firmness" are the
"stabilization of the internal situation" in
the USSR and Eastern Europe, the "success" of the ICBM test,
and a desire to reply to Western moves in the UN General As-
sembly on Hungary.
this firmer
line can be expected to lead to an increasingly critical situation
�in the Middle East and to "assiduous support from Moscow for
the liberation movements in general and of Syria in particular."
;:tlement on 10 September was to offset Western moves in the
the general purpose of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's
UN on the Hungarian question, to pressure the West on disarm-
ament, and to exploit any differences that may develop among
non-Communist powers. Gromyko's warnings
to Turkey and the West against intervention in Syria were de-
signed to repeat Moscow's Suez gambit and to place the USSR in
a position to take credit for any relaxation of tension in the Near
East0
despite the bellicose
Soviet tone on the Middle East, Moscow's purpose is basically
defensive and that the Russians are concerned that the United
States will bring down the Syrian regime in a manner which
would not only damage Soviet influence in the Middle East but
possibly have serious repercussions on the Soviet position in
Europe. Moscow could accept a peaceful change
in Syria out that it would react strongly to the use of force even
by Syria's neighbors if this were carried out in a manner to
cause world opinion to consider the USSR weak and the United
States strong.
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BULGANIN NOTE TO TURKEY
Comment on:
Premier Bulganin's note of 10 September
to Turkish Prime Minister Mencleres,
while suggesting Soviet concern over a
possible Turkish attack on Syria, was
largely designed to give impetus to Soviet
attempts to distract international attention from the UN Gen-
eral Assembly debate on Hungary.
The note charged the West with assigning a
"certain role" for Turkey in "the plans to unleash military ac-
tion against Syria," and expressed "profound alarm" that Turk-
ish leaders apparently favored the alleged plans. It repeated
Foreign Minister Gromyko's veiled threat of the same day, ask-
ing how the Turks would feel "if foreign troops were being con-
centrated on their borders:'
The note further warned, "in the interests
of Soviet state security," of the danger that armed conflict
"would not be limited to that area alone," but it avoided com-
mitting the USSR to any specific course of action in event of
hostilities.
The Turks have been relatively unimpressed
by Soviet threats before. The Ankara government has already
stated that its planned troop movements are part of "regular" -
maneuvers and will probably give a routine answer to Bulganin's
note. On 13 September, according to press accounts, tha Soviat
naval attache and a colleague in Istanbul were accused of es-
pionage and asked to leave Turkey within 48 hours. The Turks
will not, however, disregard the note as they weigh the consid-
erations involved in any possible military moves toward Syria.
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6, SOVIET POLICY ON PRODUCTION OF MODERN WEAPONS
the USSR's progress in
weapons technology is so rapid--especially
in e missile --that some new weapons may not be placed
in mass production. "What is new today," he said, "is old to-
morrow."
only those heavy bombers which are
"absolutely necessary" have been produced.
Soviet bomber output will give way entirely to missiles
which will be "more economical and reliable."
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7 SOVIET PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM MAY
BE IMMINENT
Twelve of the 16 Soviet ambassadors
abroad who are affiliated with the party,
central committee are believed to be in
Moscow. Their presence in the capital
may indicate the convocation of a central committee plenum.
Khrushchev and Bulganin have been on vacation since mid
August and if they have not already returned to Moscow, should
be returning in a few days.
a plenum was scheduled for August or September
to deal with the activity of Soviet trade unions. It seems un-
likely, however, that a plenum would be restricted to this ques-
tion. Khrushchev may also review the results of his talks with
Tito and the trips to Czechoslovakia and East Germany and ap-
prove personnel assignments in the party and government in
connection with the economic reorganization.
More significantly, the meeting might take
up the questions of the fate of some of the members of the '!anti-
party" group and of Bulganin's status. Khrushchev may feel the
need to create a new and stronger wave of popular indignation
against the opposition, particularly the former adherents of
Malenkov. Khrushchev may fear that Malenkov may become
a rallying point for new opponents in the future.
such a move may be necessary
zeuiwserndepressed, cynical, and dis-
trustful of the present party leaders.
Khrushchev could go as far as to attack pub-
licly all members of the opposition for complicity in Stalin's
crimes and even bring them to trial, but he would run the risk
of having his own complicity revealed. A trial would cancel out
most of the benefits of his de-Stalinization campaign and could
touch off a wave of terror that might be impossible to control.
There have been rumors that Khrushchev may be under pressure
by the army to set the record straight on the 1930 purge era, and
a few pur ed arm leaders have been mentioned favorably re-
cently.
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8, AUSTRIANS PUSH PLAN TO GIVE CREDITS TO
POLAND THROUGH OEEC
Austrian Foreign Minister Figl has
told American officials that he is dis-
cussing with "other" countries plans
for a multilateral extension of credits
to Poland under OEEC auspices. Bonn has already indicated
agreement in principle, according to Figl, and he expects
that the question will be raised,at the mid-October OEEC min-
isterial meeting. Figl stressed the relationship of his pro-
posal to the problem of moving Poland closer to the "Western
European community.."
The Polish trade minister, who was in
Vienna on 10 September, is said to have told the Austrians
that Warsaw has decided to seek observer status in OEEC
and full membership in GATT.
Comment Figl has in mind using West Germany's
huge European Payments Union surplus for
credits which, for political reasons, Bonn could not directly
offer to Poland. Some Vienna officials hope that Austria can
play a vital role in central Europe, and probably expect trade
benefits as well from this idea.
Yugoslavia has participated in a limited
observer status in OEEC since February 1955, the only Com-
munist country to maintain ties with the OEEC.
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9. JAPAN APPROVES EXCHANGE OF TRADE MISSIONS
WITH PEIF'ING
Comment on:
e Japanese government has taken
a major step toward normalizing rela-
tions with Communist China by paving
the way for an exchange of permanent
trade missions and offering certain diplo-
matic privileges to five members of the Chinese mission.
Tokyo's decision follows increasing pressure from Peiping,
which has stressed the possibilities of lucrative trade in
order to induce Japan to normalize relations with the main-
land.
The Kishi cabinet, in response to pres-
sure from business and political interests, has waived finger-
print requirements for the five Chinese, offered them the use
of secret codes and freedom of travel within Japan, and ex-
empted them from customs duties and taxes.
There is considerable doubt, even among
Japanese, that the Chinese Communists will be able to sub-
stantiate their claims on Sino-Japanese trade possibilities
because of a shortage of foreign exchange and goods desired
by the Japanese.
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10. HATTA SETS CONDITIONS FOR RE-ENTERING
INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT
The American ambassador in Djakarta
has been reliably informed that former
vice president Hatta's conditions for co-
operating with President Sukarno call
for the elimination of the National Council, replacement of
the present cabinet by a presidential cabinet, and cessa-
tion of all "nonconstitutional activities:' The ambassador
comments that these conditions, submitted at a private� meet-
ing between the two leaders on 11 September, are obviously
unacceptable to Sukarno. If Hatta persists in his demands,
the ambassador sees "no prospect of any present solution of
the main problem confronting the conference which everyone
agrees is a restoration of the Sukarno-Hatta relationship."
Comment Hatta's conditions, which he has always
maintained, are aimed at the heart of the
"guided democracy" program which Sukarno has uncompro-
misingly put forward as the only solution to Indonesia's prob-
lems. The dissident leaders at the national round-table con-
ference are insisting that the Sukarno- Hatta joint leadership
be re-established.
The fragmentary and perfunctory accounts
of the conference's progress suggest that the deliberations
have been inconclusive, and that neither the government nor the
disaffected regional leaders have come forward with significant
concessions.
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'U-
i1 THAI ARMY CHIEF DEMANDS PHIBUN'S RESIGNATION
Thai Army Commander in Chief Sarit
has demanded that Premier Phibun re-
sign and that a new leader be elected
"according to established constitutional
procedure." He also called on General
Phao to resign as chief of police.
The American army attache has been
reliably informed that the premier has
indicated he would not quit under duress.
Sarit has reached "the point of
no return" and will resort to an armed coup d'etat if no other
means can be found to oust Phibun. The source feels that the
army chief now has sufficient support to overthrow the govern-
ment but must act soon or lose some of this following.
Comment Sarit could bring about the downfall of
Phibun's government through a no-confi-
dence vote in the assembly. However, the assembly is not
scheduled to meet until next Thursday and he may fear delay.
In refusing to resign, Phibun is probably calculating that Sarit
will not resort to a military coup to achieve his aims.
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12, VIOLENCE IN ECUADOR THREATENED BY FORMER
PRESIDENT'S RETURN
Comment on:
The Ecuadoran government may be
threatened by widespread violence de-
veloping from extensive public demon-
strations planned for former president
Velasco's return to Guayaquil about 14 September. A key
rVelase7 supporter has stated,
that Velasco has enough military backing for a coup
to restore him to power.
he left-
ist but non-Communist Concentration of Popular Forces--
the strongest opposition party, headed by demagogic Carlos
Guevara--is cooperating in demonstration plans designed to
test public reaction for an attempt against the government.
Furthermore, the Ecuadoran ambassador to the United States
advised Ambassador Ravndal on 12 September that Velasco
had substantial support among the military and was returning
for the sole purpose of overthrowing President Ponce by rev-
olution.
Ponce's regime, which has become in-
creasingly more stable since its inauguration last September,
is believed to retain the loyalty of the key officers in the armed
forces and has taken measures to cope with possible disturbances.
The government's security problem is complicated by a strike
at an American-owned oil company near Guayaquil which Com-
munists are attempting to spread. The anti-Ponce and Commu-
nist-oriented Confederation of Ecuadoran Workers--the nation's
principal labor organization--may also attempt to move against
Ponce by calling a general strike. Its national congress opens
in Guayaquil on 17 September.
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