CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/06/17
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03189338
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15
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March 17, 2020
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 17, 1960
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17 JUNE 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Unscheduled flights to Moscow suggest
bloc leaders, possibly including Chinese,
may meet shortly.
Soviet delegates at both Geneva confer-
ences threatening to withdraw if Western
concessions not forthcoming.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Japan--Kishi's early resignation seems
almost certain; extensive political wran-
gling likely to follow.
Indonesia--Sukarno appears determined to
put through his plan for new parliament
with strong Communist representation. 0
UAR strengthening its forces in the Sinai. 0
Turkey--Additional reports suggest pos-
sibility of a split within ruling military
group.
III. THE WEST
()French make preliminary offer to evacu-
ate their Moroccan bases by 1963.
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17 June 1960
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DAILY BRIEF
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*USSR: Unscheduled flights to Moscow from several
bloc caiiitirg between 13 and 16 June suggest that a meeting
of bloc leaders may take place in Moscow before Khrushchev's
expected departure for Bucharest to attend the Rumanian party
congress scheduled for 20 June. The Chinese Communists
may also attend; one of the flights went from Moscow to Pei-
ping on 14 June, and probably left Peiping on its return flight
on 16 June.
there would
be a meeting of bloc leaders in Moscow between 16 and 20 June.3
En route home from Paris, Khrushchev said twice in Berlin
that he would be discussing future policy in the light of the sum-
mit failure with other members of the bloc. The Soviet Union,
In the 12 and 13 June Pravda articles, has firmly reasserted
its position on the isFIETTC, dispute with Peiping; in the event
of a bloc meeting, discussion of the Sino-Soviet dispute would
be unavoidable. (Page 1)
USSR! Soviet delegates at both the disarmament and nuclear
test talks Geneva have issued thinly veiled warnings that the
USSR may withdraw from the negotiations and resume nuclear
weapons tests if Western concessions are not forthcoming. At
the disarmament conference, the Soviet delegate is making a
strong effort to exploit differences in Western reactions to Mos-
cow's latest proposals. Soviet spokesmen have hinted that, in
view of the "lack of viestern cooperation," the USSR may take
the issue to the UN General Assembly. Moscow's representative
In the nuclear test talks has warned that if the US and Britain go
head with the experimental underground explosions without ac-
cepting Moscow's conditions for Soviet participation, the USSR
will consider itself free to resume nuclear weapons tests.
(Page 3)
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
EJapan: Kishi's humiliation in being forced to cancel the
President's trip will almost certainly result in his early resig-
nation as prime minister and party chief. An acceptable com-
promise successor will be difficult to find and extensive political
wrangling is likely. The 15 June Soviet note and widespread
Identification of the Japanese Communist party as the source of
the recent violence will tend to focus Japanese attention on the ex-
tent of Communist influence over leftist elements. The extrem-
ists under Communist leadership, however, now are greatly en-
couraged and likely to increase their violence in an effort to de-
feat the ratification of the security trentv TinriPr thpsp prinditiOnS
anti-American incidents may ()emir k
Indonesia. Fresident buicarno, aespite unprecedlentedly heavy
criticism, apparently intends to proceed with his plan to install a
new parliament with strong Communist representation. Sukarno
has previously announced that "some improvements," involving the
appointment of additional members, will be made, but he has not
disclosed how many he will name nor their political orientation.
He is expected to confer shortly with political leaders, but it is not
expected that he will materially modify his program.
(Page 5.)
LUAR-Israel: The UAR is quietly reinforcing its forces in the
Sinai, evidently as a precautionary move following Israel's well-
publicized decision to hold summer army maneuvers in the central
Negev. The UAR is still concerned over Israeli plans to undertake
a new dredging project, on the Jordan River channel in the demil-
itarized area between Israel and Syria, even though Tel Aviv appar-
ently has decided not to proceed with such work now without per-
mission of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization. There have
been several minor shooting incidents in this area in the past few
days.
some incidents,, but described the general situation as "quiet."
dune 1)0 DAILY BRIEF ii
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t- Turkey: The National Unity Committee which controls Tur=
key has established contact with Turkish military attaches abroad
and instructed them to report on the activities of ambassadors
and other members of each embassy.
possibility of a split within the committee.
(Page 6) ;
III. THE WEST
L France-Morocco: France has made a preliminary offer to
evacuate all its bases in Morocco by 1963, and will try for "rea-
sonable" settlements on other disputed questions such as French
property holdings and certain border problems. The French are
probably willing to concede the evacuation of troops in order to
protect their large economic stake in the country �a move that
would be consistent with De Gaulle's policy in other new African
states. Morocco will probably prolong discussions both to gain
maximum concessions from France and to fores �11 ""4+-
iCiSM that the Kin). is spllin out to the French.
(Page 7) j
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Situation in Cuba. NIE 85=2-60. 14 June 60.
17 June 60
DAILY BRIEF lii
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Possible Sino-Soviet Bloc Meeting
Preparations appear to be under way for the immediate
convocation of a meeting of Sino-Soviet bloc leaders in Mos-
cow. special flights to Moscow
from Pyongyang, Tirana� Sofia, and Budapest during the period
of 13 to 16 June. A special flight also went from Moscow to
Peiping on 14 June, possibly to bring Chinese leaders to the
USSR, and probably left Peiping on its return flight on 16 June.
A VIP flight from Simferopol to Moscow on 16 June in all prob-
ability returned the vacationing Khrushchev to Moscow.
there
would be a meeting of bloc leaders in Moscow between 16 and
20 June) --��
*
In his speeches in Berlin on 19 and 20 June, Khrushchev had
said that in light of the summit failure, he would discuss post-
summit policy with the governments of all socialist states. If
the Chinese Communists attend such a meeting, discussion of
Sino-Soviet differences over policy toward the West, particularly
the United States, would probably be unavoidable.
The Soviet Union in the 12 and 13 June issues of Pravda
firmly asserted its position on the issues in dispute with Peiping,
thereby putting the Chinese on notice that their continuing lobby-
ing within the bloc will represent open defiance of the USSR. Mos-
cow and Peiping, however, have taken care not to mention each
other directly in the open arguments, in an effort to keep their dif-
ferences within certain bounds.
The continued public conflict has nevertheless brought into
question Moscow's leadership of the bloc and seriously disrupted
its unity of action. The Chinese Communist attempts to get sup-
port for their tougher line at the recently concluded vVFTU meeting
in Peiping generated considerable "pulling and hauling" among del-
egates.
The general resolution which came out of the WFTU meeting
appears to be a compromise which puts the heaviest stress on the
17 June 60
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� Soviet position while accepting some aspects of the Chinese line.
In a bloc meeting Khrushchev could face the unpleasant choice of
attempting to force Chinese acceptance of the Soviet view, thus
risking an open break, or of hammering out a compromise such
as the WFTU resolution which would either gloss over or conceal
the conflict and reaffirm Soviet leadership of the bloc.
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NNW
USSR intensifies Pressure on West in Geneva Talks
Soviet delegates at both the disarmament and nuclear test
talks in Geneva have stepped up pressure on the West by is-
suing thinly veiled warnings that the USSR may withdraw from
the negotiations and resume nuclear weapons tests if Western
concessions are not forthcoming.
Soviet delegate Zorin is making a strong effort in the ten-
nation disarmament conference to exploit differences in West-
ern reactions to Moscow's latest proposals. iThe British, French,
Italian, and Canadian delegates have all expressed the view that
some modifications must be made in the Western disarmament
plan .;1 Zorin has singled out French delegate Moch for special
attention, complimenting him on his efforts to bridge East-West
differences. He has pressed for a full French reply to the new
Soviet proposal to prohibit and destroy all means for the de-
livery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of a disarmament
program--a proposal particularly designed to exploit French
insistence on top priority to measures for controlling nuclear
weapons delivery systems.
Soviet spokesmen in London have hinted that, in view of the
"lack of Western cooperation," the USSR may soon pull out of
the disarmament conference and take the issue to the United
Nations General Assembly. Zorin has warned that if the West
continues to refuse to discuss Soviet proposals for complete
and general disarmament, there will be no basis for further
negotiations.
These tactics suggest that Moscow's principal current aim
at Geneva is to build the strongest possible record for again
presenting the Soviet disarmament position to the United Na-
tions General Assembly next fall or, possibly, to a session of
the 82-nation UN Disarmament Commission prior to the as-
sembly's regular meeting.
In the nuclear test talks, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin has
demanded full Soviet participation in the formulation and
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execution of Western research explosions and has announced
that the USSR has no plans to conduct underground explosions
of either, chemical or nuclear devices. Tsarapkin has warned
that if the United States and Britain proceed with underground
nuclear explosions for research purposes without accepting
Moscow's conditions for Soviet participation to verify that the
explosions are not being utilized for military purposes, the
USSR will consider itself free to resume nuclear weapons
tests "for the purpose of ensuring its security.
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Sukarno Proceeds With Plans to Install Indonesian Parliament
President Sukarno, despite unprecedentedly heavy criti-
cism, is proceeding with plans to install his appointed parlia-
ment later this month. He has made the minor concession,
however, of promising to name additional members and is ex-
pected to confer with selected political leaders before the in-
stallation.
Sukarno has not announced how many more members he
plans to appoint. Indonesian sources claim the number will
total 23 to 25, all of them representatives of Moslem groups.
The forthcoming political discussions probably will involve
bargaining on the distribution of the appointees, and Sukarno
may also find it expedient to make a further slight increase
In membership. Of the original 261 appointees, 24 percent
are Communist.
The Democratic League, which led criticism of Sukarno
during his absence on a world tour during April and May, has
renewed its charges that non-Communist elements are under-
represented and that parliament is unconstitutional. Signifi-
cant factions in the National party and the orthodox Moslem
Nandlatul Ulama oppose the parliament, although the national
leadership of both parties supports Sukarno. Apparently in
reply to these criticisms, a cabinet spokesman announced
on 13 June that Sukarno and the cabinet would not be intimi-
dated on the parliamentary issue, although they .were ready to
entertain constructive suggestions.
Sukarno
has ordered the dissolution of the Democratic League, but no
action appears to have been taken against it. -)Some top army
officers appear apprehensive that during the next few months
Sukarno will attempt to reshuffle army leadership in retalia-
tion against the army's quiet support of the league.
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The Turkish Situation
There are increasing signs of dissension and discontent
both within the controlling military group in Turkey and be-
tween the National Unity Committee (NUC) and the Republican
People's party (RPP). To further consolidate its position,
the NUC has established direct contact with Turkish service
attachds abroad to report on ambassadors and their staffs.
Each of these attachds is said to be in contact with a member
of the military committee in Ankara. The NUC contact in
Washington reportedly received his initial assignment from
Colonel Turkes, adviser to interim President - Prime Min-
ister Gursel and apparently a key figure in the committee.
Whether these contacts are with the NUC as a whole or
with only one faction of the larger committee has not yet been
determined. Turkes has been reported to be .a leader of a
group within the NUC which opposes a return to power of
Inonu and the RPP. There are other reports of a 12-man
"Control Unit" or watchdog committee which has maintained
close contact with the RPP since before the overthrow of the
Menderes regime. General Cemal Madanoglu, who has been
referred to as a member of such a "control unit," is reported
to be angered by Gursel's growing popularity. Any major split
that develops within the National Unity Committee could re-
sult in a cleavage within the military forces.
, The new regime also faces major financial problems and
has already begun making informal approaches to American of-
ficials for emergency economic aid. All development projects,
unless nearing completion, have been halted pending reassess-
ment of the situation. A national planning group, to be assisted
by foreign advisers, is to be organized in the near future to de-
1 m for Turkey.
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. France Makes New Settlement Offer to Morocco
The French ambassador in Morocco has resumed "serious
discussions" with King Mohamed V on outstanding French
Moroccan problems, according to a senior French Embassy
official. On 13 June he made a preliminary offer providing for
France to give up its military bases in Morocco, not excepting
its major naval and naval air installations at Kenitra (Port
Lyautey) and Agadir, when evacuation of American Air Force
bases is completed in 1963. Paris probably will concentrate
on obtaining a "reasonable settlement" of the extensive property
claims of French nationals in Morocco. It would prefer to let the
frontier questions wait, pending Mauritania's anticipated accession
to independence and clarification of Algeria's future status.
This new French move appears consistent with De Gaulle's
general policy of physical French withdrawal from Africa in ex-
change for good relations with the new states there. In Tunisia,
France has already withdrawn from all military installations ex-
cept the base at Bizerte, which it maintains is essential for the
defense of French interests in the Mediterranean. There have
been intermittent negotiations on French property in Tunisia, but
no settlement has yet been reached, although the French holdings
there are smaller and less complex than those in Morocco.
Although French officials expect the King's government to be
more tractable than that of former. left-wing Premier Abciullah
Ibrahim, the King will seek maximum French concessions in line
with his proclaimed policies of obtaining commitments during 1960
for the evacuation of all foreign troops, Moroccanizing the adminis-
tration and economy, and "regaining lost territories." The King will
be especially wary of giving the nationalists a chance to charge him
with having sold out to France. A French official in Rabat claims
that the King asked that talks not proceed too rapidly "lest the op-
position be encouraged to attack the results solely on the grounds
of undue haste," and anticipates that several months will pass be-
fore results become apparent.
NATION)
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1 A
Nor; Ine
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget.
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
�Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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