CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/06/11
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
03189333
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Document Page Count:
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Document Creation Date:
March 17, 2020
Document Release Date:
March 26, 2020
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 11, 1960
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WI' SLKLT
11 June 1960
Copy No. C 68
CENTRAL
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT NO. 34
NO MANDE IN
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11 JUNE 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Japanese National Police chief says
charged atmosphere has aggravated se-
curity problems related to President's
visit; he believes extremists might
subject President to indignities despite
security precautions.
Lebanese Army chief disturbed by re-
ports that army interfering in elections
set for tomorrow.
Ivory Coast and three other French-
West African Community states ask in-
dependence without commitments as to
ties with France.
III. THE WEST
French disarmament delegate believes
,Soviet disarmament proposals generally
�acceptable for further negotiation.
,British-Cyprus negotiations still stalled
�over questions regarding British bases.
Finland's failure to form hroad-based
government probably eliminates pros-
pects for early Finnish association with
�European Free Trade Association.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1.1 June 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
II. ASIA-AFRICA
[iapan: Leftist-led demonstrations in opposition to Prime
Minister Kishi and the US-Japan security treaty have created
an emotionally charged atmosphere which the director general
of the Japanese National. Police said on 8 June has seriously
aggravated security problems related to the President's visit.
He believes that the less extreme elements have lost their con-
trol of the opposition movement, which now has come to tolerate
violence. While the great majority of the� Japanese people wel-
come the President's visit, the director general believes there
is a real possibility that extremists, despite security precautions,
may subject the President to indignities.
(Page 113
Lebanon:�The commander in chief of the Lebanese Army is
disturbed at reports of army interference in the elections set for
12 June. He fears that if this is taking place extensively it will
cause the army to split along religious lines, impairing its effec-
tiveness and ability to maintain order. Disorders are expected
daring the elections.
he has threatenea to resign unless mis interierenee L.eabb.
A
the chief of Lebanese
military intelligence is working directly with the UAR ambassa-
dor in Beirut to enhance the prospects of pro-UAR candidates.
(Page 2)
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French-African Community: The bid by Ivory Coast and three
oth-e-FUTFicAri---iican Community states for independence within the
Community without prior commitments as to future ties with
France poses a major challenge to this institution, which em-
braces ten states in Africa and the Malagasy Republic (Madagas-
car). There are signs that De Gaulle will accede to the bid.
This would almost certainly hasten the Community's evolution
,frloward a still looser association. Should De Gaulle reject the
bid, the four states have threatened to become independent out-
side the Community, as did Guinea in 1958. However, none of the
territories concerned could afford a complete rupture with F7ance
on the Guinea model, and none desires it.
(Page 3)
III. THE WEST
France: Jules Moch, France's delegate at the ten-nation dis-
armament talks, has described the new. Soviet disarmament plan
as essentially a good one which he hopes to accept for further ne-
gotiation if the "little bad in it" can be removed. Moch admitted
that there was disagreement between President de Gaulle and the
French Foreign Ministry on disarmament policy, and his state-
ments imply that De Gaulle's views are close to his own. Moch,
who has often acted in a freewheeling manner on disarmament
matters over Foreign Ministry objections, will leave for Paris
this week end in an effort to sell his views to the Foreign Minis-
try. (Page 5)
CCyprus: Negotiations continue to be stalled over questions re-
garding British bases on the island. Archbishop Makarios insists
that Britain specifically agree that bases be transferred to Cyprus
if the British abandon them. Britain has refused, fearing that the
Cypriots would begin early attempts to force the British out. The
Impasse could delay the formal grant of independence for Cyprus
this summer. The British Parliament, which must pass inde-
pendence-enablinglegislation, is scheduled to recess at the end
of July. The new regime in Turkey has announced it will abide by
all agreements reac1cr1 thus far and iq qapkincr a fnrrnilla fn 1m-ecla1r
the present deadlock.
(Page 6)
DAILY BRIEF ii
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inland: The failure of President Kekkonen last week to re-
ace the minority Agrarian cabinet with an Agrarian-led major-
ity coalition probably eliminates the prospects for any. early
Finnish affiliation with the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), The USSR had hinted to the Finns that it would agree
to Finland's affiliating with the EFTA if, in return, the USSR
could get a commitment from a broadly based Finnish govern-
ment that would assure Finnish trade ties with the USSR for a
longer period than the present five-year pact. LKekkonen is re-
ported to have said that Khrushchev, under present circum-
stances, would not hesitate to denounce any Finnish politicians
who might try to associate Finland with EFTA,
(Page 7)
11 June 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Japanese Police Director Concerned Over Security Problems
During the President's Visit
The director general of the Japanese National Police stated
on '8 June that snowballing emotionalism among those opposed to
Kishi and the security treaty is aggravating the problem of provid-
ing security for the President. He feels the more moderate ele-
ments have lost control to radical extremists and that the leader-
ship of the opposition movement now has accepted violence as a
means of expression. He fears that the police may not be able to
prevent the fanatical, left-wing extremists from acts of violence
such as throwing stones and other objects at the presidential car
on the route from the Tokyo airport.
The police director believes the Japanese Communists will
attempt to provoke incidents during the President's visit for which
they will avoid blame because of the general confusion resulting
from the demonstrations. He also feels planned demonstrations
at the American Embassy will increase the problem of preventing
troublemakers from slipping into the embassy area and creating
incidents.
The police director, who would naturally be inclined to cau-
tiousness, apparently hopes the visit will not take place at this
time. He was aware his views would reach the US Government
and he may accordingly have intended to promote a postponement
of the visit. He stated that it was difficult for Japanese govern-
ment officials to take the initiative in asking for such a postpone-
ment, as the "face" of many leaders was involved.
The pro-Communist General Federation of Koreans in Japan
(Chosen Soren) decided on 7 June to mobilize Koreans in Japan in
an effort to block forcibly President Eisenhower's departure for
South Korea on 22 June. A Chosen Soren leader is maintaining
close liaison with the Japanese Communist party to coordinate op-
position to the President's visit both to Japan and South Korea.
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The Lebanese Election Situation
General Adil Shihab, commander in chief of the Lebanese
Army and a cousin of President Shihab, was said to be "aghast"
on his return from a two-week trip abroad at reports of army
involvement in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. He
feels that such action has set a dangerous precedent and that it
threatens to split the army along religious lines and thus seri-
ously impair its ability to maintain order. The threat of such a
split was the major reason the army was not fully committed dur-
ing the 1958 rebellion. The commander in chief has told the
President of his concern over the army's extensive manipula-
tion and has threatened to resign unless the army returns to its
traditional policy of abstention from politics.
The chief of Lebanese army intelligence, Col. Antun Saad,
is actively working with the UAR ambassador in Beirut to fur-
ther the nrosnects of nro-TT R candidates.
Saad has suggested that Armenian
religious dignitaries from Syria be sent into Lebanon to influence
Armenian voters. The UAR ambassador has requested further
instructions regarding payments to Lebanese politicians and the
influencing of voting in Beirut, southern Lebanon, and Mount
Lebanon.
Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt had sug-
gested to the ambassador that UAR support should be given to
Pierre Jumayyil, leader of the Maronite Phalange and a rival of
former President Chamoun, in order to split the Christian vote.
Jumblatt declared that at the same time the UAR should secretly
work against Jumayyil. Should Jumayyil learn of this duplicity, he
might join forces with Chamoun against pro-UAR candidates. UAR
propaganda is emphasizing the theme of Lebanese independence in
order to lessen Christian opposition to pro-UAR candidates and
split the Christian ranks. Many Lebanese politicians apparently
are too cowed by army pressure to register open protests at inter-
ference against them.
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France's Community Concept Challenged
Four West African states of the French Community which
follow the leadership of Ivory Coast Premier Houphouet-Boigny
have posed a major challenge to France's concept of this insti-
tution. The four�Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey--
have requested immediate independence within the Community
without prior commitments on their part as to future ties with
France.
As originally launched last year, the Community was a close-
knit association linking under one sovereignty France and 12
autonomous Black African states. Its constitution has just been
revised to permit the African states formal independence with-
out sacrificing their membership in the Community. Paris has
insisted, however, that negotiations for independence be ac-
companied by the simultaneous negotiation of wide-ranging
bilateral "cooperation accords" designed to preserve intimate
links between France and the African members.
Mali and the Malagasy Republic--the first two Community
states to invoke the new option--initialed such accords in early
April and have been expected to complete action on them im-
mediately after becoming independent this summer. Houphouet's
four-state group, in contrast has indicated it will discuss such
accords only after its members have obtained their independence
and been admitted, separately, into the UN. They have threatened,
should this procedure be denied them, to become independent out-
side the Community, as did Guine in 1958. However, none of the
territories involved desires a rupture with France on the Guinea
model.
The American Embassy in Paris believes the group's move
was prompted by Houphouet's inability to secure from De Gaulle
assur nces that the four states--which have been the most loyal
to France--would have a preferred status within the "renovated"
Community. CHouphouet's chief lieutenant in Abidjan, however,
claims that the move was motivated by a restrictive French j
11 June 60
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z- interpretation of the legal competence of independent African
members of the Community to enter into direct economic
relationships with other countries. He cited as a further
reason Houphouet's desire to facilitate Guinea's reassocia-
tion with the other states of the old federation of French West
Africa.T.There have recently been indications of a possible
rapprochement between Houphouet and Guinea's President Sekou
Toure.
Indications that De Gaulle may accede to Houphouet's de-
mands suggest a further rapid evolution of the Community
toward a still looser association. The four Equatorial African
states, which are about to claim their independence, now
may insist on following Houphouet's lead. Mali and the Mala-
gasy Republic might then have second thoughts about their own
arrangements with France.
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Nap.'
France May Press for New Western Disarmament Proposal
The US disarmament delegate at Geneva credits as accurate
a report that French delegate Jules Moch said the new Soviet
disarmament plan is acceptable as the basis for further nego-
tiation if the "little bad in it" can be eliminated. Moch reported-
ly stated that he intends to use every device at his command
to prevent the US from "torpedoing" the Soviet plan. He urged
that if the short period left before US national elections pro-
hibited the US from being a party to a new Western proposal,
either the other four Western powers should frame anew plan
without US participation or the Soviet plan should be accepted
with modifications.
Admitting that President de Gaulle and the Foreign Ministry
disagree on disarmament policy, Moch implied that his views
were close to those of De Gaulle and said he was going to Paris
this week end to sell his views to the Foreign Ministry. He plans
to return to Geneva and speak at the ten-nation meeting on Mon-
day.
Moch has been France's chief disarmament negotiator since
1952 and, in his desire to bridge Western and Soviet positions,
has often acted without reference either to Allied or Foreign
Ministry positions. Nevertheless, his general views on disarma-
ment, especially his interest in control and elimination of
vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, have apparent-
ly been accepted by De Gaulle, who publicly expressed similar
views on 31 May. In view of De Gaulle's tendency to overrule
Foreign Ministry advice, the ministry may be able only to de-
lay temporarily an official French proposal at Geneva for a new
Western initiative on disarmament alone the lines of the latest
Soviet plan.
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Cyprus Negotiations Continue Stalled Over Future of
British Bases
Negotiations between Archbishop Makarios and the Brit-
ish are again deadlocked, this time by Makarios' insistence
that Britain's bases on the island be transferred to Cyprus if
Britain ever withdraws from them. The archbishop has the
support of the Greek Government on this issue. The British
are refusing to make such an agreement formally, fearing that
the Cypriot Government would begin early attempts to force
them out. Furthermore, the British suspect that once they
concede on this issue Makarios will raise another one, in-
sisting, as he has with this one, that the entire future of the
agreements hinges on the new point. her unsettled matters
are the wording of the British statement regarding the ad-
ministration of the bases, their exact boundaries, and the
amount of British financial aid.
Both Britain and Turkey believe that if an agreement on
all issues is not reached soon, the British Parliament's recess
at the end of July will end the chances for independence this
summer. Parliament must pass enabling legislation before
independence is final. Makarios appears to be unconcerned
over this deadline.
Cypriot Vice President Kuchuk and President of the Federa-
tion of Turkish Associations Denktash recently went to Ankara to
consult with the new Turkish regime regarding the Cyprus situa-
tion. Ankara has agreed to respect all agreements reached
thus far and is seeking a formula to break the present impasse.
Turkey, according to a report from the US Embassy, accepts
the necessity of the transfer of the bases to Cypriot sovereign-
ty should Britain abandon them, but will propose, after approval
by the provisional cabinet at Ankara, that actual transfer must
be effected by agreement of all signatories of the Zurich-London
agreements on Cypriot independence. Turkey hopes to persuade
Athens and London to accept this formula and then to bring
Makarios "to reason" in time to achieve independence this sum-
mer.
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"Mr
Finnish Affiliation With European Free Trade Association
Now Unlikely
President Kekkonen's failure last week to replace Fin-
land's minority Agrarian government with an Agrarian-led
majority coalition probably makes it impossible for Finland
to join the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) at any
early date. Kekkonen is reported to have told a small group
of leading Finnish industrialists that prospects for such af-
filiation are very dim in view of current world conditions and
the continuation of the minority government, which controls
only 47 of the 200 votes in parliament.
According to Conservative party chairman Hetemaki, who
was involved in the attempt to form a coalition government,
"the Russians wanted a broader based government" in order
to nail down Finnish commitments under a possible new
trade agreement. Moscow had hinted to the Finns that it
would agree to Finland's affiliating with the EFTA if, in re-
turn, Finland would accept a trade agreement for a longer
period than the present five-year pact. In 1959 the USSR ac-
counted for approximately 18 percent of Finland's foreign trade.
Kekkonen feels that joining EFTA at this time might arouse
Khrushchev's animosity and that the Soviet leaders would not
hesitate to assail any Finnish politicians Dromotine such an
affiliation.
CO
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_ CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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