CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/06/09

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
03189332
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
March 17, 2020
Document Release Date: 
March 26, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 9, 1960
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Body: 
V ZZ/Z/Z/Z/ZZIZZI WZ,Z0e, Z/Z/ZrZ/7///////////// Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 ir zeucc -.4�K 3.5(c) / 9 June 1960 Copy No. C GS CE ULLETIN PRIIUMENT NO. 3 V. � NO EtNINGE EN CLASS. �kr ri CL:74sS T� 3 0 NEX7.' 42,,Ptat RUTH; Nit 7,6 9 JUN 1980 PATE! REVIEWER: 'FOP-SECRET- forRelease: 2020/03/13 C03189332/Z/ZWZWZZZWZZif Approved7o7leleZE207070713 C03189332 -"rum Cr,' /Pt E- Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 r.11 � -4n Irs. aro PV-r Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 9 JUNE 1960 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC II. ASIA-AFRICA Pakistan's Ayub tells US ambassador he has authorized subordinates to explore sincerity of Soviet feelers on extending aid; a major motive appears to be to get US to increase military assistance. UAR last week alerted some military units because of report that Israelis were ready to start diverting Jordan waters; alert apparently has since been eased somewhat, but danger of new ten- sions, or incidents, remains. Paris official as saying France will con- tinue to work with Ethiopia to curb Somali sion. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 NL � Approved for Release. 2020/03/13 C03189332 � Isse TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 9 June 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC II. ASIA-AFRICA [Pakistan: President Ayub has authorized his subordi- � natecp ore the sincerity of recent Soviet indications of willingness to extend economic aid, particularly in oil � and other mineral exploration. A major motive in this-- he informed Ambassador Rountree of his move on 4 June-- appears to be to take advantage of recent Soviet saber- rattling over the U-2 incident to press for increased US military assistance. (Page 1) -1 UAR-Israel. Cairo promptly ordered a number of units put on partial alert last week following receipt of a report that Israel was about to start diverting the waters of the Jordan River. The alert appears to have been eased somewhat following assur- ances from UN Truce Supervisor Gen. Van Horn that there were no indications of an imminent Israeli move of this sort. Nevertheless, the UAR's over-all apprehensions about the Jordan waters issue, as reflected in last week's alert, will certainly continue, and new tensions, or incidents, are likely. (Page 2) F rance-Ethiopia: France will continue to work with Ethiopia to curb Somali expansion, the union of Somalia and Brit- ish Somaliland could not be blocked, but he suggested that Paris \\N TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 ,-, N ',;\ \ \ L .� Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 \\ \ .., � 11,1; "-SEeRE \\;., T k.,,,,:. �--, Nrile ....\ \- r \ ..;�,.. :\ !' and Addis Ababa "take joint action" to prevent Somali national- , -, '\, 1st agitation in Ethiopia and French Somaliland. ,-,.. ,,, .... the US and Britain be asked not to give financial aid � to Somalia unless the new state renounces the "Greater Somalia" -, ,. concept. (Page 3) ,- ��. , ,-. � �,..-\ � , .� ..:,,...' s ,-; \ : , � -,. - - ,..-, '-:. A WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS ilOn the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes� that: (,A. No Sib-Soviet, bloc country intends to initiate hos- tilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future. LB. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future. Note: There are no indications of Chinese Commu- nist intentions to launch a major attack in the Taiwan Strait area in the near future. The Chinese Commu- nists may, however, use the occasion of the President's visit to Taiwan for military demonstrations in the Tai- wan Strait area to emphasize their hostility toward the US. The following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would jeopardize the security of the US in the imme- diate future. Non 9 June 60 DAILY BRIEF ii , � , \ , , TOP SECRET lApproved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 SECRET Pakistani Inquiry About Possible Soviet Aid Pakistani President Ayub, in an apparent effort to stimu- late US interest in giving additional aid, has informed the US Embassy that he has authorized the Foreign Ministry to ex- plore the sincerity of recent Soviet indications of willingness to give economic aid, particularly in oil and minerals explora- tion. Although the Pakistanis have often cited the success of India and other neutrals in securing aid from both the Commu- nist bloc and the West, they would probably be unwilling to jeopardize good relations with the US by accepting extensive Soviet aid. Ayub, however, may also believe that suggesting willing- ness to improve relations with Moscow. will help reduce Soviet pressure on Pakistan over the U-2 incident. Soviet leaders probably consider that Pakistan's strong ties with the West preclude the prospect of substantial Soviet gains, but may respond with a specific offer in the hope of prejudicing Pak- istani ties.with the US. Ayub's statement to Ambassador Rountree that as an econ- omy measure he is considering a reduction of Pakistani mili- tary units to 80 percent of full strength may have been designed to underscore the need for additional US assistance. It seems unlikely that Ayub would take this step, since it would probably weaken the army's support for his military regime. More- over, he appears especially concerned over long-term Sovipt pressures on Pakistan, particularly through Afghanistan. -SECRE-T 9 June 60 Cekrrn � I I. iorr9 I I ����lk 10.1. no II I l�rlk I Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 '11 Amor UAR Apprehension Over Possible Israeli Move to Divert Jordan Waters The UAR has exhibited intense concern over the possibil- ity of a sudden move by Israel to divert the waters of the Jordan River. Reacting to information that diversion was imminent, Cairo order- ing a partial alert. A subsequent UAR check with General Van Horn of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization provided no con- firmation of the information, and the state of alert has appar- ently been reduced. the Israeli front was quiet. Israel's over-all water development program calls for no sig- nificant diversion of water either from the Jordan River or Lake Tiberias for several years. Only a small part of the conduit= canal system which is eventually to carry off large amounts of this water to central and southern Israel has been completed, and construction work has not yet begun on the sections closest to the lake and river. Israel does, however, utilize some water from the Jordan for irrigation in the immediate vicinity of the river, The Israelis are reported to have asked UN officials recently to obtain Syrian approval for Israeli work crews to improve Israel's irrigation canal which parallels the Jordan River in the northern demilitarized zone be- tween Israel and Syria. Although the Israelis apparently have no Intention of using this project to increase their off-take of water ap- preciably�if at all�the Syrians suspect that this project may be a part of the major long-range Israeli diversion scheme. Even if Syrian approval is not forthcoming, the Israelis may go ahead. Because of such sensitivity over the waters issue, either side may misinterpret a move by the other. Thus it is likely to cause further tensions and incidents between Israel and the Arab states, long before any significant water diversion actually takes place. TOP SECRET 9 June 60 CENTRAI INTFI I irzFra�F RI III FTIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 TOP SECRET French-Ethiopian Cooperation Reiterated France would continue to cooperate with Ethiopia in efforts to curb Somali nationalist ex- pansion. the French official's opinion that the union of Somalia and British Somali- land�scheduled for 1 July following the attainment of independ- ence by each state�could not be prevented. He suggested, how- ever, that Paris and Addis Ababa should take "joint action" includ- ing the exchange of information to prevent any incitement of Soma- li subjects in either country,. He also proposed to the Ethiopian ambassador that the United States and Britain be asked to de- mand Somali renunciation of the "Greater Somalia" concept be- fore extending financial assistance. Ethiopia is deeply concerned about Somali nationalist ag- itation because about 30 percent of the country is inhabited by Moslem Somali tribesmen who differ in religion and culture from the Christian rulers. As a result Ethiopia has recently tried various diplomatic moves to obtain international guarantees of its borders. France opposes Somali nationalism because of the appeal it exerts for about half the population of French Somaliland and the potential threat it poses to continued French control Of the naval base .t Djibouti. Since mid-1958 Paris has several times shown its determination to maintain its terri- tory. In November 1958 the pro-Somali Premier, Mahmud Harbi, was dismissed from office because of his nationalism and opposition to the new French Community. Recently, Paris has ensured Ethiopia's cooperation by agreeing to share control of the vital rail line between Djibouti and Addis Ababa. TOP SECRET 9 June 60 CFMTD A I IkITPI I irtrkirc RI II I PTIM Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 CONFIDENTIAL vie THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National. Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination 'Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director _eopiffirvirrxr_ Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332 � qii0" � ft/ 110 NEI MI 1. MN II 7.4rm�rzzzz#Z,Z.IZZSZ/Z4r/Z/Z/ZZ.I.,///////Z/Z./Z/Z/M4e/drirl (//1 4rnzzdrzirzzzzj-zzz Approved for Release: 2020/03/13 C03189332, TOP-SECRET- e".