CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1960/06/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03189327
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: March 17, 2020
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2020
• Publication Date: June 2, 1960

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2 JUNE 1960
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping and Moscow make several new
economic overtures to Burma following
U Nu's return to premiership.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Japanese Socialists, in new effort to
block ratification of US-Japanese treaty,
announce decision to resign en masse
from Diet lower house.
Despite the demonstrations protesting
Rhee's departure from South Korea,
most politicians and bulk of public there
appear to support provisional Huh gov-
ernment.
Afghan Government reportedly has de-
cided to accept large-scale Soviet aid
for Second Five-Year Plan.
Iranian officials, concerned over impact
of Turkish coup, reportedly are trying
to warn Shah to start political reforms
or face possible outbreaks in Iran.
Turkish foreign minister indicates trials
of Menderes regime officials may be
held under present provisional govern-
ment.
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, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
2 June 1960
: DAILY BRIEF
13(f)
I. THE COMIVIUNIST BLOC
Burma: The Sino-Soviet bloc has made several eco-
nomic overtures to Burma since U Nuts recent return to
the premiership there. During the past month, Peiping
has proposed an expansion of trade and aid for small in-
dustry, and the USSR has offered to help construct the
Burmese portion of a proposed Southeast Asian road net
and to staff the Soviet-built hospital and technological in-
stitute in Burma. U Nu probably will be more receptive
than the previous Ne Win government to Communist aid
offers. The Ne Win regime did not stop the $12,000,000
worth of bloc projects under construction, but did cancel
$25,000,000 worth of bloc credits.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
Japan: The Socialist party's announced decision to
resign en masse from the lower house of the Diet is the
opposition's latest effort to block ratification of the new
US-Japanese security treaty by forcing Prime Minister
Kishi to dissolve the parliament or resign. ICishi has the
constitutional right to use his party's sizable majority in
the upper house to proceed with ratification of the treaty.
His decision to do so, however, may depend on the extent
to which the press and public opinion support the Socialist
demand for dissolution of the Diet, or heed Kishi's warn-
ing that a government surrender to unparliamenta.ry leftist
pressures would pose a serious threat to democracy in
Japan. Although the Japanese press has recently become
increasingly critical of Kishi for his handling of the treaty
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issue, it has also shown signs of increasing uneasiT7
over the extreme position assumed by the leftists.
(Page 1)
South Korea: The initial reactions in South Korea to the
flight of former President Rhee to Hawaii have ranged from
simple expressions of "good riddance" to demonstrations de-
manding the resignation of the Huh Chung government and
the recall of US Ambassador McConaughy for permitting him
to depart. These extremist demands, however, appear
limited to a minority of students, possibly under the influence
of demogogues who have appeared since Rhee's ouster. While
there may be further protest demonstrations, most politicians
and the bulk of the public appear to decry them and to support
government and its program of reforms.
(Page 3)
Afghanistan: The Afghan Government reportedly has de-
cided to accept large-scale Soviet aid for its Second Five-
Year Plan (1961-66) and plans to send a delegation to Moscow
later this month to sign a formal agreement. Although the
Afghan royal family has been wary of excessive Soviet par-
ticipation In the country's economic development, Prime
Minister Daud probably has decided that the need for large,
long-term commitments for the foreign-exchange components
of the plan justifies the risks involved. Daud has also asked
for substantial US aid for the plan.
(Page 4)
[Iran: Some top Iranian officials, alarmed over the
possible effects in Iran of the Turkish coup, are attempt-
ing to warn the Shah that unless he starts political reforms
soon, there may be outbreaks directed against him. [Activi-
ty by political opposition groups, noted even before the
-Turkish Army's action, reportedly has since increasedoithe
Shah returned to Tehran from Europe on 29 May, apparent-
ly several days earlier than previously planned.
(Page 5)J
2 June 60
DAILY BRIEF Page ii
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4111.0f
I III. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
con the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United
States Intelligence Board concludes that:
W., No &no-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hos-
tilities against the United States or its possessions in
the immediate future.
No Sino- Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to
initiate direct military action against US forces abroad,
US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit in the im-
mediate future.
The following developments are susceptible of direct
exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which
could jeopardize the security of the US in the immedi-
ate future:
2 June 60
skk
Turkey: The provisional government has named a com-
mittee of magistrates to investigate persons responsible for
unconstitutional acts of the Menderes regime. Foreign Min-
ister Selim .rper states that it was originally planned that
A trials of former government officials would be postponed un-
til after a new constitutional government comes into power.
but he now believes they may be held sooner.
(Page 6)
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DAILY BRIEF Page iii
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NOP'
Japanese Political Crisis Worsens
An announcement that Socialist members of the lower
house of the Diet will resign en masse is the latest move by
Japanese leftists to force Prime Minister Kishi either to re-
sign or to dissolve the Diet and thereby halt ratification of
the new US-Japanese security treaty. The Socialists, how-
ever, are delaying the submission of their resignations until
after mass leftist demonstrations scheduled for 4 June--which
are expected to exceed the turnout of 160,000 persons on 26
May--and are allowing themselves time to gauge press and
public reaction before actually implementing their decision.
If the resignations are submitted, Prime Minister Kishi
has two alternatives for handling them, other than resigning
or dissolving the Diet. The Diet can refuse to accept them
and proceed with final ratification of the treaty in the upper
house, whether or not the opposition parties maintain their
boycott of the Diet sessions. A second, less likely, possi-
bility is for Kishi to carry out his earlier threat to hold by-
elections for any vacancies created by Socialist resignations,
but this would probably be denounced by the press as another
of his "dictatorial" tactics. Kishi's prospects for retaining
office following completion of the President's visit are uncer-
tain but appear to be diminishing.
Indications are that Kishi will continue his efforts to com-
plete ratification, with or without Socialist participation, by
the time President Eisenhower arrives on 19 June. His deci-
sion may depend on the extent to which the press and public
opinion continue to denounce Kishi for his handling of the se-
curity treaty issue or heed his warning that a government sur-
render to demonstrations and unparliamentary tactics would
constitute a serious threat to democracy in Japan�
The latter argument is inducing some members of the
ruling Liberal-Democratic party to work somewhat more
aggressively for passage of the treaty and to de-emphasize
their attacks on Kishi until this is achieved.
-CONFIDENTIA.L
2 June 60
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Government officials continue to believe that the present
crisis and demonstrations will subside before the President's
arrival. Asahi Shimbun, Japan's largest and most influential
newspaper, believes the crisis will not abate, however, and
has called on KiShi to request that the visit be postponed until
"a more suitable time."
A spokesman for the radical Zengakuren students' federa-
tion, whose two principal leaders were arrested on 31 May,
has said that the group is withdrawing its threat to stone the
President and to engage in other violent acts, but he cautioned
that a Communist-dominated faction within the federation has
orders from Moscow to stage violent demonstrations.
-CONFIDENTIAL
2 June 60
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South Korean Reaction to Rhee's Flight �
The initial reactions in South Korea to the flight of
former President Rhee to Hawaii on 29 May have ranged
from simple expressions of "good riddance" to demonstra-
tions demanding the resignation of the government of acting
chief, of state Huh Chung and the recall of American Ambas-
sador McConaughy for permitting him to depart. Extremist
demands, however, appear limited to a minority of students,
possibly under the influence of demagogues who have appeared
since Rhee's ouster. (Leftist groups seem unlikely to become
a major political influence in the near future, although they
may eventually emerge as an influential minority.
While there may be further protest demonstrations,
most politicians and the bulk of the public appear to decry
them and to support Huh's provisional government and its
program of reform. Ambassador McConaughy has noted
that the National Assembly's interpellation of Huh regarding
Rhee's departure was not hostile and appeared more for the
record than to harass Huh. On 31 May antigovernment student
demonstrators were dispersed by other student elements,
and a number of schools reportedly have refused to take part
in demonstrations planned for later this week.
Meanwhile, General Paek Son-yop has submitted his
resignation as chairman of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of
Staff. This action has been expected for some time and
follows the ouster of other top army leaders tainted by as-
sociation with the Rhee regime. Although the replacement
of other officers appears likely, the government has given
strong indication of desiring to control such changes s
the military's capabilities are not adversely affected.
2 June 60
-CONFIDENTIAL
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Kabul Reportedly Accepting Soviet Aid for Second Five=
Year
Kabul has decided to send a delegation to Moscow on 19
June to sign a formal agreement on Soviet aid for its Second
Five-Year Plan (1961-66)
The
- new aid is apparently expected to cover a major part of the
foreign exchange components of the plan and is likely to be
substantial�Soviet offers of loans ranging from $200, 000,000
to $300, 000,000 have been rumored in Kabul. Afghanistan
has already received about $240, 000, 000 in Soviet credits
and grants, of which about $80, 000,000 has been drawn.
, The royal family has been wary of overdependence on
Soviet aid--Kabul had earlier asked for substantial US sup-
port for the plan. Prime Minister Daud, who recently re-
turned from a five-week vacation in the USSR, however, has
probably decided that the need for large-scale, long-term
commitments for the foreign exchange components of the
plan justifies accepting a new loan. In addition he may feel
that with the discovery of oil in Afghanistan his government
will be better able to repay additional loans and can afford
to relax its policy of accepting only grants.
The size and content of the Second Five-Year Plan,
which is being prepared by the interested ministries in
Kabul, are likely to depend in part on the results of nego-
tiations in Moscow. The Afghans are likely to indulge in
some hard bargaining on the terms of renavment tefore
signing a credit agreement.
SECRET
2 June 60
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Key Iranian Officials Attempting to Warn Shah to Make
Political Reforms
L. U. Gen, Teimur Eakhtiar, chief of the Iranian National
Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK), told an Ameri-
can official that he is urging Court Minister Hosein Ala to
warn the Shah to withdraw from personal direction of the gov-
ernment "while he still can." Prime Minister Eqbal hopes
that the events in Turkey will provide a "much-needed lesson"
but does not believe Ala is forceful enough to convince the
Iranian ruler. The Shah, who returned to Tehran from Europe
on 29 May, apparently several days earlier than he previously
had planned, now must decide on the degree of freedom to per-
mit in the parliamentary elections scheduled for July. In a
speech to parliament on his return he declared, "Democracy
is the strongest guarantee of a regime's perpetuity." There are
no indications, however, that he is prepared to relinquish his
dominance. \
Meanwhile, Iranian political opposition groups have be-
come more active since the coup in Turkey on 27 May. The
leader of one group claims that on 28 May he attempted to
persuade his associates to stage a coup the next day but failed--
apparently because the group lacked assurance of military sup-
port.-,
'_Any successful coup in Iran must have the support or ac-
quiescence of a considerable part of the military forces in Tehran.
Most of the higher ranking officers have vested interests in the
status quo, and the Shah has encouraged the rivalry among am-
bitious officers as a means of enhancing his own power. Dis-
satisfied lower ranking officers, however, have been plotting
against the regime and seeking alliances with civilian groups,
but apparently without well-developed plans. The conditions
for a coup attempt have existed for several years, but govern-
ment surveillance and lack of common purpose among opposi-
tion groups have
gime movement.
2 June 60
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Turkish Internal Situation
The new government of Turkey has established a special
committee to investigate the activities of former Pre-
mier ifiencteres and the-members of his regime. If this in-
vestigation reveals evidence of misdeeds in office, the offi-
cials involved will stand trial and be barred from future polit-
ical attivity, according to the present head of government,
General Cemal Gursel. An aide to Gursel has indicated that
the' charge against them would be "acting against the constitu-
tion." Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports continue to circulate
in Turkey that the deposed officials were plotting to destroy
the effective opposition of dissatisfied elements in the army
and universities. Reports of corruption in the highest levels
of the old regime are also being disseminated by spokesmen
for the new government.
LSelim Sarper, foreign minister in the new government but
a long-time acquaintance of the highest �ranking members of
the old regime, informed the American ambassador in Ankara
that he recently visited the military academy where the Demo-
cratic party leaders are in custody. Menderes, ex-President
Bayar, and former Foreign Minister Zorlu reportedly are in
good health. According to Sarper, the trials of these men,
originally to be postponed until after election of a new govern-
ment, may be held much sooner in order to prevent loss of
evidence of misdeeds and to reduce the excessive nervous
strain on the accused. This decision appears to have followed
the suicide of former Minister of Interior Nemik Gedik after he
suffered what the government described as a "nervous break-
down."11
Sarper also indicated that there is a division within the
cabinet between moderate and extremist wings, with Sarper
among the former. The moderates will be encouraged by
Republican People's party (RPP) leader Ismet Monies promise
during a press conference on 1 June to take no vindictive meas-
ures against the ousted leaders. In case of RPP victory in
the forthcoming elections, Inonu would become premier
-SECRET
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2 June 60 CV,
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Departmr,nt of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Politica', Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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