CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/07/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03189017
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: July 7, 1957

r(//1/4/7/07ff Approved
firtiaAZ.Calf10 c.ecki, 7/77://.70,04
7 July 1957
Copy No
/
,
VOZ/Z1071, TOP
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
136
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
ILViEVVER:_
TELLU
LL TI
UOCUMENTI",,!0.
NO UIiN
I
TS
NEX REV'L'Of URLE:
AUT1-1: NH 70-2
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
hd,r4LonLd A
CONTENTS
. SOVIET LEADERS CAST LIGHT ON PURGE
(page 3).
(-)\j2 . VISIT OF KHRUSHCHEV AND BULGANIN TO PRAGUE
(page 4).
3 POLISH LEADERS WELCOME SOVIET CHANGES
(page 5).
REACTION TO MLIN PURGES
(page 6).
V) 5. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE REACTION TO SOVIET PURGES
(page 7).
h 6. DISSIDENT EAST INDONESIAN COMMANDER ASSERTS
SUPREMACY (page 8).
oh 7. KOREANS IN iJAPAN REPORTEDLY PLAN ACTION AGAINST
US EMBASSY (page 9).
8. ARGENTINA "INTERRUPTS" RELATIONS WITH VENE-
ZUELA OVER PERON ASYLUM (page 10).
7 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Pk CONFIDENTIAL "
1. SOVIET LEADERS CAST LIGHT ON PURGE
Comment on:
The precipitating cause of the 29 June
purge of Soviet party Presidium mem-
bers appears to have been a plot to oust
Khrushchev and his supporters from the
Presidium. From statements made by
members of the new Presidium in Lenin-
grad on 6 July, the following picture emerges:
The "anti-party group" had been holding se-
cret meetings and had recruited fellow con-
spirators in an attempt to weight the party and government with
their followers. The group "timed its action" to coincide with
Leningrad's 250th anniversary celebration beginning on 22 June
when most of the top leaders would be in Leningrad. (Khru-
shchev apologized for the Presidium's failure to appear at that
time.) When the question of the visit was discussed in the Pre-
sidium, the group apparently refused to go to Leningrad with
the rest, thereby tipping its hand.
The central committee was hastily called
to meet on 22 June and the whole question of the group's activ-
ities was debated. According to a statement Mikoyan made to
a US Embassy official, the opposition made a long and stubborn
defense of its position. Leningrad poet Prokofyev later reported
to a party meeting that the "conduct of these renegades changed
before our eyes in the course of the several days of work at the
plenum."
Charges made in Leningrad against the purged
leaders appear to herald further action against them. Khrushchev
accused Malenkov of engineering the "Leningrad Case"--the 1948-
49 purging of the Leningrad party organization for which former
security chief Abakumov was executed in 1954. Shvernik, refer-
ring to the Stalin purges of the late 1930's, denounced the group
for tolerating violations of revolutionary law. Meantime, the
rising tide of demonstrations and denunciations from below may
set the stage for a trial "by popular demand." Moscow TASS re-
ports that some 700,000 Leningrad citizens demonstrated against
the purged "Stalinist" leaders.
7 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
Ar. r glom. inrrurntrirtrAT
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
(Atli NI' JEULIN /111/..
Vie
2. VISIT OF KHRUSHCHEV AND BULGANIN TO PRAGUE
Comment on;
Khrushchev and Bulganin, who leave
Moscow on 8 July for Prague, probably
will discuss with Czech party leaders
the problems which have been raised for
t e Czechs by the purge in Moscow. At its recent central
committee meeting in mid-June,the Czech party reaffirmed
its consistent conservative position on Communist interre-
lationships and internal political questions. It also made
clear its intention to resort to repression if necessary to
hold the line internally.
After the forthcoming talks, however,
Czech party leader Siroky may feel compelled to demote
some officials who are tarred with the Stalinist brush, just
as was done after the 20th party congress. At that time,
only two officials, Defense Minister Cepicka, and Minister
of Education Stoll, were ousted from their party and govern-
ment posts, but they were retained as party members, Any
more far-reaching shake-up at this time appears unlikely be-
cause it might provide additional encouragement to revision-
ist elements in the party who probably have been cheered con-
siderably by the recent shake-up in Moscow.
The visit of the Russian leaders to Prague
is probably the first of a series of such visits which they will
make to the Satellites in the next few months, It is probably
designed in part to demonstrate that the situation in the Soviet
party is under control,
7 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 4
a If
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
CONFIDENTIAL
3. POLISH LEADERS WELCOME SOVIET CHANGES
Comment on:
Private expressions of opinion by both
Polish officials and journalists attend-
ing the US embassy party on 4 July in
Warsaw indicate a relaxation of the fear
of forceful Soviet intervention in Polish
affairs and of possible attempts to force
a return to hard-line policies. Polish
premier Cyrankiewicz termed the news
of the Sovietpurges"interesting," and ob-
served that better relations between all
na ions wor ng for peace would now be a prime Soviet aim.
Deputy premier Zenon Nowak, who was earlier associated
with leading Polish Stalinists, stated that the changes were a
good development for everyone. Typical of the Polish man-
agerial class reaction was the statement of the deputy min-
ister of construction that Polish contacts with the West would
now be easier. The embassy commented that Gomulka's hand
would now be strengthened in dealing with Stalinist elements
within his own party.
Polish journalists were even more enthusi-
astic about the changes, and their articles have described the
event as "a grievous blow to our own native conservatives and
dogmatists," as aid and support for Polish policies, and as
easing Poland's struggle for its own road to socialism. Try-
buna Ludu, official party newspaper in an editorial clearly
aimed at Polish Stalinists, described the ousted Soviet lead-
ers as a faction steeped in dogmatism, sectarianism and con-
servatism. Declaring factionalism the greatest danger to any
Communist party, it described the Molotov group's post-20th
party congress activity as damaging to the Soviet party cam-
paign against revisionism. Another press article has directly
warned Polish conservatives to heed the events in the Soviet
Union.
7 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
ArrArlaterrITTICZ1710711T4 r
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
4. EAST GERMAN REACTION TO KREMLIN PURGES
Comment on:
East German reaction to the Soviet
purges suggests that the Communist
leadership, while probably informed
in advance, has not as yet received
definitive guidance from Moscow.
The Neues utschland article of 5 July
which constituted the first official East German reaction to
the purges was written by politburo member Hermann Matern,
rather than party first secretary Ulbricht whose political phil-
osophy closely resembles that of Molotov. In commenting that
"people who lag behind have always been removed and have had
to give up their positions, however eminent," Matern may have
been hinting at a possible purge of Ulbricht. On the same day,
however, Gerhart Eisler, a party prop andist, reportedly
said that Ulbricht's position would not be affected by the changes
in the Kremlin and that the West is in for "a great disappoint-
ment" if it expects a major shake-up in East Germany.
The Soviet leaders may still be debating the
fate of Ulbricht. They probably recognize that purging him,
even though he represents the Stalinist philosophy which the
Presidium firings were designed to eradicate, would risk dan-
gerous unrest since any move suggesting liberalization will in-
evitably inspire popular pressures for even greater concessions.
On the other hand, such a purge now would be a logical step fol-
lowing the Soviet firings and could be conveniently arranged for
maximum effect in the West German September elections.
7 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
5. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE REACTION TO
SOVIET PURGES
Comment on:
The British Foreign Office fears that
the recent shake-up in the Soviet hier-
archy may promote a dangerous mood
of relaxation in the Western alliance, but
expects no essential changes in Soviet foreign or domestic
policies.
London sees the personnel changes in the
Presidium as the culmination of long-standing policy disagree-
ments on many subjects, and suggests that Khrushchev may
have wished to eliminate his opponents partly in order to press
forward with his far-reaching reorganization and other major
plans. Since Khrushchev will no longer be checked by opposi-
tion, the Foreign Office believes Soviet foreign policy is likely
to be "more clever, more enterprising, more elastic, and more
insidious" than ever.
The Foreign Office strongly disagrees with
the view of its embassy in Moscow that the Soviet government
will be weakened and command less popular support. London
officials suggest, however, that Khrushchev may have promoted
Zhukov to full membership in the Presidium partly to lend pres-
tige to the new version of collective leadership.
7 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 7
Artirlit.7 El I'm LI 71,711 7" A _
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
SECRET
6, DISSIDENT EAST INDONESIAN COMMANDER
ASSERTS SUPREMACY
Comment on:
Lt. CoL Sumual, deposed commander
in East Indonesia, on 7 July declared
himself still the supreme military
authority in that territory, according
to a press report from Djakarta. His announcement noted
that his decision was based on the demand of the "entire pop-
ulation of East Indonesia," and that troops there "still obey
me." His headquarters has been transferred from Makassar,
in southern Celebes, to Menado in the north.
This outright defiance apparently nullifies
Djakarta's recent efforts, led by army chief of staff General
Nasution, to enci Sumual's revolt against the central govern-
ment's authority. Nasution only last week returned from
Makassar with optimistic statements on negotiations for an
amicable settlement in East Indonesia. Sumual's statement
also brings to an end some weeks of confusion regarding his
status, during which his actions at times suggested some ac-
quiescence to the demands of Djakarta.
The northern Celebes area, which recently
declared itself a separate province under Sumual's aegis and
announced its economic independence, is a stronghold of sup-
port for Sumual. The establishment of his command in Menado
is additional confirmation that this region has become the prin-
cipal area of dissidence in East Indonesia.
7 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
QATI?
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
7. KOREANS IN JAPAN REPORTEDLY PLAN ACTION
AGAINST US E ASSY
The pro-North Korean General Federa-
tion of Koreans Residing in Japan is plan-
ning an action against the American em-
bassy in Tokyo on 10 July,
They plan
a protest against the decision of the United States to modernize
the equipment of the forces in South Korea.
Comment
The Koreans in Japan are more
prone to violence than the Japanese. They have often been
used by the Japan Communist Party to spearhead violent ac-
tion, and participated in the Communist-instigated disorders
of 1952.
7 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017
ZAL4/Vrd
8 ARGENTINA "INTERRUPTS" RELATIONS WITH
VENEZUELA OVER PERON ASYLUM
Comment on:
The Argentine foreign minister announced
on 7 July that Argentina had "interrupted"
its relations with Venezuela� Argentina
acted after it had demanded that Venezuela
deport ex-dictator Peron or move him into
the interior of Venezuela. In response, Vene-
zuela had recalled its top embassy officials
in Buenos Aires on 5 July, and on 6 July de-
clared the Argentine ambassador in Caracas
persona non grata.
Argentine concern over Peronista activities
throughout South America is especially acute at this time in view
of reports that the "Peronista Command" and Argentine Commu-
nist elements plan violence just prior to the scheduled 28 July
constituent assembly elections. Argentina has successfully per-
suaded most neighboring countries to restrict Peronista, activ-
ities but Venezuela has thus far refused to acknowledge that
Peron's presence there is a serious threat to the Aramburu re-
gime.
The Argentine foreign minister has admitted
that a break with Venezuela
might also create an unfavorable atmosphere
for convocation of the 15 August inter-American economic con-
ference in Buenos Aires.
7 July 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 10
Ob.
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189017