CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/08/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03189014
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: August 22, 1957

_Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
TOP SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
ranyo'
22 August 1957
Copy No. 136
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains classified information affecting
the national security of the United States within the
meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections
793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an un-
authorized person, as well as its use in any manner
prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States.
z
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10
C03189014
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
opooN,
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
CONTENTS
. EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD SYRIAN SITUATION
(page 3).
THAI CABINET CRISIS
(page 4).
3. UNEF DEPLOYMENT LIKELY TO BE CRITICAL ISSUE
AT FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY (page 5).
.14. VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT MAY BAN CHIEF OPPOSITION
LEADER FROM PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
(page 6).
(PS. NEW FRENCH INDUSTRIAL MISSION GOING TO PEIPING
(page 7).
6. PROPOSED ALGERIAN STATUTE TERMED STEP BACKWARD
(page 8).
1 7. INDONESIAN PRIME MINISTER PLANS NATIONAL ROUND-
0c)
TABLE CONFERENCE (page 9).
22 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
xi� A
mok
1. EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD SYRIAN SITUATION
While the Egyptian press and radio have
utilized the current Syrian situation as
material for intense anti-American prop-
aganda, and have generally approved
Syrian actions, President Nasr has re-
portedly expressed some anxiety over the
recent developments.
Nasr feels the present
leftist orientation of the Syrian government is "not favorable to
Egyptian interests," and places the blame on American "play-
ing around." He allegedly fears that the extent of Communist
influence in the Syrian regime may reflect upon Egypt and there-
fore lead friendly "neutralist" nations to assume that Egypt has
also sold out to the USSR. Nasr added his belief that the appar-
ent Communist nature of the regime may provide the United
States with an opportunity for interference in Syria, working
through Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan.
The Syrian ambassador in Cairo reportedly
has stated that Egyptian influence in Syria is waning considerably,
while the Soviet embassy has become the "dominant mission" in
Damascus. Continued close cooperation with a Communist-
dominated Syria would be extremely difficult for Nasr in the face
of his many denials of sympathy for Communist aims in the Mid-
dle East. At the same time, a severance of his affiliation with
Syria would leave him isolated in the Arab world unless Egypt's
present strained relations with other Arab states undergo rapid
improvement.
22 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
/...71.-,/
2. THAI CABINET CRISIS
ivoignations of Defense Minister
Sarit and a number of his followers
from the Thai cabinet may lead to a
serious political crisis in Bangkok.
Both the army, controlled by Marshal
Sarit, and the police, controlled by his
rival, General Phao, are reportedly on
an alert status,
the Sarit faction
hoped by resigning to force Phibun to form a new cabinet.
Sarit would then presumably use his influence to prevent
reappointment of Phao as minister of interior. Phao has
informed the press he will resign his numerous corporate
directorships, rather than leave the present cabinet under
Phibun's edict that ministers can retain no business inter-
ests.
Sarit might be inclined to attempt a coup
d'etat at this time, when his forces presumably are in a state
of readiness. He has failed to act forcefully, however, during
previous tense periods over the last several months. A settle-
ment might be achieved by Phibun's own assumption of the de-
fense and interior portfolios, which he held prior to last Feb-
ruary; Sarit and Phao would withdraw from the cabinet or be-
come deputy ministers. Such an arrangement might satisfy
Sarit, who for some time has been pressing for Phao's elimina-
tion from the cabinet. Under any such agreement, Sarit would
remain in control of the army and Phao the police.
22 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 4
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
Approved for Release.: 2019/12/10 C03189014
ftt
3. UNEF DEPLOYMENT LIKELY TO BE CRITICAL ISSUE
AT FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold
believes that the deployment of the UN
Emergency Force on both sides of the
Egyptian-Israeli armistice line will be
a critical issue at the forthcoming Gen-
eral Assembly unless Israel agrees soon to at least a "token"
patrol of its territory by UNEF.
Hammarskjold believes that this issue is
a "pearl" for the Arab bloc. Since the Eleventh General As-
sembly's resolution of 2 February is generally interpreted to
mean that the UN force should be on both sides of the line, he
feels the Twelfth Assembly will probably specifically call for
such deployment and that Israeli refusal to comply might re-
sult in an Egyptian demand for UNEF's withdrawal, and, for
practical purposes, the end of the UN force. Hammarskjold
considers that the continued presence in the area of the UN
force is a stabilizing factor conducive to settlement of other
issues.
Ambassador Lodge agrees with the secre-
tary general and adds that Tel Aviv's refusal to accept UNEF
might well result in a "further weakening of Israel's interna-
tional status,"
Comment The majority of UN members can be ex-
pected to call formally for such action, pri-
marily because of the general approval of the UNEF effort,
unless Israel agrees in advance to some token stationing of
UNEF on its side of the Egyptian border--which at present
seems unlikely. Israel has, however, recently agreed to the
stationing of UN truce observation posts on its Syrian border
after many previous refusals.
22 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
4. VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT MAY BAN CHIEF OPPOSITION
LEADER FROM PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Comment on:
Venezuelan President Perez, who will
seek a new five-year term in the 15
December elections, is apparently mov-
ing to eliminate Rafael Caldera, princi-
pal opposition leader and head of the social
Christian COPEI party, from the campaign.
Caldera is considered one of the few oppo-
sition leaders not in edle who might be capable of challenging
Perez' re-election bid. Oriented toward the Catholic Church,
his party would probably receive the endorsement of the hier-
archy, which recently has been at odds with the government.
Moreover, the outlawed Democratic Action party, which may
still control many votes, has reportedly arranged to support
Caldera's candidacy.
The rubber-stamp Venezuelan congress
recently set the date of elections, but the opposition is not free
to engage in political activity until an electoral law is promul-
gated--an action which the regime will probably postpone as
long as practicable.
22 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
5L-CR El.
5. NEW FRENCH INDUSTRIAL MISSION GOING
TO PEIPING
The French industrial delegation leaving
for Communist China next week is described
by a Foreign Ministry official as a "fact-
finding group" which will not discuss diplo-
matic recognition. He admitted, however, that it would "men-
tion" to the Chinese the desirability of having French commer-
cial representation in Peiping and that, if the Chinese demanded
reciprocal representation in Paris, "France would have to face
a decision not yet arrived at"
The American embassy in Paris believes
that the mission, which will be headed by Senator Henri Rochereau
and Socialist Deputy Francis Vals, will seek orders for specific
items, and points out that some of the industries represented are
"strategic" in trade control terms.
Comment A Chinese Communist official indicated last
spring that Peiping considered that the 1956
talks placed trade relations with France on a satisfactory basis
and was now interested solely in a visit by a French political
mission. Moreover, Peiping has recently discouraged other
West European efforts to send trading missions. In the light of
these facts, some French elements may plan to use the mission
as a cloak for advancing diplomatic relations.
Rochereau, who also headed the first French
mission which visited Communist China in 1956, recently stated
publicly that further trade expansion is bound up with the ques-
tion of political recognition. However, Vals was reportedly
named to the delegation by Premier Bourges-Maunoury with in-
structions to make a report which would counteract pro-recog-
nition propaganda spread by former premier Edgar Faure after
his June-July sojourn in Peiping.
22 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 7
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
�C�firtriitrZreitir
6. PROPOSED ALGERIAN STATUTE TERMED
STEP BACKWARD
Consul General Clark in Algiers be-
lieves that the new basic law for Algeria
prepared by Minister for Algeria Lacoste
would be a step backward from the 1947
Algerian Statute and, therefore, unlikely
to attract support either from Moslems or from many Euro-
peans in Algeria. He says the draft is less liberal than im-
plied in press reports and is heavily weighted in favor of pro-
tecting only the European minority.
Meanwhile, the Algerian government is
stepping up its press campaign. It is emphasizing the alleged
success of pacification, dissension within the Algerian National
Liberation Front, and growing cooperation with France by
Algerian Moslems. A consular officer who recently visited
the Kabylie region of north central Algeria confirms that a
more cooperative attitude exists among Moslems in that area.
Comment The French cabinet reportedly is consider-
ing two nearly identical drafts, the Lacoste
draft and another which differs mainly in that it provides for
revision by negotiation between French and Algerian representa-
tives two years after the law takes effect. This provision is
not likely to attract much Moslem support.
22 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
-CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014
7. INDONESIAN PRIME MINISTER PLANS NATIONAL ROUND-
TABLE CONFERENCE
Prime Minister Djuanda claims to have ob-
tained the approval of President Sukarno,
the national council, and the cabinet for a
national round-table conference which he
hopes to hold early in September, according to the American
ambassador in Djakarta. Participants in the conference, which
would deal with the controversies between Djakarta and the out-
lying provinces, would be the cabinet and the chief military com-
mander and civil official in each province. Both Sukarno and
former vice president Hatta would act as advisers to the confer-
ence.
Djuanda said he would invite disaffected mil-
itary commanders, such as Hussein of Central Sumatra and
Sumual of North Celebes, to Djakarta for private talks prior to
the formal conference sessions. He says they have assured him
that they would accept an invitation from Djuanda h.mself al-
though not from the army chief of staff, General Nasution.
Djuanda told the American ambassador that
in his opinion the country's greatest single need is the restora-
tion of the Sukarno-Hatta relationship and that this will be dis-
cussed at the conference. He said that if the conference failed,
Indonesia's situation would speedily become critical.
Comment Djuanda has made repeated efforts to resolve
the issues between Djakarta and the non-
Javanese provinces, but has failed to make any real progress
as the result of Sukarno's refusal to cooperate� It is unlikely
that Sukarno will give his wholehearted support to Djuanda's
latest plan, particularly since a favorable outcome of the con-
ference would require compromising Sukarno's own political and
economic concepts. It is far more likely that the conference will
point up unresolved differences between Djakarta and the provinces
and increase provincial resistance.
22 Aug 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/12/10 C03189014