CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/06/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03189003
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: June 10, 1955

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10 June
3.3(h)(2)
1955 3.5(c)
14/
/
Copy No. 94
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO,
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE � /
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: SV/h5f2_ REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
=FO-P---SifeRE
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NEW
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. USSR desires diplomatic relations before general settlement with
Japan (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. South Korea may propose "neutralization" of Korea by Big Four
(page 4).
3.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
areas of Viet Minh strength in the south
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Greeks see Yugoslav enthusiasm for Balkan pact undiminished by
Soviet visit (page 5).
5. Comment on increased Soviet interest in Balkan affairs (page 7).
6. Yugoslav non-Communists reportedly fear closer Yugoslav-Soviet
ideological ties (page 8).
7. Polish officials pleased with Belgrade pronouncement (page 9).
* * * *
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GENERAL
1. USSR desires diplomatic relations before general settlement with
Japan:
During the first substantive meeting of
the Soviet and Japanese representatives
in London on 7 June, Soviet delegate
Malik gave the impression that the USSR
rmalization of relations precede negotia-
tions on outstanding problems, according to a senior official of
the Japanese embassy in London.
The official told an American embassy
officer that Japanese delegate Matsumoto, without developing the
Japanese position, proposed the following list of subjects for
discussion: repatriation of Japanese subjects, the Habomai and
Shikotan Islands, the Kurils, South Sakhalin, fishing rights, trade,
and admission of Japan to the United Nations. Malik replied that
discussion of some of the subjects would take a "long time," but
others he thought were already solved. He asked for a postpone-
ment until 14 June of the next meeting of the negotiators, presum-
ably to give him time to consult Moscow.
In answer to a question by Malik about
the American attitude on the negotiations, Matsumoto said that
his government would not deviate from existing commitments,
but that the United States was in no position to interfere.
Comment: In order to achieve the
normalization of relations with Japan, including a formal end-
ing of the war and an exchange of diplomatic representatives,
Moscow might make minor gestures such as returning Japanese
prisoners of war or agreeing to negotiate concerning Japanese
fishing rights. It probably will retain the former Japanese terri-
tories as a lever for influencing Japan's future international
orientation.
Tokyo probably will hold out for at least
a partial settlement on some of the issues before agreeing to nor-
malize relations, despite the Hatoyama government's commitment
to promote closer ties with the Sino-Soviot bloc.
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FAR EAST
2. South Korea may propose "neutralization" of Korea by Big Four:
Under Pyun's proposal, the Chinese
Communists would withdraw from North Korea and the United
States from South Korea, and South Korea would agree not to per-
mit American bases in its territory. South Korea, however, would
retain a "defensive force" and the right to maintain defensive alli-
ances and would request UN-supervised elections throughout Korea.
Pyun also mentioned the possibility of a nonaggression pact with
the USSR and Communist China.
Comment: Pyun's reported proposal is
but a slight modification of the stand taken by South Korea and the
UN at Geneva a year ago. It leaves unclear such key questions as
the timing of the troop withdrawals and the disposition of North
Korean forces.
The Communists have long favored a
withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. At last year's Geneva
conference they rejected any UN supervision over the elections,
stated that military treaties were "incompatible" with peaceful
unification, and insisted on procedures which precluded genuinely
free elections. Pyun has expressed his concern that the USSR
might put forth a neutralization proposal at the summit meeting,
and may wish to assure that South Korea's views are given con-
sideration by American officialdom.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
areas of Viet Minh strength in the south:
Viet Minh influence south of the 17th par-
allel is predominantly in two main belts,
one in the western part of central Annam
and the other in the southern mountainous
strip extenaing mum, ouiiinc hi. n a . There are also relatively small
areas of influence in Cochinchina near the Cambodian border, north
of Saigon, and in coastal areas to the south and west of the city
(see map, p. 6).
In addition, the Viet Minh has established
clandestine political or paramilitary networks in areas extending
southward from the demarcation line, near Qui Nhon, and near the
Cochinchina border. There are also efforts in the villages to
sponsor youth movements, create basic cells among peasants, a.nd
intensify propaganda calling for the re-establishment of north-south
relations.
Comment: Viet Minh strength south of the
demarcation line has been estimated at 7,000 to 10,000 not including
Viet Minh sympathizers. It is concentrated in largely underpopu-
lated areas which are relatively inaccessible to national government
authority. The groundwork has thus been laid for the establishment
of relatively secure base areas from which the Viet Minh can extend
its influence to more important areas in the absence of effective
security measures on the part of the national government.
EASTERN EUROPE
4. Greeks see Yugoslav enthusiasm for Balkan pact undiminished by
Soviet visit:
Greek foreign minister Stephanopoulos
told the North Atlantic Council meeting
in Paris on 8 June he was confident that
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the Soviet leaders' visit to Yugoslavia
did not change Belgrade's attitude toward
the Balkan pact.
Greek general staff chief Dovas, who re-
on ft7June Irom a 12-day tour of Yugoslav military commands,
told Amer can officials in Athens that his party had been warmly re-
ceived throughout Yugoslavia and that his Yugoslav hosts, including
the army chief of staff, gave an impression of complete forthright-
ness. Dovas indicated that the Yugoslays stressed close Yugoslav-
Greek co-operation within the framework of the Balkan alliance.
Comment: Greek optimism concerning
Yugoslavia's intention to continue co-operation with Greece and
Turkey appears to have been reinforced. According to Ambassa-
dor Perkins' report, the Turkish North Atlantic Council representa-
tive supported the Greek analysis of Belgrade's position. Ankara
may therefore now become less suspicious and relax its pressure
on Yugoslavia for a formal linking of NATO and the Balkan alliance.
5. Comment on increased Soviet interest in Balkan affairs:
Soviet propaganda treatment of the Bel-
grade communiqu�einforces other
Indications that rapidly developing Soviet
diplomatic initiatives prior to Big Four
talks may include new proposals involv-
ing the Balkan nations. Since the Soviet
leaders' brief visits to Sofia and Bucha-
rest, Soviet propaganda has emphasized the "important conse-
quences" for southeastern Europe of the recent talks between So-
viet and Yugoslav leaders.
As part of Soviet preparation for new
European security proposals, Moscow may be devising proposals
to be made directly to Athens and Ankara, possibly for the crea-
tion of an enlarged Balkan bloc independent of East and West.
Greece and Turkey would not accept such a plan, since it would
require withdrawal from NATO.
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During the talks with the Yugoslays,
Soviet leaders asked whether Bulgaria might join the Balkan
alliance. 1Chrushchev told the Greek ambassador to Yugoslavia
that the success of the Belgrade talks was leading to closer rela-
tions with Greece. The Soviet ambassador in Turkey expressed
an interest on 28 April in improved relations, and the volume of
Soviet propaganda material directed to Turkey has increased four-
fold during the last month.
6. Yugoslav non-Communists reportedly fear closer Yugoslav-Soviet
ideological ties:
Yugoslav circles op-
posing the Tito regime are stunned by
the failure of the Western press to real-
ize that Article 30 of the Soviet-Yugoslav communiqu�rovides
for the same co-operation as that for which the Cominform was
created. This article states that "the two governments have agreed
to assist and facilitate co-operation among the social organizations
of the two countries through the establishing of contacts, the ex-
change of socialist experience, and a free exchange of opinions."
These circles also reportedly feel the
common ideology of the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist parties is
such that Yugoslavia will increasingly serve not only its own inter-
ests, but those of the USSR in the ideological field includi f-
forts to undermine the capitalist governments.
Comment: This interpretation of the
wording of the joint communiqu�s overdrawn. The resolution
establishing the Cominform defined its task as organizing and ex-
changing the experiences of Communist parties, and co-ordinating
their activities. Nevertheless, Yugoslav officials do not deny
that the paragraph quoted might cover the possibility of future ties
with the Soviet party. The Belgrade press, however, emphasized
on 7 June that nothing has changed in Yugoslavia's "socialist orien-
tation."
Borba, points out that Yugoslavia has co-
operated with socialist movements and forces irrespective of
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ideological and political differences and that it would be contrary
to previous practice if Belgrade did not exchange socialist experi-
ences with the USSR as well. The Tito regime has made special
efforts to foster relations with Scandinavian and Asiatic socialists.
7. Polish officials pleased with Belgrade pronouncement:
ccording to American ambassador
illon in Paris, the French ambassador
n Warsaw reported that when he asked
olish foreign minister Skrzeszewski's
pinion of the Belgrade communiqu�e
eplied immediately and unequivocally
hat the paragraph stating that "the dif-
erent forms of the development of
socialism are the exclusive business of the peoples of the respec-
tive countries" was of utmost importance to Poland.
Comment: Because of the strength of
Polish nationalism, the Belgrade communiqu�ay have made a
profound impression on Polish Communists. This concept of the
independent development of Communism in Poland was the cause
for the purge in 1948 of Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Polish national-
ist Communist.
The Soviet Union's public reconciliation
with Tito and recognition of the Yugoslav "form of development of
socialism" will probably stimulate nationalist sentiments both
among the Satellite populations and within the Communist parties
and may hamper further the so far unsuccessful efforts of the
Satellite regimes to gain mass support for their policies.
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