WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03187937
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2022-01252
• Publication Date: June 6, 1969

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
45
6 June 1969
No. 0373/69
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"AMARY. issued every Friday morning by [the
intoiligeuce ittports and analyzes signifidaat
.s or he week through noon on l'hursday. it !tre-
es material coordinated with or nrepared by the
m Research. the Oilice of Strategic Research.
zioraio, tit Science and Technolopy Topics recibir-
trenttnsive treatment and theretore published Sett-
'Lai Reports are listed in the contents nages.
KIN SI 'MMARY contains classified informationi
notion,ii security or the United States, within the
8, sections 793 and 794.: of the US Codid, as
trail mission or revelation (1' its contents to ott re-
prized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
(Information (Information as of noon EDT, 5 June 1969)
Far East
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 1
VIETNAM 3
Military action has tapered off, but abundant evi-
dence still points to a new round of offensive action
sometime in June and July. Politically, Liberation
Front officials have been seeking additional support
for their ten points from foreign countries, while
President Thieu has been publicly given South Korean
and Chinese Nationalist backing in his stand against
any unilateral withdrawal of allied forces and a coa-
lition government.
SINGAPORE ATTEMPTING TO CONTROL TRADE WITH CHINA
Singapore has severely limited the activities of the
local branch of Peking's Bank of China. In addition,
Singapore has approved licensing controls aimed at
overseeing the large volume of imports from Communist
China.
Europe
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
FRENCH VOTERS DEAL BLOW TO POHER AND THE POLLSTERS
French voters upset most forecasts on the first bal-
lot and gave Gaullist standard bearer Pompidou the
best chance to be the second president of the Fifth
Republic.
GENERAL LIMITS OF REDUCTIONS IN FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE
The French presidential campaign has produced prom-
ises of deep cuts in France's nuclear force, but the
program is committed to such an extent that savings
would be far less than the speeches imply.
-SEeR-EZ
5
7
8
9
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POLES GO THROUGH EXERCISE OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS
The smooth progress of Poland's predetermined national
elections on 1 June indicates that party boss Gomulka
succeeded in suppressing last year's intraparty fac-
tionalism and in smashing open dissension among the
youth.
10
RESURGENCE OF CZECHOSLOVAK CONSERVATIVES CONTINUES
Party leader Husak's campaign against prominent lib-
erals, and his acceptance of a tenuous coalition with
the pro-Soviet conservatives, suggest that it's a
brand new ball game in Czechoslovakia.
WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE OPENS
Some portions of the main conference document still
have to be worked out, but even if all parties agree
on the wording, speeches by delegates may detract
from the facade of unity that Moscow seeks.
12
13
-srvit-ux_
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Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION STIFFENS
Israel continues its tough stance, both militarily
and politically. Tel Aviv has particularly warned
Jordan about the increased border incidents. Arab
saboteurs on 30 May blew up the American-owned pipe-
line in Israeli-occupied Syria, thereby adding to
the tensions.
ISRAEL'S RESPONSE TO THE ARAB MISSILE BOATS ABOUT READY
Israel's Gabriel surface-to-surface antiship missile
has entered its final testing stage\
BIAFRAN AIR ATTACKS UNNERVE FEDERAL LEADERS
Recent Biafran air raids have shaken federal leaders.
They were already edgy because of their inability to
score any recent military successes.
Western Hemisphere
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT FACES GROWING CRITICISM
Arrests and deportations of columnists and politicians
have stirred a growing outcry against the government's
tactics and its failure to respect the constitutional
guarantees of civil liberties.
-Ste-REX_
15
16
17
20
21
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STUDENTS AND LABOR POSE PROBLEMS FOR ARGENTINA
Student unrest and labor dissatisfaction have com-
bined to pose a serious problem for the Ongania
government.
CURACAO RECOVERING FROM RIOTS
The Curacao government's decision to call new elec-
tions in response to labor's demands should ease
tensions on the riot-torn island but is not a capit-
ulation to the union demand for Premier Kroon's�
immediate resignation.
BOLIVIAN POLITICAL SITUATION WORSENS
President Siles' chances of serving until his term ex-
pires next year are decreasing.
VIOLENCE MARS GUATEMALAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
A prominent opposition leader has been assassinated
and the possibility of violence is strong if the anti-
Communist National Liberation Movement interprets the
action as an opener in a series of terrorist attacks.
VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT FACES GROWING PROBLEMS
Leftist extremists may be emboldened by their success
in forcing the cancellation of Governor Rockefeller's
visit to attempt further confrontations with the
Caldera government.
CUBA'S 1969 SUGAR HARVEST AN ILL OMEN FOR 1970
Fidel Castro's admission that this year's sugar har-
vest is faring badly is a further sign that Cuba will
be hard pressed to meet the highly publicized produc-
tion schedule for 1970.
POLITICAL CRISIS DEEPENS IN URUGUAY
President Pacheco is continuing to press his fight
with Congress.
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24
25
26
27
28
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FAR EAST
the Vietnamese Communists intend to begin
a new offensive during June and July. The new phase may be launched to
coincide with President Nixon's meeting with President Thieu on 8 June.
The current disposition of enemy main force units does not point to
impending attacks against the major cities, but widespread shellings and
limited ground probes could come at any time.
The Vietnamese Communists' propaganda apparatus has gone all out to
promote support for the Liberation Front's ten-point peace proposal. Front
representatives have been calling on leaders in Communist capitals to solicit
statements of support, and Hanoi is also pressuring its non-Communist
friends.
President Thieu has completed state visits to South Korea and Nation-
alist China, where he received official support for South Vietnam's opposi-
tion to unilateral allied troop withdrawals and a coalition government.
Apparently with an eye to the Midway meeting, Thieu and President Pak of
South Korea gave only lukewarm endorsement to President Nixon's eight
points and reaffirmed that the 1966 Manila Conference statement contains
the basic allied position on a settlement.
In Communist China, political disunity and sporadic factional violence
continue to beset the provincial governments. Recurring disorders in both
east and west China suggest that factional conflicts are preventing some
provincial governments from consolidating their authority and dealing with
basic law-and-order problems. Armed clashes were reported last month from
at least half a dozen provinces. Limited factional fighting is also reported to
have broken out in Canton and authorities there are increasingly concerned
over the problem of maintaining order.
Malaysia continues to be quiet under its emergency government, and
authorities in neighboring Singapore quickly put down some minor racial
disturbances early this week.
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-REG-REX_
VIETNAM
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Heavy fighting resumed last
weekend after the military stand-
downs in honor of Buddha's birth-
day, but the level of military
action has since tapered off
sharply. Most fighting during
the week was generally light, with
only occasional harassing shell-
ings and sporadic ground clashes
in widespread sectors of South
Vietnam.
many Commu-
nist main force units preparing
for action in key sections of the
country.
_1 another
round of fighting is likely to be-
gin soon. Furthermore, certain
first-line combat units are in a
high state of readiness in several
parts of the country.
The current disposition of
main force enemy units does not
point to impending attacks against
the major cities, but widespread
shellings and limited ground
probes similar to those on 12-
13 May could come with little ad-
ditional warning. The areas where
enemy battle preparations appear
to be most advanced include the
region south of the Demilitarized
Zone, Quang Ngai Province, and in
northwestern III Corps.
L /new enemy offensive phases to
take place during June and July
as part of the Communist's "sum-
mer" campaign.
COSVN--the over-all
Communist command authority for
South Vietnam--has called for a
new phase of attacks during June
which will be country-wide and
"stronger" than the May attacks.
the new phase
may be launched during the period
5-10 June. refer
to "highpoints" in mid-June and
during July.
Communists Promoting Ten Points
The Communist propaganda
apparatus has gone into high gear
to promote support for the Libera-
tion Front's ten-point peace pro-
posal. The number one Front dele-
gate to the Paris talks was sent
on a brief but well publicized
visit to Cuba last week for a heavy
round of speech making. In one
of the main ceremonies on 3 June,
Fidel Castro made a speech which
included the complete text of the
ten points so "the people of
other Latin American countries"
could hear it.
In other Communist capitals,
Front representatives are per-
sonally calling on foreign leaders
to solicit statements of support.
Although the tone of the speeches
and surrounding publicity varies
widely in the East European capi-
tals, the Liberation Front repre-
sentatives are getting all the
mileage they can out of each ges-
ture. On 31 May, Hanoi's main
party daily carried a long list
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of Communist allies which had pub-
licly endorsed the Front's new
program; the most significant
omission was, of course, Peking.
Thieu's Asian Tour
President Thieu has completed
state visits to South Korea and
Nationalist China where he re-
ceived official support for South
Vietnam's opposition to unilateral
allied troop withdrawals and a
coalition government. The visits
and the ensuing joint communiques
were intended both to warn Wash-
ington and to reassure Vietnam's
nervous hawks.
Apparently with an eye to
the forthcoming Midway meeting,
S
Thieu and President Pak of South
Korea issued a joint communique
which gave only lukewarm endorse-
ment of President Nixon's eight
points and reaffirmed that the
1966 Manila Conference statement
contains the basic allied position
on troop withdrawal, a subject
about which the Vietnamese have
recently shown a great concern.
Despite Saigon's earlier public
statements that some US troops
could be replaced by South Viet-
namese forces by the end of 1969,
the two presidents declared that,
in the absence of corresponding
action by the Connunists, uni-
lateral withdrawal "of even a
part of the allied troops" would
prejudice the security of the re-
maining allied forces.
In Taipei, Thieu and Presi-
dent Chiang Kai-shek issued a
statement at the end of Thieu's
four-day visit denigrating the
notion of a coalition government.
The communique extolled the pre-
sent "popularly elected and legiti-
mate government" of South Vietnam
and branded the Communists' call
for a coalition government as an
"absurd demand."/
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SINGAPORE ATTEMPTING TO CONTROL TRADE WITH CHINA
Singapore has severely lim-
ited the activities of the local
branch of Peking's Bank of China
in an attempt to control China's
growing trade with the city state.
In addition, Singapore now re-
quires that all goods imported
from Communist countries with
which Singapore does not have
trade agreements must be subject
to licensing controls issued by
a new state trading company.
This action is related to the
government's dispute with the
Bank of China and is aimed pri-
marily at overseeing the large
volume of imports from Communist
China.
Singapore recently suspended
the bank's use of government
clearing house facilities after
the bank failed to heed govern-
ment charges of noncompliance
with Singapore's liquidity laws
and refused to pay a small fine.
A serious run on the bank's re-
serves developed, but transfers
from branches in London and Hong
Kong plus new deposits by left-
ists in Singapore have enabled
the local bank to meet the gov-
ernment's liquidity requirements.
The government also recovered the
fine from Bank of China funds in
government clearing house facil-
ities.
Singapore now appears will-
ing to allow the bank to operate
without clearing house facilities
as long as it does not provoke
public disorders. In response
to recent warnings by Singapore,
the bank has reduced its anti-
government propaganda campaign.
If Peking, moreover, were to ac-
knowledge the fine, the local
bank could regain its clearing
facilities by depositing the
amount of the fine into its clear-
ing house deposits, thus bringing
this deposit back to the required
minimum. Rather than pay the
fine, however, Peking probably
will choose to use its branch in
Hong Kong to finance its trade
with Singapore until the present
dispute is resolved. Meanwhile,
the Singapore branch will concen-
trate on financing local Chinese
businessmen.
Chinese commercial activi-
ties in Singapore have increased
significantly since 1967, when
Peking transferred a large share
of its re-export trade to Singa-
pore following riots in Hong Kong.
China also has been increasing
its purchases of Malaysian rubber
through Singapore and supplying
increasing quantities of food-
stuffs and other consumer goods
to Singapore. These goods are
distributed primarily through
nine large department stores
selling only Chinese products at
extremely low prices. Total
trade between the two countries
amounted to about $190 million
in 1968.
Last year Singapore was Chi-
na's second largest source of
foreign exchange, after Hong Kong,
with earnings of about $145 mil-
lion. Singapore is also an im-
portant channel for Overseas Chi-
nese remittances, an additional
source of foreign exchange for
Peking.
-"SrePt.E.T,
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EUROPE
Soviet party chief Brezhnev opened the World Communist Conference
on 5 June with the representatives of 75 parties attending. He could properly
sigh with relief that the conference is finally under way after six years of
"preparation," and that the Cubans agreed to send an "observer" delegation.
Five ruling parties are absent, however, and about a dozen parties are
reluctant and skeptical participants. Even if agreement ultimately is reached
on the conference documents, these parties are prepared to find a way in
their speeches or other actions to demonstrate the hollowness of Soviet
claims to Communist unity.
Rumania made clear in a number of ways it would not change its
opposition to the conference documents. As if to underscore their intransi-
gence, Bucharest and Belgrade have demonstratively drawn closer together.
The Rumanians also have made friendly gestures toward China, Albania, and
West Germany.
In Czechoslovakia, party first secretary Husak may have temporarily
bought the support of party conservatives by ousting liberals and replacing
them with pro-Soviet hard liners. This will be well received in Moscow. It
strengthens the potential, however, for a showdown between Husak and
Czech party bureau chief Strougal. The power balance could easily lead to
heightened animosities between Slovaks led by Husak and Czechs led by
Strougal, making the nationalities problem once again critical.
Poland's rigged elections came off without a hitch on 1 June, despite
the threat of a student boycott. The East Germans made only perfunctory
protests against the meetings of West German parliamentary committees in
West Berlin, and the Soviets virtually avoided the topic completely. The
anniversary of last year's student riots in Yugoslavia passed quietly, although
the issues raised last year have not been resolved.
Gaullist candidate Pompidou regained his position of frontrunner in the
French presidential election campaign by his impressive performance in the
first ballot. Runner-up Poher is now in deep trouble, especially in light of the
Communist Party's decision to abstain on the second ballot on 15 June
-rreREX_
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FRENCH VOTERS DEAL BLOW TO POHER AND THE POLLSTERS
French voters, in the first
ballot of the presidential elec-
tion last Sunday, upset most fore-
casts and gave Gaullist standard
bearer Pompidou the best chance
to be the second president of the
Fifth Republic.
Despite heavy pressure from
Pompidou, who won an impressive
44.46 percent of the vote, runner-
up Poher has reiterated his deci-
sion to remain in the run-off
second-ballot race. He plans to
wage a vigorous campaign--in marked
contrast to his performance prior
to the first ballot--to give the
French a chance to vote for an
alternative to both Gaullism and
Communism. Poher does not appear
confident of winning, but he has
indicated that he believes that
it is his duty to continue to
challenge Pompidou by advocating
domestic and foreign policies coun-
ter to those of the past decade
of Gaullist rule.
Poher's popularity peaked in
mid-May when a poll gave him al-
most 40 percent of the first bal-
lot votes and 56 percent of the
second ballot. He progressively
lost electoral strength, however,
as the campaign progressed and
the public became more familiar
with his style and program. A
week before the vote, his support
dropped to 27 and then to 25 per-
cent. Thus, the 23.38 percent
that Poher actually received con-
firmed an already evident downward
trend.
Added to the liability of an
extremely poor showing in the first
round, Poher also received a serious
setback when the Communist Party
advised its supporters to abstain
on the second round. Although an
official Communist endorsement
would have been a "kiss of death"
for Poher, he undoubtedly hoped
that the Party Wculd refuse of-
fically to back either candidate
but give him tacit support.
In order to win, Poher must
retain his first ballot supporters,
pick up all of the Socialist and
Communist vote, and receive some
far-left votes. Many first ballot
Communist voters will ignore the
party's recommendations and shift
to Poher on the second ballot, but
enough will probably stay home to
deny Poher the victory the poll-
sters have been predicting since
mid-May.
Another casualty of the first
ballot returns is the reputation
of France's two most respected
polling organizations, IFOP and
SOFRES. Both charted the progres-
sive decline in Poher's popularity,
but they consistently underesti-
mated Pompidou's strength by show-
ing it remaining almost stable at
just over 40 percent throughout
the campaign period. In addition,
they continued to overestimate So-
cialist Defferre's strength, and
failed to predict the impressive
21.43 percent received by Communist
candidate Duclos.
To improve their now tarnished
record, the French pollsters will
have to devise some method of
probing the large political group
of uncommitted and uninformed French
voters, who, swayed more by emotion
than by reasoned political argument,
make up their minds very late in
the contest.
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�srtit_grz.
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GENERAL LIMITS OF REDUCTIONS IN FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE
The French presidential cam-
paign has generated reports and
speeches forecasting deep cuts in
France's nuclear Force de Dis-
suasion. The latitude for such
actions, however, is not great,
and savings from reduced spending
would be far less than these re-
ports imply. The nuclear budget
since 1965 has run a little over
a billion dollars a year and sav-
ings could be on the order of
$100 million annually.
The nuclear-equipped Mirage
IV bomber force is complete and
has been operational for several
years. Modifications to extend
the life of the bombers to the
mid-1970s were recently finished.
Development of the nuclear
force of submarines and land-
based missiles has progressed to
a point where investments of time,
effort, and money have irrevo-
cably committed the French to com-
pleting at least the major por-
tion of the Force de Dissuasion.
A large part of the investment
in research and development, al-
ways the major expenditure in new
weapons systems, has already been
made. There are, however, sev-
eral areas where reductions could
logically be made without seri-
ously degrading the force.
In the nuclear submarine
program, three submarines are al-
ready committed. The first is
undergoing sea trials, the second
is to be launched in September,
and work on the third, for which
materials have already been pur-
chased, is scheduled to begin im-
mediately thereafter. To abandon
the third submarine probably would
cost at least as much in lost em-
ployment as would be saved. The
only reductions in the submarine
program, therefore, probably would
come from canceling plans for
the already budgeted fourth sub-
marine. This would save, over a
four- or five-year period, about
$275 million for the submarine,
missiles and warheads.
The submarine missile pro-
gram seems certain to continue
at its present pace so missiles
will be ready when the submarines
become operational.
Cutting the land-based IRBM
program would save even smaller
amounts of money. Production
costs for the planned 51 missiles,
without warheads, needed for
testing, training, deployment,
and spares will be about $180
million over several years. The
French intend to deploy 27 IRBMs;
the first nine are scheduled to
be operational by the end of next
year.
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--s7m+gx_
saving something more than $50
million over several years.
Political and social pres-
sures to expand nonmilitary pro-
grams may be considerable, but
there is at least comparable
pressure to continUe the nuclear
force. Potential alvings are
not huge and there4ore do not
add significant force to argu-
ments calling for reductions in
the nuclear Force de Dissuasion.
POLES Go THROUGH EXERCISE OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS
The smooth progress of Po-
land's predetermined national
elections on 1 June indicates
that party boss Gomulka succeeded
in suppressing last year's intra-
party factionalism and in smash-
ing open dissension among the
youth. The outcome of the per-
functory voting for the 460-seat
Sejm (parliament) and some
170,000 local government posts,
held every four years, was vir-
tually a carbon copy of the 1965
elections.
All previous records were
broken, however, as 97.6 percent
of the country's 21 million eli-
gible voters--all persons over
18--turned out to cast 99.2 per-
cent of the valid vote for the
Communist-approved single slate.
There were only about 8,000 in-
valid--in effect opposition--
votes, just over half the number
cast in 1965.
When all the returns are in,
about half the seats in parlia-
ment are expected to change hands,
but significant shifts in key
personnel are not likely. With
only minor variatiOns in over-
all majorities--ranging from a
record 99.8 percent for party
boss Gomulka to a "scant" 92.9
percent for politburo member
Jaszczuk--all 18 meMbers of the
Communist politburo and secre-
tariat were re-elected to the
Sejm.
The existing distribution
of seats among the cpmmunists,
the two puppet parties, and "non-
party" slots probably will re-
main the same in both the na-
tional parliament alid in the
local governments. Traditionally,
the Communists have held about
55 percent of the seats in the
Sejm, and just unde4 half of
the positions on th local levels.
The newly elected Sejm prob-
ably will convene in ceremonial
session later this nonth. Accord-
ing to Polish journalists, Premier
Cyrankiewicz may use the occa-
sion to announce sothe shifts in
his cabinet. These are unlikely
to involve key positions.\
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RESURGENCE OF CZECHOSLOVAK CONSERVATIVES CONTINUES
Party first secretary Husak
appears to have been pressured into
a tenuous alliance with pro-Soviet
conservatives. The regime last
week returned several conservatives
to positions of power, then joined
them in ousting a number of out-
spoken liberals.
Conservative leader Lubomir
Strougal won new prominence as
Husak's deputy. Party secretary
Indra, who was accused of collabor-
ating with the Soviets at the time
of the invasion last August, has
been given responsibility for
state and social organizations.
He now is in a position to bring
other conservatives into high posts
in the government and in such ma-
jor national organizations as the
trade unions. In addition, a Mos-
cow-trained, former Stalinist
youth leader has replaced a recal-
citrant liberal as head of the key
Prague municipal party committee,
until then the last remaining bas-
tion of party liberals.
The conservatives also gained
a slight majority in the party sec-
retariat when the central commit-
tee replaced Josef Spacek--the last
member of Dubcek's "inner circle"
in the party leadership.
New, moderate policies have
also been announced. They are de-
signed to deal with domestic oppo-
sition--particularly the unre-
pentant liberals--both in and out
of the party, to strengthen Husak's
hand within the party, and to con-
vince the Soviets that the Czech-
oslovaks are speeding the process
of "normalization."
At its 29-30 May plenum, the
party central committee expelled
six prominent progressives includ-
ing ultraliberal economic reform
architect Ota Sik, reprimanded cer-
tain unreconstructed reformists,
and initiated investigations on
others.
In his speech to the plenum,
Husak indicated that these measures
were just the beginning. He held
up the specter of future action
against all dissidents, particuarly
among the trade unions, intellec-
tuals, and students. Husak appears
willing, however, to give each dis-
sident the opportunity to fall in
line before facing party censure.
Strougal's new pre-eminence
in the top leadership, as well as
his control of the largest regional
party body�the, Czech party bureau--
suggests that his political powers
nearly approximate those of Husak.
A struggle for power between
Husak and Strougal is a distinct
possibility because of their dis-
similar backgrounds, temperaments,
and political outlooks. For the
present, however, Husak needs the
conservatives to reassert the
party's authority over society, but
his attempts to control them prob-
ably will lead to trouble.
Significantly, friction be-
tween Husak, a Slovak, and Strougal,
a Czech, could intensify animosities
between the Czechs and Slovaks.
Strougal presumably is not above
capitalizing on such a development.
Consequently, the nationalities prob-
lem could become critical.
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The Russians have withheld
public support for Husak, who
still has to prove himself to
them. \
WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE OPENS
The World Communist Confer-
ence opened in Moscow on 5 June
with some elements of the main
conference document apparently
still to be ironed out. A draft
of the document, with amendments
included, was referred to the
plenary session by the preparatory
meeting which concluded on 30 May.
Seventy parties, three un-
named for "security" reasons,
took part in the preparatory meet-
ing and probably will attend the
conference. Cuba will send ob-
servers. Three parties which did
not attend the final preparatory
session, but did attend in March,
probably will make it to the sum-
mit. The Soviets thus will muster
about 75 parties, most of them
minuscule, of the more than 90
identifiable parties of the world.
Three ruling parties--China,
Albania and Yugoslavia--are boy-
cotting the meeting, and two
others, North Korea and North
Vietnam, are not likely to attend.
Except for Cuba, the participating
delegations of the ruling parties
will be headed by their first
secretaries.
As the conference opened,
the principal stumbling block
was disagreement over how to word
the main conference document on
"anti-imperialism" and "unity of
action." This document has been
drafted and redrafted to satisfy
various objections. Consequently,
the original Soviet formulations
have been virtually eliminated.
Even though the Soviets made con-
cessions to achieve their goal of
wide attendance, the Italians and
Rumanians and a few smaller parties
are likely to press for more
changes on the floor of the con-
ference. Bucharest, for instance,
staked out its critical position
by publicizing the Rumanian party's
basic theses last weekend even
though the theses ostensibly were
drawn up for the party congress in
late summer.
--grefiLgx_
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which was re-
sponsible for the sabotage of Tapline last week in Israeli-occupied Syrian
territory, has announced that this act was the first step in a campaign to
destroy all US "interests" in the Arab world.
A new cabinet was announced in Syria on 29 May, but it does not
appear to reflect any great change in Damascus. Defense Minister Hafiz Asad
remains as the strong man of Syria. The new cabinet may represent an
attempt to broaden the base of the government somewhat by bringing in
representatives of political factions outside the ruling Baath Party.
Iran is still pressing for renegotiation of the boundary in the Shatt
al-Arab River, which divides Iran and Iraq in the south, and Iraq is attempt-
ing to line up Arab support for its position. Relations between the two
governments continue to deteriorate, with a virulent press campaign aggra-
vating the situation.
In India, major violence erupted in Andhra Pradesh State's Telengana
region, where agitation for a separate state has been festering for five
months. New Delhi fears that significant concessions would encourage dis-
contented groups in other states. The agitation shows no sign of slackening
and may increase as dissidents focus on their demand that separate statehood
be granted by 15 June.
In Pakistan, the government has promised eventual elections to pave the
way for a return to democratic rule, but no date has been mentioned.
Congolese security forces brutally repressed a student demonstration in
Kinshasa on 4 June causing the death of eight students. The affair seems to
have had little effect on other Kinshasa residents. A thousand students in
Lubumbashi are holding a silent and so far peaceful solidarity strike, but
outside the academic community there seems to be little sympathy for the
students. The Mobutu regime, built on fear, probably has been strengthened
by its forceful handling of the situation.
Conservative Ivory Coast President Houphouet-Boigny late last week
carried out a long-planned break in diplomatic relations with the USSR,
using as a pretext alleged Soviet involvement with striking university stu-
dents. The strike itself was squelched by the liberal use of military force. In
nearby Dahomey, where a similar student strike nearly triggered a general
strike, the Zinsou government appears on top of the situation for the
moment following use of military power this week.\
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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION STIFFENS
Israel continues its tough
stance, both militarily and po-
litically. Israeli leaders issued
warnings to
to end what Tel Aviv consid-
toughened Jordanian stand
on the border, particularly new
aggressiveness from the Jordanian
Army and from the Iraqi troops
stationed in Jordan. Israel,
which has already made daily use
of aircraft, artillery, and even
border-crossing by ground forces,
threatened even more dire pun-
ishment if the situation did not
quiet down on the Jordanian bor-
der.
Jordan
ers a
On the diplomatic front,
Prime Minister Golda Meir fired
more of her salvos against the
big powers and their delibera-
tions. She reiterated that
Israel would stand firm and re-
ject any recommendations which
were unacceptable to Israel.
She expressed strong doubts that
the US and the USSR could come
to an agreement at all, but if
they did it could only be an un-
acceptable compromise. She ad-
vised the Israelis to maintain
their nerve and be prepared to
get ready to say "no" to the big
powers. Minister of Defense Day-
an also warned the people to get
ready for the long pull and talked
of the possibility of extending
the length of army service.
Arab saboteurs blew up the
American-owned pipeline in Is-
raeli-occupied Syria on 30 May
The 30-inch line, which brings
oil from Saudi Arabia to the
Lebanese port of Sidon, was dam-
aged by members of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine, the same group which
carried out the Zurich and Athens
raids against El-Al, Israel's
airline.
/Nasir's al-Ahram has de-
nounced the operation as bene-
fiting only the Israelis and
hurting the Arabs.
Lebanon's political crisis
is entering its second month
as the country reMains without
a cabinet. In a television ad-
dress to the natiOn on 31 May,
President Hilu reiterated his
strong oppositionto any deal
with the fedayeenthat would al-
low them freedom Of action in
Lebanon. His bringing the feda-
yeen issue to a head is considered
to be the cause of sentiment in
the country polarizing along re-
ligious lines, thereby aggravating
the difficulties that have al-
ready hampered the formation of
a national unity pabinet. Rashid
Karami, who has been regarded as
the Muslim most likely to form
the new cabinet, for example, has
publicly disassociated himself
from Hilu's remarks.
(b) (3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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7;regia_
BIAFRAN AIR ATTACKS UNNERVE FEDERAL LEADERS
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Biafra's newly acquired air
capability has shaken the federal
regime which was already edgy be-
cause of its inability to make any
military progress recently.
Biafran air raids, which be-
gan late last month, have damaged
federal aircraft at Port Harcourt,
Benin, and Enugu, and the Ughelli
electrical power station in the
has thus far been directed mainly
at foreign relief operations.
There has been no significant
change in the military situation on
the ground. DeSpite a slowdown in
arms shipments to the secessionists,
caused mainly by transportation
problems, the Biafrans have retained
the initiative On the southern front,
while federal fdrces, which recently
underwent a maj0r command reshuffle,
are still trying to consolidate their
positions in the north.
Meanwhile, general Ojukwu on 4
June agreed to the eventual release
of 18 foreign oil technicians, 14
of whom are Italians, who were cap-
tured last month in a secessionist
Midwest State./
The frustrated
federal leaders
are also showing
raid
in
the Midwest and condemned
to
signs of increasing xenophobia which
death
by
a Biafran court. Ojukwu
made
the
release conditional on gov-
SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA
MID-WESTERN
Ughelli Electric
PoweicPlirri
Federal iviMori
.,,,u,..,��
95290 6-69 �
ernment-to-goverpment negotiations
with the Italian, and will prob-
ably extract as Much political gain
as he can from the issue before
actually releasing the technicians.
Rome, however, has been warned by
the Nigerians that even de facto
recognition of Biafra would result
in the nationalization of all Ital-
ian oil holdings in the federation.
EQUATORIA
(b)(3)
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-speREz_
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Governor Rockefeller's trips remain the principal topic of interest in
Latin America. Both the Venezuelan and Chilean governments felt obliged to
ask the Governor not to come, because they feared the resulting demonstra-
tions could be controlled only with bloodshed.
The anti-US demonstrations in some countries during the past ten days
received the greatest attention and led some observers to state that the
mission had a negative impact on US - Latin American relations. Others,
particularly government officials in those countries Rockefeller visited, have
described the talks as "very fruitful." They praised the expertise and interest
shown by the Governor and his party.
The latest swing of the Rockefeller mission�the second of four sched-
uled trips�was to take him to Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, and
Trinidad-Tobago. The visits to Colombia and Ecuador came off as scheduled,
despite anti-US demonstrations in Colombia and serious student-police
clashes in Ecuador. The Bolivia visit was cut to a three-hour stop at the
airport \
\ The Venezuelan stop was
"deferred" by the government. The Trinidad-Tobago visit was unmarred by
disturbances.
The origins of the disturbances vary from country to country, though
Communists and other leftist extremists were in each case seeking opportuni-
ties to exploit. In Venezuela, antigovernment agitation had been building up
among the students since March, and it was only shortly before Rockefeller
was to arrive that it began to take on an anti-US tone. In Ecuador, a
vacillating regime had been trying in vain since early April to bring an end to
an outbreak of student lawlessness. Bolivian President Siles, who assumed
office after his predecessor's death in late April, continues to be extremely
insecure in his position.
The contagion of anti-US demonstrations has spread to countries
Rockefeller is scheduled to visit this month and early next. Demonstrations
against Rockefeller are being planned in Brazil and Uruguay, and can be
expected in Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Guyana. Serious student
unrest in Argentina and a developing political crisis in Uruguay combine
further to complicate the scene.
-57611-El_
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PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT FACES GROWING CRITICISM
The heavy-handed manner in
which Peru's military government
has attempted to eliminate its
severest critics has been counter-
productive. Arrests and depor-
tations of columnists and politi-
cians have stirred a growing out-
cry against the government's
tactics and its failure to respect
the constitutional guarantees of
civil liberties.
The latest incident, and the
one that has stirred the most
vociferous protest yet, was the
deportation on 24 May of the
editor of the weekly news magazine
Caretas, which has been consist-
ently critical of the military
government. Minister of Interior
Artola, a frequent target of
Caretas, attempted to justify the
deportation by charging that
the editor was trying to divide
the military and the people.
To prove his charges Artola made
public a letter from the Caretas
editor to a former official of
the Belaunde government in
which he agreed to print an
article designed to create fric-
tions in the military.
Instead of accepting this
explanation the Lima press used
it for further attacks on Artola.
One paper stated that the deporta-
tion was a clear violation of the
constitution and that publication
of the letter was a further viola-
tion of constitutional guarantees.
Another paper said that Artola's
statement and publication of the
letter were nothing more than a
"tardy, infantile and ill-con-
ceived attempt....to justify the
unjustifiable." The paper went
on to say that it would not be in-
timidated by this or any other at-
tempt to curb freedom of the press.
In addition, the Federation of
Peruvian Journalists has publicly
charged the minister of interior
with criminal abuse of his author-
ity and called for his suspension
from the government.
The press was not the only
source of criticism this week.
In a speech before a crowd that
included President Velasco, Luis
Bedoya Reyes, the mayor of Lima
and currently the country's
highest elected official, leveled
indirect but obvious criticism at
the military government for its
abuse of the constitution.
Bedoya's criticism e received
vigorous applause and were given
broad coverage in the Lima press.
Serious disagreements appear
to have arisen within the govern-
ment on the proper method of deal-
ing with the growing opposition.
This, coupled with, frictions caused
by the deterioratiOn in relations
with the US, is prObably responsi-
ble for the increasing number of
rumors that a major change within
the government will take place in
the next two to three weeks
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STUDENTS AND LABOR POSE PROBLEMS FOR ARGENTINA
Student unrest combined with
labor dissatisfaction during May
to present the Ongania administra-
tion with the most serious prob-
lem it has faced during nearly
three years in power. No real
solution is in sight.
Labor leaders say that the
brunt of the government's largely
successful program to combat in-
flation has fallen on the workers,
resulting in some decline in real
wages. They point out that the
government's program to increase
the efficiency of state enter-
prises has cost the jobs of some
workers, while the working day of
others has been increased. The
union officials also maintain that
workers were hurt by price in-
creases in transportation and
basic food commodities in May.
Many students still harbor
deep resentment against the On-
gania government for its action
in mid-1966 when it rescinded the
traditional autonomy of the na-
tional universities on grounds
that they were foci of subversion
and were unable to fulfill their
educational role. The government
appointed new administrators to
replace the old system of tri-
partite government under which the
students, faculty, and alumni had
joint control over the national
universities. At that time the
government promised much-needed
reforms in higher education. Lit-
tle has been accomplished toward
reforms, however, and the country's
more than 230,000 university stu-
dents are restive under a system
that limits their educational op-
portunities and career prospects.
The shooting of student demon-
strators by police during the last
two weeks of May provided the
catalyst for unity--perhaps only
temporary--between students and
labor. On 30 May most of the
country's labor unions joined in
a general strike, which proved to
be the most effective in many
years even though the government
had declared it illegal and warned
that persons involved in endanger-
ing public services or in "rebel-
lion, subversion, or plotting"
would be tried by military courts.
There were some terrorist in-
cidents during the strike. A show
of force by security officials pre-
vented violence in most areas, but
clashes between police and workers
joined by students did result in
approximately 16 deaths and over
$10 million in property damage in
the industrial city of Cordoba.
Even though military forces took
control of the city late on 29 May,
sporadic sniping--particularly in
the university district--continued
for two days. Press reports list
400 persons arrested in Cordoba,
among them two priests. Some have
already been given long prison
terms by military courts. The
sentencing of some labor leaders
may heighten the tension between
labor and the government.
-SEC-REZ.
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-STeRE-1._
CURACAO RECOVERING FROM RIOTS
The Curacao government's de-
cision to call new elections in
response to labor demands should
ease tensions on the riot-torn
island.
The riots that erupted on
30 May stemmed from a mid-week
work stoppage by construction
workers which, aided by sympathy
walkouts, quickly burgeoned into
a general strike. During a march
on Willemstad, the capital, dis-
orders broke out and local secu-
rity forces were unable to con-
tain the rioters. Additional
troops were flown in from neigh-
boring islands and a contingent
of Dutch marines was airlifted
from The Hague.
20
StatuteMilEs
CURAcA0
WILLEMSTAD�
(01s0 in.! Cr capitol
C(Ccia400)
KLEIN CLIPAgA0
95223 6-69
NETHERLANDS
AJ,VTILLES
eUeel.PRAcACV
2:��-, BONAIRE
4.f5
The decision by Democratic
Party leader Premier Ciro Kroon
to call elections Within three
months appears to have mollified
union leadership although it does
not amount to a capitulation to
the union demand for his imme-
diate resignation.
Without the riots, elections
would have been held next year
for Curacao's 12 peats in the
22-man legislature shared by the
other five semiautonomous is-
lands that make up the Nether-
lands Antilles. The Democratic
Party won a convincing victory
in the last national elections,
in 1966, and follOwed this with
THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES
100 290
390
Statute Miles
PUERTO RICO
490
500
WILANDYYARD
ISNDS
Anguilla (U.K.)
SARA
.Saint Martin
tsa
SAINT EU,TATIU7 Ant.,
/ (U.K.)
4.Gua(dFerlo)upe
AtMertinique
TRtNIDAD
ro'Bn;kiCo
SAINT MARI IN
(Sr.)
phinipsbute SAINT MARTIN
WIN CIWARD
IS
SABA
Saint Earthelem
OT.)
SAINT EUSTATIUS
Saint Christopher
20 Wiz.)
Statute Miles
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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-grmET__
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
a triumph in local elections in
1967.
In the Netherlands, the dis-
orders and the decision to send
additional Dutch troops to the
island have touched off a major
debate over the lack of social
justice for the blacks in the
former colony and the advisabil-
ity of revising the Realm Statute
in order to avoid giving the
Dutch a neo-colonialist image.
BOLIVIAN POLITICAL
President Siles'chances of
serving until his term expires
next year are decreasing. He was
forced to shorten the visit of
Governor Rockefeller to a three-
hour airport stop/
Military ac-
ceptance of his government has
always been contingent on a num-
ber of factors, including his
ability to maintain public order.
Although the disturbances them-
selves were relatively minor,
the fact that Rockefeller was un-
able to visit La Paz was a blow
to Siles and will weaken his hand
in dealing with the military.
The military leaders appar-
ently are becoming increasingly
dissatisfied with the Siles gov-
ernment. They believe that his
Particularly among the par-
ties of the left, as well as
among labor groups, criticism has
focused on the statute under which
The Hague retains responsibility
for matters affecting Antillean
defense and foreign affairs. Al-
though early revision seems un-
likely, the Dutch are expected
to increase development aid to
the islands as one means of amel-
iorating the social conditions
that contributed to the disorders.
SITUATION WORSENS
efforts to ingratiate himself with
students and workers are undermin-
ing the prestige of the military.
Although armed forces Commander
in Chief Alfredo Ovando probably
would like to be elected presi-
dent next May, considerations of
democratic legitimacy are unlikely
to restrain him should he decide
to move against Siles before then.
Two military members of the
cabinet recently approached US
officials to ascertain their at-
titude toward a coup. The minis-
ter of government told the US am-
bassador that the opposition of
the US Embassy was the only reason
a coup had not already taken place.
The minister of defense indicated
that the military feared Siles'
actions were unwittingly unleash-
ing Communist forces and that the
military, reluctantly, would have
to take power within the next five
or six months.\
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VIOLENCE MARS GUATEMALAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The prospects for a tranquil
election campaign, never bright in
Guatemala, are growing dimmer.
Already, a prominent opposition
leader has been assassinated, and
the possibility of further vio-
lence is strong.
Communist terrorists, acting
at mid-day on 1 June, killed Mario
Lopez Villatoro, a founder and of-
ficer of the virulently anti-Com-
munist National Liberation Move-
ment (MLN), and his bodyguard.
The MLN presidential candidate,
Col. Carlos Arana, is known to be
a prime target of the Communists,
and the party may interpret the
Lopez murder as the opener in a
planned series of terrorist at-
tacks against its leadership. The
MLN constituency includes an ex-
tremist element of its own that
can be expected to attempt retal-
iation against the left. The gen-
erally unsettled atmosphere of
electioneering is conducive to
a revival of the political vio-
lence between the left and the
right which was brought in check
just over a year ago.
None of the parties or can-
didates has inspired much inter-
est among the electorate. The
government's standard bearer, Mario
Fuentes Pieruccini, opened his
campaign last week with a speech
that fell short of the "sensational
political event" advertised by the
ruling Revolutionary Party and
probably further disillusioned the
apathetic public With campaign
promises. The public's concern
is focused on the criminal and
political violence that has risen
steadily over the past several
weeks. The discovery of mutilated
cadavers, repeated cases of kid-
napings and extortion, and other
crimes have caused the business
community to feel nervous and
insecure.
The government, in an effort
to mollify the right, will prob-
ably show it is willing to con-
front the problem of Communist
terrorism. Possibly in an attempt
to balance recent shifts which
have elevated military officers
identified with the leftist revo-
lutionary politics of the 1950s,
President Mendez has offered the
Ministry of Government post to
Col. Manuel Sosa Avila. Sosa,
the Guatemalan military attach�
to Madrid, was one of three top
security men "exiled" to diplo-
matic posts in March 1968\
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-STC-R4a_
VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT FACES GROWING PROBLEMS
Leftist extremists in Vene-
zuela may be emboldened by their
success in forcing the cancella-
tion of Governor Rockefeller's
visit to Caracas to attempt fur-
ther confrontations with the Cal-
dera government.
The decision to postpone
the Governor's visit was appar-
ently prompted by fears that
student-extremist demonstrations
would get out of hand and that
labor violence in Curacao would
spread to the mainland, siphoning
off security forces needed to
protect the Governor's party.
The postponement was greeted
with relief by most political
leaders. Nevertheless, the gov-
ernment has been criticized by
some for backing down in the face
of student threats and showing
timidity and irresolution in deal-
ing with extremists. Criticism
of the government has grown within
the last few months, and appar-
ently extends not only to the gov-
ernment's pacification program de-
signed to end insurgency, which
some political and military lead-
ers consider misguided and a fail-
ure, but also to the handling of
economic problems.
While these economic prob-
lems--a large budget deficit and
a sluggish growth of oil revenues--
are not of its own making, the Cal-
dera administration has been un-
able to come up with solutions
that satisfy either its own sup-
porters or the opposition parties
that presently control congress.
The opposition Democratic
Action party is seeking to
arouse latent nationalism with
charges that the government is
not aggressive enough in protect-
ing Venezuela's share of the US
oil import market. Continuing US
oil import restrictions and pro-
spective competition from recently
discovered oil fields in Alaska
pose a threat to the maintenance
of Venezuela's oil revenues--the
principal source of government
financing for social and economic
programs.
President Caldera's reluc-
tance to adopt any policy that
might be controversial has gener-
ated questions on whether his ad-
ministration can govern effec-
tively./
la prolongation of
this present atmosphere is likely
to erode the confidence of those
elements upon which the future of
Caldera's Christian Democratic
government depends.
-Breit.Fx_
(b)(1)
f(b)(3)
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�RreBA;X__
CUBA'S 1969 SUGAR HARVEST AN ILL OMEN FOR 1970
Fidel Castro's admission
that this year's sugar harvest is
faring badly is a further sign
that Cuba will be hard pressed to
meet the highly publicized pro-
duction schedule for 1970.
In a speech in Havana on 26
May, Castro described the 1969
harvest as "the agony of this
country" and said that, with the
harvest 85 percent complete, pro-
duction amounted to only 4.28
million tons. Final totals prob-
ably will not exceed 4.7 million
tons, less than last year's poor
harvest.
The poor showing was attrib-
uted to organizational problems,
ANNUAL CUBAN SUGAR PRODUCTION
UNDER CASTRO
(in millions of metric tons)
1959
5.96
1964
4.40
1960
5.86
1965
6.05
1961
6.76
1966
4.45
1962
4.81
1967
6.13
1963
3.82
1968
5.20
technical difficulties, and con-
flicts caused by preparations
for next year's harVest. Despite
this year's disappointment, Castro
re-emphasized his determination
to achieve the production goal
of 10 million tons in 1970.
In view of the sugar indus-
try's unimpressive performance
over the past several years, Cas-
tro's continued confidence in
achieving the 1970 target is per-
plexing. Although Milling capac-
ity and supplies of: cane may be
adequate to reach tie goal, the
supply of labor and machinery
for harvesting the cane appar-
ently is not much higher than it
was in 1967, when 6.1 million
tons of sugar were produced.
Unless Castro Can find a
convincing scapegoat such as a
severe drought or disastrous
hurricane, he will be hard put
to explain away a failure to
achieve, or at least approach,
next year's target.! He cannot
help but suffer a significant
drop in prestige, particularly
if production does pot exceed
the record 7.2 million tons
achieved in 1952.
Page 28
WEEKLY SUMMARY
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POLITICAL CRISIS DEEPENS IN URUGUAY
President Pacheco is con-
tinuing to press his uphill bat-
tle with Congress over his pro--
gram of economic austerity.
The current dispute is over
a key aspect of Pacheco's pro-
gram--new government regulations
that would eliminate both the
privileged position of the no-
toriously inefficient state-owned
slaughterhouse and certain fringe
benefits traditionally enjoyed by
workers at the larger meatpacking
plants.
The Senate began censure ac-
tion on 27 May against the cabinet
minister responsible for imple-
menting the new regulations, and
on 29 May the General Assembly
(the combined House and Senate)
voted the censure. Pacheco, who
had warned that he would not tol-
erate the censure of a minister
on a question of policy, has re-
fused to accept the minister's
resignation.
As a result, the issue must
now, according to the constitution,
be raised again in the General As-
sembly. If the Assembly fails to
reaffirm its vote of censure by
a three-fifths majority, Presi-
dent Pacheco may retain the min-
ister, dissolve Congress, and call
for new parliamentary elections.
Opposition politicians,in turn,
have indicated that if new con-
gressional elections are held and
the new General Assembly votes to
uphold the censure action of the
present Congress, they will intro-
duce a motion to amend the consti-
tution so that the President and
Vice President will have to re-
sign.
The battle lines are thus
clearly drawn. Public opinion
against the new slaughterhouse
regulations is running high and
striking workers have clashed several
times with police during the past
weeks. Popular support aside, it is
doubtful that Congress will be
able to override the presidential
veto by the necessary three-fifths
vote. Given the reluctance of
many Congressmen to risk new
elections, speculation is in-
creasing that the General Assembly
will somehow manage to sidestep
a vote. Any such maneuver would
be of dubious constitutional
legality, however.
President Pacheco is deter-
mined to continue his economic
program and if the General Assembly
is unable to avoid a showdown,
the possibilities for new con-
gressional elections are good.
(b)(3)
-"S`reit-.EX_
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6 Jun 69
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(b)(
(b)(
1)
3)
-SEGREI
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