CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03186519
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 26, 1968

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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212
26
26 February 1968
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�Top-SeeFel�
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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26 February 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation Report. (Page 1)
Laos: Communists maintain pressure in Bolovens
Plateau area. (Page 2)
Burma: Poor year for government-controlled rice
trade may aggravate regime's difficulties. (Page 3)
Panama: Political crisis over electoral tribunal
seems to have eased. (Page 4)
Czechoslovakia: Dubcek's plans for wide-ranging
changes meeting conservative resistance. (Page 0
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a Nang
CORPS
Cojer ng Pleiku
� �
EIINH
LONG
OA�
PHU QUOC
24) Ctal See
US Fire Support
Base
BAC LIEU
CONFIDJtITIAL
26
� � �
IN
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*South Vietnam: Enemy activity has dropped to its
lowest level since the Tet offensive began on 30 January,
but the threat to a number of urban areas continues.
In Saigon, the Viet Cong have reportedly told residents
of Cholon that they will launch a new attack in that
district on 27 February.
On 25 February, an enemy battalion assaulted a US
artillery fire support base in the delta province of Dinh
Tuong and succeeded in breaching the base's defenses.
After a fierce two-hour fight, the enemy was repulsed.
US forces suffered 19 killed and 43 wounded; the Com-
munists lost 94 dead.
enemy
attacks in the Kontum-Pleiku area may be imminent.
Since the middle of February, several units subordinate
to the B-3 Front and some elements of the front head-
quarters have moved from the tri-border region into
Kontum and Pleiku province. In addition, extensive
resupply, recruitment and reconnaissance activities
have been conducted by the Front's subordinates.
� In western Kontum,
impending enemy forays against Dak To and the destruction
of a bridge�possibly along Route 512--to restrict allied
ground movement and hamper the reinforcement of Dak
To. Moreover,
In Pleiku, extensive enemy
reconnaissance oi the Le Thanh and Plei Djereng areas.
According to intercepted messages, the enemy was making
preparations for attacks on 26 February in the Le Thanh
area.
26 Feb 68
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LAOS PANHANDLE
15
hainh Hoe
NORT
Enemy Controlled
Territory
VIE TN
0 2,5 5,0 7,5 M i les
' ' '
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
COINA
HAINAN
Vinh
THAILAND
.../
t'Jc
69700 2-68 CIA
19
CAM6BODIA
141
13
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I. W.
*Laos: Communist forces are maintaining pressure
in the Bolovens Plateau area.
The towns of Attopeu and Saravane came under attack
yesterday following two days of heavy enemy pressure on
government outposts. The regional government commander
considers Attopeu untenable due to the unavailability of
adequate reinforcements and intends to withdraw if the
situation deteriorates further.
The Lao Ngam area is quiet after government forces
there beat back Communist attackers, apparently inflict-
ing heavy casualties on the enemy.
The Communists are also stepping up their activity
in the northern panhandle. They have again overrun govern-
ment positions at Muong Phalane, which they had briefly
occupied last December. The Communists have recently
strengthened positions long held near Thakhek on the
Mekong. There is no indication,however, that they in-
tend to conduct major attacks in this area, although they
may increase their harassment activity.
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Burma: The Ne Win regime's current political
and economic difficulties may be aggravated by an-
other poor year for the government-controlled rice
trade.
Despite an expected increase in the rice harvest
by over one million tons, purchases by the government
rice monopoly are running at a rate even lower than
last year. This shortfall sterns from a number of fac-
tors, including unrealistically low official prices, a
shortage of consumer goods for the peasants to buy
with the proceeds, intimidation by the insurgents, and
diversion to more lucrative black market channels.
Unless this trend is reversed, Burma's rice ex-
ports--vital for essential consumer imports--may not
even reach last year's 500,000 tons, the lowest since
World War II. Cheap government rice for urban domes-
tic consumption could also be in extremely short sup-
ply, raising the possibility of another round of rioting
and looting which troubled the regime last year.
Burma's diverse and disunited insurgent groups
are in no position to exploit these difficulties to achieve
a major breakthrough. Popular disgruntlement over
the rice situation could, however, improve the climate
for modest insurgent gains.,
26 Feb 68 3
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Panama: The political crisis over control of the
three-man electoral tribunal appears to have eased.
The Supreme Court still has not announced its de-
cision to fire two pro-Arias tribunal judges so that pro-
Samudio alternates could take over. With the court
scheduled to go on a month's vacation during March, it
is unlikely that further action will be taken until after
1 April. In the meantime, moderates on both sides
may be able to work out a compromise which will per-
mit the presidential elections to be held on 12 May.
Arias continues to temper threats with concilia-
tory gestures. During a speech on 23 February he
said he would seek to impeach or overthrow Robles
if necessary, but asked his followers to respect the
national guard and cautioned against attacks on the Su-
preme Court.
Although passions could again be easily aroused,
the likelihood of major disturbances in the immediate
future has diminished. The guard is still on full alert
and probably will be able to deal with any partisan
clashes that might break out during the re-Lenten
carnival observances.
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Czechoslovakia: Conservative elements appear to
be resisting new party First Secretary Dubcek's plans
for wide-ranging changes.
Former party boss Novotny's speech on 23 Febru-
ary, commemorating 20 years of Communist rule in
Czechoslovakia, clearly implied that he believesDubcek's
proposed political "action program" goes too far in re-
ducing the power of the Communist Party, Novotny may
therefore intend to lead an effort to water down the "de-
mocratizing" aspects of the program.
The "power struggle between progressive and con-
servative forces," forecast by Dubcek in his keynote ad-
dress on the anniversary, seems to be crystalizing fairly
rapidly. On 24 February the chief of the Defense Min-
istry's political administration publicly condemned cer-
tain units of the armed forces for trying to interfere in
Novotny's behalf during the crucial days before his over-
throw. This statement probably succeeded in heading
off reported planned pro-Novotny demonstrations in
Prague yesterday.
A Czechoslovak party central committee plenum
is scheduled for mid-March. At this time the fate of
the "action program" and of some party leaders could
be decided. A clear-cut political victory will probably
not be won, however, by either the conservative or lib-
eral factions.
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