CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185682
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: February 24, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2023
• Case Number: F-2014-00485
• Publication Date: February 23, 1962

Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
COPY NO.
OCI NO, 0405/62
23 February 1962
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
1 I
SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONTINUED CONTROOETURII TO ARC7ES & RECORDS CUM
'1 AFTER U
JOB.- OX
_Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1962
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
(Information as of 1200 EST 21 Feb)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
LAOS
SOUTH VIETNAM
CONGO
SECRET
1.
Page 1
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
BRIEFS
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
SECRET.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1962
FRANCE-ALGERIA
DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH LABOR
SINO-SOVIET CLASH OVER DISARMAMENT
CHINESE COMMUNIST GRAIN PURCHASES
Stiel?7E-T-
Page 8
Page 9
Page 10
Page 12
ii
BRIEFS
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
�SECRET-7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1962
FINNISH�SOVIET ARMS AGREEMENT
BLOC�YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Page 13
Page 14
COMMUNIST BLOC AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES Page 15
BRITISH GUIANA
Page 16
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN HAITI
5759ZIKEL
iii
BRIEFS
Page 17
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-S-BeftErt�
CURRENT I:77LLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1962
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
SPECIAL ARTICLES
WEST GERMANY ACTIVITY IN AFRICA
THE SOVIET ANTIRELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN
POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA
The past year has revealed two divergent trends in
South Africa. The Verwoerd government, having attained
last May its long-sought goal of establishing a republic,
and having increased its parliamentary strength in elec-
tions the following October, is pushing ahead with its
policy of separate racial development. Nonwhites, frus-
trated by lack of an effective political voice and by the
government's security measures, are being drawn toward
illegal activities such as sabotage. Both trends are
gradual, but they overshadow the efforts of moderates of
all races. :3(2-Q-cr-e-t---Xe-fervid
-SEER:ET
Page 18
Page 1
Page 5
Page 9
iv
BRIEFS
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
�SECRET�
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
23 Feb 62
SECRET
WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 1 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
NR
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 Fob 62
WEEKLY ICVIE
Page 2 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
NR
CURRBNT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SECRET
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 3 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
SErefirT
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
LAOS
czrn 1C,T1
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW Page 4 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
SOUTH VIETNAM
-SECRET-
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW Page 5 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKL1 SUMMARY
NR
NR
CONGO
-SEERF-T-
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW Page 6 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
.S.E.G,ZET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
23 Feb Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 7 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
NR
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FRANCE�ALGERIA
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 8 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
4E-C-141-T-
NR
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH LABOR
NR
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW
REVIEW
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 9 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
SINO�SOVIET CLASH OVER DISARMAMENT
--SE'CREZ_
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW Page 10 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW Page 11 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-SEatEr
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
CHINESE COMMUNIST GRAIN PURCHASES
SECRET
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW Page 12 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
FINNISH�SOVIET ARMS AGREEMENT
SECRET
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW Page 13 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
BLOC�YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC RELATIONS
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW Page 14 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
SEe:?-gi
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COMMUNIST BLOC AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
NR
23 Feb 62
SECRET
WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 15 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
BRITISH GUIANA
SECRET
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW Page 16 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
7STH?7En
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE i",72,J3KLY SUMMARY
NR
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN HAITI
-rcEERT"
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 1.7 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-SECRET--
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
23 Feb Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW Page 18 of 18
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-SteREP
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
WEST GERMAN ACTIVITY IN AFRICA
NR
23 Feb 62
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 1 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEST GERMAN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN AFRICA
NR
23 Feb 62
WEEKLY REVIEW
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 2 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
SECRET
23 Feb 62
SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 3 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-
CURRENT
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
23 Feb Feb 62
SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 4 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NR
THE SOVIET ANTIRELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN
23 Feb 62
RDRrTAT. ARTTMRS
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 5 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
,�����., ,�����,
NR
CURRENT INTFLLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 Feb 62
.;spr,ciAL ARTICLES
�� Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 6 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
SEGi-gT
NR
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 Feb Feb 62
CDFOTAT ADMTOTVQ
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 7 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
NR
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
-5-EGRET._
23 Feb 62
SPECIAL ARTICLES
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 8 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA
The past year has revealed
two divergent trends in South
Africa. The Verwoerd govern-
ment, having attained last
May its long-sought goal of
establishing a republic and
having increased. its parlia-
mentary strength in elections
the following October, is
pushing ahead with its policy
of separate racial development
(apartheid). Nonwhites,
frustrated by the lack of an
effective political voice and
by the government's security
measures, are being drawn
toward illegal activities such
as sabotage. Both trends are
gradual, but they overshadow
the efforts of moderates of
all races.
White Politics
Verwoerd's Nationalist
party for more than a year has
had a clear majority of popular
support--the first such major-
ity since it came to power in
1948. Gerrymandering and a
disproportionate number of
rural constituencies have in-
creased its representation in
the House of Assembly--the
lower house of the legislature
--to 105 out of 160 seats.
Nationalist power is based
on the cohesiveness of the
Afrikaner community, which
comprises 60 percent of the
white population. The number
of non-Nationalist Afrikaners
is gradually increasing, partic-
ularly in the cities. and there
are differences within the
community--between doctrinaire
defenders of Afrikaner culture
in the Transvaal and easygoing
pragmatists in Cape Province,
and to some extent between
rank-and-file conservatives and
relatively liberal industrial
and religious leaders within
each region. However, the
various Afrikaner groups have
generally united under pressure,
and the community's cohesiveness
shows no sign of diminishing,
even though its political vild
social goals have been largely
achieved. As the Afrikaners
have a higher birthrate and
a higher percentage of young
people than the English-speaking
South Africans, Afrikaner polit-
ical dominance of the white
community is likely to increase.
Verwoerd's white opponents
are disorganized and unsure of
themselves. The main opposition
group, the United party (UP),
has never overcome the handicaps
resulting from the disparate
character of its support: it
must appeal to die-hard Empire
loyalists in Natal and to
renegade Afrikaners in Transvaal
and Cape Province cities, to
relative liberals, and to
extreme conservatives whose
racial ideas are almost in-
distinguishable from those of
the Nationalists. The UP's
program of "racial federation
under white leadership" is
designed to paper over these
differences. Many of the party's
leaders, taking their cue from
the surprisingly good showing
made by the small Progressive
party last October, feel the
UP should move in a liberal
direction; any effort to
promote such a trend, however,
would appear fruitless, inasmuch
as a large majority of the
electorate is already more
conservative than the UP pro-
gram.
The Progressives, who in-
clude some of the best minds
in the country, are considered
by both Afrikaners and Africans
to be an "honest" opposition,
in contrast to the UP, whose
racial policy they feel is
hypocritical. But the Progres-
sive demand for a nonracial
franchise based on high educa-
tional and financial standards
not only is far too liberal for
the mass of the white electorate
but fails by a wide margin to
meet African desires. The
small Liberal party, which
campaigns on a "one man - one
vote" platform, has even less
influence in white politics.
23 Feb 62
SECRET
QTIVOTAT ADTTnTVQ
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 9 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Foreign Policy
The government has grad-
ually become more aggressive
toward its foreign critics.
One manifestation of this was
Foreign Minister Louw's intran-
sigent attitude during the
UN General Assembly's discus-
sion of apartheid last October
--an attitude for which his
government was censured by
the assembly in an unprece-
dented action. This year's
apartheid resolution in the
UN narrowly avoided a clause
asking member states to take
sanctions against South
Africa.
The republic took a simi-
lar line--and received a simi-
larly strong rebuke--during the
General Assembly's debate on
South-West Africa, the former
German territory which South
Africa received as a mandate
from the League of Nations
after World War I and which it
refuses to place under UN
trusteeship. Afro-Asian states
can be expected to attack South
Africa vigorously on this is-
sue and are challenging the
republic's rather shaky legal
frontier in the International
Court of Justice.
The South African Govern-
ment remains concerned over
developments in the territories
bordering it to the north--the
Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland as well as Angola
and Mozambique--and probably
would respond quickly with
help if it were asked to do
so; so far, the governments
concerned have not been able
to overcome their distrust of
each other to do any formal
planning toward a "fortress
southern Africa."
Implementation of Apartheid
Overseas opinion and develop-
ments elsewhere in Africa apparent-
ly have moved the Nationalists to
give apartheid the best possible
face. They are rapidly implement-
ing a long-dormant program for
seven rural territories--popularly
called "Bantustans"--to administer
the country's 11,000,000 Africans
through their tribal leaders. Three
such territorial authorities ap-
parently are in operation, and the
other four are to be set up this
year.
The 3,000,000 urban Africans,
many of whom have never seen
their tribal homeland, apparently
are to receive a degree of local
self-government, but their po-
litical institutions reportedly
are to be part of the "Bantustan"
system. The government is also
working out schemes to give
some self-government to the
colored (mixed blood) and Indian
communities, although a major-
ity of both groups live in
small communities within urban
areas and lack a "national
homeland" within the country.
Neerwoerd has said that the
"Bantustans" may eventually
attain independence. There is
no sign, however, that the
government is willing to risk
losing the support of the white
electorate by spending the
money necessary to make the
poverty-striken African areas
viable, or that its efforts
to stimulate private white in-
vestment along the borders of
these areas have borne much fruit.
Moreover, the establishment
of African political institu-
tions, even if they are,domi-
nated by "safe," conservative
leaders, creates potential
-SECRET-
23 Feb 62 SDPOTAL ARMTOTR
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 10 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-SECRET-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
centers of discontent which may
prove hard to control. Last
year a group of chiefs in one
territorial authority actually
requested the independence prom-
ised by Verwoerd, thereby
causing some consternation in
government circles before the
chiefs were dissuaded by their
territory's own conservative
majority. Faced with a deter-
mined effort by the government
to channel their political
activity, however, urban Africans
in particular are likely to
become increasingly sympathetic
to extremists who assert that
violence--particularly sabotage
--is the only possible way to
work changes.
African Politics
African communities in the
cities are active, but the gov-
ernment's security measures
have disrupted some organiza-
tions and led the other to
operate with greater secrecy.
It appears the "congresses"
which until a year and a half
ago dominated what politics
there was among the Africans
have been reduced to virtual
impotence, but that small groups
--including several known Com-
munists--have been operating
with relative efficiency.
The Pan-Africanist Congress
(PAC) has shown no recent sign
of activity, either overt or
covert, and its organization
seems to have disappeared ex-
cept in African communities
around Cape Town. There are
some who still espouse the
PAC's "Africa-for-the-Africans"
slogan, which has considerably
more potential rallying power
than anything espoused by the
PAC's rivals. None of its
leaders, however, has shown
the ability to build up a
responsive following in the
face of government counter-
measures.
The hard core of the PAC's
main competitor, the African
National Congress (ANC), seems
to have fared somewhat better.
The ANC's leaders have a
longer history of organizational
and conspiratorial work, and
they have benefited from the
tutelage of whites and Indians
in the so-called "Congress
Movement"--an alliance of
organizations, most of them
Communist-dominated, which
claim to represent various
South African racial and eco-
nomic groups. The movement
itself is troubled by factional-
ism, but a caure of its leaders,
operating outside the main
organizational structure, prob-
ably is responsible for many
of the bombings in South Africa
since last September.
This group calls itself
the National Liberation Committee.
Its known leaders include two
Africans, Nelson Mandela and
Duma Nokwe, and two whites,
Benjamin Turok and Raymond
Strachan. All have long been
associated with Communism.
Strachan, described by an
acquaintance as a "benign, well-
balanced" Communist, is under
arrest. The police believe he
supervised the making of the
bombs which were set off in
Port Elisabeth and Johannesburg
in mid-December. Mandela, who
lived under cover in South
Africa and Basutoland after the
failure of the general strike
he called last May, has left
the country
The Mandela group's main
sources of aid from abroad
reportedly are Cairo, Accra,
and radical--but not necessarily
Communist--groups in London.
These cities are the centers
for the operation of the "South
African United Front," an amal-
gamation of exiles from both
the ANC and the PAC. Factional-
ism has made this grouping
ineffective, however--the PAC
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
23 Feb 32
-SEERE-T-_
SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 11 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-SEeRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
exiles themselves are split
into pro-Ghana and pro-Nigeria
factions--and most of the covert
antigovernment activity in
South Africa probably bypasses
it.
Aid obtained
abroad reportedly is channeled
through Bantoland and Swaziland,
two British High Commission
territories where African nation-
alists opposed to South Africa
are becoming increasingly active.
So far sabotage has been
well plannel but poorly executed.
One African has been killed
and another wounded by a prema-
turely exploding bomb, and
those bombs which did go off
properly achieved far less than
the maximum possible damage.
Even inept sabotage, however,
is likely to have some effect
on the whites, many of whom
feel that their backs are
against the wall. Moreover, the
saboteurs can be expected to
improve in proficiency with
practice and further training
abroad. The ANC's efforts
probably will be supplemented
by other groups attempting
sabotage on their own, as seems
to have happened early in Jan-
uary in Cape Town. Finally,
Africans probably will not be
the only perpetrators; many of
the coloreds, who until recently
were fearful of antagonizing
the whites, have been alien-
ated by the government's policy
toward them and.are showing
greater interest in extra-
legal activities.
Government Security Measures
with a
harsh anti-sabotage law sehed-
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
uled to be enacted in this
session of parliament, the gov-
ernment probably can keep the
underground harassed and dis-
organized. It will not be able
to stamp out the subversive
groups, however, and sporadic
outbreaks of bombings can be
expected.
The buildup of the re-
public's security is continuing.
The police are being reorganized
to increase their efficiency,
and the government plans to
build three new munitions
factories to supplement the
country's already sizable
armaments production.
Outlook
Verwoerd and the policies
for which he is the strongest
spokesman cannot be success-
fully challenged by whites
until something weakens his
two chief supports: the unity
of the Afrikaners and the
racial conservatism of the white
population as a whole. Such a
weakening might come about
through a serious economic de-
cline; South African exiles
have been urging economic
sanctions by other governments
to bring this about. The effect
of such sanctions, however,
would be lessened by the fact
that gold accounts for more than
a third of the value of South
Africa's exports and could not
be controlled by anysanctions
resolution.
The republic's security
forces seem capable of prevent-
ing any violent outbreaks from
endangeringthe white-dominated
political structure. Behind this
shelter the Nationalist govern-
ment apparently plans to push
ahead with more rather than less
apartheid. With the dominant
white party and the increasingly
dominant African group seemingly
set in their ways, efforts to
bridge the gap between them are
likely to be more and more futile.
(SECRET NOFORN)
23 Feb 62
RDWITAT_ ADTTIITVQ,
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Page 12 of 12
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
/����,
SEGRE4'
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
-SECRET--
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1962
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
(Information as of 1200 EST 21 Feb)
NR
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Page 1
LAOS
SOUTH VIETNAM
CONGO
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
NR
NR
NR
BRIEFS
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
.-SEeZzEf--
,������\
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1962
FRANCE�ALGERIA
DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH LABOR
Page 8
Page 9
SINO�SOVIET CLASH OVER DISARMAMENT Page 10
CHINESE COMMUNIST GRAIN PURCHASES
-61?4=EZ_
NR
Page 12
NR
NR
NR
NR
Ii
BRIEFS
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1962
FINNISH-SOVIET, RMS AGREEMENT
BLOC-YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Page 13
Page 14
COMMUNIST BLOC AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES Page 15
BRITISH GUIANA
Page 16
NR
NR
NR
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN HAITI
NR
Page 17
N
R
NR
BRIEFS
lii
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682
SECRET
CURRENT
LLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 February 1962
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
SPECIAL ARTICLES
Page 18
WEST GERMANY ACTIVITY IN AFRICA Page 1
NR
NR
THE SOVIET ANTIRELIGIOUS CAMPAIGN Page 5
POLITICAL TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA
The past year has revealed two divergent trends in
South Africa. The Verwoerd government, having attained WITH DELETIONS
last May its long-sought goal of establishing a republic,
and having increased its parliamentary strength in elec-
tions the following October, is pushing ahead with its
policy of separate racial development. Nonwhites, frus-
trated by lack of an effective political voice and by the e
government's security measures, are being drawn toward 41/4
illegal activities such as sabotage. Both trends are
gradual, but they overshadow the efforts of moderates of
all races. (2.u.sat-Ne4taini
Page 9
NR
iv
BRIEFS
Approved for Release: 2017/07/13 C03185682