CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/05/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03185640
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: May 27, 1958

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INTELLIGENCE
27 May 1958
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Copy No. 140
CENTRAL
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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27 MAY 1958
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Stronger Soviet pressure aimed at
bringing about bloc economic inte-
gration may result from recent
bloc conference.
USSR - Party secretary and
presidium member Suslov has
not been identified publicly since
16 May.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - Political impasse con-
tinues, with moderates moving
toward extremist opposition.
Government military action has
lost momentum.
Clash between Jordanian and
Israeli forces in Mount Scopus
area may lead to more serious
incidents.
Sudanese Government consider-
� ing new Soviet offer which may
provide for cash purchases of
Sudanese cotton.
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Tension continues on Cyprus
with all parties to dispute await-
ing British plan expected next
month.
Tunisians mustering public sup-
port in wake of clashes with
French; Bourguiba to go to UN
Security Council.
Algerian rebel message orders
attack for 28 May.
III. THE WEST
France - Trend favoring call to
De Gaulle gaining momentum.
Civil disorder possible.
(CI Paraguayan Government fears
arrival of Peron, whose presence
could lead to the fall of the govern-
ment.
LATE ITEM
0 Warsaw Pact makes gesture of troop
reduction as Ichrushchev warns that
Soviet rocket bases may be set up in
Eastern Europe.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 May 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Bloc economic integration: Moscow's dissatisfaction
with the present status of economic specialization among
bloc countries is reflected in the 24 May communiqud of
the bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CE MA).
Because of mutual rivalry and unwillingness to depend on
imports from other satellites--highly unreliable in the
past--the satellites have been reluctant to go along with
various economic specialization schemes purporting to
aim at a rational division of labor within the bloc. The
Soviet Union can be expected to exert pressure to enforce
CEMA decisions, which have often been ignored in the
past. (Page 1)
Soviet leadership: Soviet party secretary and presid-
ium member Suslov, who has not been identified in public
since 16 May, may be in trouble. Polish Communists,
noting his absence from the meetings of Communist bloc
members in Moscow last week, are speculating that he
has been removed from the Soviet party presidium. While
it is possible Suslov may be vacationing, he has from time
to time shown signs of being out of step with Khrushchev.
His absence from the bloc conferences seems unusual,
since Soviet-satellite relations have long been his special
concern
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon: Despite cabinet meetings on 25 and 26 May,
Prime Minister Sulh has not been able to hammer out an
agreed approach to resolving the political impasse. There
are prospects of additional cabinet resignations, and the
moderate opposition, the "Third Force," seems to be
moving toward the extremist position. Military action
initiated by General Shihab ailnst the onnosition ias ap-
parently lost its momentum, (Page 2)
Jerusalem: The clash between Israeli and Jordanian
forces in the Mt. Scopus area on 26 May, which resulted
in the death of Colonel Flint, Canadian chairman of the
United Nations Mixed Armistice Commission for the two
countries, may be the prelude to more serious incidents.
The next Israeli relief convoy to the Israeli enclave is
scheduled to move into the demilitarized zone on 4 June..
tfb Jordanian Foreign Minister Ftifai has said Jordan will
prohibit the convoy from transiting Jordanian territory
unless Israel by then has ceased digging fortifications in
the zone and has provided adequate identification of convoy
0 r)
personnel.
� �'�
Sudan- bbli: me buaanese eaninec iseunbluering
Soviet offer of "unconditional" aid, which, in addition to
exchanges of goods, may include cash purchases of
Sudanese cotton. Previous offers made solely on an ex-
change-of-goods basis were rejected by Prime Minister
Khalil, who stated he was interested only in cash sales.
Khalil has been under strong attack from opposition and
anti-Western elements for his recent acceptance of
American aid. In view of the Sudants current economic
straits, the new Soviet offer may be difficult to refuse.
(Page 4)
Cyprus: All parties to the dispute are awaiting
LondontS new plan for the islandts future, now promised
27 May 58
BAILY BRIEF ii
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by 17 June. Archbishop Makarios apparently is willing to
accept an interim solution based on internal self-govern-
ment while retaining British sovereignty. However, Turkish
insistence on partition is unaltered. The new British plan ap-
parently calls for some form of self-government, but excludes
both union with Greece and partition. Meanwhile, EOKA. at-
tacks on leftist elements in Cyprus and British efforts to
ferret armed terrorists from mountain hideouts continue.
Tunisia: Leaders of the guerrilla bands which fought
France prilir to Tunisian independence in 1956 appear to be
reassembling 'their former followers in southern Tunisia.
The political bureau of the ruling Neo-Destour party has
appealed for general mobilization of all people's forces so
they can be at the immediate disposition of the government
during the coming "week of vigilance." President Bourguiba
announced on 26 May that he will take Tunisia's dispute with
France before the UN Security Council.
Algeria: The army in Algeria continues to promote
dispI� of unity between the Moslems and the local Euro-
peans in an effort to convince Paris that support of the new
regime in Algeria is the surest means of bringing about an
/lb early end of the guerrilla war.
(Page 5)
III. THE WEST
France: Pflimlint position is steadily weakening. The
n epen en party has asked Coty to summon a meeting of
nonextre mist party leaders, together with De Gaulle, who
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returned to Paris on 26 May following a visit from a mem-
ber of the premier's staff. Socialist leader Mollet appears
discouraged and indecisive and believes the general "has
but to sit in his tent and wait." With the loyalty of security
forces inside France increasingly in question, Interior Min-
ister Moch seems to be considering arming non-Comm mist
militants. The Communist-led General Labor Confedera-
tion has called a general strike for 27 May.
(page 6)
h
Paraguay-Argentina: The Paraguayan Government is
disturbed over reports that former Argentine President
Peron may arrive in Paraguay momentarily, but feels it
cannot legally prevent this. The American ambassador in
Asuncion believes Peron's presence could lead to the fall of
the Paraguayan Government. Under Argentina's amnesty
bill of 22 May, Peron could re-enter Argentina, but would
still face criminal charges. (Page 8)
LATE ITEM
*Warsaw Pact announcement: The announcement by
the Warsaw Pact organization that Eastern European mem-
bers will cut their military forces by 119,000 and that the
USSR will withdraw all its forces from Rumania and one
division from Hungary is primarily intended to make Mos-
cow's stand on disarmament issues appear more concilia-
tory. At the same time Khrushchev warned that if the West
arms West Germany with nuclear weapons, he will set up
"rocket bases" in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Page 9)
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DAILY BRIEF iv
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communique of Moscow Economic Meeting
The communiqu�ssued by national representatives of
the bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)
and concurred in by the Far Eastern Communist countries
indicates that the USSR is renewing efforts toward develop-
ing an integrated bloc economy. The communique points
out that the immediate target is the reduction in cost per
unit of output. This can be derived only from mass produc-
tion, which in turn can best be achieved by national special-
ization. The tendency of satellites in the past to ignore CEMA
recommendations when convenient to do so has blocked prog-
ress toward a more closely knit bloc economy.
CEMA will need new powers to ensure that the long-
range national economic plans reflect closer economic
integration. Such policies will further Khrushchev's pro-
gram to surpass the West in industrial production, and by
increased interdependence will enhance Moscow's control
in Eastern Europe.
The communiqu�oints out that the Far Eastern coun-
tries, which have only observer status, will cooperate in the
implementation of the new tasks assigned to CEMA, presum-
ably by supplying details on their requirements for bloc in-
dustrial goods and their ability to supply raw materials.
Specialization of production within the bloc will create hard-
ships for those countries which are primarily agricultural
or producers of raw materials but have been maintaining in-
efficient industries.
CONFIDENTIAL
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanese Situation
The Lebanese cabinet met on 26 May and is reported
to have decided that on 27 May Prime Minister Sulh will
make a statement to Parliament on the internal situation,
if a quorum can be gathered. If not, it has been suggested
that Sulh make a radio appeal to the Lebanese people urg-
ing a return to normal life, accusing the opposition of
responsibility for the present crisis and stating that the
real issue is the continued existence of Lebanon and not
the presidential succession question. The position of mod-
erate "Third Force" leaders remains somewhat enigmatic,
although they appear to be moving in the direction of the more
extremist opposition which demands President Chamoun's
resignation. So far all compromise proposals put forth by
"Third Force" leaders appear to represent major victories
for the opposition. Charnoun's resignation, or even his
declaration at this time not to seek a second term, would
be interpreted as a triumph for the extremist opposition.
Although the army has regrouped and concentrated some
of its forces for action against the irregular bands and infil-
trators from Syria, it is too early to judge if the "offensive"
will be carried out in a determined manner. Rumors con-
tinue of the Imminent arrest of opposition leader Saib Salam,
who is holed up in the Moslem quarter of Beirut, and press
reports state that barricades there are being cleared by
army units. However, it is doubtful that General Shihab
will actually arrest opposition leaders.
at least one Syrian has been captured
by the Lebanese forces. The existence of difficulties in sup-
plying Lebanese rebels with arms and ammunition is revealed
in an Egyptian message which relates to arms and explosives
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for Kamal Jumblatt. Meanwhile, arms
continue to flow into Lebanon fr m Turkey, Jordan, and
Great Britain.
Bombings in Beirut have assumed a terrorist nature,
with a bomb exploding in a loaded streetcar and another in
the British ambassador's home. A special section in the
Syrian Ministry of Interior has been reported set up to car-
ry out activities in Lebanon. This bureau makes contacts
with Lebanese opposition leaders and sends infiltrators
across the border.
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Sudan Considers Soviet Aid Offer
The Sudanese cabinet is reported to be studying a
Soviet offer of technical and economic aid, renewed last
week by Ambassador Teplov following a statement by
Foreign Minister Mahjoub that his government would ac-
cept assistance provided there were no strings attached.
Prime Minister Khalil rejected barter arrangements sug-
gested by the USSR last year, stating that the Sudan was
in need of cash and did not require Soviet goods. Press
reports suggest that the latest offer may have been mod-
ified to include an arrangement whereby the Sudan would
accept those Soviet products which it could use, and re-
ceive cash for the balance of cotton taken by the USSR.
Cotton is practically the sole source of the Sudan's foreign
exchange, and the stock now on hand is valued at more than
$100,000,000,
Khalil's coalition government is being severely crit-
icized by opposition and anti-Western elements who object
to his recent acceptance of American aid after rejecting
past Soviet approaches. The Egyptian-directed subversive
effort aimed at destroying KhaliPs small parliamentary ma-
jority is making capital of the situation. The issue could
cause the defection of a critical number of lukewarm sup-
porters of his coalition, and to prevent this Khalil might
feel constrained to accept an offer which includes cash pay-
ments.
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Situation in Algeria
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The French Army in Algeria, with the aid of its civilian collab-
orators, is continuing to promote and exploit displays of unity be-
tween the Moslems and the local Europeans in an effort to convince
Paris that support of the new regime is the surest means of bring-
ing about an early end to the guerrilla war--now in its fourth year.
According to the Algerian regime's propagandists, a "miraculous"
reconciliation has occurred since the 13 May action in Algiers and
would be undermined by a prolongation of the present split between
Paris and Algiers.
The official line is further buttressed by claims that even the
rebels of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) have ceased
fighting in many areas and that the war is virtually over. Such views
were "officially" transmitted to the American consul general in Al-
giers on 23 May by General Salan�titular supreme authority in Algeria--
who asserted that the "backbone of the FLN's effort has been broken"
and that "interesting" surrenders of rebels and arms would occur in
the near future. The local press, which formerly gave front-page
coverage to engagements with the rebels, has now almost ceased to
mention military activities.
Information from various rebel sources, however, reveals no
weakening in the FLNIs determination to continue its fight for Algerian
independence. A high-level FLN spokesman in Tunis on 23 May de-
nied any "rallying" to the French by rebel fighters and stated cate-
gorically that the FLN has no intention of dealing with Salan. The
FLN representative in the United States has also indicated the rebels
would deal only with a French government with "real authority" and
one willing to accept Algerian independence.
Rebel troops in the interior were also informed
that "a large coordinated attack" will take place on 28 May"--appar-
ently in several "zones" in the vicinitythe northwestern Algeri
town of Tiaret. 3
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III. THE WEST
French Crisis
Premier Pflimlin's weakening position is increasingly
evident despite the newly imposed censorship on outgoing
press dispatches. The key Independent party, now almost
solidly pro - De Gaulle, asked President Coty on 26 May
to summon a meeting of non-Communist party leaders with
De Gaulle, who returned to Paris late last night following
a visit from a member of the premier's staff. The govern-
ment faces heavy going in the National Assembly debate
scheduled for 27 May on its proposed constitutional re-
forms, which have been widely criticized both as too dras-
tic and too mild.
Pflimlin's reported designation of Popular Republican
ex-Premier Robert Schuman as his semiofficial interme-
diary to De Gaulle suggests the premier's desire to prepare,
at least contingently, for an orderly turnover of power.
Discourp.gement on the part of a key anti-Gaullist leader
was reported on 24 May who
quoted Socialist Guy Mollet as believing De Gaulle "has
but to sit in his tent and wait."
A majority of the Pflimlin cabinet was reliably re-
ported as opposed on 24 May to sending an army unit to re-
establish Paris' authority on Corsica because they believed
the island would join the rebels,
the Republican Security Company
flown to the island from mainland France joined the reb-
els "after two minutes." Doubts as to the loyalty of the
fleet were intensified by the appearance of several French
warships on 26 May at Algerian ports rather than their home
base of Toulon, following recent NATO maneuvers. Interior
Minister Mach, whom several reports have characterized as
personally doubtful of the reliability of the army and of secu-
rity forces under his control, may be considering arming
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�ftse
non-Communist leftist militants as a counterweight to the
military.
The Communist-dominated General Labor Confedera-
tion (CGT) has called a general strike for the afternoon of
27 May. The CGTis effort to promote brief work stoppages
on 19 May, on the occasion of De Gaulle's press conference,
was opposed by the Socialist and Catholic trade unions and
failed to rally a majority of worker support.
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Paraguay Disturbed Over Reports of Peron's
Imminent Arrival
The Paraguayan foreign minister told US Ambassador
Ploeser on 24 May that former Argentine President Peron
may arrive in Paraguay at any moment and that Paraguay
cannot legally prevent this since Peron is an honorary
Paraguayan general and does not require a visa. In a
personal letter, the minister has advised Peron he is not
wanted in Paraguay, but he does not know what action
President Stroessner intends to take.
Peron's return to Paraguay, his first place of exile,
would presumably be intended to exert pressure on the
Argentine Government. He told the press that he consid-
ers Argentina's amnesty bill of 22 May a "trap" to jail
him should he return, since it d6es not remove all out-
standing criminal charges. A Peron move from the
Dominican Republic to Paraguay, which borders Argen-
tina, would probably increase Peronista demonstrations
In Argentina and also increase concern among conserva-
tive military groups over possible Peronista influence in
Frondizi's administration. The Peronistas reportedly
are planning a large demonstration on 9 June to commemo-
rate the abortive revolt in 1956.
Ploeser believes that Peron's arrival in Asuncion
could lead to Stroessner's fall by encouraging a coalition
of rebel forces in exile and anti-Peron elements in Argen-
tina. Stroessner is already gravely concerned over pos-
sible new attacks by exiles based in Argentina, although
the major opposition Liberal party reportedly has not been
involved in such plans since 22 April, when Argentina
and Paraguay issued a joint communique stating that all
former sources of friction had been removed.
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LATE ITEM
Soviet Bloc Armed Strength Cutback
At the 24 May meeting in Moscow of the political con-
sultative committee of the Warsaw Pact countries, it was
decided to reduce the forces of Eastern European members
by 119,000 men and to withdraw all Soviet troops from
Rumania and one division from Hungary. The planned re-
ductions will include 55,000 Rumanian, 23,000 Bulgarian,
20,000 Polish, 20,000 Czech, and 1,000 Albanian troops.
The announcement of the decision made no mention of re-
ductions in the Soviet, Hungarian, or East German forces.
The reductions would leave the over-all strength of the
Eastern European satellite forces at about one million men.
The withdrawal of one further Soviet division from
Hungary would still leave at least three line divisions or
about 50,000 Soviet troops in that country, twice the num-
ber stationed there before the uprising. There now are
35,000 Soviet troops in Rumania which, like Soviet troops
in Hungary, were originally stationed there to maintain
the line of communications with Soviet troops then in Austria
and, in accordance with Moscow's treaties with these coun-
tries, should have been withdrawn in the fall of 1955. There
are also 35,000 Soviet troops in Poland and over 350,000 in
East Germany.
The announcement is intended to make the Soviet posi-
tion on disarmament appear more conciliatory during the
presummit talks and to reinforce Moscow's argument against
discussing Eastern Europe at the summit. This step is also
designed to make NATO defense measures, such as missile
bases, appear less urgent. Khrushchev meanwhile has warned
that if the West arms West Germany with nuclear weapons, he
will set up "rocket bases" in East Germany, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia.
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DISTRIBUTION
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Operations Coordinating Board
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
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